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Supporting the diffusion of democratic norms and practices around the globe has 
become a significant element of the security and foreign policies of many developed 
countries and of the operation of many international governmental and non-
governmental organizations. Therefore, a better understanding of this phenomenon is 
important; yet much of our knowledge about it comes from studying the activities of a 
handful of established Western democracies. Would fledgling non-Western 
democracies support democratization abroad? What would motivate such efforts, and 
how would they be undertaken? What are the strengths and weaknesses of these young 
democracy promoters, and how do their efforts compare with the activities of the 
established Western democracy promoters? I answer these questions by unraveling the 
puzzle of the quick turnaround by the Eastern European members of the EU from 
being primarily recipients of democracy promotion in the 1990s to promoters of 
democracy in the 2000s. The dissertation examines the activities of the Eastern 
European governmental and non-governmental actors supporting democratization 
abroad both bilaterally and through the EU. I argue that the local civic elites who 
prepared the democratic breakthroughs in the region subsequently became the norm 
entrepreneurs who championed the incorporation of democracy promotion into their 
country’s foreign policy and then continued to advocate for keeping support for 
democracy abroad high on the agenda. I further find that the Eastern European civic 
activists have been motivated by a normative commitment to democracy, while the 
Eastern European official efforts are best understood as strategic foreign policy 
commitments. Despite their reputation as “idealist donors,” the Eastern European 
governments have supported democracy abroad primarily to create a secure and stable 
international environment for their states. Moreover, both governmental and non-
governmental approaches to supporting democratization abroad have been based on 
strategic calculations about the pragmatic usefulness (rather than the normative 
appropriateness) of their transition experiences to the recipients’ democratization 
needs. While Western donors are said to export models of democracy based on their 
domestic institutions, the Eastern European donors have promoted democratizaion 
recipes tested in their own recent transitions and selected to fit the needs of their 
recipients. In contrast to the Western one-size-fits-all and institution-centric 
approaches, the Eastern European approaches to democracy promotion vary according 
to the regime type of the recipient and pay more attention to the process of 
liberalization. Therefore, although they are young donors, the Eastern European 
democracies represent a new generation of democracy promoters that have avoided 
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CHAPTER 1: 
THE PUZZLE OF EASTERN EUROPEAN DEMOCRACY PROMOTION 
Few authoritarian countries have avoided being swept up by the most recent 
global wave of democratization. That wave, which began during the 1970s, continues 
to spread, in part due to the efforts of transnational and international actors. Indeed, 
especially since the end of the Cold War, exporting democracy has become a 
significant element of the security and foreign policy of many developed countries and 
of the operation of many international governmental and non-governmental 
organizations. Much of our knowledge about such democracy promotion comes from 
studying the activities of a handful of established Western democracies. Yet, while the 
Western commitment to supporting the global spread of democracy began to wane in 
the early and mid-2000s, some of the newest recruits to the community of democracies 
– the Eastern European members of the European Union (EU) – have become 
increasingly involved in supporting democratization abroad. It is this group of little-
studied but ardent democracy promoters that I examine in this dissertation. 
It is both theoretically and empirically puzzling that young democracies such 
as the Eastern European ones began supporting the democratization of others often 
before even consolidating democracy at home and that they are becoming even more 
active at a time when established donors are becoming increasingly skeptical about 
democracy promotion. In this thesis, I resolve this puzzle by analyzing the 
transformation of the Eastern European members of the EU from being the targets of 
democracy promotion in the 1990s to becoming democracy promoters themselves in 
the 2000s. I discuss the efforts of the Eastern European governments and civil 
societies to promote democracy bilaterally and through the EU. I examine what 
motivates these actors, how they support democratization abroad, how successful they 
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are, and how their motivations, strategies, and impact compare to those of established 
(Western) donors.  
I argue that democracy promotion was incorporated in the foreign policy of the 
Eastern EU members as a result of the advocacy of the civic norm entrepreneurs who 
prepared the democratic breakthroughs in the region. Despite its reputation as 
democracy promotion “idealism,” such official support for democratization abroad is 
best understood as a strategic response to the concerns dominating these countries’ 
foreign policies. Similarly, the approaches to democracy promotion of these new 
donors are based on a strategic export of their transformation experience, as it is 
appropriate to their recipients’ democratization needs. Thus, the Eastern European 
actors represent a new generation of democracy promoters who strive to avoid some of 
the mistakes for which Western donors have been criticized. While they may lack the 
resources and international standing of the majority of established Western donors, the 
Eastern European democracy promoters enjoy considerable credibility among 
recipients and bring to them more relevant and nuanced expertise. 
This dissertation is well positioned to address several aspects of democracy 
promotion that have received insufficient attention in the literature. I define two 
distinct theoretical approaches to understanding the place of democracy promotion in 
the foreign-policy process – democracy promotion as a normative commitment and 
democracy promotion as a strategic commitment. I then use these approaches to 
examine the activities of a group of young, non-Western, and overlooked democracy 
promoters. I also analyze the efforts of state and non-state actors as well as their 
interactions in supporting democratization abroad. Finally, I also provide a mixed-
methods account based on the triangulation of three different types of analysis: the 
origin, the rhetoric, and the practice of the Eastern European democracy promoters. 
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1. Democracy Promotion in the 20th Century 
During the 1990s, democracy promotion became an explicit goal of the foreign 
policy of many industrialized democracies and the work of many international and 
non-governmental organizations, even if this objective was pursued through 
inconsistent, ad hoc, and sometimes low-priority policies.1 The collapse of the Soviet 
bloc eliminated the bargaining power of dictatorships. Democracy began enjoying an 
unrivaled position as an “ideology for humankind.”2 Decreased ideological tensions 
facilitated the giving and taking of assistance.3 Moreover, political openings across 
Latin America, Eastern Europe, Sub-Saharan Africa, East and Southeast Asia, and 
even parts of the Middle East presented opportunities for the West to promote 
democracy as elections became important and fledgling civic and political actors 
sought financing and advice.4 Such openings also produced a proliferation of hybrid 
regimes, which combined elements of dictatorship and democracy, and which thus 
became appealing targets for international interventions meant to tip the political 
balance towards democracy.5 Finally, there was a growing donor consensus that there 
                                                 
1 Larry Diamond, Promoting Democracy in the 1990s: Actors and Instruments, Issues and Imperatives 
(New York: Carnegie Corporation of New York, 1995); Peter Burnell, ed., “Democracy Assistance: 
The State of the Art,” in Democracy Assistance: International Cooperation for Democratization 
(London: Frank Cass, 2000), 3–33; John Glenn and Sarah Mendelson, eds., The Power and Limits of 
NGOs: A Critical Look at Building Democracy in Eastern Europe and Eurasia (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 2002); Milada Vachudova, Europe Undivided: Democracy, Leverage, and Integration 
After Communism (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005); Richard Youngs, The European Union 
and the Promotion of Democracy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001); Geoffrey Pridham, 
Designing Democracy: EU Enlargement and Regime Change in Post-Communist Europe (New York: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2005); and Michael Emerson, ed., Democratization in the European 
Neighborhood (Brussels: CEPS, 2005). 
2 Francis Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man (New York: Free Press, 1992).  
3 Thomas Carothers, Aiding Democracy Abroad (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for 
International Peace, 1999). 
4 Burnell, Democracy Assistance. 
5 Valerie Bunce, “Democracy and Diversity in the Developing World: The American Experience with 
Democracy Promotion” (paper prepared for the American Political Science Association Task Force on 
Difference and Inequality in the Developing World, Chicago, IL, August 30–September 2, 2007). 
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is a virtuous cycle of democratization and development and that neither one of these 
requires rare and exacting pre-conditions that take a long time to materialize.6 
Thus, the 1990s became a decade of unprecedented democracy promotion in 
terms of the sense of purpose, the diversity of target countries, the number and variety 
of donors, the range of approaches and principal concerns, and the resources 
involved.7 Many developed countries and leading international organizations (IOs) 
actively supported new democracies through quiet diplomacy and pressure, positive 
and negative sanctions, assistance, and occasionally outright military occupation.8 
Governmental and non-state actors provided direct material support and technical 
assistance (providing blueprints, sharing experiences, and giving advice) to assist in 
liberalizing and democratizing other countries. Democracy promoters did not shy 
away from re-writing recipient constitutions, designing their electoral systems, 
teaching their party members how to campaign, helping civil society organizations to 
lobby and human right groups to monitor the state, encouraging the work of trade 
unions, business and professional associations, assisting state agencies to set up forms 
                                                 
6 On the virtuous cycle of democracy and development, see Joan M. Nelson and Stephanie J. Eglington, 
Encouraging Democracy: What Role for Conditioned Aid? (Washington, DC: Overseas Development 
Council, 1992). On the pre-conditions to democracy, see Samuel Huntington, The Third Wave: 
Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century (Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991); 
Valerie Bunce, “Rethinking Recent Democratization: Lessons from the Postcommunist Experience,” 
World Politics 55, no. 1 (2003): 167–92; and Giuseppe Di Palma, To Craft Democracy (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1991). 
7 Burnell, Democracy Assistance. 
8 The northern industrialized democracies have emerged as the most prominent democracy promoters in 
the 20th century. A leader among them has been the US, which has since its founding more or less 
consistently pursued the projection of its political ideals abroad. Big European players such as Germany 
and former imperial powers – the UK and France – have also been active in the post-WWII era. Finally, 
middle powers such as the Scandinavian countries (Norway, Finland, Sweden, and Denmark), the 
Netherlands, and Canada, too, have more recently sought to carve out a niche in the democracy 
promotion industry. Crucial for the mainstreaming of human rights and democracy has been the work of 
international organization such as the United Nations, Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development, Council of Europe, Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, EU, 
Organization of American States, the Commonwealth Association, etc. Also, quite a few multilateral 
banks such as the World Bank, the Inter-American Development Bank, the European Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development, and the Asian Development Bank have moved into activities relating 
to good (democratic) governance. 
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of (good) governance, and socializing individuals to “proper” civic values and 
behavior.9 
However, even though 106 countries gathered together in Warsaw in 2000 to 
discuss a common interest in advancing an international “community of democracies,” 
the commitment to spreading democracy around the globe began to wane in the early 
and mid-2000s.10 Democracy seemed to be in retreat in a number of the former Soviet 
Union republics and in many parts of Africa and Asia.11 Moreover, disappointment 
grew in the West, especially in the US, with the slow and mixed results of democracy 
promotion.12 At the same time, recipients complained that democracy promotion had 
produced an array of unintended consequences, which undermined the 
democratization of recipient countries.13 
Furthermore, the foreign policy of the Bush Administration in the Middle East 
had the unintended effect of discrediting the concept of democracy promotion in the 
West.14 In its war on terrorism, the United States closely cooperated with authoritarian 
regimes in the Middle East, Asia, and Eurasia. Even more damaging was the 
Administration’s inclusion of democracy promotion as an objective in the highly 
                                                 
9 Burnell, Democracy Assistance. 
10 On the Community of Democracies, see http://www.community-democracies.org/ 
11 Doyle acknowledges this perception but argues that it is erroneous. Michael W. Doyle, “After the 
Freedom Agenda,” Dissent 56, no. 3 (2009): 107–11. 
12 Carothers, Aiding Democracy Abroad. It should be noted, however, that despite this disillusionment, 
US democracy assistance funding continued to grow steadily at least until 2005 but declined in the 
overall foreign aid budget. Azpuru de Cuestas et al., “What Has the United States Been Doing?” 
Journal of Democracy 19, no. 2 (April 2008), 150–59.  
13 Some have pointed out that democracy assistance, for example, has often made political and civic 
elites in democratizing countries opportunistic as well as dependent on and accountable to external 
actors rather than to the publics they are to serve. See for example, Janine Wedel, Collision and 
Collusion: The Strange Case of Western Aid to Eastern Europe 1989–1998 (London: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 1998); Nicolas van de Walle, African Economies and the Politics of Permanent Crisis, 
1979–1999 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001); and Thomas Carothers, Revitalizing 
Democracy Assistance: The Challenge of USAID (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for National 
Peace, 2009). 
14 Thomas Carothers, “The Backlash Against Democracy Promotion,” Foreign Affairs 85, no. 2 (2006): 
55–68. 
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controversial war in Iraq since 2003.15 Not only did the US seem to have lost 
credibility as a promoter of democratic values, but the domestic and international 
reactions to the military presence of the West in the Middle East divided the European 
NATO members and further tarnished democracy promotion.16 This happened at a 
moment when the Western European members of the EU were already beginning to 
suffer from post-enlargement democracy promotion fatigue.17 The eastern enlargement 
of the EU was understood to be the Union’s most ambitious exercise in democracy 
promotion to date. However, it was a massive, difficult, and controversial undertaking; 
it sent the EU into a period of deepening integration and internal reforms, meant to 
strengthen the Union institutions and address its own putative democratic deficit.18 So 
despite the democratization breakthroughs in some of the organization’s newest 
eastern neighbors in 2004-2005, the EU has been somewhat reluctantly involved in 
supporting the spreading of democracy further east. 
Despite this growing “skepticism about democracy promotion” in the West, the 
new Eastern European members of the EU have recently emerged as ardent 
                                                 
15 For a critique of the US’ Afghanistan and Iraq efforts, see Lawson Chappel, “How Best to Build 
Democracy: Laying a Foundation for the New Iraq,” Foreign Affairs 82, no. 4 (2003): 206–9; Larry 
Goodson, “Afghanistan’s Long Road to Reconstruction,” Journal of Democracy 14, no. 1 (2003): 82–
89; Larry Diamond, “What Went Wrong in Iraq?” Foreign Affairs 83, no. 5 (2004): 34–56; and James 
Dobbins, “Iraq: Winning the Unwinnable War,” Foreign Affairs 84, no. 1 (2005): 16–18. 
16 National Endowment for Democracy, The Backlash Against Democracy Assistance: Report for the 
U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee (Washington, DC: NED, June 8, 2006); Thomas Carothers, 
U.S. Democracy Promotion During and After Bush (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for 
International Peace, 2007). Some Europeans have gone to great lengths to sharply distinguish the goals 
and means of EU external policy from those of the (Bush) United States, not least in the area of 
democracy promotion. Michael McFaul, Amichai Magen, and Thomas Risse, American Versus 
European Approaches (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009). 
17 Interview with P. T., July 11, 2007. 
18 Kristin Archick, European Union Enlargement (Congressional Research Service Report No. 
RS21344, Washington, DC: Library of Congress, July 3, 2008); Geoffrey Pridham, “Change and 
Continuity in the European Union’s Political Conditionality: Aims, Approach, and Priorities,” 
Democratization 14, no. 3 (2007): 446–71; 
Frank Schimmelfennig, “EU Political Accession Conditionality After the 2004 Enlargement: 
Consistency and Effectiveness,” Journal of European Public Policy 15, no. 6 (2008): 918–37. 
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democracy promoters.19 On the one hand, they demonstrated a particular interest as 
well as some success in securing a greater place for democracy promotion on the 
agenda of the EU and other (Western) international organizations, such as the North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the Organization for Security and Cooperation 
in Europe (OSCE), and the Council of Europe (CoE).20 On the other hand, especially 
following their EU accession, the Eastern European members have also stepped up 
bilateral diplomacy and assistance meant to strengthen democracy in the European 
“neighborhood” (especially, Ukraine and Belarus in the east and Serbia in the south) 
and beyond (for example, Cuba and Myanmar). Such official democracy promotion is 
supported and complemented by the efforts of a number of dynamic Eastern European 
non-governmental organizations (NGOs), working to spread democratic norms and 
practices around the globe. In sum, these new Eastern EU recruits to the community of 
democracies have now become some of the most insistent supporters of the diffusion 
of democracy around the world but especially in their backyards. 
2. Research Agenda 
Yet, much of our knowledge about democracy promotion comes from studying 
the activities of a handful of established Western democracies. What would motivate 
fledgling non-Western democracies to support democratization abroad and how would 
such efforts be undertaken? I answer these questions by studying the democracy 
promotion efforts of the Eastern European members of the EU in the first 20 years 
                                                 
19 Laurynas Jonavicius, “The Democracy Promotion Policies of Central and Eastern European States” 
(working paper, Fundacion para las Relaciones Internacionales y el Dialogo Exterior, 2008); Jacek 
Kucharczyk and Jeff Lovitt, eds., Democracy’s New Champions: European Democracy Assistance after 
EU Enlargement (Prague: PASOS, 2008); David Kral, Enlarging EU Foreign Policy: The Role of New 
EU Member States and Candidate Countries (Prague: EUROPEUM Institute for European Policy, June 
2005); Open Society Institute, Not Your Grandfather’s Eastern Bloc: The EU New Member States as 
Agenda Setters in the Enlarged European Union: Comparative Policy Report (Prague: PASOS–Sofia, 
April 2009); Development Strategies–IDC, The Consequences of Enlargement for Development Policy: 
Volume 1 (Cambridge, UK: Development Strategies–IDC, August 31, 2003). 
20 Kucharczyk and Lovitt, Democracy’s New Champions. 
 8 
after the end of the Cold War (1989 to 2009). Their especially quick transformation 
from targets of democracy promotion in the 1990s to democracy promoters in the 
2000s presents a puzzle. Theoretically, it is puzzling that given the high stakes and the 
complexities of a double – and in some Eastern European countries even triple – 
transitions, these young democracies began supporting the democratization of others 
before “consolidating” democracy at home.21 While most of the post-communist 
donors stepped up their democracy promotion efforts after their EU accession, many 
of the Eastern EU members became active shortly after their democratic 
breakthroughs. Thus, these countries were expending scarce political and financial 
capital to promote democratization abroad while working on not only political but also 
economic liberalization at home and in cases such as Slovakia, Estonia, Latvia, and 
Lithuania – on state building as well. Empirically, it is puzzling that these young 
donors are zealously promoting democracy when other established donors are losing 
optimism in the face of decreasing support for democracy promotion in donor and 
recipient societies and during what appears to be the end of a long wave of 
democratization. It is also surprising that the Eastern European countries have 
advocated for supporting the democratization of the European neighborhood through 
                                                 
21 On the complexities of the Eastern European transitions, see Karen Dawisha and Bruce Parrott, eds., 
The Consolidation of Democracy in East-Central Europe (New York: Cambridge University Press, 
1997); Claus Offe, Varieties of Transition: The East European and East German Experience 
(Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1997). Most regime change theories assume, explicitly or implicitly, that 
after a democratic breakthrough (collapse of the old regime and establishment of a democratic 
institutional structure), there is a period of democratic consolidation – “a slow but purposeful process in 
which democratic forms are transformed into democratic substance through the reform of state 
institutions, the regularization of elections, the strengthening of civil society, and the overall habituation 
of the society to the new democratic ‘rules of the game.’” (Thomas Carothers, “The End of the 
Transition Paradigm,” Journal of Democracy 13, no. 1 [2002]: 5–21.) While such “transition 
paradigms” have been criticized for being naively teleological, the core of this criticism is the 
understanding that democratization involves a multitude of usually chaotic processes of change “that go 
backwards and sideways as much as forward, and do not do so in any regular manner.” (Carothers, 
“The End of the Transition Paradigm,” 15.) Therefore, both supporters and opponents of the transition 
paradigm accept that democratization is a long and complex project that requires much elite and societal 
investment and attention to ensure progress and avert derailment. 
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further EU and NATO enlargement, instead of seeking to consolidate their accession 
gains by preventing additional growth of these clubs.  
In this thesis, I resolve this puzzle by answering several related questions: 
What motivates the democracy promotion activities of Eastern European actors? How 
is the spread of democracy supported (‘which actors,’ ‘doing what,’ ‘when,’ and 
‘where’)? What are the resultant approaches to Eastern European democracy 
promotion as defined by the type of democracy promoted, the target countries, as well 
as the repertoire, standardization, and institutionalization of the deployed policy 
instruments (diplomacy, assistance, and conditionality)? Also, are these young 
democracies using strategies different from the ones used by established democracies? 
Finally, given their motivations and approaches to democracy promotion, what is the 
impact of the Eastern European members of the EU? 
Answering those questions is important for several reasons. Theoretically, our 
understanding of democracy promotion by young non-Western democracies is very 
limited – are they socialized or perhaps even compelled by older donors into 
supporting the spread of democracy around the globe or are they investing in it with 
the recognition that a more democratic international environment can enhance the 
chances for survival of democracy at home?22 Empirically, focusing on the Eastern 
European democracy promoters offers valuable insight about and a snapshot of the 
                                                 
22 The former hypothesis is based on the understanding that democracy promotion is ultimately a 
primarily American project, which has been reproduced indirectly by the post-WWII liberal order 
created by the US as well as by direct, formal or informal, US pressure that its allies support the 
political liberalization of the developing world as well. (See, for example, Jurgen Ruland and Nikolaus 
Werz, “Germany’s hesitant role in promoting democracy,” in Peter J. Schraeder, ed., Exporting 
Democracy: Rhetoric vs. Reality [Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2002], 73–88.) The second 
hypothesis is based on one of the most consistent findings of the works on democratic diffusion – that a 
regional environment of democratic neighbors appears to help prevent such democracies countries from 
failing, while an unpropitious regional political environment might work against their survival. See, for 
example, Harvey Starr and Christina Lindborg, “Democratic Dominoes Revisited: The Hazards of 
Governmental Transitions, 1974–1996,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 47, no. 4 (August 2003): 490–
519; and Scott Mainwaring and Anibal Perez-Linan, “Regional Effects and Region-wide Diffusion of 
Democracy” (paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, 
Chicago, IL, September 2–5, 2004). 
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regional diffusion of democracy and the regional influences on democratization. These 
dynamics have been documented in large-N quantitative studies but remain little 
studied beyond the few works on the fourth wave of democratization.23 Moreover, the 
Eastern European actors represent a new generation of democracy promoters whose 
practices hold important lessons for the effectiveness of different democracy 
assistance strategies. Unlike the activities of great and middle powers, the efforts of 
young and small donors and their place in the international community supporting the 
global spread of democracy are poorly understood. Moreover, the Eastern EU 
members have excelled where the efforts of older Western donors have been found 
lacking: bringing local knowledge and first-hand democratization experience.24 
Finally, a better understanding of the motivations and strategies of the Eastern EU 
actors helps solve the puzzle of their democracy promotion activism outlined above. 
3. The Democracy Promotion Debate 
Existing works on Western export of democracy have mostly shied away from 
articulating competing theoretical propositions about “what might be called the ‘high 
politics‘ of international democracy promotion.”25 On the one hand, some previous 
studies have presented a theoretical defense of democracy promotion as a “grand 
strategy” without discussing in detail the policies through which this strategy has been 
implemented.26 On the other hand, work on the democracy promotion policies of 
various donors remains largely descriptive and mostly without an explicit theoretical 
framework.27 Building on such previous analyses, this dissertation defines two distinct 
                                                 
23 For a discussion of this literature, see the Contributions section below. 
24 Carothers, Aiding Democracy Abroad. 
25 Criticism and quote by Peter Burnell and Peter Calvert, “Promoting Democracy Abroad,” 
Democratization 12, no. 4 (2005): 433–38. 
26 See, for example, Michael Cox, G. John Ikenberry, and Takashi Inoguchi, American Democracy 
Promotion: Impulses, Strategies, and Impacts (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000). 
27 This critique is well articulated by Jonas Wolff and Iris Wurm, “Towards a Theory of External 
Democracy Promotion? Approximations from the Perspective of International Relations Theories” 
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theoretical approaches to “the place of democracy promotion in the foreign-policy 
process,” including the motivations behind a country’s support for democracy abroad 
and its democracy promotion approach.28 
Since democracies are generally thought to be peaceful, stable, and prosperous, 
some suggest that already democratic states see it in their interest to export democracy 
to volatile and/or poor countries whose socio-political developments affect the donor 
countries. In these types of accounts, democracy promotion is a strategic commitment 
– a means for creating a favorable international environment premised on the donor’s 
understanding of the benefits of having democratic international partners. However, 
others argue that there has emerged an international norm that considers democracy 
promotion to be an accepted and necessary component of international behavior and 
that in promoting democracy abroad, states follow a cultural script and/or taken-for-
granted democratic values and practices. In these types of accounts, democracy 
promotion is a normative commitment that stems from the understanding of democracy 
as an emerging international norm and/or a constituent domestic practice. 
                                                                                                                                            
(paper prepared for the 51st Annual Convention of the International Studies Association [ISA], New 
Orleans, LA, February 17–20, 2010). Notable exceptions to this trend include Peceny’s Democracy at 
the Point of Bayonets and William Robinson’s Promoting Polyarchy (Mark Peceny, Democracy at the 
Point of Bayonets [University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1999]; and William I. 
Robinson, Promoting Polyarchy: Globalization, US Intervention, and Hegemony [Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1996]). However, the first work is limited to military interventions and the 
second to hegemonic projects. Wolff and Wurm also propose no less than 7 theoretical approaches to 
democracy promotion but the distinctions between some of them seem both unclear and exaggerated. 
For example, these authors propose that there is a difference between democracy promotion as a 
primary and as a secondary aim depending on whether democracy promotion goals “lose” when 
competing with other foreign policy objectives. However, as already pointed out elsewhere, even when 
democracy promotion is a primary objective it can “lose” to other primarily foreign policy goals as 
economic and security objectives sometimes do when they compete with other economic/security goals. 
Interview with C. M., September 9, 2010. 
28 Quote from Richard Youngs, ed., Survey of European Democracy Promotion Policies 2000–2006 
(Madrid: Fundacion parar las Relaciones Internacionales y el Dialogo Exterior, 2006), 8–9. The 
majority of previous works on democracy promotion come from the Liberal, the Constructivist, and the 
Marxist schools of thought. Most realists have argued that democracy promotion is at best a distraction 
or at worst a dangerous overweening moralistic zeal. See, for example, John Harper, “The Dream of the 
Democratic Peace,” Foreign Affairs 76, no. 3 (1997): 117–21. 
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Both types of accounts acknowledge that the domestic experiences (history, 
norms, and/or institutions) that shape the donor’s democratic identity affect the 
motivations for and approaches to democracy promotion. However, in the accounts of 
democracy promotion as a strategic commitment, such domestic experiences inform 
“causal beliefs” about the benefits of having democratic international partners and 
about the domestic practices that produce such benefits. On the other hand, in the 
accounts of democracy promotion as a normative commitment, the domestic 
experiences produce “principled beliefs” about the rights and responsibilities of 
democratic states not only to observe the principles of democracy domestically but 
also to propagate them internationally.29 Therefore, neither approach to democracy 
promotion ignores the important role of ideas and identity in shaping foreign policy. 
3.1. Democracy Promotion as a Strategic Commitment: Peace, Stability, and 
Prosperity as Benefits of Having Democratic International Partners 
Some scholars and practitioners emphasize that democracy promotion reflects 
a pragmatic and evolving strategy, based on the realities of world affairs in the 20th 
century and meant to create a stable international political order.30 This so-called 
“national security liberalism” is founded on several interrelated beliefs: democratic 
states cooperate and rarely fight each other; international institutions constrain state 
                                                 
29 On causal and principled beliefs, see Judith Goldstein, Robert Keohane, and Social Science Research 
Council (U.S.), eds., Ideas and Foreign Policy: Beliefs, Institutions, and Policy Change (Ithaca, NY: 
Cornell University Press, 1993). Another useful way of distinguishing the two types of accounts of 
democracy promotion is by pointing that they loosely parallel the two logics of foreign policy action: 
“the logic of consequences” and “the logic of appropriateness.” On these logics, see James March and 
Johan Olsen, “The Institutional Dynamics of International Political Orders,” International Organization 
52, no. 4 (1998): 943–69. 
30 Such accounts have been criticized by some realists who argue that democracy promotion is at best a 
distraction and at worst a dangerous, overweening moralistic zeal that is both theoretically dubious and 
practically dangerous. See, for example, Harper, “The Dream of the Democratic Peace.” On the other 
hand, radicals claim that US democracy promotion is just a façade masking the hard edge of US 
hegemony. Colin S. Cavell, Exporting “Made-in-America” Democracy: the National Endowment for 
Democracy & U.S. Foreign Policy (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 2002); William 
Robinson, “Promoting Capitalist Polyarchy: The Case of Latin America” in Cox, Ikenberry, and 
Inoguchi, American Democracy Promotion, 308–26. 
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conflict and promote cooperation; and trade and economic openness foster and benefit 
from international cooperation and democracy.31 
In support of such accounts, their proponents often point to the strategic 
calculations by political elites premised on the “democratic peace” idea that 
“democracies are peaceful to each other.”32 Often cited in these explanations is a long 
tradition of arguments in American diplomacy in the 20th century, if not since the 
Republic’s founding, that the US would get along better with other democracies.33 The 
most prominent advocates of this tradition were Presidents Woodrow Wilson and, in 
more recent history, President Bill Clinton, who claimed that since “democracies 
rarely wage war on one another”, “the best strategy to insure our security and to build 
a durable peace is to support the advance of democracy elsewhere.”34 Democracy 
promotion is thought to be a less expensive and perhaps even a more effective long-
term solution to old-fashioned security threats than building up a country’s military 
force.35 Lastly, some authors bring up the political elites’ understanding of the value of 
                                                 
31 On the concept of national security liberalism, see Tony Smith, America’s Mission: The United States 
and the Worldwide Struggle for Democracy in the Twentieth Century (Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press, 1994). For a summary of the national security liberalism argument, see also John 
Ikenberry, “America’s Liberal Grand Strategy: Democracy and National Security in the Post-War Era” 
in Cox, Ikenberry, and Inoguchi, American Democracy Promotion, 103–27. However, the accounts of 
democracy promotion as strategic commitment should not be reduced to liberal and liberal 
institutionalism theories of international relations. Some Constructivist, Marxists and Realist 
approaches could be subsumed in this category as well because they too point to the security and 
economic benefits of having democratic international partners. 
32 In the original essay, Michael Doyle talks about liberal peace, but most other authors talk about 
democratic peace. Michael W. Doyle, “Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs,” Philosophy & 
Public Affairs 12, no. 3 (1983): 205–35; and Michael Doyle, “Liberalism and World Politics,” 
American Political Science Review 80, no. 4 (1986): 1151–69. 
33 Goldman and Douglas argue that the US has been promoting its republican ideals abroad since the 
Union’s founding. Ralph M. Goldman and William A. Douglas, Promoting Democracy: Opportunities 
and Issues (New York: Praeger, 1988). 
34 “Clinton’s Confronting the Challenges of a Broader World,” quoted in Ido Oren, “The Subjectivity of 
the ‘Democratic Peace’: Changing US Perceptions of Imperial Germany,” International Security 20, no. 
2 (1995): 147–84; Clinton’s 1994 State of the Union Address, cited in John M. Owen, “How Liberalism 
Produced Democratic Peace,” International Security 19, no. 2 (1994): 87–125. 
35 Burnell, Democracy Assistance. 
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common identity (community) in facilitating the establishment of a peaceful and 
durable order through shared expectations.36 
Proponents of this type of explanation of democracy promotion have remarked 
on the conviction of many policy-makers that democracies make better international 
partners because they both prefer and are well-suited to create and maintain stable, 
rule-based, and institutionalized international institutions. For instance, democracies 
develop relations based on the rule of law rather than on political expediency, and 
democratic openness allows states to have more confidence in the international 
commitments of politically liberal states.37 Furthermore, democracies are characterized 
by systems of accountability, transparency, and rule of law, which are especially 
important to international economic partners and development at home.38 In other 
words, such accounts argue that many policy-makers have seen no tension but rather a 
virtuous cycle among global order, market economics, and democracy.39 
While such accounts agree that the domestic characteristics of other states are 
very important to the security and material interests of their partners, democracy 
promotion is understood to be primarily a means to these more central foreign policy 
goals. From this perspective, the pursuit of political freedom abroad has often been 
neither unconditional nor allowed to upset key (economic and security) alliances with 
                                                 
36 Clinton argues that states with similar political values and social purposes will be more likely to 
understand each other and have shared expectations about how conflicts are to be resolved. Ikenberry, 
“America’s Liberal Grand Strategy: Democracy and National Security in the Post-War Era,” in Cox, 
Ikenberry, and Inoguchi, American Democracy Promotion, 103–27. 
37 Anne-Marie Burley, “Towards the Age of Liberal Nations,” Harvard International Law Journal 33, 
no. 2 (1992): 393–405; John Ikenberry, “Rethinking the Origins of American Hegemony,” Political 
Science Quarterly 104 (Fall 1989): 375–400; Kurt Gaubatz, “Democratic States and Commitment in 
International Relations,” International Organization 50, no. 1 (1997): 109–39. 
38 Michael Cox, “Wilsonianism Resurgent? The Clinton Administration and the Promotion of 
Democracy,” in Cox, Ikenberry, and Inoguchi, American Democracy Promotion; Nelson and Eglington, 
Encouraging Democracy. 
39 Strobe Talbott, “Democracy and the National Interest,” Foreign Affairs 74, no. 6 (1996): 47–63; 
Douglas Brinkley, “Democratic Enlargement: The Clinton Doctrine,” Foreign Policy 106, no. 2 (1997): 
111–27. 
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authoritarian regimes.40 Moreover, democracy promoters are thought to assist 
primarily those unstable and poor countries important to the donor’s security and/or 
economy.41 Stronger support for such important international partners as well as 
support to other countries is conditioned by perceptions about the prospects for 
success and especially for achieving tangible results in the short-term without 
incurring potential costs stemming from the democratization process itself.42 
According to such accounts, the approach to democracy promotion, especially 
the particular form of democracy promoted, reflects the overall character and purpose 
of a state’s foreign policy; for example, in the pursuit of security interests abroad, the 
emphasis might be on political liberalization but in the pursuit of economic interests 
abroad, the focus most likely would be on good governance.43 These authors also 
                                                 
40 Cox, Wilsonianism Resurgent? Wolff and Wurm also point out that since “the positive impact [of 
democracy promotion] on national security in the long-term implies that in particular situations, where 
the goal of democracy promotion clashes with directly tangible security interests, the latter prevail.” 
Wolff and Wurm, “Towards a Theory of External Democracy Promotion?,” 10.  
41 For instance, some have pointed to the connection among democracy, security, and regional stability, 
especially in the EU’s eastern and southern flanks. G. R. Olsen, “Promotion of Democracy as a Foreign 
Policy Instrument of ‘Europe’: Limits to International Idealism,” Democratization 7, no. 2 (2000): 142–
67. 
42 On the utilitarian cost-benefit analyses implied in these strategic types of accounts, see Wolff and 
Wurm, “Towards a Theory of External Democracy Promotion?” Wolff and Wurm also argue that 
“democracy promotion is rational only under very specific conditions: good and relatively short-term 
prospects of success, low risks, high asymmetries in relative power, and selective incentives or close 
international coordination” (p. 6). The last two factors are understood to inhibit democracy promotion 
free riders. However, it has already been established that donors choose their targets carefully and 
invest in their democratization even if others do the same, so that there is often over- rather than under-
supply of aid in some countries. (On the first point see, Peter J. Schraeder, Steven W. Hook, and Bruce 
Taylor, “Clarifying the Foreign Aid Puzzle: A Comparison of American, Japanese, French, and 
Swedish Aid Flows,” World Politics 50, no. 2 [1998]: 294–323; on the second point, see Burnell, 
Democracy Assistance.) Accordingly, in this dissertation, I hypothesize that most strategic democracy 
promoters focus primarily on those unstable and poor countries important to the donor’s security and/or 
economy. The significance of high asymmetries in relative power has already been called into question 
by several empirical works on democracy promotion by the US: Lowenthal, for example, argues, that 
the capacity to nurture democratic politics abroad is thought the greatest in those countries where the 
donor is sufficiently involved to be influential but not so extensively engages as to warp the domestic 
fabric of social and political life (Abraham F. Lowenthal, Exporting Democracy: The United States and 
Latin America [Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1991]). On the potential costs stemming 
from the democratization process itself such as increased incidence of intra- and inter-state conflict, see 
Jack L. Snyder, From Voting to Violence: Democratization and Nationalist Conflict (New York: 
Norton, 2000). 
43 For instance, surveying key democracy promoters among the northern industrial democracies, one 
study found “US emphasis on political liberalization in the pursuit of security interests [and] a German 
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suggest that since the primary objective of democracy promotion is to stabilize 
important international partners, the strategy used also tends to reflect such 
effectiveness calculations. In some cases, such calculations have been based on a 
donor’s understanding of its own success towards peace and prosperity and in other 
cases – on the donor’s understanding of its accomplishments as a democracy 
promoter.44 Such accounts also note donor sensitivity to the specific democratization 
needs of recipients, since those are critical to the promoter’s effectiveness.45 
3.2. Democracy Promotion as a Normative Commitment: The Role of Domestic and 
International Democratic Norms 
Other scholars have argued that democracy promotion is a mission to advance 
democratic values for their own sake. In such accounts, democracy is not only a 
universal value that can be nurtured in all regions of the world but “the ‘normal’ form 
of government to which any nation is entitled – whether in Europe, America, Asia, or 
Africa.”46 Scholars in this tradition argue that democracy is “widely regarded as an 
ideal system of government […with] near-universal appeal among people of every 
ethnic group, every religion, and every region of the world,” so that even autocracies 
have come to claim that they are either already democratic – even if they are not (e.g., 
Russia and Iran) – or that they are moving “step by step” toward democracy (e.g., 
                                                                                                                                            
and Japanese focus on economic liberalization as reflective of their economic interests abroad.” 
Schraeder, Exporting Democracy: Rhetoric vs. Reality, 231. See also Steven W. Hook, National 
Interest and Foreign Aid (Boulder, CO; London: Lynne Rienner, 1995). Good governance here refers to 
effort to bolster the rule of law, transparency, and state capacity of a recipient country.  
44 John G. Ralph, “‘High Stakes’ and ‘Low Intensity Democracy’: Understanding America’s Policy of 
Promotion Democracy,” in Cox, Ikenberry, and Inoguchi, American Democracy Promotion, 200–217; 
Jeffrey Kopstein, “The Transatlantic Divide over Democracy Promotion,” Washington Quarterly 29, 
no. 2 (2006): 85–98. For instance, the interwar period, the post-WWII reconstruction in Germany and 
Japan, the post-1989 assistance to the post-communist region, and the post-9/11 work in the Middle 
East and North Africa have all been suggested as such formative learning experiences. 
45 Carothers, Aiding Democracy Abroad. 
46 Amartya Sen, “Democracy as a Universal Value,” Journal of Democracy 10, no. 3 (1999): 3–17; 
Michael McFaul, “Democracy Promotion as a World Value,” Washington Quarterly 28, no. 1 (2004): 
147–63. 
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China).47 As a result, the efforts of external actors to support the spread of democracy 
have grown in scope as well as in legitimacy. 
Proponents of this type of argument also claim that the idea that people around 
the globe have a right to democracy has already gained some expression in 
international law.48 Such accounts document that state and non-state actors from 
democratic countries have consequently often assumed the right and felt the 
responsibility to assist the democratizing world. As a result, external actors have 
intervened more often and more aggressively to promote democracy and especially to 
enforce human rights (thus even eroding the sanctity of state sovereignty as an 
international norm). That democracy promotion is an accepted and necessary 
component of international behavior is further argued to be evident from the fact that 
the normative burden has shifted to those not interested in advocating democracy 
promotion; these are the state leaders who must explain why they are not doing more 
to advance democracy’s cause worldwide.49 
Moreover, some have also pointed out that universal values, including 
democracy, are supported internationally in a way, which corresponds to one’s own 
domestic values.50 Such normative explanations emphasize national self-images, roles, 
                                                 
47 McFaul, “Democracy Promotion as a World Value.”  
48 Thomas M. Franck, “The Emerging Right to Democratic Governance,” American Journal of 
International Law 86, no. 1 (January 1992): 46–91; Morton Halperin, “Guaranteeing Democracy,” 
Foreign Policy 91 (Summer 1993): 105–22; and Roland Rich, “Bringing Democracy Into International 
Law,” Journal of Democracy 12, no. 3 (2001): 20–34. 
49 McFaul, Democracy Promotion as a World Value, 147–63. Such arguments have been contested by 
those who ask whether the developed world has the right to impose its version of good polity on the rest 
of the world. Radicals see in this drive an attempt to continue western hegemony through the supremacy 
of political ideals, while others worry that even the efforts well-meaning and dedicated democracy 
promoters have often backfired. Cavell, Exporting ‘Made-in-America’ Democracy; and Miyume Tanji 
and Stephanie Lawson, “‘Democratic Peace’ and ‘Asian Democracy’: A Universalist–Particularist 
Tension,” Alternatives 22, no. 2 (1997): 135–55; and Bunce, “Democracy and Diversity in the 
Developing World.” 
50 This type of account of democracy promotion thus combines actor-centric and structural 
constructivist explanations. Democracy promotion is understood to be a regulative international norm, 
which creates permissive conditions for supporting democracy abroad. However, to the extent that the 
meaning of democracy is still contested at the international level, domestic values and norms 
nonetheless shape foreign policy decisions. Such domestic norms, which are both regulative and 
constitutive, not only reinforce the norm of universal right to democracy at present but also potentially 
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and identities, and foreign policy cultures to argue that democracies tend to externalize 
their domestic norms.51 In these types of accounts of democracy promotion, it is a 
“moral” mission embedded in the foreign policy culture of a particular democratic 
state.52 
The implication of this normative understanding of democracy promotion for 
the strategies states use is the argument that donors follow taken-for-granted domestic 
practices and/ or international scripts. Although there is no blueprint universally 
recognized as the best way to promote democracy, some authors have pointed to a 
certain degree of convergence in democracy promotion efforts; for example, there 
seems to be somewhat of a consensus on the importance of promoting civil society 
development and regular, free, and fair elections.53 
Still, the majority of authors in this tradition argue instead that most donors 
follow taken-for-granted domestic practices based on core domestic democratic 
values.54 Such values constitute the donor’s self-image, which influences how these 
                                                                                                                                            
served to motivate democracy promotion even before the consolidation of the international norm 
sanctioning democracy promotion as a foreign policy goal for states. Still, given the institutionalization 
of a universal right to democracy, the normative account of democracy promotion defined in this 
dissertation prioritizes this international norm over domestic values because it mandates support for 
democracy abroad and thus creates a stronger and more legitimate obligation than the moral impetus to 
support democratic forces abroad created by the domestic values of liberal states. 
51 Wolff and Wurm, “Towards a Theory of External Democracy Promotion?”; Thomas Risse-Kappen, 
“Democratic Peace – Warlike Democracies? A Social Constructivist Interpretation of the Liberal 
Argument,” European Journal of International Relations 1, no. 4 (1995): 491–517. It should be noted 
that normative variants of the democratic peace that emphasize the benefits of having democratic 
partners over moral imperatives as a motivation for supporting democracy abroad are considered in this 
thesis part of the strategic accounts of democracy promotion.  
52 Wolff and Wurm, “Towards a Theory of External Democracy Promotion?”; Smith, America’s 
Mission; and Peceny, Democracy at the Point of Bayonets. However, as Gaddis (2006: 225) reminds, 
the foreign policy role of a given state is not just a product of the self-image of a society but primarily 
of its interaction with the roles of other actors: “promoting democracy became the most visible way that 
the Americans and their West European allies could differentiate themselves” from their opponents. 
John Lewis Gaddis, The Cold War: A New History (New York: Penguin Press, 2005). 
53 McFaul, Democracy Promotion as a World Value, 147–63; McFaul, Magen, and Risse, American 
Versus European Approaches; Schraeder, Exporting Democracy, 231. 
54 Richard Youngs, “Democracy Promotion: The Case of the European Union Strategy” (CEPS 
Working Document No. 167, Brussels, 2001); Henry Nau, “America’s Identity, Democracy Promotion 
and National Interests: Beyond Realism, Beyond Idealism,” in Cox, Ikenberry, and Inoguchi, American 
Democracy Promotion, 127–51. 
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actors organize their own power and resources to pursue foreign affairs as well as how 
they perceive their international partners.55 Thus the domestic normative setting 
determines not only whether and to what extent a country promotes democracy but 
also defines the specific model of democracy that is to be supported and the 
appropriate policy instrument for such export.56 Many authors have remarked that 
individual donors have sought to export their ideals by promoting replicas of their 
domestic political institutions.57 The emphasis in such accounts is based on the fact 
that the domestic experiences inform the taken-for-granted meaning of democracy, 
rather than a calculation based on the performance of such institutions. In addition, the 
donor’s self-image as well as its international “actor-ship” have also been argued to 
inform the policy instruments considered appropriate for individual democracy 
promoters.58 Lastly, because they understand the approaches to democracy promotion 
to be based on core domestic values, authors in this is tradition expect that there would 
be variance in these approaches among different donors but not among the different 
recipients of the same donor and not even between support for a particular recipient 
over time. 
Finally, these accounts argue that donors in principle promote democracy 
universally but in practice often focus on contexts where there is solidarity and/or 
similarity with the recipient country, especially through shared membership in a 
                                                 
55 Nau, “America’s Identity, Democracy Promotion and National Interests.” 
56 Wolff and Wurm, “Towards a Theory of External Democracy Promotion?” 
57 Carothers, Aiding Democracy Abroad. However, even regarding institutional design, it would be a 
gross mischaracterization to posit that Americans and Europeans only promote their own systems of 
government. McFaul, Magen, and Risse, American Versus European Approaches. 
58 For example, the EU’s use of multilateralism and standardization of democracy promotion have been 
linked to the Union’s attempt to enhance its international legitimacy and credibility as a regional 
“normative” power. Andreas Stahn and Vera van Hullen, “Different Actors, Different Tools? 
Approaching EU and US Democracy Promotion in the Mediterranean and the Newly Independent 
States” (paper prepared for the European Union Studies Association [EUSA] Tenth Biennial 
International Conference, Montreal, May 17–19, 2007). 
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community.59 Moreover, such normative support for democracy abroad is especially 
strong where the partner country in transition shares the aim of “deepening” or 
“consolidating” democracy or in autocracies in which there are opposition forces 
struggling towards democracy and human rights.60 
It should be noted that democracy promotion motivated by strategic 
considerations does not necessarily lead to a strategic approach to supporting 
democracy abroad. Similarly, normatively-motivated democracy promotion does not 
automatically lead to a normative approach to supporting democracy abroad. In fact, 
the two types of accounts of democracy promotion have often been combined. For 
instance, some have acknowledged the emergence of a universal right to democracy 
but have also suggested that donors seek effective strategies to enforce it.61 And 
another example – others have argued that democracy promotion has made it possible 
for the donors to square the circle between self-interested behavior abroad and 
attachment to democratic norms at home.62 US democracy promotion in particular is 
often thought of as being strategically motivated while at the same time implemented 
through an export of the domestic institutional models considered to be key to 
sustaining the American democratic order.  
Moreover, the two types of accounts of democracy promotion are not 
necessarily strictly competing with each other in another sense as well: they can both 
be at work at the same time but at different levels (micro, meso, and macro). However, 
the real test of the commitment of a democracy promoter – and of the explanatory 
                                                 
59 This hypothesis is based on McAdam and Rucht’s argument that “attribution of similarity” is a 
precondition for diffusion. Doug McAdam and Dieter Rucht, “The Cross National Diffusion of 
Movement Ideas,” Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Sciences 528 (1993): 36–
59. 
60 Wolff and Wurm, “Towards a Theory of External Democracy Promotion?” 
61 McFaul, “Democracy Promotion as a World Value.” 
62 Smith, America’s Mission. On the importance of rooting American foreign policy in the American 
democratic tradition see Rick Travis, “The Promotion of Democracy at the End of the Twentieth 
Century: A New Polestar for American Foreign Policy?” in After the End: Making US Foreign Policy 
in the Post-Cold War World, ed. James Scott (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1998), 251–75. 
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leverage of the two types of accounts of support for democracy abroad – is in 
situations in which the implications of principled support for democracy promotion 
come into conflict with the implications of strategic support for democracy abroad. If 
there is a clear trend in a democracy promoter’s record to privilege either principled or 
strategic considerations at such points, then it could be argued that one these two types 
of accounts is more useful in explaining (and perhaps even predicting the future) 
efforts of this particular democracy promoter. [For a summary of the observable 
implications of the strategic and the normative types of accounts of democracy 
promotion, see Table 1.1.] 




Implications Strategic Normative 
Motivations 1) Seek perceived benefits of 
having democratic partners 
2) Target partners perceived to 
be important but also unstable, 
unreliable, or underdeveloped  
1) Uphold universal right to democracy 
and/or export domestic values 
2) Target peoples with whom there is 
perceived solidarity (shared identity/ 
community membership) 
Approach 1) Export effective/ best practices 1) Export taken-for-granted practices 
4. Democracy Promotion by the Eastern European Members of the EU: Research 
Design and Methods 
Previous works on democracy promotion suggest that a donor’s policies are 
shaped by the donor context and/or the recipient’s environment – a fact that reinforces 
the need for detailed scrutiny of individual cases.63 Accordingly, in studying the young 
Eastern European democracy promoters, I follow a two-tiered mixed-methods 
                                                 
63 Steven W. Hook, ‘‘Building Democracy Through Foreign Aid: The Limitations of United States 
Political Conditionalities, 1992–96,” Democratization 5, no. 3 (1998): 156–80. 
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research strategy: 1) I carry out a medium-N study, which examines the democracy 
promotion efforts of the 10 Eastern EU donors; and 2) I also conduct two sets of 
paired comparisons: one holding the recipient constant but varying the donor country 
and the other one – holding the donor constant but varying the recipient context.64 I 
compare Poland’s involvement in Ukraine and Belarus directly and through the EU to 
Slovakia’s engagement in Ukraine and Belarus directly and through the EU. [See 
Table 1.2.] 
Table 1.2. Paired Comparisons Design  
 Donor 
Recipient 
1st Eastern European Wave of 
Democratization / Turnaround 
from Recipient to Donor 
2nd Eastern European Wave of 
Democratization / Turnaround 
from Recipient to Donor 
Autocracy Poland in Belarus Slovakia in Belarus 
Hybrid Regime/ Democracy Poland in Ukraine Slovakia in Ukraine 
 
The medium-N study includes the whole population in the universe of cases of 
interest in this dissertation: Hungary, Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Estonia, 
Latvia, Lithuania, Slovenia, Romania, and Bulgaria.65 I describe some of the 
significant similarities and differences in the democracy promotion efforts of the 
Eastern EU members. I then examine several possible explanations of these trends to 
                                                 
64 Paired comparisons are an intermediate step between a single case study that suggests general 
relations and a multi-case analysis that tests or refines a theory. This method provides greater 
confidence in theory-testing and theory-building as well as greater analytical leverage in explaining 
patterns and outcomes than single case study analysis does. On paired comparisons, see Sidney Tarrow, 
“The Strategy of Paired Comparisons: Towards a Theory of Practice,” Comparative Political Studies 
43, no. 2 (2010): 230–59. 
65 The cases of interest in this dissertation are the Eastern EU member states. This is not to imply that 
there are no other democracy promoters in the post-communist space. For example, there is a strong 
core of Serbian NGOs supporting democratic breakthroughs abroad; however, Belgrade has 
demonstrated a lot less interest in democracy promotion. Much more importantly, the democratic 
credentials of Serbia, like those of many of the post-communist countries that are currently outside of 
the EU are still under question. Therefore, they were excluded from this study focusing on young 
democracies as democracy promoters.  
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single out the variable that best accounts for this variation. I further build on this 
medium-N analysis with two sets of paired comparisons. They examine in detail the 
explanation derived from the medium-N study for Eastern European support for 
democracy abroad.66 
On the donor side of the paired comparisons, the cases of Poland and Slovakia 
are optimal ones for both theory-testing and theory-amending: Poland and Slovakia 
not only represent and are typical of the two waves of recipient-to-donor 
transformations in Eastern Europe but also feature two of the most pronounced such 
turnarounds.67 There have been two waves of democratization among the Eastern 
European members of the EU. In the first wave (1989-1991), these countries 
overthrew communism; in the second wave (1996-98) – pro-democratic forces in the 
countries that had gotten stuck in the gray zone between dictatorship and democracy 
challenged post-communist leaders who had become authoritarian. Corresponding to 
these two waves of democratization, there have also been two waves of democracy 
promotion recipients that later became democracy promoters. Poland is a case 
representative of the first wave of such transformations, Slovakia – of the second. The 
democracy promotion activities of both countries are typical for the region in terms of 
both their motivations and their approaches as well as in the factors shaping those. 
Moreover, Poland and Slovakia have been among the most active democracy 
exporters in the Eastern EU members group. Therefore, Poland and Slovakia represent 
                                                 
66 Combining qualitative and quantitative methods has several advantages. Abbas Tashakkori and 
Charles Teddlie, Mixed Methodology: Applied Social Research Methods Series (Thousand Oaks, CA: 
Sage Publications, 1998). Statistical analysis boasts precision and generalizability, case studies – 
richness in detail, a dynamic view of actor interaction, and ability to capture social processes. On the 
advantages of quantitative research, see Gary King, Robert O. Keohane, and Sidney Verba, Designing 
Social Inquiry: Scientific Inference in Qualitative Research (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 
1994). On the advantages of qualitative research, see Henry E. Brady and David Collier, eds., 
Rethinking Social Inquiry: Diverse Tools, Shared Standards (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 
2004). 
67 On typical cases with extreme values, see John Gerring, Case Study Research (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 2007). On Poland and Slovakia as typical cases, see Jonavicius, The Democracy 
Promotion Policies of Central and Eastern European States, as well as Chapter 2 in this dissertation.  
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typical cases with extreme values on the dependent variable (democracy promotion) 
and thus illuminate the most about the Eastern European exporters of democracy.68 
Additionally, having cases from two consecutive waves of recipient-to-donor 
transformations – one in the early 1990s and one in the late 1990s – is important when 
analyzing the motivations of the Eastern European democracy promoters. Since the 
international norm of universal right to democracy grew increasingly stronger over the 
course of the 1990s, the Poland-Slovakia comparison provides a lot of insight about 
the importance and power of this norm. Having donor cases from the two waves of 
democratization in the post-communist world is also important when examining the 
approaches to democracy promotion of the Eastern European donors. As mentioned 
above, each wave faced specific democratization challenges (defeating a long-standing 
authoritarian regime in the first wave vs challenging hybrid regimes in the second 
wave) and each wave overcame those challenges with particular innovations in 
democratization. Poland has been the leader in the post-1989 democratization 
processes in the region, whereas Slovakia was one of the laggards until the late 1990s 
when it became the front-runner in the second democratization wave in Eastern 
Europe. And the innovations of these early risers were then adopted by other 
latecomers in each wave of democratization. 
However, when examining the diffusion of such innovations beyond these 
early risers’ initial waves of democratization, I hold the recipient constant while 
varying the donor country in one set of comparisons and in the other one, I hold the 
donor constant but vary the recipients. It should be noted, however, that when 
analyzing the motivations of the post-communist democracy promoters, I examine the 
                                                 
68 While the case studies focus on young democracies that have become democracy promoters (positive 
cases), my overview of the 10 Eastern European EU donors also includes cases of countries – most 
notably Bulgaria – that provide some minimal development assistance but no meaningful democracy 
support (negative cases). On selection bias such as selecting on the dependent variable, see David 
Collier and James Mahoney, “Insights and Pitfalls: Selection Bias in Qualitative Research,” World 
Politics 49, no. 1 (1996): 56–91. 
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activities of Poland and Slovakia in general, that is, I do not focus on particular 
recipients since the targets of democracy promotion reveal much about why 
democratization abroad is supported. 
On the recipient side of the paired comparisons, Ukraine and Belarus have 
comparable geopolitical locations and historical-political development; but the former 
is a hybrid regime with democratic prospects since 2004, whereas the latter is an 
autocracy.69 Pairing those two recipients allows me not only to compare how different 
types of donors export democracy in the same countries (Poland vs. Slovakia in 
Ukraine and Poland vs. Slovakia in Belarus) but also to differentiate between the 
democracy promotion strategies of those donors in receiving contexts with different 
regimes (Poland in Ukraine vs. Poland in Belarus and Slovakia in Ukraine vs. 
Slovakia in Belarus). Accordingly, I build on the democracy promotion literature by 
extending it to a set of previously unstudied donors and by illustrating some of the 
different challenges those donors face when working in recipient countries with 
different regime types.70 
To uncover the motivations and define the approaches of the Eastern European 
democracy promoters, I conduct an in-depth examination of their activities. The 
conclusions of each of the cases within the paired comparisons are based on a 
triangulation of three different types of analysis: I examine the origin, the rhetoric, and 
the practice of the post-communist donors. Moreover, I study these different 
dimensions of democracy promotion by using three different research methods: 
process tracing, discourse analysis, and the qualitative comparative method 
                                                 
69 Like the officials I study, I use the term of hybrid regime interchangeably with democratizing regimes 
and countries in transition. 
70 Richard Youngs has advocated for and implemented such a distinction in some of his latest studies. 
See for example, Richard Youngs, The European Union and Democracy Promotion: A Critical Global 
Assessment (FRIDE, 2010). 
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respectively.71 In each analysis, I use the observable implications of the strategic and 
normative accounts of democracy promotion (described in Section 2 of this chapter 
and summarized in Table 1.1): 
On motivations: 
 Origins: How was democracy promotion incorporated into the foreing 
policy of the Eastern European democracy promoters? 
o Strategic Account: Did these donors recognize some benefit of 
having democratic international partners? 
o Normative Account: Were the Eastern European democracy 
promoters compelled by a perceived mission to export their 
domestic values and/or to uphold a universal right to 
democracy? 
 Rhetoric: How have the post-communist donors talked about their 
democracy promotion efforts? 
o Strategic Account: Have they talked about the benefits of 
having democratic international partners? 
o Normative Account: Have they referred to their responsibility to 
spread democratic values? 
 Practice: Which are the recipients of Eastern European support for 
democracy abroad? 
o Strategic Account: Are they traditional / important but 
undemocratic partners? 
                                                 
71 Since the motivations behind democracy promotion are notoriously difficult to uncover and the 
approaches to supporting democracy abroad are difficult to define, such triangulation affords me the 
opportunity to sidestep the limitations and to combine the strengths of all three types of analysis. On 
process tracing, see Alexander L. George and Andrew Bennett, Case Studies and Theory Development 
in the Social Sciences (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2005). On the qualitative comparative method, see 
Brady and Collier, Rethinking Social Inquiry. On discourse analysis, see Patricia Bizzell and Bruce 
Herzberg, The Rhetorical Tradition: Readings from Classical Times to the Present (Boston: Bedford 
Books of St. Martin’s Press, 1990). 
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o Normative Account: Are they members in a community with 
which the donor feels solidarity or perceives important 
similarities in term of their domestic or international identity? 
On approaches: 
 Origins: What considerations informed the decisions of the Eastern 
European democracy promoters when choosing how to support 
democracy abroad? 
o Strategic Account: Have their approaches been informed by 
calculations based on the performance of certain institutions? 
o Normative Account: Have their approaches been informed by 
the normative appropriateness of certain practices? 
 Rhetoric: How have the Eastern European democracy promoters 
described their approach to supporting democracy abroad? 
o Strategic Account: Have they talked about the effectiveness of 
particular processes and instruments? 
o Normative Account: Have they referred to institutions, 
processes, and policy instruments taken-for-granted at home or 
scripted by the international community? 
 Practice: What instruments have the Eastern European democracy 
promoters used and which institutions have they suported in recipient 
countries? 
o Strategic Account: Have these donors varied their approach to 
most effectively democratize the target country? 
o Normative Account: Have these donors used a “cookie-cutter” 
or “one-size-fits-all” approach based on taken-for-granted 
practices? 
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4.1. Definitions and Data Collection 
Following the consensus in the field, I define democracy promotion as 
purposeful actions meant to encourage a transition from dictatorship to democracy or 
to enhance the quality of democracy in regimes that have already moved towards 
democratic government.72 Democratic regimes have been understood as “having 
uncertain results (or electoral competition) but also having certain procedures (rules 
that make democratic rulers both responsive and effective).”73 Therefore, democracy 
promotion activities include support for regular, free, and fair elections and the 
development of the political and civic actors and local and national institutions that 
make political competition and representation meaningful. Democracy promotion 
efforts have tended to include three general categories of initiatives:74 
 Political Process: promoting regular, free, and fair elections as well as 
political party development; 
 Governing Institutions: strengthening of the legislature, the executive, 
and the judiciary at the national and local level as well as their checks 
and balances and the rule of law; 
 Civil Society: support for civic groups and for individual non-state 
actors with important civic functions such as the media, educators, etc. 
                                                 
72 In recent years, the term “democracy promotion” has acquired a somewhat negative connotation. 
Some have expressed concern that “democracy promotion” implies that democracy can and should be 
advanced by external actors. Interview with P. D., November 26, 2008. However, I use the term 
“democracy promotion” with the acknowledgement that “the primary force for democratization is and 
must be internal to the country in question.” (Quote by Burnell, Democracy Assistance.) Moreover, I 
use democracy promotion interchangeably with support for democracy or democratization abroad and 
with democracy import/export. The latter terms have also been criticized as implying a mechanistic 
transplantation of a set of political institutions. However, I use them to indicate the 
adoption/transmission of a diffusion item without loading these terms with any information about the 
degree of adaptation of such diffusion items.  
73 Valerie Bunce, “Comparative Democratization: Big and Bounded Generalizations,” Comparative 
Political Studies 33, no. 6–7 (2000): 703–34. 
74 Thomas Carothers, “Taking Stock of US Democracy Assistance,” in American Democracy 
Promotion: Impulses, Strategies, and Impacts, ed. Michael Cox, G. John Ikenberry, and Takashi 
Inoguchi (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 181–99.  
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In addition, these goals can be achieved through several more or less intrusive 
policy instruments: 
 Diplomacy: persuasion and pressure; 
 Foreign Aid: technical and financial assistance; 
 Political Conditionality: incentives and sanctions; 
 Intervention: covert or overt coercion.75 
Table 1.3. Democracy Promotion Efforts Studied 
 Level 
Type of Actor Bilateral Multilateral / EU 
State Polish & Slovak official efforts in 
Ukraine & Belarus 
Polish & Slovak official efforts to influence 
EU efforts in Ukraine & Belarus 
Non-state Polish & Slovak NGO efforts in 
Ukraine & Belarus 
Polish & Slovak NGO efforts to influence 
EU efforts in Ukraine & Belarus 
 
For the purposes of this dissertation, I have identified two types of Eastern 
European democracy promoters working at two levels. [See Table 1.3.] There are state 
and non-governmental actors, where the latter include quasi-governmental institutes, 
think tanks, and monitoring and service-oriented groups. These two groups of actors 
can work directly in target countries as well as multilaterally by leveraging the 
resources of the EU (and other relevant international organizations). Previous studies 
have analyzed either governmental or civic democracy promoters and have overlooked 
the interactions of the two types of actors. Moreover, existing works have focused on 
bilateral democracy promotion and have given insufficient attention to the ways in 
which states seek to further their democracy promotion agenda through participation 
in multilateral organizations. Accordingly, I have built on the democracy promotion 
literature by examining the efforts of Eastern European governments as well as civil 
                                                 
75 Schraeder, Exporting Democracy, 231. 
 30 
societies to promote democracy in neighboring post-communist countries bilaterally as 
well as through the EU. 
When preparing the overview of the 10 Eastern European governmental and 
non-state democracy promoters, I relied primarily on secondary sources and on the 
online archives of their foreign ministries and their associations of NGOs working 
abroad. When preparing the case studies, I drew on in-depth interviews, participant 
observation, and archival research. I gathered documents and materials produced by 
governmental and non-governmental democracy promoters in the process of deciding 
on and implementing such assistance. In addition, I observed some aspects of their 
democracy promotion activities. Finally, I also conducted close to 100 interviews with 
Polish and Slovak civic activists and government officials as well as with 
knowledgeable observers of Polish and Slovak democracy promotion efforts, such as 
journalists, academics, policy analysts, other donors, and their recipients.76 
In Poland, I studied the work of various governmental foreign policy makers 
within the Department for Development Cooperation and the Department for Eastern 
Policy of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Presidency, the Prime Minister’s 
Chancellery, and the Sejm’s Foreign Affairs Committees. I interviewed officials at 
different levels in those institutions and obtained internal and external evaluations of 
their work. I collected public statements on Polish foreign policy in general and 
democracy promotion in particular. I further attended events organized by those 
institutions and relevant to Polish democracy promotion.  
At the same time, I studied the work of Polish civic democracy promoters. I 
focused on the relevant members of Zagranica – the Polish association of NGOs 
working abroad, but I also studied the activities of other groups working in Ukraine 
and/or Belarus as well. I interviewed members of these NGOs and collected their 
                                                 
76 All interviews were conducted in confidentiality and the names of the interviewees are withheld by 
mutual agreement. 
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annual reports. Finally, I attended some of their ongoing democracy promotion events 
(conferences, training sessions, study tours, etc.) and collected the materials produced 
for such events.  
In Slovakia, I collected data similarly but my focus was on foreign policy elites 
from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, SlovakAid, the Prime Minister’s Office, and 
Parliament. At the non-state level, I studied the efforts of the relevant members of 
MVRO – the Slovak coalition of development NGOs working abroad.  
Lastly, in Brussels, I studied the work of the Permanent Representations of 
Slovakia and of Poland. I also followed the work of their representatives to the Eastern 
Policy and the Human Rights and Democracy Committees of the Council of Ministers. 
I further examined the activities of Polish and Slovak Members of European 
Parliament (MEPs) active on democracy promotion issues. Additionally, I talked to 
relevant EU-level NGOs, policy analysts, and other donors – I familiarized myself 
with the EU’s general democracy promotion efforts as well as the EU’s support for 
democracy in Ukraine and Belarus. I wanted to be able to situate Polish and Slovak 
effort in the context of the broader European initiatives. Finally, I investigated the EU-
level activism of the other Eastern European state and non-governmental democracy 
promoters. 
While participating in democracy promotion events at these research sites, I 
also met and interviewed an array of beneficiaries of Eastern European, and especially 
Polish and Slovak, democracy promotion efforts. Still, it should be noted that this 
dissertation is primarily donor-centric. Most previous studies have been primarily 
recipient-centric in that they have studied either the policies towards particular 
recipients or the impact of democracy promotion efforts on particular beneficiaries. I 
examine instead the decision-making process through which support for democracy 
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abroad is decided on and implemented through the lenses of the donors, not of the 
recipients. 
5. Arguments 
I argue that the Eastern EU countries have been investing in supporting 
democracy in their neighborhood in order to create a congenial international 
environment for the survival of their new democratic states. Democracy promotion 
became part of the foreign policy traditions of these countries as a result of the 
advocacy of the elites who prepared the democracy breakthroughs in the region. These 
elites were successful only in cases where civic voices in favor of democracy 
promotion were strong and they articulated compelling arguments about the 
importance of official democracy promotion. However, while civic democracy 
promotion has been motivated by a normative commitment to democracy and to 
assisting others on the road to democracy, official support for democracy abroad is 
best understood as a strategic response to these countries’ main foreign policy 
challenges. Still, both civic and governmental actors have strategic approaches to 
democracy promotion: they both export the “best practices” from their local transition 
to democracy that are perceived to fit the democratization needs of recipients. While 
such exports often include practices that were Western imports in support of the 
democratization of the Eastern EU members, there are still distinct national 
approaches to democracy promotion that differ according to the regime type of the 
recipient. Moreover, if the approaches of the established democracies are based on 
their domestic models of democracy, Eastern EU young democracies have sought to 
export their local models of democratization. 
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5.1. On the Motivations of Eastern European Democracy Promoters 
Understanding the motivations behind Eastern European democracy promotion 
is important for several reasons: 1) it helps unravel the puzzle of post-communist 
investment in democratization abroad; 2) it speaks to the drivers of the foreign policy 
of these young democratizing states; and 3) it enhances the observer’s ability to 
understand and predict the democratization policies (targets, policy consistency and 
contradictions, etc.) as well as their development over time. 
In the post-communist world, democracy promotion began with the efforts of 
and built on the normative commitments and transnational networks of the civic 
activists who brought democracy to the region. These activists report a moral 
obligation to help others in their struggle for democracy, the way the West had 
supported them. Such a duty has been felt most acutely by those with ties to other pro-
democratic activists abroad and primarily towards other countries in the communist 
and post-communist space. It has been solidarity with these peoples that motivates 
civic democracy promotion.77 So with the support and encouragement of the West and 
primarily the US, many Eastern European activists maintained and further developed 
the regional (dissident or post-communist pro-democratic) civic networks put in place 
before the local breakthroughs to democracy.78 In the 1990s and 2000s, these networks 
continued to facilitate the flow of technical assistance and moral support among their 
members. Such non-governmental democracy promotion efforts flourished where the 
transnational civic networks were most active and dense, that is, between countries 
with traditionally close historic-cultural relations. 
                                                 
77 This solidarity has both a structural (network) and an ideational (shared identity) component, which 
reinforce one another. 
78 Moreover, while those networks were primarily civic in nature they often included political activists 
as well or at least civic activists who moved between the state and civil society. Such transnational 
networks were not just bilateral organizational or even country contacts but often included multiple 
organizations from multiple countries, forming a web of contacts and collaboration within the post-
communist space but also between Eastern Europe and the West. 
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The civic activists who brought democracy to the region have not only been 
supporting the diffusion of democratic norms and practices but have also have been 
advocating that their governments to do the same. In cases where such norm 
entrepreneurs represented strong contingents and articulated resonant arguments in 
favor of official support for democracy abroad, democracy promotion was 
incorporated into their country’s foreign policy. In Poland and the other Baltic 
countries, democracy promotion became an element of a geo-political strategy to 
create reliable partners in their eastern neighborhood and to deter Russian aggression. 
In Slovakia, as in some of the other Central and Southeastern European new 
democracies, democracy promotion became the solution to the political and economic 
destabilization as a result of the neighboring former Yugoslav and Soviet republics. 
And although local political elites would at times express personal and even official 
solidarity with other leaders and countries struggling on the road to democracy, when 
the implications of such principled support would come into conflict with perceived 
strategic objectives, the latter imperatives have been most frequently given priority. 
The Eastern European civic democracy promoters have also been working to 
keep support for democracy abroad high on their state’s agenda and have participated 
in its realization by implementing projects under their country’s official development 
assistance system. In addition to such domestic players, Western and especially 
American actors too have played role in stimulating and reinforcing post-communist 
democracy promotion. Western donors quickly recognized that Eastern EU members 
have more relevant experience to share with countries further east and southeast than 
the expertise Western donors were bringing. Moreover, from the perspective of the 
West, post-communist democracy promotion was a continuation of their work and 
realization of their values. Consequently, the Western democracy promoters have 
encouraged and supported Eastern European democracy promotion, thus stimulating 
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and legitimizing such activism. Also by brokering the diffusion of the Eastern 
European transformation experience (within the space circumscribed by the 
domestically-negotiated logic of post-communist democracy promotion), the Western 
donors have shaped its reach. And to the extent that some of the best practices the 
Eastern European democracy promoters have exported abroad have included practices 
imported earlier in these countries by Western democracy promoters, the Western 
activists have further influenced how Eastern European democracy promotion has 
been implemented. Still, it would be a mistake to overlook the independent and 
organic Eastern European movements behind post-communist democracy promotion 
and to treat these movements as Western intermediaries in the European neighborhood 
and beyond. 
5.2. On the Approaches to Democracy Promotion of the Eastern European Donors 
A donor’s approach to supporting democracy abroad has important 
implications for the way this donor’s efforts are received by recipients and by other 
donors. Are the form of democracy supported abroad and the instruments used to that 
end grounded in the donor’s domestic practices and institutions, in an international 
script for democracy promotion or in the needs of recipients? Established democracies 
are said to have national, one-size-fits-all, approaches to democracy promotion 
because they export replicas of their domestic institutions, that is their domestic 
models of democracy.79 In contrast, the Eastern European approaches to supporting 
democracy abroad are based on a strategic export of the local transition experience as 
it fits recipient needs. Thus, there are distinct Eastern European national approaches to 
                                                 
79 On the US, see Carothers, Aiding Democracy Abroad, and on the EU, see Tanja Borzel and Thomas 
Risse, “One Size Fits All! EU Policies for the Promotion of Human Rights, Democracy and the Rule of 
Law” (paper prepared for the Workshop on Democracy Promotion, Stanford University, 2004). 
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democracy promotion; however, they vary according to the regime type of the 
recipient and are based on these donors’ models of democratization.  
Both governmental and civic Eastern European democracy promoters work on 
the intuition that sharing their transition experience with countries that have been 
historically close is pragmatically “helpful.” In fact, given their first-hand 
democratization experience, both types of actors are very consciously and 
purposefully passing along “lessons” they have learned about “what worked at home 
and what did not.”80 Such lessons are most often like “recipes” about defeating 
authoritarians (breakthrough) and achieving particular reform objectives 
(consolidation) such as decentralization or compliance with EU regional policy 
directives. Moreover, these lessons also often include best practices that were Western 
imports in support of the democratization of the Eastern EU members.  
In supporting democracy abroad, Poland, for example, has been borrowing 
from its experience with a “negotiated transition” and Slovakia has drawn inspiration 
from its own model of “electoral breakthrough.” Such democratization models are 
usually about political liberalization based on a particular type of state-society 
interactions, which have produced a specific national repertoire of struggle against 
unchecked and concentrated state power and lack of political representation. It should 
also be noted that these state-society relations are often also transferred and reinforced 
through various other reform recipes for the period of “democratic consolidation.” 
At the same time, however, out of all the democratic breakthrough strategies 
and the reform recipes they have, the Eastern European democracy promoters have 
tended to share those that they understand to fit the needs, that is, advance the 
democratization, of individual recipients. That is why there are differences in the 
approach between the practices of individual donors when they target hybrid regimes 
                                                 
80 Interview with V. H., October 30, 2008. 
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and when they target autocracies. Poland and Slovakia, and all other Eastern European 
donors, base their approach to autocracies such as Belarus on their experience of 
struggling for democracy before their local breakthrough; similarly, these democracy 
promoters derive their approach to hybrid regimes such as Ukraine from the lessons 
they have learned about consolidating democracy at home in the period after the local 
breakthrough. 
5.3. On the Impact of the Eastern European Democracy Promoters 
Even though they are young donors and mostly small players compared to the 
other members of the international community supporting the development of 
democracy around the globe, the Eastern EU members have emerged as true 
champions of democracy promotion. Moreover, they have excelled where the efforts 
of older Western donors have been found lacking – the young democracy promoters 
have a nuanced approach, local knowledge, and recent democratization experience. As 
a result, the activities of the Eastern EU members have been generally appreciated by 
both recipients and other donors – a fact that has allowed these young donors to keep 
democracy high on the Euro-Atlantic agenda and to secure some democratization 
gains in the neighborhood. The Eastern European democracy promoters have had most 
impact in the hybrid democracies in the European space – the Western Balkans, 
Ukraine, and Moldova. Their bilateral democracy promotion and keeping the Euro-
Atlantic IOs engaged in these countries have been very important in 1) helping pro-
democratic forces there prepare democratic breakthroughs (the electoral revolutions in 
the 2000s81) and continue pushing for reforms thereafter; and 2) in creating an 
                                                 
81 These revolutions were attempts to expose electoral fraud and to use mass protest in defense of the 
existing, democratic constitution in order to defeat the illiberal incumbent and after assuming power, to 
push the country in a decidedly more democratic direction. Such successful campaigns were organized 
in Croatia and Serbia in 2000, Georgia in 2003, Ukraine in 2004, and Moldova in 2009–2010. Valerie J. 
Bunce and Sharon L. Wolchik, “International Diffusion and Postcommunist Electoral Revolutions,” 
Communist and Postcommunist Studies 39, no. 3 (2006): 283–304. 
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international environment that favors and supports the diffusion of democracy into the 
European neighborhood.  
Moreover in joining the international community of democracy promoters, the 
Eastern EU members not only contributed to but also influence the activities of other 
players. First, individual countries have assumed leaderships of external efforts to 
support democracy in particular countries. Second, the Eastern European democracy 
promoters have often successfully advocated that certain countries of concern to them 
be prioritized by the international community as well as that the international 
community take a particular approach to supporting their democratization. Third, by 
re-granting Western aid and serving as consultants or subcontractors in Western 
projects, the Eastern European activists have also influenced how Western assistance 
has been implemented. In sum, by studying the efforts of the Eastern European 
democracy promoters, this dissertation suggests that what they lack in resources and 
international standing, small and young donors can make up in credibility and 
relevance of expertise. 
5.4. Contributions 
This dissertation contributes to previous work on democracy promotion 
theoretically, methodologically, and empirically. Empirically, the thesis examines the 
activities of a group of little-studied non-Western democracy promoters. Unlike 
previous works, this one also pays close attention to the state-societal interactions in 
which policies of both bilateral and multilateral democracy promotion are formulated 
and implemented. Methodologically, while a lot of the studies of democracy 
promotion either assume the motivations of the actors involved or confirm them 
deductively, this dissertation conducts an in-depth inductive examination of the 
motivations and strategies of the players on the ground. Moreover, it is a mixed-
 39 
method study, the qualitative part of which is based on the triangulation of three 
different types of analysis (of the origin, the rhetoric, and the practice of the Eastern 
European democracy promoters) done through the use of three different research 
techniques (process tracing, discourse analysis, and the qualitative comparative 
method respectively). 
Theoretically, the dissertation explores a corollary of the democratic peace 
literature – how and why policymakers might try to produce democratic peace.82 
Moreover, unlike previous works, which have struggled to theorize the “high politics” 
of democracy promotion, this study builds on the existing literature to define two 
distinct theoretical approaches to understanding the place of democracy promotion in 
the foreign-policy process: democracy promotion as a normative commitment and 
democracy promotion as a strategic commitment.83 The thesis then improves on 
previous strategic types of explanations by suggesting that the benefits of having 
democratic international partners are not fixed and universal as previously assumed 
but rather domestically negotiated through the state-society interaction in which the 
policies of democracy promotion is produced and implemented. Moreover, the 
dissertation moves beyond the study of democracy promotion as a project of the 
Western economically developed and politically established democracies. The focus 
                                                 
82 Most of the democratic peace conversations, however, have defended liberalism against realist 
critiques and have therefore focused on the “objective” existence of democratic peace: whether 
democracies really do not go to war with each other, what constitutes “democracy” and what constitutes 
“war,” and what mechanisms underlie the democratic peace. (See, for example, Bruce Russett, 
Grasping the Democratic Peace [Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993]; Risse-Kappen, 
“Democratic Peace – Warlike Democracies?”; John M. Owen, Liberal Peace, Liberal War: American 
Politics and International Security [Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1997]; and David Lake, 
“Peaceful Pacifists: Democratic States and War,” American Political Science Review 86 [March 1992]: 
24–37. For a review of the democratic peace literature, see Sebastian Rosato, “The Flawed Logic of 
Democratic Peace Theory,” American Political Science Review 97, no. 4 [2003]: 585–602.) However, 
in answering these questions, the literature has neglected the on-the-ground direct investigation of 
which benefits of having democratic international partners matter to foreign policy-makers and how 
these statesmen adopt and use such ideas about democratic peace (their beliefs and decision-making 
processes). This is a gap my dissertation fills. 
83 For a similar criticism of previous works on democracy promotions, see Wolff and Wurm, “Towards 
a Theory of External Democracy Promotion?” 
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here is on the process of transition from recipient to donor country and on young 
instead of mature democracies as democracy promoters – both questions are still 
poorly understood. The theoretical payoff is a better understanding of the role of 
domestic actors in the institutionalization of support for democracy abroad. 
Additionally, this dissertation contributes both theoretically and empirically to 
the diffusion literature and especially to the study of diffusion of democracy. Most 
previous works on this topic seek to establish that diffusion dynamics are at work 
behind the spatial and geographical clustering of democratic change or follow the 
spread of democratic practices from one location to another during the democratic 
breakthrough cycles in Eastern Europe in 1989-91 and 1996-98 and the early to mid 
2000s.84 This study traces instead the diffusion of democracy within the post-
communist space not just during democratization waves but also through the everyday 
political and social interactions within the region before and after such waves. In other 
words, I document the production of a “region” as well as the importance of regional 
factors in the process of democratization. Moreover, since most of the diffusion 
literature (in both comparative politics and international relations) is adopter-centric, 
this thesis improves on our understanding of regional / transnational diffusion by 
exploring instead the motivations of transmitters and how these motivations produce 
uneven diffusion of values and practices.85 
                                                 
84 For an example of the first type of work, see Daniel Brinks and Michael Coppedge, “Diffusion Is No 
Illusion,” Comparative Political Studies 39, no. 4 (2006): 463–89; and Kristian Skrede Gleditsch and 
Michael D. Ward, “Diffusion and the International Context of Democratization,” International 
Organization 60, no. 4 (Fall 2006): 911–33. For an example of the second types of work, see Mark R. 
Beissinger, Nationalist Mobilization and the Collapse of the Soviet State (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 2002); and Bunce and Wolchik, “International Diffusion and Postcommunist Electoral 
Revolutions.”  
85 For a criticism of the adopter-centric nature of previous diffusion work, see Sarah A. Soule, 
“Diffusion Processes Within and Across Movements,” in The Blackwell Companion to Social 
Movements, eds. David A. Snow, Sarah A. Soule, and Hanspeter Kriesi (Oxford, UK: Blackwell 
Publishing, 2005), 294–310. 
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Finally, by focusing on two movements-participants in the transnational 
democracy advocacy network, this dissertation represents a case study of transnational 
activism. A novel finding here is that the normative and opportunistic motivations of 
various civic actors for participating in transnational activism might follow a cycle-
like pattern: transnational movements develop around a core of normatively-motivated 
actors but as these movements grow and become established, available funding, 
legitimacy, prestige, etc. become a leading motivation for some of the latest recruits to 
the transnational democracy advocacy movement. Moreover, this dissertation further 
contributes to the overlooked question of social movement demobilization by 
suggesting that as some successful national pro-democratic movements demobilize, 
the transnational components of these movements become increasingly active; in brief, 
demobilization in some cases is accompanied by an upward scale shift to transnational 
democracy advocacy activism. Finally, in arguing that such norm entrepreneurs were 
successful if they represented a strong lobby for and compelling causal arguments in 
favor of official democracy promotion, the thesis documents an interesting interaction 
of movement resources and framing: organizational strength is perhaps crucial for 
frames based on causal ideas. 
6. Structure of the Dissertation 
The next chapter, Chapter 2, surveys the democracy promotion efforts of the 
Eastern EU members and examines some of the possible explanations of the 
differences in the activities of these actors. It finds that the introduction, persistence, 
and logic of official post-communist democracy promotion are shaped by the efforts 
of the civic elites who prepared the democratic breakthroughs in the region. Chapter 3 
then presents the similar transition of the Polish and the Slovak civil societies from 
being recipients of democracy assistance to becoming exporters of their transition 
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experience. The argument here is that such efforts have been normatively motivated 
but strategically pursued. Chapters 4 and 5 look respectively at the efforts of the 
Polish and the Slovak governments to support the diffusion of democracy in their 
neighborhood. These chapters suggest that such activities are best understood as a 
strategic commitment meant to create a favorable international environment for these 
new democratic states. Moreover, there are distinct national approaches to democracy 
promotion that vary according to the regime types of the recipient and are based on the 
local model of democratization. Chapter 6 concludes by summarizing the 
dissertation’s main findings and discussing their implications for some of the relevant 




OVERVIEW OF EASTERN EUROPEAN DEMOCRACY PROMOTION 
The recent post-communist recruits to the global community of democracies 
have now become some of the most ardent supporters of the spreading of democratic 
norms and practices. Some Eastern European countries began investing in the 
democratization of their neighborhood almost immediately after their own democratic 
breakthroughs and most of them joined the ranks of democracy promoters within the 
first decade after the beginning of their own democratic transformation. Democracy 
promotion became a priority for a majority of these new donors after their accession to 
NATO and especially to the EU (when their diplomacies were no longer overwhelmed 
by the requirements of these integration processes).  
The young Eastern European democracies have worked to secure a greater 
place for democracy promotion on the agenda of a number of transatlantic 
international organizations such as the EU, NATO, OSCE and CoE. As countries that 
have the ear of their neighbors, the new post-communist donors have also built on 
their bilateral diplomacy in the region to strengthen democracy in the European 
neighborhood: they have served as models, criticized undemocratic practices, and 
advised and pressured transition laggards to make further progress towards 
democracy. Moreover, by the mid-2000s, a majority of these Eastern European 
democracy promoters had already begun the process of setting up their development 
aid systems, which prioritized the delivery of democracy assistance to the post-
communist region. And even if somewhat reluctantly, all 10 current Eastern European 
members of the EU have joined the sanctions imposed by the international community 
on the regimes, which committed grave violations of human rights and democratic 
practices in the region – Serbia and Belarus. 
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This chapter briefly surveys the democracy promotion efforts of the Eastern 
EU members to suggest that supporting democracy in their neighborhood has become 
a significant element of their foreign policy. After noting some general trends, the 
chapter examines several possible explanations of the differences in geographical 
priorities and in levels of engagement among the Eastern EU members. The argument 
is that the introduction, the persistence, and the logic of the official post-communist 
democracy promotion were all a product of the efforts of the civic elites who prepared 
the democratic breakthroughs in the region. This chapter further argues that the 
democracy promotion approaches of the Eastern EU members have been primarily a 
conscious and strategic “export” of the “best practices” from their own transitions that 
fit the democratization needs of recipients. 
1. Overview of Eastern European Democracy Promotion 
Since these donors followed the lead of the international community on 
sanctioning violators of democracy and human rights, the overview of the activities of 
the Eastern European countries in this section focuses primarily on the diplomacy and 
assistance of post-communist democracy promotion. This review suggests that despite 
being small powers and young donors, the Eastern EU members have emerged as 
highly committed and relatively effective supporters of democracy abroad. 
1.1. The Diplomacy of Eastern European Democracy Promotion 
Bilaterally, many of the Eastern EU members have developed a variety of 
cooperation mechanisms to maintain friendly and good relations with their neighbors 
and other traditional international partners – an agenda, which has included supporting 
the democratization and where applicable the Euro-Atlantic integration of transition 
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laggards. Such political consultations occur primarily within the executive but also 
sometimes at the legislative or local (cross-border) level. 
The transformation success stories from each wave of post-communist 
democratization have often served as models for their international partners still 
struggling to reform. Regional bilateral and multilateral ties have served to spread 
information – directly or indirectly – about how democratic institutions are set up and 
function in the democratization leaders in the region.1 More frequently in private but 
sometimes also in public, elites from these emerging democracy promoters have also 
tried to persuade their counterparts that democracy would be beneficial for them and 
for their nations.2 Moreover, elites from successfully democratizing countries have 
frequently shared how they had solved transition problems similar to the ones 
currently facing their partners in the region.3 And given how onerous EU integration 
requirements are, many of the new Eastern European members set up special 
cooperation mechanisms or programs to guide their partners’ efforts to move closer to 
Brussels. Furthermore, post-communist democracy promoters have frequently exerted 
peer pressure on their counterparts to keep up democratization reforms.4 The Eastern 
European democratization success stories have also regularly joined the international 
                                                 
1 Jacek Kucharczyk and Jeff Lovitt, eds., Democracy’s New Champions: European Democracy 
Assistance after EU Enlargement (Prague: PASOS, 2008). Although countries such as Poland, 
Hungary, and the Czech Republic have often been the democratization poster children, Slovakia has 
sought to demonstrate that even transition laggards can catch up on their democratization and Estonia, 
Latvia, and Lithuania have tried to persuade their neighbors that post-Soviet transformation can be 
successful as well. 
2 Wlodzimierz Cimoszewicz, Foreign Minister of the Republic of Poland, “The Eastern Policy of the 
European Union,” Speech, Institute of Political Science, Paris, April 22, 2004; Donald Tusk, Current 
President of the Council of Ministers of The Republic of Poland, Exposé, Warsaw, November 23, 2007. 
Interview with E. K., November 11, 2008; interview with L. A., October 25, 2008; interview with 
L. M., April 1, 2010. 
3 Interview with S. R., November 27, 2008; interview with M. V., November 27, 2008; interview with 
M. J., October 30, 2008; interview with M. S., October 28, 2008. 
4 Interview with A. S., October 25, 2008; interview with T. L., October 28, 2008; interview with I. K., 
November 21, 2008. 
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community in criticizing regimes perpetrating electoral fraud and grave violations of 
human rights.5 
Eastern European bilateral efforts were crucial in inspiring and preparing pro-
democratic forces in the European neighborhood to push their countries in a decidedly 
democratic direction through the electoral revolutions in the 2000s.6 Despite its 
mundane character, such democracy promotion through everyday diplomacy has been 
particularly important in conveying the international and regional expectations of 
democratization laggards to their elites as well as in shaping the expectations of these 
elites about what is possible and beneficial for them and their nations when it comes to 
further reform. Given the first-hand democratization experience of the Eastern 
European democracy promoters and the social capital they have in the region, they 
have “had the ear” of their international partners.7 At the same time, however, 
considerations of democracy promotion have sometimes been accorded lower priority 
and even sacrificed for good neighborly relations or other political or economic 
considerations. 
Multilaterally, the Eastern European countries have supported and in some 
cases sought to influence the foreign policy of key regional international organizations 
such as the EU, OSCE, CoE, and NATO to support democratization in the European 
neighborhood. Recognizing their own limitations as small and/ or young states, the 
Eastern European countries have sought to involve post-communist democratization 
laggards in a web of regional cooperation as a way to anchor them in the transatlantic 
democratic community.8 At the same time, the Eastern European democracy 
                                                 
5 David Kral, Enlarging EU Foreign Policy: The Role of New EU Member States and Candidate 
Countries (Prague: EUROPEUM Institute for European Policy, June 2005). 
6 Interview with P. D., November 27, 2008. 
7 Interview with L. M., April 1, 2010.  
8 Only Poland and Romania could perhaps be considered middle powers; Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Slovakia began building their state, including their foreign policy, apparatus only in the early 1990s. 
Open Society Institute, Not Your Grandfather’s Eastern Bloc: The EU New Member States as Agenda 
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promoters have also sought to keep democratization high on the agenda of such 
regional organizations. The post-communist democracies have been most active in the 
EU and to a lesser extent in NATO primarily because joining them carries numerous 
security, political, economic, and social benefits and because, as a result, these 
structures have the potential to exercise tremendous influence over their applicants.9 
Given the mainstreaming of support for democracy and human rights in the 
EU’s external relations, the Eastern members have actively lobbied for enhancing the 
Union’s cooperation with its eastern and southeastern neighbors.10 The post-
communist members have argued for offering membership prospective to such 
countries in transition as well as for quickly moving forward towards trade and visa 
liberalization; these not only serve as incentives for further reform in the short term 
but also advance the diffusion of democratic norms and practices in the long run. 
Since the Western Balkans are on an enlargement track, the Central European and 
Balkan EU members have sought to speed up their accession.11 They successfully got 
Brussels to open accession negotiations with Croatia in 2005 and to give Serbia, 
Montenegro, and Macedonia visa-free travel, beginning in 2010. Because the EU 
grouped the “European” republics of the former Soviet Union with other countries in 
Eurasia and the Mediterranean without membership prospective, the post-communist 
                                                                                                                                            
Setters in the Enlarged European Union: Comparative Policy Report (European Policies Initiative at 
the Open Society Institute [PASOS]–Sofia, April 2009). 
9 On the democratization leverage of the EU and NATO, see, for example, Milada Anna Vachudova, 
Europe Undivided: Democracy, Leverage, and Integration after Communism (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2005); Wade Jacoby, The Enlargement of the European Union and NATO: Ordering 
from the Menu in Central Europe (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004); Geoffrey Pridham, 
Designing Democracy: EU Enlargement and Regime Change in Post-Communist Europe  (New York: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2005); Judith Green Kelley, Ethnic Politics in Europe: The Power of Norms and 
Incentives (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2004). 
10 In recognition of the expertise and activism of the Eastern EU members in the eastern and 
southeastern neighborhood, their diplomats have received several relevant high-level posts: for 
example, EU’s enlargement and neighborhood policy commissioner, Chairman of the Delegation for 
Relations with Belarus at the European Parliament, Co-Chairman of the EU-Ukraine Parliamentary 
Cooperation Committee, the Co-Chair of the EU-Moldova Parliamentary Cooperation Committee, the 
EU Special Representative for Bosnia and Herzegovina. 
11 Open Society Institute, Not Your Grandfather’s Eastern Bloc. 
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members have emphasized the need for a special EU policy for the immediate eastern 
neighbors. Even before it was an EU member, Poland circulated a proposal – endorsed 
and presented through the Visegrad group and actively supported by the Baltic former 
USSR republics – for such enhanced cooperation that reinforces the Union’s support 
for the democratization of these countries.12 In 2006, Romania put forward its own 
proposal but focused more on the so-called Black Sea region.13 Moreover, Poland and 
also Lithuania have played a leading role in steering the EU’s response to the 
Ukrainian political crisis in 2004 and subsequently lobbied for offering a membership 
prospective to Kiev.14 However, it was only after the Russian-Georgian war of 2008 
that the Eastern Partnership – a special cooperation mechanism for 6 of the EU’s 
immediate eastern neighbors – was passed and only after the 2010 presidential 
elections in Ukraine (seen by some as a step back in the country’s democratization) 
that Kiev was offered a membership prospective.15 However, whether other European 
Partnership countries such as Moldova would be put on an enlargement track and 
when other Western Balkans countries such as Macedonia and Serbia will be accepted 
into the Union still remain unclear despite pressure by the Eastern EU members for a 
closer cooperation between the Union and these eastern and southeastern countries.  
Moreover, the Eastern EU states have also contributed to strengthening the 
EU’s response to undemocratic regimes in the immediate eastern neighborhood. Most 
importantly, Poland, Lithuania, the Czech Republic, and Slovakia have kept the 
                                                 
12 Interview with P. W., October 16, 2008; and interview with A. D., July 27, 2007. The Visegrad group 
includes Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, and Slovakia. 
13 Oana Mihaela Mocanu, “European Neighbourhood Policy – New Initiatives,” in Contribution of 
Romania, EIR Study Collection 23 (Bucharest: European Institute of Romania, 2009). The non-EU 
participants in the Black Sea Synergy are Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Moldova, Russia, Ukraine, 
and Turkey. 
14 Grzegorz Gromadzki, Raimundas Lopata, and Kristi Raik. Friends or Family?: Finnish, Lithuanian 
and Polish Perspectives on the EU’s Policy towards Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova (FIIA Report No. 
12, Helsinki: Finnish Institute of International Affairs, 2005). 
15 Andreas Umland, “EU Risks Losing Ukraine,” EUobserver, http://euobserver.com/15/29831 
(accessed April 2010). The former USSR republics participating in the Eastern Partnership are 
Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine. 
 49 
Belarusian question on the table.16 Not only has the European Council been taking 
notice of developments in Minsk since the EU’s eastern enlargement but Belarus has 
also become the country about which the most resolutions have been passed by the 
European parliament.17 Thus the Eastern EU countries have encouraged the EU to pay 
more attention to Minsk and to respond quickly and decisively to undemocratic 
practices in Belarus. However, if the post-communist members have significantly 
weakened the EU’s “Russia first” approach towards Eastern Europe, they have been 
less successful in strengthening the EU’s democratization agenda vis-à-vis Russia.18 
Still, where Eastern European officials have not succeeded at the European Council 
level, Eastern European members of the European Parliament, especially from Poland 
and the other Baltic countries, have sought to make up with active involvement in 
questions relating not only to Russia but in other issues that have direct implications 
for EU-Russian relations, such as democratization in Georgia, Ukraine, Moldova, and 
Belarus.19 
Partly through such activism on the EU’s eastern and southeastern policy, the 
post-communist members have gained a reputation as active supporters of democracy 
promotion.20 This reputation has been further strengthened through the participation of 
the post-communist members in the debates about the EU’s general democracy 
promotion initiatives.21 Most active have been the Czech Republic, Slovakia, and 
Poland.22 The Eastern members (both at the governmental and the non-governmental 
                                                 
16 Interview with K. R., March 6, 2009. 
17 Interview with J. S.-W., February 25, 2009. 
18 Kral, Enlarging EU Foreign Policy: The Role of New EU Member States and Candidate Countries. 
19 Gromadzki, Lopata, and Raik, Friends or Family?: Finnish, Lithuanian and Polish Perspectives. 
Russia-first approach is a EU foreign policy tradition in which the Union’s eastern policy was 
dominated by EU-Russia relations. This often meant little interest in the former USSR republics and 
when there was such interest, it was in terms of how relations with these countries would affect 
Brussels’ ties with Russia.  
20 Kral, Enlarging EU Foreign Policy: The Role of New EU Member States and Candidate Countries. 
21 Vera Rihackova, “An Assessment of the Reform of the EU’s External Assistance Instruments,” in 
Kucharczyk and Lovitt, Democracy’s New Champions, 267–95. 
22 Interview with K. J., March 15, 2009. 
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level) were particularly active during the 2006 reform of the European Instrument for 
Democracy and Human Rights. They successfully insisted on keeping a separate 
instrument for democracy and human rights programs and on making that instrument 
more flexible. Moreover, the post-communist members joined the UK in lobbying for 
the setting up of a European democracy assistance agency and politically and 
financially supported the establishment of the European Partnership for Democracy.23 
However, since this idea was scrapped by the European Council, the Partnership has 
become just another NGO (with a strong contingent of Eastern European affiliates) 
that applies for EU grants and lobbies Brussels on issues of democracy promotion. 
Lastly, the Eastern members have also been very supportive of the UK initiative for a 
EU-wide Consensus on Democracy – a strategic framework for strengthening the 
EU’s contribution to democracy building around the world. The Czech Republic gave 
priority to working on the consensus during its EU presidency in 2009. 
In addition to being actively engaged in EU democracy promotion, the Eastern 
European members have been supportive of the efforts of OSCE and the CoE in the 
neighborhood and of the UN in the field of human rights. The post-communist 
countries have frequently used their turn in the rotating leadership of these 
organizations to steer them towards supporting democratization in the European post-
communist space. The Eastern EU members have also regularly contributed funds and 
experts to these organizations’ efforts in the region and have joined these 
organizations’ criticism of human rights and democratic abuses in the neighborhood. 
Moreover, the post-communist members have further lobbied for NATO membership 
for Ukraine and Georgia and the countries in the Western Balkans as an additional 
incentive for further democratization as well as a way to keep these countries in the 
Euro-Atlantic democratic community. 
                                                 
23 Interview with E. M.-S., February 16, 2009. 
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In sum, democracy promotion has become a true foreign policy priority for a 
majority of the Eastern EU members. The bilateral involvement of the Eastern 
European democracy promoters in their neighborhood has also been very important 
because it has allowed democratization laggards a glimpse of what democracy looks 
like close to home and has given them encouragement and know-how to move 
forward. Moreover, even as the West began showing signs of growing democracy 
promotion skepticism and/or fatigue in the early 2000s, the post-communist EU 
members continued to insist that support for democratization in their region (and 
beyond) remain high on the agenda of a variety of Euro-Atlantic organizations. 
Keeping such organizations engaged in the European neighborhood has been crucial to 
creating a generally congenial environment for the diffusion of democracy in that 
region. The Eastern European democracy promoters have had most impact in hybrid 
democracies in the European space – the Western Balkans, Ukraine, and Moldova –
where these post-communist donors worked both bilaterally and multilaterally to help 
pro-democratic forces make some further reform gains through the electoral 
revolutions in the 2000s.24 
1.2. Eastern European Democracy Assistance 
In addition to providing diplomatic support for democratization in the 
neighborhood, the post-communist democracy promoters have also been offering 
democracy assistance. A lot of the Eastern EU members do not consider themselves 
“new donors;” the former COMECON members used to provide a not insignificant 
                                                 
24 The appeal of Euro-Atlantic membership, for example, has been argued to have been important to the 
success of the electoral revolutions in Serbia, Georgia, and Ukraine. Joshua A. Tucker, “Enough! 
Electoral Fraud, Collective Action Problems, and Post-Communist Colored Revolutions,” Perspectives 
on Politics 5, no. 3 (2007): 535–51. On the role of the Eastern European democracy promoters in these 
revolutions, see Valerie J. Bunce and Sharon Wolchik, Democratizing Elections, Diffusion and 
Democracy Assistance (New York: Cambridge University Press, forthcoming); and Mark R. Beissinger, 
“Structure and Example in Modular Political Phenomena: The Diffusion of Bulldozer, Rose, Orange 
and Tulip Revolutions,” Perspectives on Politics 5, no. 2 (2007): 259–76. 
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amount of assistance to countries “on the road to socialism,” such as Cuba, Vietnam, 
Cambodia, Laos, Yemen, Angola, Zambia, Ethiopia, and Iraq.25 As they restructured 
their economies in the post-communist period and entered clubs such as the OECD 
and later the EU, the Eastern European countries were required by these international 
organizations and increasingly encouraged by established donors such as the U.S. and 
the U.K. to begin providing development assistance once again.26 For example, the EU 
requires its members to have begun contributing at least 0.33% of their GDP as 
development aid by 2015. And very much as it did with Japan and Germany after 
WWII, the US has been exercising formal and informal pressure to get the Eastern EU 
and NATO members involved in providing development but especially democracy 
assistance.27 Faced with such expectations and obligations, the young post-communist 
democracies not only began setting up development aid systems but also given their 
pre-existing interest in democracy promotion, also decisively transformed such 
institutional frameworks into platforms for democracy assistance. Some countries 
began setting up these systems in the late 1990s but by the mid-2000s, they were 
already fully functional in all Eastern European countries that joined the EU in 2004. 
The UN Development Program and Canadian International Development Agency have 
been most systematically engaged in building these countries’ capacities to provide 
                                                 
25 For example in the 1980s, Czechoslovakia allocated from 0.7% to 0.9% of its GDP as aid to 136 
countries around the globe. Petr Halaxa and Petr Lebeda, “Mnohostranna rozvojova pomoc Ceske 
republiky,” Mezinarodní Politika 4 (1998): 7–9. Hungary and Poland had similarly ambitious programs 
while Romania and Bulgaria provided more modest assistance (Adele Harmer and Lin Cotterrell, 
Diversity in Donorship: The Changing Landscape of Official Humanitarian Aid [London: Overseas 
Development Institute, 2005]). Yugoslavia was a driving force in the Non-Aligned Movement, and 
contributed to development assistance, in particular through the Solidarity Fund for the Non-Aligned 
and Other Developing Countries, created in 1974. (Mojmir Mrak, “Slovenia as a Donor Country: Where 
It Is and Where It Should Go?” [paper presented at the EADI Conference in Ljubljana, August 2002]). 
However, as the Eastern European countries began transitioning to market democracies and 
consequently experienced economic difficulties, development aid significantly declined and in some 
cases was reduced to some minimal debt relief. Lena Krichewsky, Development Policy in the Accession 
Countries (Vienna: Trialogue, 2003). 
26 Interview with K. V., November 19, 2008. 
27 Interview with R. P., October 19, 2008. 
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development assistance.28 Platforms of development NGOs such as Trialogue and to a 
lesser degree Concord have done similar work at the non-state level.29 
Table 2.1. Democracy Assistance Project Funding (DAPF), Percent of Democracy 
Assistance Project Funding out of All Official Development Assistance 
(DAPF%ODA), and Percent of Democracy Assistance Project Funding out of All 
Development Assistance Project Funding (DAPF%PA) in 2006 € (Euros) by 
Country by Year 
  Donor Country 



















































































































a Author’s calculations based on data published by the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs at 
http://www.polskapomoc.gov.pl/Organizacje,pozarzadowe,506.html. 
b Author’s calculations based on data published by the Estonian Ministry of Foreign Affairs at 
http://www.vm.ee/?q=en/taxonomy/term/55 
c Author’s calculations based on data published by the Latvian Ministry of Foreign Affairs at 
http://www.mfa.gov.lv/lv/Attistibas-sadarbiba/valstis/ 
d Jacek Kucharczyk and Jeff Lovitt, eds., Democracy’s New Champions: European Democracy 
Assistance after EU Enlargement (Prague: PASOS, 2008), 40. Reported here are the democracy 
assistance projects sponsored by the Human Rights and Transition Promotion Department as well as the 
democracy assistance projects funded by the Czech development assistance appropriations. 
e Kucharczyk and Lovitt, Democracy’s New Champions. 
f Kucharczyk and Lovitt, Democracy’s New Champions. These figures do not include the budget of 
either the Nyiregyhaza Initiative or the Szeged Process but do include the development assistance 
projects funding and the funding from the Promotion of Democratic Transition appropriation from 2007 
on. Grants to NGOs and private-sector organizations have been distributed annually since 2003 with the 
exception of 2006.  
                                                 
28 Interview with E. K., November 19, 2008; and interview with O. D., June 17, 2009. 
29 Interview with N. R., March 17, 2009. 
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Table 2.1 (Continued) 
  Donor Country 




































































Most Eastern European countries have set up a department for development 
cooperation within their ministry of foreign affairs to decide on and oversee the 
implementation of bilateral assistance projects, including democracy aid ones.30 
Slovakia is the only country, which has also set up an independent agency responsible 
for project selection and management while the Czech Republic is the only country to 
establish a special Human Rights and Transition Promotion Department in addition to 
the development cooperation department with the foreign ministry. The funding 
provided by such institutions is implemented through projects proposed by central and 
local state institutions and non-state actors. Moreover, a few Eastern European donors 
(including Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia) have also set up small grants funds within 
some of their embassies abroad and as a result provide additional democracy aid 
directly to state and non-state actors in partner countries. It should be noted, however, 
that the administrative capacity of the young Eastern European donors to provide aid 
is still rather underdeveloped.31 
                                                 
30 For an overview of the institutional and legal development aid set up of the Eastern EU members, see 
European Parliament’s Committee on Development, The Challenge of the EU Development 
Cooperation Program for New Member States, Brussels: European Parliament, 2007. 
31 Kucharczyk and Lovitt, Democracy’s New Champions. 
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Table 2.2. Number of Democracy Assistance Projects/ Number of All 
Development Assistance Projects and Percent of Democracy Assistance Projects 
out of All Development Assistance Projects by Country by Year 
 Donor Country 
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a Author’s calculations based on data published by the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs at 
http://www.polskapomoc.gov.pl/Organizacje,pozarzadowe,506.html 
b Author’s calculations based on data published by the Estonian Ministry of Foreign Affairs at 
http://www.vm.ee/?q=en/taxonomy/term/55 
c Author’s calculations based on data published by the Lithuanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs at 
http://www.urm.lt/index.php?1809419855 
d Author’s calculations based on data published by the Latvian Ministry of Foreign Affairs at 
http://www.mfa.gov.lv/lv/Attistibas-sadarbiba/valstis/ 
e Jacek Kucharczyk and Jeff Lovitt, eds., Democracy’s New Champions: European Democracy 
Assistance after EU Enlargement (Prague: PASOS, 2008), 38. The data presented in this column is 
about the projects implemented by the Transition Ministry. 
f Kucharczyk and Lovitt, Democracy’s New Champions. Author’s calculations based on data published 
by the Hungarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs at 
http://www.mfa.gov.hu/kum/hu/bal/Kulpolitikank/Nemzetkozi_fejlesztes/ 
Moreover, because most of these countries are relatively small, the total 
democracy aid they have been providing amounts to “a tiny drop in the aid business.”32 
                                                 
32 Ibid.  
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For instance, in 2006, these donors together supplied about €12m in democracy 
assistance; compare this to the estimated €340m given in the same year by Sweden.33 
However, the Eastern European rates of democracy to overall official development 
assistance are about average for the donor community. For example, the second least 
generous Eastern European donor, Hungary, spends 0.7% of its official development 
assistance on democracy, as does France. The most generous democracy promoter 
(according to this measure), Estonia, contributes 8% of its official development 
assistance to democracy projects and thus compares favorably to influential 
democracy promoters such as the US and UK both of which contribute about 7% and 
such as Germany, which contributes 9%. The majority of post-communist democracy 
promoters spend about 2%, which is also the EU’s democracy assistance rate. [See 
Table 2.1.] Still, the Eastern European donors lag behind some of the Nordic 
countries, such as Netherlands, Denmark, and Sweden which spend respectively 12%, 
13%, and 24% of their official development aid on assisting democracy abroad.34 If the 
Eastern European rates do not seem impressive at first glance it is because bilateral 
assistance projects, through which democracy aid is distributed, are only a small 
fraction of the official aid provided by the post-communist donors.35 Therefore, these 
average Eastern European rates of democracy to overall official development 
                                                 
33 Ibid. 
34 Data on Western democracy promoters from Richard Youngs, “Is European Democracy Promotion 
on the Wane?” (CEPS Working Document No. 292, May 2008). 
35 A majority of the official development assistance provided by many of these (re-) emerging donors 
has been in the form of preferential (trade) credits, debt forgiveness, and scholarships. For instance, up 
to ¾ of Polish official assistance went to such aid (Ilona Ilowiecka-Tanska and Marta Pejda, “Poland 
Official Development Assistance and Peacebuilding,” Initiative for Peacebuilding, 
http://www.initiativeforpeacebuilding.eu/pdf/Polish_Official_development_assistance_and_peacebuildi
ng.pdf [accessed June 2009]). The remaining aid is often distributed among contributions to multilateral 
organizations such as OSCE, the World Bank, and the UN Funds, humanitarian aid, and then bilateral 
assistance projects. It is in that last category that democracy assistance falls. And while such aid is only 
a few percent of the overall official assistance provided, it is also the portion that is under direct and 
meaningful control of the foreign ministry (together with humanitarian assistance) (Interview with F. 
T., March 12, 2009). Since bilateral assistance projects have been the most meaningful foreign policy 
instrument of the emerging Eastern European donors, the analysis presented below is based on such aid. 
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assistance actually mask the higher than average donor contribution of the post-
communist states to democracy assistance. 
Even if bilateral assistance projects are only a small fraction of the official aid 
supplied by the Eastern European donors, a high proportion of such bilateral assistance 
projects are devoted to democratization support. The majority of the Eastern European 
donors regularly sponsor democracy assistance projects of about 30% of all 
development assistance projects.36 [See Table 2.2.] For some countries, such as Latvia 
and Poland, this number is as high as 46% and 45% respectively. Even the second 
least active donor, Hungary, funds democracy projects that are about a quarter of all 
development aid projects. Unfortunately similar data is not available for Western 
democracy promoters. However, recipients of international democracy assistance in 
Ukraine and Belarus report that a larger percent of the aid provided by the Eastern 
European donors goes to democracy than of the assistance offered by Western 
donors.37  
The real generosity of the Eastern European democracy prompters is best 
captured by the amount of democracy assistance provided to their priority countries. 
For example, since the mid-2000s, Poland has been the second biggest democracy aid 
provider in Belarus.38 Similarly, Poland is one of the key donors in Ukraine, and the 
size of its democracy assistance to Ukraine rivals that of the leading European donors 
in the field: Poland was not only more generous than Sweden or the UK in terms of 
the percentage of development aid to Ukraine that was devoted to democracy 
assistance but its democracy assistance to Ukraine in 2006 was larger than the 
                                                 
36 The remaining projects usually tackle infrastructural, economic, social (especially education) and 
cultural issues. 
37 Data from Natalia Shapovalova and Olga Shumylo, “Ukraine: Supporting Elusive Consolidation,” in 
Kucharczyk and Lovitt, Democracy’s New Champions, 267–95. 
38 Interview with M. S., October 13, 2008. 
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democracy aid given by Sweden and the UK combined.39 Another example: more 
Ukrainians receive scholarships funded by the Visegrad Four than by the rest of the 
EU put together.40 And a final comparison, in 2004-2006, 30% of the EU assistance to 
Belarus and 26% of the EU aid to Ukraine went to support democratization projects in 
these countries; at the same time, all of Slovakia’s aid to these countries was 
democracy assistance.41  
Lastly, as recipients of international democracy assistance have pointed out, it 
is often “not the amount of aid that matters” but the quality of the projects through 
which it is distributed.42 Recipients of Eastern European aid have often remarked on 
the usefulness of this assistance, which derives from the fact that the donors have just 
recently gone democratized themselves and have done so in relatively culturally and 
politically similar circumstances.43 Thus the local knowledge and the recent 
democratization experience of the Eastern European donors allow them to make an 
“important” contribution to strengthening democratic forces and promoting political 
reforms in their neighborhood as well as bringing it closer to the transatlantic 
community.44 
On the other hand, most of the limited democracy assistance provided by the 
Eastern European donors has been technical rather than financial and therefore 
sometimes derided by other donors and some recipients.45 Moreover, there has already 
been some additional criticism about the democracy assistance set up of the Eastern 
                                                 
39 Shapovalova and Shumylo, “Ukraine: Supporting Elusive Consolidation,” in Kucharczyk and Lovitt, 
Democracy’s New Champions, 267–95. 
40 Interview with O. S., February 2, 2010. 
41 Data from Marian Kowalski, “Belarus: Next Generation Democracy,” in Kucharczyk and Lovitt, 
Democracy’s New Champions, 189–215.  
42 Shapovalova and Shumylo, “Ukraine: Supporting Elusive Consolidation,” in Kucharczyk and Lovitt, 
Democracy’s New Champions, 267–95. 
43 Interview with O. S., March 19, 2009; interview with M. S., October 21, 2008; interview with K. F., 
October 22, 2008. 
44 Quote from Shapovalova and Shumylo, “Ukraine: Supporting Elusive Consolidation,” in Kucharczyk 
and Lovitt, Democracy’s New Champions, 267–95. 
45 Development Strategies–IDC, The Consequences of Enlargement for Development Policy: Volume 1 
(Development Strategies–IDC, August 31, 2003). 
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European donors. For example, some have noted that the assistance institutions have 
been somewhat understaffed and underpaid.46 Others have pointed out that assistance 
has been project- rather than program-driven, therefore somewhat ad hoc (much as 
Western assistance has been).47 Yet others have observed that despite a significant 
convergence in priority countries, there has been little programmatic coordination and 
collaboration between these donors, leading to some overlapping and ineffectiveness.48 
 
Figure 2.1. A Political Map of Europe – 20 Years After the Collapse of the Soviet 
Bloc 
In brief, while most Eastern European donors, even the re-emerging ones, are 
still working on developing their assistance capacities and on integrating with the 
                                                 
46 Interview with W. B., October 13, 2008; interview with E. D., December 10, 2008; and interview 
with B. B., October 27, 2008. 
47 Development Strategies–IDC, The Consequences of Enlargement for Development Policy. 
48 Kucharczyk and Lovitt, Democracy’s New Champions. 
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international donor community, they have already demonstrated a lot of potential to 
support the spread of democracy in the post-communist world. 
1.3. The Targets of Eastern European Democracy Promotion 
Which countries have been the targets of the post-communist democracy 
promoters? Most of the Eastern EU members are small countries whose foreign policy 
is focused on their immediate neighborhood. [For a political map of Europe, see 
Figure 2.1.] These foreign policy goals are reflected in the geographical priorities of 
Eastern European democracy promotion through their focus on the European eastern 
and southeastern regions. In terms of recipient priorities, there are two types of Eastern 
European democracy promoters: 1) Poland, Lithuania, Estonia, and Latvia, which 
support primarily the democratization of the EU’s immediate eastern neighbors and 2) 
Slovakia (the Czech Republic), Hungary, Romania, Slovenia (and Bulgaria), which 
support the democratization of the EU neighbors to the east but also and perhaps 
primarily to the southeast. The Czech Republic is somewhat exceptional because it has 
a meaningfully strong regional as well as global presence. Bulgaria on the other hand 
has invested very little in supporting democracy abroad. [Since the democracy 
assistance priorities of the Eastern European donors have tended to mirror and build 
on their diplomatic democracy promotion priorities, these priorities are presented in 
Table 2.3 as they were reflected in the official development aid data.49] 
                                                 
49 Bulgaria and Romania’s development assistance systems have not yet been set up, so the priorities 
listed in this table are based on these countries’ diplomatic initiatives and declared development 
assistance priorities. However, since Bulgaria’s diplomatic efforts have also been minimal, determining 
Sofia’s democracy promotion priorities is very difficult. 
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Table 2.3. Geographical Democracy Assistance Priorities by Donor Country 
Donor Country 
Recipient PO EE LT LV CZ SK HUa SLb ROc
Eastern  Russia * *   
Europe Ukraine ** * * * * ** **  *
 Belarus ** ** * ** *   
 Moldova  * * * ** * * * **
South  Georgia * ** ** ** *   *
Caucasus Armenia *   









 Macedonia  ** 
 Albania  * 
Middle 
East 
Iraq **   
Americas Cuba **   
Asia Burma *   
 China *  
 Vietnam *  
Note. * Democracy Assistance Recipient (at least one project a year on average); ** Democracy 
Assistance Priority Recipient for the Donor. 
a Hungary has not made public the complete list of its development assistance projects. Moreover, the 
recipient countries eligible for such assistance have changed somewhat over time. In 2003, Budapest 
declared its development assistance recipients as Serbia, Montenegro, Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
Vietnam, Macedonia, Moldova, Mongolia, Ukraine, Kyrgyzstan, Palestine Authority, Ethiopia, Yemen, 
Cambodia, Laos, Afghanistan, and Iraq. In 2008 they were Serbia, Belarus, Moldova, Albania, Cuba, 
Palestine Authority, and North Korea. Budapest’s diplomatic democracy promotion priorities have been 
Serbia, Ukraine, and Moldova but in the late 2000s, Hungary also maintained a human right dialogue 
with China and with Vietnam. Aron Horvath,“Hungary‘s Democracy Assistance Policies and 
Priorities,” in Jacek Kucharczyk and Jeff Lovitt, eds., Democracy’s New Champions: European 
Democracy Assistance after EU Enlargement (Prague: PASOS, 2008), 51–81. The analysis here is 
based on a combination of the diplomatic and assistance democracy promotion priorities of Hungary.  
b Slovenia has not published a list of projects, so the analysis here is based on the year in which a 
development cooperation partnership agreement was concluded with each country: Serbia and 
Montenegro in 2003, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Macedonia in 2005, Moldova in 2007 and Albania in 
2008. See http://www.mzz.gov.si/si/zunanja_politika/ 
mednarodno_razvojno_sodelovanje_in_humanitarna_pomoc/ 
c Romania’s priorities here are derived by cross-referencing the list of declared future development 
assistance recipients and the list of actual diplomatic democracy promotion targets. 
While Poland has demonstrated some ambitions for regional leadership within 
the post-communist space, its democracy promotion activities have been mostly 
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oriented towards the east.50 On the other hand, the Czech Republic’s ambitions to 
speak for dissidents (fighting communist and post-communist dictators) around the 
globe is the exception to the neighborhood attention span of the other Eastern 
European democracy promoters. However, if Budapest steps up its activities in general 
and continues to invest in the political liberalization of Asia (to build on its current 
programs in countries such as China and Vietnam), Hungary too might soon come to 
boast a truly global democracy promotion program. Lastly, as NATO members and 
“Atlanticists,” the Eastern European donors have taken part in the reconstruction 
efforts in Afghanistan and Iraq after the US interventions there after the turn of the 
century, partly in the name of democracy promotion. However, while most of the post-
communist democracy promoters have provided some aid to Afghanistan and to a 
lesser degree to Iraq, such aid has been development rather than democracy assistance. 
The exception here is the Czech Republic, which has made Iraq a democracy 
assistance priority. 
Although there has been little programmatic coordination or collaboration, 
there is something like a “gentlemen’s agreement” about the geographical division of 
labor among the Eastern European democracy promoters.51 Poland has taken the lead 
on supporting the democratization of Ukraine both bilaterally and through the EU, 
Lithuania – on Belarus, Estonia – on Georgia, Latvia but more recently also Romania 
– on Moldova, Slovakia – on the Western Balkans (Serbia), and the Czech Republic – 
on Cuba.52 It should be noted that the Eastern European democracy promoters have 
                                                 
50 Some have also suggested that Bucharest sees itself as representing the countries in the Black Sea 
region but its support for democracy abroad has been relatively low even compared to other Eastern 
European democracy promoters. Interview with K. R., March 6, 2009. 
51 Interview with V. U., July 12, 2007. 
52 There has been some coupling of enlargement and neighborhood policies at the EU level such that 
several Eastern European donors strive to include current neighborhood countries into the next wave of 
EU enlargement. However, given the structure of the EU’s external relations, there has been some 
growing divergence among the Eastern European democracy promoters at the EU level. The EU level 
divisions between the Black Sea Synergy and the new Eastern Partnership initiatives have prompted the 
Eastern European EU members to try to swing attention and resources towards “their part of the world.” 
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generally shied away from targeting Moscow and only Poland and Lithuania give 
some minimal democracy assistance to civic actors in Russia. On the other hand, 
although it does not qualify for development assistance, Croatia has received a lot of 
diplomatic support from Hungary, Slovakia, Slovenia, and the Czech Republic.  
Croatia and Serbia in the southeast as well as Ukraine and Georgia in the east 
have demonstrated most interest in the democratization experience of the Eastern EU 
members and most commitment to joining the democratic and Euro-Atlantic club.53 
This reciprocity has amplified the democracy promotion impact of the Eastern 
European actors in an important way because Serbia is understood to be a strategically 
pivotal state in the southeast, much like Ukraine is seen in the East and perhaps 
Georgia – in the Southern Caucasus. The democracy promotion efforts of the Eastern 
EU members have been unwelcome by the government in Minsk but have been 
generally appreciated by the citizenry and especially by civil society in Belarus, which 
is understood to be another strategic country in the Eastern neighborhood because it 
remains standing as the “last European dictatorship.”54 
Perhaps not surprisingly, it is exactly in these receptive hybrid democracies in 
the European space that the post-communist democracy promoters have had the 
largest impact. In a wave of “electoral breakthroughs,” countries such as Croatia, 
Serbia, Georgia, Ukraine, and most recently Moldova made radical breaks with their 
illiberal past.55 Moreover, they did so with much inspiration by and help from the 
Eastern EU members.56 The post-communist EU donors have had less success with 
                                                                                                                                            
See Open Society Institute, Not Your Grandfather’s Eastern Bloc. 
53 Open Society Institute, Not Your Grandfather’s Eastern Bloc. 
54 Interview with P. K., October 19, 2008; and interview with J. K., November 27, 2008.  
55 Bunce and Wolchik, Democratizing Elections, Diffusion and Democracy Assistance. It should be 
noted, however, that there has been some democratic backsliding in Georgia especially following the 
Georgian-Russian war of August 2008. Daisy Sindelar, “Is the Bloom off the Rose in Georgia?” Radio 
Free Europe / Radio Liberty, http://www.rferl.org/content/Bloom_Off_Rose_In_Georgia/ 
1351943.html (accessed December 2008). 
56 Bunce and Wolchik, Democratizing Elections, Diffusion and Democracy Assistance. 
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regional autocracies such as Belarus, Russia, and Kazakhstan. The regional wave of 
democratization suffered defeats in Belarus in 2001 and then 2006, in Azerbaijan in 
2003 and 2005, in Armenia in 2003 and 2008, and in Kazakhstan in 2005. In all of 
these cases, authoritarian incumbents or their anointed successors won power despite 
striking similarities between these elections and those that had resulted in a transfer of 
power from authoritarians to democrats. Regime change was never attempted in 
Russia, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Mongolia. The successes of the 
Eastern European democracy promoters in the so called “countries in transition” 
compared to the difficulty experienced in working in authoritarian contexts parallels 
the findings in previous works on the diffusion of democracy, which argue that 
partially free countries appear to be more sensitive to diffusion effects than non-free 
countries.57 
To conclude, the democracy promotion activities of the Eastern European 
countries deserve attention for several empirical reasons. First, despite being young 
democracies and fledging donors, these EU members have emerged as true champions 
of democracy promotion. Supporting democratization abroad has become a significant 
element of their foreign policies pursued both bilaterally and multilaterally and 
through both diplomatic and aid initiatives. Such efforts have been particularly 
important because they have been gaining strength at a time when the West is showing 
signs of growing democracy promotion skepticism and/or fatigue. Second, as donors, 
these countries may not be the most influential or generous democracy promoters in 
general but their assistance stands out in their priority recipient countries in terms of 
its quantity (percent of democracy assistance to overall bilateral assistance projects or 
funding in some cases as well as funding levels in other cases) and in terms of its 
                                                 
57 Harvey Starr and Christina Lindborg, “Democratic Dominoes Revisited: The Hazards of 
Governmental Transitions, 1974–1996,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 47, no. 4 (August 2003): 490–
519. 
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quality (relevance of projects derived from local knowledge and first-hand 
democratization experience). Third, the bilateral diplomatic involvement of the 
Eastern European democracy promoters has not only helped strengthen pro-
democratic forces in the neighborhood but has also demonstrated to illiberal actors the 
benefits of democracy for them and their countries. Moreover, such diplomatic 
engagement has allowed the Eastern EU members to provide much needed 
encouragement and support for further reform. Fourth, the Eastern European 
democracy promoters have managed to keep the transatlantic international 
organizations engaged in the European neighborhood, thus creating a pro-democratic 
international environment that has secured some further democratization gains in the 
post-communist space. In sum, the Eastern EU members have demonstrated 
commitment to supporting democracy abroad as well as some potential in influencing 
both the democratic developments in recipients and the democracy promotion efforts 
of other donors. 
2. Explaining Eastern European Democracy Promotion 
Having outlined some of the general trends in the diplomacy and assistance of 
Eastern European democracy promotion, this chapter proceeds by briefly noting some 
of the differences in the initiatives of individual countries. Then the discussion turns to 
the possible explanations of this variation. 
2.1. The Diversity of Eastern European Democracy Promotion 
There are two dimensions of important variation among the democracy 
promotion efforts of the Eastern EU members: differences in geographical priorities 
and in levels of engagement. First, as described in the previous section, the Baltic 
countries have targeted primarily the EU’s immediate eastern neighbors while the 
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Central European and Balkan donors have focused both on the EU’s southeastern and 
eastern fringes. Second, as suggested above, there are striking differences among the 
Eastern EU members in terms of their democracy promotion activism when the length, 
scope, and initiative of their diplomatic and assistance democracy promotion efforts 
are considered. I have examined and coded all three of these dimensions for the ten 
cases of interest in this dissertation to produce a score for the level of activism in 
democracy promotion of each Eastern EU member. [See Table 2.4 for the democracy 
promotion activism scores of individual countries as of 2009 and Appendix 1 for the 
coding scheme.] 
Table 2.4. Democracy Promotion Activism Scores By Donor Country 
  Donor Country 
Activities  PO EE LT LV CZ SK HU SL BG RO 
Diplomacy  Start 2 1 2 1 2 2 2 0 0 1 
 Initiative 2 0 2 0 1 2 2 0 0 2 
 Engagement 2 1 2 1 2 2 1 0 0 1 
Assistance  Start 2 2 1 1 2 1 2 2 0 0 
 Institutionalization 1 1 1 1 3 2 1 1 0 0 
 Level 2 2 1 2 2 2 1 0 0 0 
Combined Activism Score 11 7 9 6 12 11 9 3 0 4 
 
Among the Eastern European democracy promoters, there are countries such as 
Bulgaria, Slovenia, and Romania that have been slow to transition from being 
democracy promotion recipients to becoming donors that support democracy abroad. 
In this group, Bulgaria is the least active country – Sofia has yet to begin providing 
development, including democracy, assistance and to take diplomatic initiative to 
support democratization abroad. Ljubljana has supported the development of 
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democracy in its neighborhood primarily indirectly through advocating for stronger 
cooperation between the region and various European regional structures, especially 
the EU; moreover, not much of the development aid Slovenia has provided has gone to 
support democratization abroad. Despite its regional leadership ambitions, Romania 
has been slow to begin investing in strengthening democracy abroad and has not yet 
invested heavily in such efforts but it has at the same time already taken diplomatic 
initiative both bilaterally and multilaterally. 
In contrast, other Eastern European countries such as the Czech Republic, 
Poland, and Slovakia have quickly become true champions of democracy. Warsaw and 
Bratislava began actively promoting democracy diplomatically within a year of their 
own democratic breakthroughs by working directly with recipients and by leveraging 
the resources of various transatlantic international organizations. Prague began 
supporting democracy abroad diplomatically within the first five years of its 
independence and has done so very actively both regionally and globally especially by 
taking initiative multilaterally. All three countries have amongst the highest rates of 
democracy to overall official development assistance of all Eastern European donors 
and compare favorably to Western donors. Poland and the Czech Republic were also 
among the first donors in the region and the Czech Republic and Slovakia have 
respectively the most and the second most institutionalized system for democracy 
assistance provision. 
Hungary, Lithuania, Estonia, and Latvia rank in between the least and the most 
active Eastern European democracy promoters. Budapest and Vilnius began 
supporting diplomatically democratization in their neighborhood early on and have 
taken both bilateral and multilateral initiative; however unlike Lithuania, which has 
been an active supporter of democracy abroad, Hungary’s investment in regional 
democratization beyond the protection of minority rights and cross-border cooperation 
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has remained low. Estonia and Latvia, on the other hand, started promoting democracy 
diplomatically mostly after their EU accession and have done so moderately and 
without taking initiative. The institutionalization of the democracy aid distribution in 
all these countries is relatively low and the democracy assistance provided by all of 
them but Estonia has been either belated or small. [For additional details on the 
democracy promotion record of the Eastern EU members, please see Appendix 2.] 
2.2. Previous Explanations 
How can this variation in the geographical priorities and in the level of 
activism of the Eastern European democracy promoters be explained? This section 
examines several existing accounts of these differences: the contrast between 
communism and post-communism as motivating support for democratization abroad, 
the foreign policy specialization of the Eastern EU members on neighborhood and 
democratization questions, the continuities between the Euro-Atlantic integration of 
Eastern European countries and their support for democracy in the post-communist 
region, and the pressures from various international actors – the EU, the US, and 
Russia. I find that while all of the factors put forth contribute to and positively 
reinforce the efforts of the post-communist donors, none of these previously suggested 
accounts adequately explain the observed variation in Eastern European democracy 
promotion. The limitations of the explanatory power of each factor are discussed 
primarily through crucial case studies.58 Crucial cases are ones that “must closely fit a 
theory if one is to have confidence in the theory’s validity.”59 The cases presented in 
this section are crucial in that they are most likely to fulfill the theoretical prediction of 
                                                 
58 On crucial cases, see John Gerring, Case Study Research (New York: Cambridge University Press, 
2007).  
59 Harry Eckstein, “Case Study and Theory in Political Science,” in The Handbook of Political Science, 
ed. Fred I. Greenstein and Nelson W. Polsby (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1975), 79–138. 
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the different alternative accounts, yet they do not. I use them to disconfirm these 
accounts. 
2.2.1. Communist and Post-communist Experience 
Some have suggested that the contrast between the experience of communism 
and the experience of post-communism has committed the more successfully 
democratized countries to helping those who are still lagging behind in the transition 
process.60 However, all Eastern EU members have experienced the contrast between 
life in an autocracy and life in a democracy. Moreover, all of these young donors have 
important international partners which have struggled to follow democratic norms and 
practices and to implement reforms and which have at some point expressed interest in 
the transformation experience of the Eastern EU members. Yet, not all of the post-
communist EU members are interested in democracy promotion. 
Of course, there are qualitative differences in the Eastern European 
experiences of communism and post-communism. There are at least two ways to 
capture the contrast between life in an autocracy and life in a democracy: the most 
commonly used measures are “satisfaction with the way democracy works” and 
“rejection of authoritarianism.”61 Neither of the two measures of approval of the recent 
post-communist transitions among the Eastern EU members correlates strongly with 
official democracy promotion activism.62 [For a graphical expression of these 
relationships, see Figure 2.2.]  
                                                 
60 Laurynas Jonavicius, “The Democracy Promotion Policies of Central and Eastern European States” 
(working paper, Fundacion para las Relaciones Internacionales y el Dialogo Exterior, 2008). 
61 For a commentary on the use of these indicators to capture satisfaction with democracy, see Jonas 
Linde and Joakim Ekman, “Satisfaction with Democracy: A NOTE on a Frequently Used Indicator in 
Comparative Politics,” European Journal of Political Research 42, no. 3 (2003): 391–408. 
62 The data for the correlation was compiled from the following sources: Central and Eastern 
Eurobarometer 8 (1997), available online at http://europa.eu.int/comm/public_opinion; Cologne: 
Zentralarchiv fur Empirische Sozialforschung (available at http://www.gesis.org/ZA/); Richard Rose, 
New Baltic Barometer III: A Survey Study (Studies in Public Policy No. 284, Glasgow: Centre for the 
Study of Public Policy, University of Strathclyde, 1997); Richard Rose and Christian Haerpfer, New 
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Figure 2.2. Correlation between Popular Satisfaction with Democracy and 
Official Democracy Promotion Activism 
2.2.2. Foreign Policy Specialization 
On a similar note, some have argued that the Eastern EU members have found 
a “niche” in the EU’s division of foreign policy labor: on the one hand, they have 
                                                                                                                                            
Democracies Barometer V: A 12 Nation Survey (Studies in Public Policy No. 306, Glasgow: Centre for 
the Study of Public Policy, University of Strathclyde, 1998); Richard Rose, William Mishler, and 
Christian Haerpfer, Democracy and Its Alternatives: Understanding Post-Communist Societies 
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1998). 
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recent experience with democratization and on the other hand, they have unique 
regional expertise and good relations with the EU’s new neighbors.63 The Slovene and 
Bulgarian cases illustrate the limitations of such arguments well. Bulgaria was one of 
the early risers in the second wave of democratic breakthroughs in post-communist 
Europe. Slovenia is the only country in the Western Balkans to quickly join the ranks 
of market democracies. Thus although both Bulgaria and Slovenia have had unique 
democratization experience to share with their neighbors, these Eastern EU members 
are also the post-communist countries least interested in democracy promotion. 
Moreover, the case of Czech democracy promotion reveals another limitation of this 
argument. Prague has focused its efforts on Belarus, Iraq, and Cuba; yet, when it got 
involved in supporting democratization there, the Czech Republic had few special ties 
to the first two countries and little special expertise on any of them relative to other 
Eastern and Western EU donors. 
Another related argument is that the Eastern EU members are invested in their 
neighborhood, where the democratization question is on the agenda.64 Consider the 
case of Hungary, however. Budapest has focused on developing good relations with 
all its neighbors, which are countries in transition. Still, Hungary has shied away from 
supporting their democratization (except for working towards mutual respect of 
minority rights). 
Finally, some have pointed out that democracy promotion is a “continuation” 
of the Euro-Atlantic integration of the Eastern EU and NATO members. Democracy 
promotion has been suggested to fill in a so-called foreign policy “action gap”, which 
emerged in the foreign policy agendas of the Eastern EU members after their Euro-
                                                 
63 Open Society Institute, Not Your Grandfather’s Eastern Bloc. 
64 Some have argued that this is especially the case after the US shifted its attention to other regions 
(Greater Middle East) and left democracy promotion in Eastern Europe in the hands of new EU (and 
other NATO) members. Jonavicius, “The Democracy Promotion Policies of Central and Eastern 
European States.” 
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Atlantic accessions.65 However, some countries such as Poland, Lithuania, the Czech 
Republic, and Slovakia had begun to actively promote democracy abroad even before 
they joined the Euro-Atlantic international organizations. Also, while quite a few 
former EU enlargement bureaucrats have been reassigned to work on neighborhood 
policies, the personnel from the former applicants responsible for EU integration 
questions is now staffing primarily various EU-level position rather than development 
cooperation departments.66 Thus if there is a bureaucratic politics case to be made 
about the continuity between enlargement and neighborhood policies at the EU level, 
such a case would be a straw man at the level of the Eastern EU members. 
2.2.3. Identity Concerns 
Democracy promotion has been understood to be a continuation of the Euro-
Atlantic integration of the Eastern EU and NATO members in another way as well. 
These emerging donors have recently undergone an “identity transformation” from 
“countries in transition” to “(democratic) European states.” A good opportunity to 
create and enhance this new identity is through supporting democracy not just at home 
but also abroad.67 The variation in the level of democracy promotion activism between 
Slovakia, Romania and Bulgaria is instructive here. In the late 1990s, all three 
countries initially fell off of the fast track to EU and NATO accession and therefore 
needed to prove, consolidate, and project their new identity. Yet, the three countries 
have not been equally active in supporting democracy abroad. In fact, Slovakia was 
                                                 
65 Jonavicius, “The Democracy Promotion Policies of Central and Eastern European States.” 
66 On the EU, see Judith Kelley, “New Wine in Old Wineskins: Promoting Political Reforms through 
the New European Neighborhood Policy,” Journal of Common Market Sources 44, no. 1 (2006): 29–55. 
The Development Cooperation staff I interviewed had little connection with the former and current 
institutions dealing with European integration. 
67 Signaling their new identity as recognized, consolidated democracies – and new members of the EU – 
is a point made by Marian Kowalski, “Belarus: Next Generation Democracy,” in Kucharczyk and 
Lovitt, Democracy’s New Champions, 189–215; and Jonavicius, “The Democracy Promotion Policies 
of Central and Eastern European States.” 
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the only one of the three countries to catch up with the first wave EU applicants, thus 
having its democratic credentials recognized. At the same time, Slovakia has been one 
of the most active democracy promoters in the post-communist region whereas 
Romania and Bulgaria have been among the least interested in supporting democracy 
abroad. Romania and Bulgaria were both left behind to advance in their own second 
wave of EU enlargement and thus fairly equally in need to project a democratic 
identity internationally but they are not both equally interested in supporting 
democracy abroad. 
2.2.4. International Expectations, Pressures, and Obligations 
Some have also pointed to the EU members’ obligations in the field of 
development cooperation of which democratization is a constituent element.68 Yet, 
only some of the Eastern EU countries have transformed these obligations into an 
opportunity to provide democracy assistance. Consider Slovenia: like all the other 
(re)/emerging post-communist donors, Ljubljana’s important international partners – 
the Western Balkan countries – are transition laggards which have expressed interest 
in its transformation experience. Slovenia, however, has provided development but not 
democracy assistance to them. At the same time, democracy assistance should not be 
understood to be substituting for poor development cooperation capacity either 
because the most active democracy promoters, Poland, Slovakia, and the Czech 
Republic, also provide development aid throughout the neighborhood and beyond. 
Similarly, some have argued that the US has been instrumental in turning 
former recipients of democracy assistance into donors supporting political 
liberalization abroad. In the 1990s, Washington invested heavily in supporting the 
democratization of the current Eastern EU and NATO countries and in getting them 
                                                 
68 Open Society Institute, Not Your Grandfather’s Eastern Bloc; and Kucharczyk and Lovitt, 
Democracy’s New Champions. 
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into these Euro-Atlantic structures. As a result, these new members are seen to align 
themselves with US democracy promotion and to try to help others, as the US has 
helped them. Sofia is a good counter example for the suggested relationship between 
indebtedness to the US and official democracy promotion activism.69 In the 1990s, 
Bulgaria was the highest per capita recipient of US aid among the Eastern EU 
members. At the same time, Sofia is the least active democracy promoter.70  
The relationship is equally weak if one looks at subjective measures of 
indebtedness to external actors. A poll of the Visegad citizenry has found that the 
majority of Poles (62%) and Czechs (52%) think that they achieved democracy 
principally through their own efforts whereas a minority of Slovaks (40%) and 
Hungarians (35%) share this opinion.71 Such reports about the perceived external help 
these countries have received in the course of their democratic transitions, however, 
do not map in a meaningful way onto the democracy promotion activism ranking of 
the Visegrad countries: the Czech Republic (12), Poland (11), Slovakia (11) and then 
Hungary (9).  
Moreover, despite largest perceived indebtedness to external actors, Hungary 
has been least willing among the Visegrad group to itself support the development of 
democracy abroad. Moreover, Budapest has shied away from democracy promotion 
despite US pressure to be active.72 With US encouragement, Budapest set up an 
International Centre for Democratic Transition as the Hungarian contribution to the 
Community of Democracies.73 However, Budapest is currently financing only the 
operation of the institute, which relies on external donors for individual project 
                                                 
69 Kral, Enlarging EU Foreign Policy: The Role of New EU Member States and Candidate Countries. 
70 Data from Joshua Muravchik, Exporting Democracy: Fulfilling America’s Destiny (Washington, DC: 
AEI Press, 1991). 
71 Zora Butorova and Olga Gyarfasova, Return to Europe: New Freedoms Embraced, But Weak Public 
Support for Assisting Democracy Further Afield (Policy Brief No. 3, Prague: PASOS, 2009). 
72 Interview with R. P., October 19, 2008. 
73 International Centre for Democratic Transition, History of the International Centre for Democratic 
Transition, http://www.icdt.hu/def_ma.php?sm=15&q=0 (accessed April 2010). 
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funding.74 More generally, Hungary remains a reluctant/ hesitant promoter of 
democracy abroad – democracy promotion has yet to become a real foreign policy 
priority for Budapest, which is clearly reflected in the following facts: 1) Hungary’s 
democracy aid is perhaps the most fragmented assistance program among the Eastern 
European donors; 2) Budapest’s activism on issues beyond minority rights is rather 
low; and 3) even minority rights have been pursued not in the framework of 
democracy promotion but within the framework of cross-border cooperation. 
An alternative geopolitical argument offered is that democracy promotion is 
the new “battle” against Russia, which is considered a “threat” by “all new EU 
members.”75 However, one of the most active democracy promoters, Slovakia, has 
been defined as a “friendly pragmatist” when it comes to its relations with Russia 
because it sees little “threat” in Russia and seeks to maintain a relatively close 
relationship with it.76 Moreover, such accounts can not explain why the small Baltic 
nations, which do consider Russia a threat and until very recently were not included in 
the NATO defense plans, would risk and did indeed anger Russia with their 
democracy promotion efforts in the Russian “near abroad.” 77  
2.3. Strategic Democracy Promotion with a Domestic Twist 
So what explains the differences in geographical priorities and in levels of 
engagement among the Eastern European democracy promoters? This dissertation 
argues that the introduction, persistence, and logic of the official democracy 
promotion were all a product of the efforts of the civic elites who prepared the 
democratic breakthroughs in the region. Motivated by a normative commitment to 
                                                 
74 Horvath, “Hungary’s Democracy Assistance Policies and Priorities,” in Kucharczyk and Lovitt, 
Democracy’s New Champions, 51–80. 
75 Jonavicius, “The Democracy Promotion Policies of Central and Eastern European States.” 
76 On Russian-Slovak relations, see Mark Leonard and Nicu Popescu, A Power Audit of EU-Russia 
Relations (policy paper, European Council on Foreign Relations, November 2007). 
77 On Russian-Baltic relations, see Leonard and Popescu, A Power Audit of EU-Russia Relations.  
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democracy, these activists not only continued working towards developing democracy 
at home but also laid the foundations for civic as well as for governmental democracy 
promotion: they have been supporting the diffusion of democratic norms and practices 
and have encouraged their governments to do the same. The advocacy of such civic 
norm entrepreneurs benefited from two facts: first, that in the 1990s democracy 
promotion became increasingly understood as an accepted and necessary component 
of the international behavior of states and second, that some of the former opposition 
allies of these entrepreneurs had assumed power and continued to pay attention to 
democracy issues at home and abroad. However, only in cases where these civic (and 
political) activists articulated strong and compelling arguments about the importance 
of official democracy promotion did support for democracy abroad become part of the 
foreign policy traditions of these new democratic post-communist states. Moreover, 
the stronger the civic voices in favor of democracy promotion, the more easily it was 
embraced by local political elites and the more attention was paid to it thereafter. And 
finally, the arguments about the importance of official democracy promotion shaped 
the logic of consequent state efforts to support democracy abroad. 
2.3.1. Explaining the Variation in the Level of Democracy Promotion Activism 
Consider the comparison of the Bulgarian and the Slovak case. The Bulgarian 
democratic breakthrough preceded the Slovak one by a little more than a year and was 
part of the same wave of democratization and Central and Southeastern Europe. A 
decade later, Slovakia is one of the most active democracy promoters in the region 
whereas Bulgaria has invested little in supporting democracy abroad. Thus a 
comparison of the turnaround of these two countries from democracy promotion 
recipients to donors is appropriate as well as instructive. 
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Both democratic breakthroughs produced a core of civic norm entrepreneurs 
who felt a moral responsibility to work towards developing democracy at home as 
well as abroad. Such Slovak and Bulgarian activists began sharing almost immediately 
the lessons they had learned during their democratic breakthrough struggles with other 
civic elites in the Western Balkans. Bulgarian civic support for the democratization of 
their neighbors was limited to a few mostly informal initiatives while Slovak civic 
democracy promotion flourished quickly and soon became internationally recognized. 
Consequently, the Slovak entrepreneurs approached their former opposition allies who 
were now in power in Bratislava and convinced them of the potential of the Slovak 
democratic breakthrough to serve as a model for defeating illiberal incumbents 
reigning over unstable “electoral democracies” throughout the neighborhood. The 
Slovak government quickly joined forces with the Slovak civic democracy promoters 
because their arguments resonated with the perceived political realities and needs in 
Slovakia. The Bulgarian civic norm entrepreneurs were less successful – they kept the 
Bulgarian cabinet staffed with their former opposition allies up to date on the civic 
initiatives in support of democratization in the Western Balkans. However, they failed 
in framing such democracy promotion activities as transcending transnational civic 
solidarity. In fact, during these conversations, the Bulgarian political elites in effect 
convinced the few civic democracy promoters in the country of the importance of 
official non-intervention – an argument rooted in Bulgaria’s history of tense relations 
with its neighbors.78 If the Slovak civic elites used the period before and after their 
country’s EU accession to consolidate the democracy promotion agenda introduced in 
the period immediately after the Slovak democratic breakthrough, their Bulgarian 
counterparts were not strong enough to even influence Bulgaria’s post-EU accession 
                                                 
78 The Slovak and Bulgarian accounts presented here are based on interviews with civic and political 
activists in the late 1990s. Most informative among more recent interviews have been the following 
conversations: Interview with P. D., November 26, 2008; interview with E. K., November 28, 2008; 
interview with R. S., October 22, 2009; interview with R. S., May 14, 2010. 
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foreign policy debate.79 The Slovak activists, on the other hand, have continued to 
wield the authority “to influence public opinion and the actions of the political elite” 
on Slovakia’s democracy promotion in the neighborhood it.80 Most impressively, they 
have kept democracy promotion on Bratislava’s diplomatic and assistance agenda 
even after the return to power of the only partially reformed left. 
In sum, this comparison speaks 1) to the necessity of an effective (resonant) 
framing of democracy promotion and 2) to the importance of a strong contingent of 
civic activists advocating that democracy promotion be high on their state’s agenda 
and participating in its realization though implementing projects under their country’s 
official development assistance system. And the stronger the contingent of civic 
democracy promoters in a country, the bigger their influence over the practice of 
democracy promotion of their country over time. I use simple regression analysis as a 
quick initial test of the influence of civic democracy promoters on the official 
commitment to democracy promotion. 
On the dependent variable side, I use the democracy promotion activism scores 
of the Eastern EU members. On the independent variable side, I use the proportion of 
NGOs involved in supporting democracy abroad out of all NGOs working abroad as a 
proxy for the strength of civic democracy promoters in each country. In all of the 
Eastern EU members, the most active non-state actors working internationally have 
organized themselves in Development-NGO platforms. Such umbrella organizations 
include groups, which work on humanitarian, cultural, social, economic, and political 
issues and which have come together to support each other’s efforts and to create 
better conditions for international development initiatives by influencing national 
governments and the EU. The umbrella structures themselves have been mostly 
                                                 
79 Interview with A. D., July 27, 2007; interview with O. D., June 17, 2009; interview with V. K., 
October 23, 2009. 
80 Juraj Marusiak et al., “Foreign Policy – Main Trends, Bilateral Relations, Regional Cooperation,” in 
Slovakia 2006: Global Report on the State of Society (Bratislava: Institute for Public Affairs, 2006). 
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involved in participating in the development of each country’s assistance programs but 
as national forums they have also facilitated the coordination of the efforts of the 
organizations interested in influencing their country’s diplomatic support for 
democracy abroad.81 Therefore, the proportion of democracy promoters within such 
platforms could be said to be indicative of the importance democracy promotion to the 
local civil society and thus, to be representative of the overall strength of civic support 
for democratization abroad. [Please see Table 2.5 for the percent of civic democracy 
promoters of all international development NGOs in individual countries as of 
2009.82] 
Table 2.5. Percent of Civic Democracy Promoters of All Members of the National 
Platform of International Development NGOs by Donor Country 
 Donor Country 
 PO EE LT LV CZ SK HU SL RO BG 
% Civic Democracy Promoters 49 31 37 33 40 34 32 11 30 10 
 
The simple regression analysis suggests a significant, positive, and potentially 
strong relationship between the strength of Eastern European civic democracy 
promoters and the democracy promotion activism of their governments. Within the 
group of Eastern European donors, the size of a country’s civic democracy promotion 
contingent seems to be a good predictor of that country’s official commitment to 
democracy promotion. [For a graphical representation of this relationship, see Figure 
2.3.] Moreover, there are no outliers in the group. And although the sample size is 
small (n=10), the relationship appears to be meaningful and positive. 
                                                 
81 Interview with G. G., October 13, 2008; and interview with V. U., July 12, 2007. 
82 It should be noted that there has not been much flux in the membership of the national development 
NGO platforms; therefore, their 2009 composition is representative of their average composition over 
time.  
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Figure 2.3. Correlation between the Size of the Civic Democracy Promotion 
Contingent and the Official Commitment to Democracy Promotion within the 
Group of Eastern European Donors 
Unfortunately, this analysis does not reveal much about the direction of 
causality or the mechanisms underlying this relationship.83 To examine those, I 
conduct two in-depth case studies, which I describe in the chapters that follow. These 
chapters set out to uncover the origins of official democracy promotion and the role of 
civic democracy promoters in the establishment of the foreign policy traditions of the 
Eastern EU members as well as the influence of civic democracy promoters in the 
persistence of democracy promotion over time. 
                                                 
83 Additionally, this analysis is further limited in that it ignores the impact of other possible explanatory 
variables and their relationship with the strength of Eastern European civic democracy promoters. As a 
result, the analysis most likely overstates the importance of the size of the civic democracy promotion 
contingent in a country to that country’s official commitment to democracy promotion. 
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2.3.2. Explaining the Variation in the Geographical Priorities of Eastern European 
Democracy Promotion 
In addition to influencing the introduction and persistence of Eastern European 
official democracy promotion, the norm entrepreneurs who advocated for it also 
shaped the logic of the consequent state initiatives on this issue. The arguments that 
such elites put forward when making a case for the importance of official democracy 
promotion have influenced the geographical priorities of such state efforts. The 
Eastern European civic activists sought to embed democracy promotion into their 
country’s foreign policy by pointing to the answers that support for democracy abroad 
holds for improving the international environment of these young democratic states. 
Accordingly, for the countries in the Eastern European political space – Poland, 
Lithuania, Estonia, and Latvia, democracy promotion emerged as a strategic response 
to containing Russian imperialism. For the countries in the Central and Southeastern 
European political space – Slovakia (the Czech Republic), Hungary, Romania, 
Slovenia (and Bulgaria), democracy promotion emerged as a solution to the political 
and economic destabilization as a result of the disintegration of the eastern but 
especially the southeastern European fringes. 
On the one hand, for the Baltic countries the struggle against communism was 
also a struggle against Russian imperialism, which had for centuries threatened the 
independence of these nations. Thus, containing Russian expansionism was deemed 
one of the most important foreign policy objectives of the new democratic Baltic 
states. Moscow’s “aggressive” stance throughout the 1990s and the 2000s – including 
economic and political pressure, opposition to Baltic membership in NATO, and 
interference on behalf of Russian minorities in Estonia and Latvia – only reinforced 
Baltic concerns about Russia’s intentions. The former Baltic dissidents saw 
independence and democracy as linked, as they had been in their own anti-communist 
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movements. Such civic norm entrepreneurs argued that if the former republics, 
especially the “European” ones that were the “founders” of the former Soviet Union, 
were independent and democratic, they would counter-balance Russia’s power, 
weakening Moscow’s temptation to take over the USSR’s imperial position. Thus 
these activists persuaded the local political elites that “shifts to democracy will 
decrease the influence of Russia in the countries of the former Soviet Union and may 
thus be considered as security guarantors” for the Baltic states.84 Therefore, official 
democracy promotion was incorporated into Baltic foreign policy as an element of a 
geo-political strategy for weakening the Russian sphere of influence and thus deterring 
Moscow’s aggression. This democracy promotion logic has led the Baltic countries to 
focus on the western former USSR republics and the South Caucuses and relative 
Baltic neglect of the Western Balkans. 
On the other hand, the post-communist Central and Southeastern European 
countries, which were formerly part of the Austro-Hungarian and/or the Ottoman 
empires, quickly realized their vulnerability to spillover from outside shocks from 
neighboring former Yugoslavia and the former USSR such as political instability, 
capricious dictators, interethnic volatility, and weak states. Such volatility threatened 
not only the economic expansion in which these Eastern EU members have tended to 
be mostly interested but also political cooperation in the region on important issues 
such as minority issues and traditional alliances. The civic elites who prepared the 
democratic breakthroughs in the Central and Southeastern European countries saw 
spreading democracy in the neighborhood as a “long-term investment in its 
                                                 
84 Quote by Vahur Made cited in Jonavicius, “The Democracy Promotion Policies of Central and 
Eastern European States.” The Estonian Government’s European Union Policy for 2004–2006 also ties 
security in the region directly to democratization in Ukraine, Moldova, Belarus, Georgia and other 
Southern Caucasian states. David J. Galbreath and Jeremy W. Lamoreaux, “Bastion, Beacon or Bridge? 
Conceptualizing the Baltic Logic of the EU’s Neighbourhood,” Geopolitics 12, no. 1 (2007): 109–32. 
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stability.”85 Therefore, official democracy promotion by these countries emerged as a 
response to autocratic nationalistic regimes, often reigning over weak states 
throughout the neighborhood. This democracy promotion logic has led most of these 
donors to prioritize recipients understood to influence their region such as Ukraine to 
the east and Serbia to the southeast as well as on traditional / important international 
partners for each individual democracy promoter. 
It should be noted that Czech support for dissidents struggling against 
communist and post-communist regimes around the globe is the exception to the 
strategic logic behind Eastern European democracy promotion. While there has been 
some strategic Czech investment in the European post-communist region (Serbia, 
Ukraine, Georgia, and Moldova), there is also a lot of principled support for upholding 
human rights in countries where they are regularly and gravely violated, for example – 
Belarus, Cuba, and Burma. This dual commitment to democracy promotion is 
reflected in the Czech “transformation policy [which] is designed to motivate political 
processes leading towards long-term stability and prosperity and to help emancipate 
human rights defenders and civil society as key actors in sustainable democratic 
change.”86 Still, the logic of Czech democracy promotion much like other Eastern 
European support for democracy abroad is a product of the efforts and beliefs of the 
civic elites who prepared the democratic breakthroughs in the country. The roots of 
the Czech democracy promotion dualism can be found in the competing political 
movements that succeeded the former Czech dissidents: the first is best articulated in 
Vaclav “Havel’s committed and distinctive belief in universal values” such as human 
rights and democracy and the second is best represented in Vaclav Klaus’ belief in 
                                                 
85 Quote from the Transition Promotion programme concept – the official strategy of Czech democracy 
assistance, cited in Kucharczyk and Lovitt, Democracy’s New Champions. 
86 Therefore, “the promotion of democracy in terms of the participation of citizens and protection of 
human rights and fundamental freedoms is a foreign policy priority [for the Central and Southern 
European EU countries] as it enhances security, stability and prosperity” in their immediate 
international environment. Czech Foreign Policy Annual Report 2007. 
 84 
economic and political (neo-)liberalism and the special role of the Czech Republic in 
“reviving democracies and market economies in the post-communist world.”87  
2.4. Strategic Democracy Export with an International Twist 
There are a lot of similarities between the thematic priorities and foreign policy 
instruments used by the young Eastern European democracy promoters. For example, 
all of them have a strong preference for technical assistance, which emphasizes – if to 
a different degree – strengthening civil society abroad. Still, there are also many 
differences. For instance, different donors emphasize different segments of civil 
society: Poland has uniquely invested in the development of local communities 
whereas Slovakia – in the development of media- and elections- monitoring groups. 
How can such variation be explained? The approaches to democracy promotion are 
impossible to analyze without an in-depth examination of the foreign policies of 
individual post-communist donors. Still, there are a few factors, which seem to have 
shaped the Eastern European approaches to democracy promotion and which stand out 
even in a cursory review of these donors’ activities: the national transition expertise of 
these fledgling donors and the Western approaches to democracy promotion, which 
have shaped the democratization of the Eastern EU members, as well as the 
democratization needs of their recipients. 
First, all the Eastern EU members have identified their recent transition 
experiences as a democracy promotion asset. They are thus very consciously 
“exporting” “best practices” from their own transformations. Such national exports 
have produced some distinctive thematic investments and unique preferences for 
particular policy instruments. For instance, Hungary prefers to implement democracy 
assistance projects with the consent of the host government and has emphasized 
                                                 
87 Rick Fawn, “Reconstituting a National Identity: Ideologies in Czech Foreign Policy after the Split,” 
Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics 19, no. 3 (2003): 204–28. 
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human and especially minority rights questions.88 The Czech Republic has 
distinctively championed rule of law through reformed state administrations and 
human and especially political rights such as freedom of expression.89 Prague has also 
supported financially and morally beleaguered opposition movements around the 
world and preferred to weaken their oppressors by international condemnation. And a 
final example – Estonia has shared its unique e-governance expertise (information 
policy and transparency) with nearby Euro-Atlantic applicants. 
Second, while such differences in national transition expertise have produced a 
lot of differences in the post-communist donors’ approaches to democracy promotion, 
the fact that the Eastern European democratic breakthroughs occurred in two waves 
has produced some similarities among donors within each of the waves and some 
differences among the donors in the two waves. Consider the following example, the 
Czech Republic and Slovakia shared the same communist experience but emerged as 
young democracies respectively during the first and the second wave of 
democratization in Eastern Europe. Each of the waves presented different 
breakthrough challenges: the first wave – the need to defeat a communist state and the 
second wave – to push a hybrid regime in a more democratic direction. Consequently, 
Prague – much like Budapest and the Baltic capitals – has emphasized strengthening 
political and civic rights through state reform while empowering civil society to de-
concentrate power in recipient societies. On the other hand, Slovakia (like Romania) 
has focused on building the capacity of politically active civil society to participate in 
policy debates and to hold elected officials accountable. 
Third, since some of the best practices exported aboard were imported from 
various Western donors, there are a lot of similarities among the Eastern European 
                                                 
88 Horvath, “Hungary’s Democracy Assistance Policies and Priorities,” in Kucharczyk and Lovitt, 
Democracy’s New Champions, 51–80.  
89 Vladimír Bartovic, “The Czech Republic’s Democracy Assistance Policies and Priorities,” in 
Kucharczyk and Lovitt, Democracy’s New Champions, 29–51. 
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democracy promotion. In fact, one of the cited comparative advantages of the young 
post-communist donors is that they have all learned from both the EU and the US 
school of democracy promotion.90 The American and the European traditions have 
often been contrasted: US is said to be preoccupied with “civil and political society” in 
the process of “political liberalization and democratization” whereas European is seen 
to focus on “governance” and the “state” and generally on the more “technical” 
aspects of the “consolidation of democracy.”91 Thus all Eastern European democracy 
promoters combine, to a lesser or a greater extent, elements of both these approaches. 
Fourth, another source of similarity in the democracy promotion approach of 
the Eastern European donors comes from the different democratization needs of 
recipients with different regime types, especially given the fact that most of them 
come from the same neighborhood. When working in dictatorships in the region, the 
Eastern European democracy promoters have worked almost exclusively with civil 
society and alternative leaders from the recipient citizenry to prepare them to act as 
agents of change. Alternatively, the post-communist democracy promoters have 
invested much more heavily in reforming the state in “countries in transition.” 
Moreover, since most of the Eastern EU priority recipients are seen as potential 
candidates for EU integration, relatively more attention has been paid to the 
Europeanization of their states. 
                                                 
90 Kucharczyk and Lovitt, Democracy’s New Champions. 
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This chapter suggested that the young Eastern European democracy promoters 
have already become some of the most ardent supporters of the idea that the benefits 
of democracy should be shared with others in the EU neighborhood. As a result, these 
(re-) emerging donors have invested a lot of diplomatic effort and not insignificant aid 
resources in supporting the democratization of a number of (communist and) post-
communist countries. In terms of geographical priorities, the Baltic countries have 
tended to support primarily the democratization of the EU’s immediate eastern 
neighbors whereas the Central and Southeastern European donors have tended to 
support the democratization of the EU neighbors to the southeast as well as the east. 
Given the cultural similarities and historic-political linkages between donors and 
recipients and the activism of the Eastern European democracy promoters, their efforts 
have proven important in shaping the expectation of elites in transition laggards about 
what is possible and beneficial for them and their nations in terms of further reform. 
Eastern European democracy promotion activism has also been crucial in keeping 
democracy promotion in the EU neighborhood high on the agenda of various Euro-
Atlantic regional structures. At the same time, however, because democracy 
promotion has represented a strategic investment by the post-communist donors in 
creating a congenial international environment, supporting democracy abroad has 
sometimes been prioritized under and even sacrificed for good relations with 
important international partners or other political or economic considerations. 
Moreover, despite much similarity in the initiatives of the Eastern European 
democracy promoters, there have also been significant differences in the geographical 
priorities and in levels of engagement of these donors. This chapter argued that the 
introduction, the persistence, and the logic of the official post-communist democracy 
promotion were all a product of the efforts of the civic elites who prepared the 
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democratic breakthroughs in the region. The arguments these activists put forward in 
their advocacy in favor of official democracy promotion have shaped the logic of 
consequent state efforts, including the priority recipients of democratization support. 
However, such norm entrepreneurs have succeeded in incorporating democracy 
promotion in the foreign policies of their countries only where these activists 
articulated strong and compelling arguments about the benefits of supporting 
democracy abroad. Moreover, the stronger the civic voices in favor of democracy 
promotion, the more easily it was embraced by local political elites and the more 
attention was paid to it thereafter. 
The next three chapters examine further the relationship between the strength 
of the civic democracy promotion contingent in a country and the official commitment 
to democracy promotion. They scrutinize the origins of official democracy promotion 
and the role of civic democracy promoters in the establishment of the foreign policy 
traditions of the Eastern EU members as well as the influence of civic democracy 
promoters in the persistence of democracy promotion over time. The focus of these 
chapters is the non-governmental and governmental efforts of the Polish and Slovak 
democracy promoters. As documented above, Poland and Slovakia are two of the 
three most active democracy promoters within the Eastern EU members group. 
Moreover, unlike the third most active player – the Czech Republic, Poland’s and 
Slovakia’s efforts are typical for the Eastern European donors: while Prague has 
offered both instrumental and principled support to autocracies and countries in 
transition around the globe, the democracy promotion efforts of Warsaw and 
Bratislava, much like the activities of the other Eastern EU capitals, are best 
understood as a strategic commitment to creating a stable, secure, and prosperous 
neighborhood. Finally, Poland and Slovakia also represent the two waves of 
turnaround from recipients to donors in Eastern Europe in two different international 
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environments both regionally and globally. This difference is additionally instructive 
for understanding the different post-communist approaches to supporting democracy 
abroad because the Eastern EU members have tended to export the expertise 
developed during their own transition to a capitalist democracy and each wave of such 
transformations has faced particular challenges and overcome those with particular 
democratization innovations. Building on this comparison, the next three chapters 
present an in-depth examination of the different factors shaping the various national 
official and non-governmental approaches to democracy promotion. 
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CHAPTER 3: 
EASTERN EUROPEAN CIVIC DEMOCRACY PROMOTION 
Much like official democracy promotion, Eastern European civic support for 
democratization abroad presents a puzzle: Why are these young civic groups, most of 
which are primarily active at home, developing international programs? Such 
initiatives divert resources abroad and need to overcome the significant costs of 
transnational activism.1 To unravel this puzzle, this chapter asks why and how have 
Polish and Slovak NGOs sought to advance democracy abroad. The argument here is 
that such efforts have been normatively motivated but strategically pursued.  
2. Motivations behind Polish and Slovak Civic Democracy Promotion 
Many of the previous works on transnational human rights and democracy 
advocacy networks emphasize “the centrality of principled ideas and values in 
motivating their formation.”2 Thus, these activists’ “strong notions about appropriate 
or desirable behavior in their community” – both domestic and international – is often 
implied or assumed to be motivating support for human rights and democracy abroad.3 
However, some observers of Eastern European civil society have suggested a more 
opportunistic behavior on the part of a lot of the human rights and democracy 
advocacy groups in the post-communist region. Valuing their survival over their social 
                                                 
1 On costs of transnational activism, see Sidney Tarrow, The New Transnational Activism (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2005) and Joe Bandy and Jackie Smith, Coalitions Across Borders: 
Transnational Protest and the Neoliberal Order (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2005), who 
discuss four major obstacles to transnational activism: 1) cultural and political diversity, 2) distance, 3) 
economic barriers to the flow of people and information, and 4) varying political contexts. 
2 Margaret E. Keck and Kathryn Sikkink, Activists Beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in 
International Politics (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1998): 1. 
3 Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink, “International Norm Dynamics and Political Change,” 
International Organization 52, no. 4 (1998): 887–917. Sometimes the principled motivations of these 
actors are explicitly argued as well: “These NGOs […] are motivated mainly by ideals, not profits.” 
Sarah E. Mendelson, “Democracy Assistance and Political Transition in Russia: Between Success and 
Failure,” International Security 25, no. 2 (Spring 2001): 68–106. 
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mission and dependent on donor generosity, Eastern European NGOs have been 
criticized for focusing on “chasing funding” (frequently to the exclusion of pursuing 
local causes.)4 Thus, one could argue that as many of the international donors, which 
used to fund democracy work in Eastern Europe, began withdrawing from the 
countries that neared EU accession and moved further east and southeast where 
democracy was still at risk, the NGOs doing democracy work in the Eastern EU states 
followed the funding. 
Understanding the motivation behind Eastern European civic democracy 
promotion is important for several reasons. First, it helps provide an answer to the 
puzzle described above. Second, to the extent that civic democracy promoters 
influence official support for democracy abroad, it is important to understand what 
drives such norm entrepreneurs – whether principled beliefs or opportunities for 
organizational survival and development. The availability of funding is, of course, a 
necessary condition for the operation of many Eastern European NGOs. However, the 
question here is whether pursuing funding opportunities is the leading cause for the 
international work of the Eastern European civil societies and whether civic 
democracy promotion is thus an extension of Western efforts or an Eastern European 
principled initiative that has become a part of the larger efforts of the Euro-Atlantic 
international community. Third, theoretically, it is valuable to understand how such 
motivations compete and interact with one another, as different motivations imply 
different patterns of activism. Fourth, since most of the diffusion literature (in both 
comparative politics and international relations) is adopter-centric, exploring the 
                                                 
4 John Glenn and Sarah Mendelson, eds., The Power and Limits of NGOs: A Critical Look at Building 
Democracy in Eastern Europe and Eurasia. (New York: Columbia University Press, 2002). James 
Richter, “Promoting Civil Society? Democracy Assistance and Russian Women’s Organizations,” 
Problems of Post Communism 49, no. 1 (2002): 30–41. Tanya Narozhna, “Foreign Aid for a Post-
Euphoric Eastern Europe: The Limitations of Western Assistance in Developing Civil Society,” Journal 
of International Relations and Development 7, no. 3 (October 2004): 243–66. 
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motivations of the transmitters improves our understanding of the supply-side of 
diffusion. 
In this section I look at the rhetoric, origins, and practice of Polish and Slovak 
non-governmental support for the spread of democracy abroad to uncover the 
motivations behind such initiatives. All three analyses suggest that Eastern European 
civic democracy promotion developed is a primarily normative commitment and the 
number of projects and organizations that are opportunistic, that is motivated by 
domestic and foreign funding, has remained relatively small. 
2.1. The Origins of Polish and Slovak Civic Democracy Promotion 
What are the origins of civic democracy promotion in Poland and Slovakia? 
Was it championed by activists who shared a belief in a universal right to democracy 
and/or did it begin when the Western donors were pulling out of Poland and Slovakia 
in preparation for Warsaw’s and Bratislava’s EU accession? The argument here is that 
civic democracy promotion in both Poland and Slovakia built on the values and 
networks of the activists who prepared the democratic breakthroughs in these 
countries and who shared a commitment to democracy coupled with a perceived 
obligation to assist others on the road to democracy. This obligation was felt primarily 
towards other post-communist countries in Europe, where a strong sense of solidarity 
(both in terms of shared identity and transnational networks) had developed as a result 
of the shared experience of communism and post-communism. 
2.1.1. Poland 
In Poland, civic democracy promotion grew out of the dissident networks, 
which in the 1989 brought down the communist regime in the country. By the late 
1970s, key Polish dissidents had embraced the idea that the Polish opposition had 
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much in common with opposition movements in the other nations in the Soviet bloc.5 
This solidarity found expression in key articles in the underground press and in 
statements of opposition leaders. Moreover, since its first congress in 1981, the 
Solidarity labor union, around which the Polish anti-communist opposition movement 
grew, began more directly and openly encouraging and supporting other dissident 
groups in the Soviet bloc to “follow the Polish example” and fight for freedom and 
representation.6 And when Solidarity was crushed by the imposition of martial law in 
Poland in 1981, the movement took that as evidence that the Polish dissidents needed 
to make allies of the neighboring eastern and southern oppositions.7 Accordingly, the 
Polish underground broke the isolation of the nations within the Soviet bloc and 
initiated dialogue with dissidents throughout the Soviet bloc and most intensively with 
Czechoslovakia, Lithuania, and Ukraine.8 
At about the same time, the international community – Christians, trade 
unionists, and Western communists, conservatives, liberals and socialists – was 
beginning to come together in support of the Polish Solidarity movement as the most 
massive and organized opposition in the communist world.9 Most active was the US 
government, which under President Reagan began openly providing technical and 
financial aid to the Polish underground.10 Washington supported the Polish 
                                                 
5 Timothy Snyder, The Reconstruction of Nations: Poland, Ukraine, Lithuania, Belarus, 1569–1999 
(New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2003). Interview with J. M., October 29, 2008. 
6 Solidarity Labor Union, “Message to the Working People of Eastern Europe,” cited in Padraic 
Kenney, A Carnival of Revolution: Central Europe 1989 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 
2002). 
7 Snyder, The Reconstruction of Nations. 
8 Kenney argues that such dialogue made it harder for communism to contain dissent within national 
borders. Moreover, as stereotypes and fears that each nation had of others were dispelled, so that by the 
late 1980s, the events in one country could influence those across its borders. Kenney, A Carnival 
Revolution. 
9 Timothy Garton Ash, The Polish Revolution: Solidarity (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 
2002). 
10 For example, between 1983 and 1988, the United States provided more than $5 million in cash 
assistance to Solidarity and other groups opposed to the Warsaw Government. Some of the money was 
openly appropriated by Congress, some of it was provided through the National Endowment for 
Democracy in consultation with the State Department, and some of the support was channeled 
surreptitiously through Polish émigré groups. This transition from secret American support for 
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underground publication network (with smuggled publications, printing machinery, 
radio equipment, and video cassettes) and sponsored the work of the Voice of America 
and Radio Free Europe/ Radio Liberty to provide the Polish citizenry with alternative-
to-the-regime information. In turn, the Polish opposition quickly started supporting the 
development of other eastern European oppositions. Solidarity activists offered 
equipment, political literature, and most importantly a rich tradition of organizing anti-
communist resistance and protest.11 The Polish underground was living its slogan 
“Fighting for your freedom and ours.”12 
In the years immediately after the collapse of communism, some of the groups 
that had operated either underground or semi-officially, such as the Polish-Czech-
Slovak Solidarity Foundation and the Karta Center Foundation, not only legalized 
their activities at home but also continued their democratization efforts abroad.13 By 
the mid-1990s, some of these NGOs working abroad had made a conscious effort to 
develop and specialize their international democracy promotion activities. For 
instance, the Helsinki Committee was training human right activists, the Initiative for 
Democracy in Eastern Europe was supporting promoting civic pluralism, and the 
Center for Social and Economic Research was advising political and business leaders 
on the social, economic and political transformations towards market democracy.14 
Moreover, those activities had moved beyond organizing occasional meetings with 
other Eastern European civic groups.  
                                                                                                                                            
opposition groups in Communist countries through the Central Intelligence Agency to public grants was 
welcomed by Solidarity supporters, who saw the new openly provided assistance as more effective 
because it made them less vulnerable to charges of being tools of Western intelligence services. Gregory 
F. Domber, Supporting the Revolution: America, Democracy, and the End of the Cold War in Poland, 
1981–1989 (PhD diss., George Washington University, 2008). 
11 Kenney, A Carnival Revolution. 
12 Interview with J. M., October 29, 2008. 
13 Both organizations sought to promoting tolerance among and democracy in Poland and its southern 
and eastern neighbors respectively. For a history of the development of Polish civic democracy 
promotion in the 1990s, see Grazyna Czubek, Social Diplomacy: The Case of Poland (Warsaw: Stefan 
Batory Foundation, 2002). 
14 Interview with A. B., October 28, 2008; and interview with P. K., October 19, 2008. 
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Additionally, a growing number of organizations, previously working mainly 
in Poland, were becoming active in the post-communist region. Most of these NGOs 
are led and/or founded by former dissidents such as the directors of the Polish-
American Freedom Foundation and of the East European Democracy Center.15 
Moreover, many of the younger civic recruits leading or staffing Polish NGOs 
supporting democracy abroad are either the children of Solidarity activists such as the 
founder of Free Belarus or graduates of the programs of the first dissident-led NGOs 
such as the director of the Pulaski Foundation.16 Such Polish civic leaders followed the 
dissident tradition of international solidarity – they maintained and further developed 
their personal and professional networks linking them to other pro-democratic actors 
with whom the Polish activists felt solidarity. 
So even by the turn of the century about 1/5 of the 2500 largest Polish NGOs 
were involved abroad and international activity was a priority for 90 organizations.17 
Some of these NGOs were working on social or economic issues but a lot of them 
focused on supporting the democratization of the region.18 And thanks to the number 
and diversity of NGOs working abroad, Polish civic democracy promotion was 
addressing a variety of problems of constructing the institutions of a democratic polity. 
Such initiatives were often sponsored by US donors but over time and especially after 
                                                 
15 Author’s estimate based on interviews with the members of the Polish federation of international 
development NGOs. See also Paulina Pospieszna, “When Recipients Become Donors – Polish 
Democracy Assistance in Belarus and Ukraine” (paper prepared for presentation at the 2010 Midwest 
Political Science Association National Conference, April 22–25, 2010).  
16 This second generation of civic activists has thus been socialized into accepting the former dissidents’ 
commitment to international solidarity. (Interview with J. M., October 28, 2008, and interview with A. 
K., October 21, 2008.) 
17 Czubek, Social Diplomacy: The Case of Poland. 
18 NGOs working on international development issues have been building not only on the early 
international initiatives of the former dissidents but also on the movement about “discovery” and 
support of Poles living abroad as well as on the work of residents in borderland communities in laying 
the foundations of “neighborly” cooperation with Poland’s near and not so immediate neighbors. For 
instance, organizations such as the Pomost (Aid to Poles in the East) Society and Polish Community 
Association began seeking out Polish communities abroad to help support the revival of Polish national 
identity, education, and culture. Czubek, Social Diplomacy: The Case of Poland. 
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the institutionalization of the Polish development assistance also increasingly by the 
Polish state.19 
Consider the following typical example.20 The Civil Society Development 
Foundation was set up in 1993 as part of a 2-year Rockefeller Brothers Fund program 
in Poland (and Hungary) to train local civic leaders to train and counsel other local 
activists about starting and running NGOs. A member of the Foundation recalls that 
“even as this program was running, the founders – [former union organizers] – were 
thinking that with time they should try to export what they’ve learned.”21 They asked 
the American trainers if they could invite some of their Ukrainian contacts to visit 
Poland and observe the sessions. These Polish activists report that they wanted to help 
their neighbors because they felt that as “the recipients of foreign assistance [they] 
have a debt to be repaid” and because “Ukraine is our most similar country with 
shared history and language.”22 
In sum, the fact that post-communist civic democracy promotion in Poland 
flourished before Western donors began pulling out of Poland at the turn of the 
century to focus on the more problematic transitions in the region suggests that the 
withdrawal of donor funding from Poland was not the driving factor behind Polish 
non-governmental support for democratization in the neighborhood. Instead, in the 
words of a prominent Polish civic democracy promoter, “The roots and motives 
underlying the foreign activities of Poland’s third sector can be found in the traditions 
of such social movements as the Solidarity Trade Union.”23 As organizational and/or 
ideological descendants of the Union, these civic democracy promoters inherited 
Solidarity’s commitment to democracy and to assisting others on the road to 
                                                 
19 Author’s estimate based on interviews with the members of the Polish federation of international 
development NGOs. 
20 This example is based on an interview with K. S., October 8, 2008. 
21 Interview with K. S., October 8, 2008. 
22 Interview with K. S., October 8, 2008. 
23 Czubek, Social Diplomacy: The Case of Poland. 
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democracy (the way that the West had supported Poland’s democratization).24 Thus 
Polish civic democracy promotion grew around a core of normatively motivated 
individuals and NGOs acting in solidarity with others struggling for democracy 
abroad.  
2.1.2. Slovakia 
In Slovakia, civic democracy promotion grew out of the networks, which 
prepared the democratic breakthrough in the country – the OK 98 civic opposition to 
Vladimir Meciar. Meciar was the most influential Slovak politician in the 1990s: he 
participated in the Slovak anti-communist movement, led the first democratic 
government in the Slovak lands of Czechoslovakia, and later negotiated Slovak 
independence from the federation in 1993. However, by the middle of the decade, his 
nationalist populism and lack of tolerance for democratic practices had arrested the 
Slovak transition and undermined the country’s bid for membership in the Euro-
Atlantic international organizations. Leading Slovak NGOs became concerned that the 
government would manipulate the forthcoming 1998 elections in order to remain in 
power and would then continue to reverse the democratization of the country and 
increase its international isolation. Such civic leaders began preparing an “open 
nonpartisan public initiative, designed to help ensure free and fair elections” – the OK 
98 campaign.25 The Slovak civil society mobilized to create a popular mandate for a 
radical break with Meciar’s illiberal regime and push the country in a decidedly 
democratic (and pro-Western) direction. 
                                                 
24 The latter commitment was further reinforced in the post-communist era, when many of these Polish 
NGOs were again recipients of Western assistance for their efforts during Poland’s transition as well. 
Civic and political elites in the country acknowledge “rel[ying] heavily on the aid and experience of 
Western NGOs” (Czubek, Social Diplomacy: The Case of Poland). Such aid is also believed to be 
“crucial” and “a major factor in the successful transition to full-fledged democrac[y]” (Kucharczyk and 
Lovitt, Democracy’s New Champions). 
25 Joerg Forbrig and Pavol Demes, Reclaiming Democracy: Civil Society and Electoral Change in 
Central and Eastern Europe (Washington, DC: German Marshall Fund of the United States, 2007). 
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Despite Meciar’s attempts to silence independent voices in Slovakia, civil 
society in the country had continued to develop with foreign, and especially US, 
financial, technical, and political support.26 Since Western donors too were alarmed by 
Meciar’s autocratic inclinations, they decisively threw their support behind the 
political and civic leaders of the OK 98 campaign. Western donors set up a flexible 
funding system with simplified application procedures for financing and co-financing 
of projects supporting democracy in Slovakia: general civil society development as 
well as improving voter awareness and information about the 1998 vote, increasing 
turnout, and ensuring citizen oversight of the elections.27 Moreover, several US 
governmental and non-governmental officials cooperated to connect key Slovak 
activists with civic leaders from Bulgaria and Romania, who lent their experience 
from similar campaigns in their countries in 1996-97.28 Lastly, Slovak civic society 
also invited Western politicians and experts, international institutions, and independent 
organizations to advise the OK 98 leaders on current developments in Slovakia and to 
prepare them to assume office in the future. The OK 98 civic mobilization not only 
forced the regime onto the defensive but also compelled the opposition parties to reject 
cooperation offers by Meciar, who won just 27 per cent of the 1998 vote.29 The 
election marked not only a turnover in power but also the formation of a national 
consensus about the Slovak international (European) and domestic (democratic) 
identity. 
                                                 
26 Long-term grant making programs were launched by the Open Society Foundation, the Democracy 
Network program of USAID, the Civil Society Development Foundation financed by the European 
Union’s PHARE Program, and many other international funders. Forbrig and Demes, Reclaiming 
Democracy. 
27 Such projects were funded by the United States Information Service, the Charles Stewart Mott 
Foundation, the German Marshall Fund of the United States, USAID, IRI, NDI, the NED, the 
Foundation for a Civil Society, the Jan Hus Educational Foundation, the British Know How Fund, the 
Fund of Canada, and others. Forbrig and Demes, Reclaiming Democracy. 
28 These included the American ambassadors to Slovakia and the Czech Republic and representatives of 
the International Republican Institute, the National Democratic Institute, Freedom House, and the 
National Endowment for Democracy. Forbrig and Demes, Reclaiming Democracy. 
29 Valerie J. Bunce and Sharon L. Wolchik, Democratizing Elections, International Diffusion, and US 
Democracy Assistance (New York: Cambridge University Press, forthcoming). 
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The potential of the OK 98 civic campaign to serve as a model for defeating 
illiberal incumbents reigning over “electoral democracies” was immediately 
recognized by the US donors and the Slovak and other democratic activists in the 
region.30 In late 1998, a US donor encouraged several of the key OK 98 organizers to 
prepare a seminar in Bratislava to share their campaign experience with interested 
representatives from Croatia, Serbia, Ukraine, Belarus and Russia.31 At the request of 
civic and political oppositions throughout the region, prominent Slovak civic activists 
subsequently led a number of additional exchanges and seminars in Slovakia and 
abroad. Building on these early efforts of key OK 98 campaigners, around the turn of 
the century a number of Slovak NGOs began turning these consultancies into full-
fledged democracy promotion programs.32 These efforts were often sponsored by US 
donors but the Slovak civic leaders also encouraged the new Slovak democratic 
government, staffed with their former political OK 98 allies, to support civic 
democracy promotion.33 
An example illustrates the development of Slovak civic democracy promotion 
well.34 Memo 98 is a media-monitoring group, which was set up in 1998 with 
assistance from the US National Democratic Institute and the US Embassy in 
Slovakia. The NGO played an important role in the OK 98 campaign and the 
subsequent improvement of the quality of Slovak democracy. In 1999 IREX 
introduced these Slovak activists to key Belarusian opposition leaders who wanted to 
                                                 
30 Bunce and Wolchik, Democratizing Elections. 
31 The first seminar was suggested by a Freedom House official. (Interview with P. D., November 20, 
2008.) Subsequently, Slovak NGO activists instructed a lot of other Eastern European activists in the 
strategies they used in OK 98 for political opposition unity, ambitious voter registration, get-out-the-
vote drives, election monitoring and exit polling, as well as effectively informing the citizenry about the 
costs of the incumbents’ rule. Such Slovak training was successfully applied in Croatia in 1999, in 
Serbia in 2000, and in Ukraine in 2004 but did not help the Belarusian opposition in either 2001 or 
2006. (Interview with P. D., November 20, 2008; interview with P. N., November 11, 2008; interview 
with M. M., July 27, 2007.) 
32 Interview with J. K., November 27, 2008; and interview with I. K., November 21, 2008. 
33 Author’s estimate based on interviews with the members of the Slovak federation of international 
development NGOs. 
34 The description is based on an interview with M. M., July 27, 2007. 
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prepare a democratization campaign similar to the OK 98 in time for the underground 
1999 presidential elections in Belarus.35 The Memo 98 leaders saw Lukashenko as pro-
Russian dictator who had isolated Belarus and had restricted political and civic 
freedoms in the country much like Meciar had in Slovakia; Memo 98 decided the help 
the Belarusian opposition by advising them on media monitoring strategies for the 
election. After this consultancy, Memo 98 decided to share their expertise with the 
Serbian opposition because they felt “close” to it as well and they also disliked 
Milosevic, whose nationalistic autocracy was reminiscent of Meciar’s. Memo 98 
convinced the US embassy in Slovakia to fund a project for setting up a media-
monitoring group in Serbia. After the success of the Serbian opposition, Memo 98 
continued their cooperation with their Serbian counterparts but also returned to 
Belarus in 2001 with the first of several projects and shortly thereafter began their 
work in Ukraine in time for the 2004 presidential elections there.36 
By the mid-2000s, the diversity and number of civic democracy promoters had 
grown even further. Slovakia had successfully caught up with the first wave of EU 
enlargement applicants, so a number of organizations such as Academia Ispolitana 
Nova and the Center for European Politics that had previously worked primarily at 
home began sharing their experience with the democratic transition as well as Euro-
Atlantic integration.37 Moreover, the institutionalization of the Slovak development 
                                                 
35 Lukashenko was elected as the president of Belarus in 1994 and according to the Belarusian 
constitution at that time, the next presidential election would be in 1999. However, Lukashenko 
manipulated a 1996 referendum to broaden his powers and extend his term in office. Following the 
referendum, he scheduled the next presidential elections for 2001. In protest, the Belarusian opposition 
decided to prepare an underground elections in 1999 but had to eventually give up as Lukashenko 
increased repression in the country. Balazs Jarabik and Vitali Silitski, “Belarus,” in Is the European 
Union Supporting Democracy in Its Neighbourhood?, ed. Richard Youngs (Madrid: FRIDE, 2008), 
101–20. 
36 Since then Memo 98 has also implemented media-monitoring projects in Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, 
Russia, and Iraq. (Memo 98 Organizational Archives. See also http://www.memo98.sk/en/.) 
37 Interview with L. B., November 12, 2008; and interview with A. L., November 14, 2008. 
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assistance system provided additional and perhaps more easily obtainable funding for 
exporting democracy abroad.38  
In sum, Slovak civic democracy promotion began almost immediately after the 
democratic breakthrough in Slovakia and had become institutionalized before Western 
donors began leaving Slovakia to support democratization further east and southeast.39 
Moreover, the NGOs involved in democracy promotion were mostly the same NGOs 
that had prepared the democratic breakthrough in Slovakia and had later worked for 
the consolidation of the Slovak democratic regime and which, as a result, shared a 
normative commitment to democracy.40 Additionally, having been assisted by external 
actors in their post-communist transition, the Slovak civic elites have been keenly 
aware of the importance of helping those on the road to democracy. Thus much like 
Polish civic democracy promotion, Slovak non-governmental support for democracy 
abroad has been motivated by the normative commitments to democracy and to 
assisting others while its scope has been defined by the demand of oppositions to 
hybrid and autocratic regimes in the European post-communist space and the 
solidarity of the Slovak civic activists with such pro-democratic forces. 
2.2. The Rhetoric of Polish and Slovak Civic Democracy Promotion 
When talking about their work abroad, do Polish and Slovak civic activists 
discuss donor invitations and funding opportunities available for international work 
and/or do they refer to their responsibility to uphold a universal right to democracy 
                                                 
38 Interview with B. B., November 27, 2008. 
39 Western donors began withdrawing from Slovakia in the mid-2000s. For example, the USAID 
Mission to Slovakia initially closed in September 2000, as it did in the other Visegrad countries. 
However, it quickly became apparent that the country needed continued and targeted assistance to 
ensure the consolidation of political and economic reforms. The USAID Mission in Bratislava closed its 
doors for a second and final time in March 2003. (See USAID-Slovakia’s online archive at 
http://www.usaid.gov/locations/europe_eurasia/countries/sk/index.html) 
40 Such leading civic democracy promoters included NGOs such as Memo 98, Civic Eye, Pontis 
Foundation, Partners for Democratic Change – Slovakia, and the Institute for Public Affairs.  
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and their solidarity with their foreign partners? This section is based on interviews 
with representatives of the democracy promoters from the Polish national platform of 
NGOs working abroad – Zagranica and from the Slovak national platform of NGOs 
working abroad – PMVRO. When asked to describe their democracy promotion 
activities, a lot of the interviewees began answering by describing the reasons for their 
general support for democracy abroad or ended their responses to the question by 
discussing the “You may wonder why we would do this?” question.41 If respondents 
did not volunteer this information by the end of the interview, they were asked “what 
factors influenced [their] decision to begin supporting democracy abroad.” The 
rhetoric of Polish and Slovak civic democracy promoters was almost exclusively about 
the moral obligations and solidarity with recipients these activists feel. Only a 
minority of these Polish and Slovak NGOs reported that available funding influenced 
their decision to launch a democracy promotion program.42 Such discussions provide 
support for the explanation that Polish and Slovak NGOs supporting the spread of 
democracy abroad are normatively motivated. 
2.2.1. Poland 
When talking about supporting democratization efforts abroad Polish civic 
democracy promoters express a strongly felt normative “obligation” to “help others, as 
[… they themselves] were assisted from abroad” in their struggle for democracy.43 
The first dimension of this commitment is a “sense of responsibility” towards other 
post-communist countries in transition in the region, where a strong “sense of 
solidarity” has developed as a result of the shared experience of communism and post-
                                                 
41 Quote is from an interview with M. J., November 18, 2008. 
42 Author’s estimate based on interviews with the members of the Slovak federation of international 
development NGOs. It should be noted that the NGOs that discussed funding-driven work did so with 
pride of the fact that their expertise was appreciated by Western donors. Therefore, it seems reasonable 
to assume that they would feel little shame in disclosing such work.  
43 Interview with M. P., October 10, 2008. 
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communism and/or a shared aspirations to freedom.44 Some typical examples of the 
ways Polish civil democracy promoters describe their motivation to share their 
democratization experience include: 
 “Democracy promotion is a kind of solidarity between us and our 
neighbors.”45 
 “We have suffered under communism and know how painful living 
under a dictatorship can be.”46 
 “Poles have many contacts with Ukrainians, so we can not pretend not 
to see that Ukraine has similar problems. Poles feel sharing their 
experience is a duty. We just can’t not share our experience with 
them.”47 
 “Poland has chosen freedom but with freedom comes responsibility. 
Having gone abroad [former Soviet Union] we saw that people there 
also want freedom as Poland did in the 1980s.”48 
 “We see that people are interested in freedom and we have solidarity 
for them, so we are helping them and encouraging them. We believe in 
freedom because it ensures respectful treatment of individuals. So we 
want that not just for Poland but for the region because we feel 
solidarity for those in the region and those struggling for freedom.”49 
In other words, Polish activists consider their own democratization experience 
as a positive development and they wish to help those they feel solidarity with to 
improve their situation as well. This perceived responsibility is further reinforced by 
                                                 
44 Interview with W. B., October 13, 2008; interview with A. M., October 8, 2008; and interview with 
K. S., October 25, 2008. 
45 Interview with G. B., October 13, 2008. 
46 Interview with A. B., October 18, 2008. 
47 Interview with A. M., October 8, 2008. 
48 Interview with A. K., October 21, 2008. 
49 Interview with O. S., October 28, 2008. 
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these activists’ belief that “Poland has received aid for many years and it is time now 
to pay off the debt.”50 Consider some of the ways in which civic leaders discussed 
their democracy promotion initiatives: 
 “As we got aid, it’s our duty to assist others.”51 
 “There is this feeling in Poland that we’re obliged for the strong 
assistance from abroad during the struggle against communism and so 
that Poland should help others too.”52 
 “Our founders think of themselves as recipients of Western assistance 
and thus with a debt to be repaid.”53 
In sum, rhetorical references to democracy promotion as a duty or 
responsibility or obligation felt primarily in contexts where there is some cultural 
similarity and shared identity suggest that civic support for democratization abroad is 
primarily normatively motivated. Very few organizations (11%) mentioned that “a 
donor invitation” influenced their decision to work abroad. 
2.2.2. Slovakia 
When talking about their support for democratization abroad, Slovak civic 
democracy promoters also express a strongly felt normative obligation, which is a 
result of the fact that they have received foreign assistance and that “there are still 
some culturally similar countries which are still authoritarian.”54 As a leading civic 
activist puts it succinctly and eloquently: “Promoting pluralistic democracy, rule of 
law, and free market is a constitutional obligation in Slovakia. We are a democracy 
and these values are not only anchored in our constitution but should be promoted and 
                                                 
50 Interview with J. M., October 27, 2008; interview with A. M., October 8, 2008; and interview with K. 
S., October 25, 2008. 
51 Interview with P. W., October 16, 2008. 
52 Interview with M. P., October 10, 2008. 
53 Interview with K. S., October 8, 2008. 
54 Interview with O. G., November 26, 2008. 
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protected both in Slovakia and abroad. Second, there is not only a sense of 
constitutional obligation, a civic obligation, but also a moral obligation. Because when 
we were doing our transition, we were also helped by countries from abroad who 
financed civic programs and brought experts who helped us write legislation and 
prepare specific reforms.”55  
In addition to anchoring democracy promotion in the externalization of the 
values on which the Slovak domestic order is built, some civic activists also refer to 
the values around which the European and even the international community is 
organized: “We want to be part of the global community and we believe that we are 
part of the global community. We are part of the European community and we are 
already at the economic level that we can give. And I think this is our moral duty and 
our people [Slovak constituents] want us to do this and judging from the emails we 
receive, their people [recipient countries] want us to do this.”56  
Finally, in the rhetoric of Slovak civic democracy promoters, there are often 
references to the demands and needs of the recipients from countries “close and 
similar” to Slovakia. As one of the Slovak activists working abroad shares: “It’s nice 
to share our experience with people who need it and ask for it.”57 Similarly, another 
civic democracy promoter further notes their “satisfaction” in seeing their recipients 
“grow themselves and decide where they belong [civilizationally].”58 
In sum, Slovak civic rhetorical references to democracy promotion as a moral 
mission embedded in the constitutive values of the domestic and the larger 
transatlantic order to which Slovaks belong as well as a duty to respond to the 
demands of others living in culturally similar contexts suggest that civic support for 
democratization abroad is primarily normatively motivated. Few of the Slovak 
                                                 
55 Interview with M. J., November 18, 2008. 
56 Interview with G. S., November 6, 2008. 
57 Interview with L. B., November 11, 2008. 
58 Interview with A. L., November 13, 2008. 
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activists interviewed (18%) mentioned that available funding for democracy 
promotion influenced their decision to work abroad: “our work abroad is both 
mission- and survival-driven.”59 For the majority of Slovak NGOs supporting the 
spread of democracy abroad, the normative commitment preceded and motivated the 
search for funding: “As we benefited form outside help, it’s important to give back. So 
we try to find donors who would cover our work abroad.”60  
2.3. The Practice of Polish and Slovak Civic Democracy Promotion 
This section looks at the individual international programs or projects of the 
democracy promoters from Zagranica and from PMVRO. The analysis of the practice 
of Polish and Slovak civic democracy promotion is based on interviews with 
representatives from these organizations as well as on an analysis of their annual 
reports. Depending on the scope of the international activity of the organization, for 
every country and/or project that was part of the democracy promotion activities of the 
NGO, I asked its representative how the organization began working in this country or 
on this project and then how these activities were funded. The information of interest 
in these narratives was the sequencing of searching for available funding and coming 
up with the idea for the democracy promotion program or project. Did an NGO 
become aware of a funding opportunity and then come up with a project to take 
advantage of it and/or alternatively did the organization come up with a project or 
program idea and then went looking for ways to fund it? The argument here is that a 
majority of Polish and Slovak civic democracy promotion programs started in 
solidarity with and because of demands by activists in the communist and post-
communist space with pre-existing ties to the Polish and Slovak civic democracy 
promoters. While donor invitations and funding did involve some organizations in 
                                                 
59 Interview with K. M., November 5, 2008. 
60 Interview with B. S., November 28, 2008; and interview with P. D., November 26, 2008. 
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supporting democracy abroad, such more opportunistic activities have generally 
included few, episodic, and ad hoc projects rather than sustained democracy 
promotion programs. Typical case studies of such sequencing trends are presented 
below. 
2.3.1. Poland 
The international work of a majority of the Polish civic democracy promoters, 
and of all the leading ones, grew out of the transnational personal and professional 
connections of their leading activists.61 A lot of the former dissidents – whether they 
entered into electoral politics or remained in civil society – maintained formal or 
informal relations with opposition activists from other countries in the neighborhood.62 
Moreover, a lot of the foreign donors supporting the spread of democracy in Poland 
and rest of the post-communist space had some regional networking component, 
which helped maintain and expand the transnational civic networks of pro-democratic 
activists.63 Therefore, a lot of post-communist NGOs inherited and sustained such 
networks. For example, the Eastern European Democracy Center is the leading Polish 
civic democracy promoter working in Belarus.64 The Center was born from the 
Belarusian Program of the Institute for Democracy in Eastern Europe, which began 
work in 1986 as an extension of the Committee in Support of Solidarity set up in 1981 
to offer moral, material, and financial support to Poland’s underground Solidarity 
movement. After 1989, under the leadership of prominent former dissidents, the 
Institute focused on “dismantling communism’s legacy” in Poland and on countries 
                                                 
61 Author’s estimate based on interviews with the members of the Polish federation of international 
development NGOs. 
62 Interview with P. W., October 16, 2008; and interview with J. B., October 9, 2008. 
63 Interview with G. G., October 13, 2008. 
64 Interview with P. K., October 19, 2008. The case study below is based on this interview and the 
organizational archives of the Eastern European Democracy Center. 
 108 
“where the end of communism did not result in democratic transition.”65 The 
Institute’s leaders’ ties to other dissidents in the post-communist world were thus 
developed and maintained through the international activities of the Institute. By the 
late 1990s, the Institute’s program on Belarus had expanded so much that it eventually 
became a separate and independent NGO – the Eastern European Democracy Center. 
The president of the Center himself first came to the Institute after working in the late 
1980 and early 1990s to support the development of youth civic group in the Soviet 
bloc; most of his contacts were in Belarus and Ukraine – the two countries that have 
now become the leading recipients of the Center’s democracy promotion efforts. 
Moreover, there were a few NGOs, such as Partners for Democratic Change – 
Poland or Amnesty International – Poland, that were set up as branches of an 
international network.66 A notable example here is Polish Helsinki Foundation for 
Human Rights.67 The Helsinki Committee in Poland was organized during the period 
of martial law by a group of intellectuals. After 1989, the members of the Helsinki 
Committee in Poland established the Helsinki Foundation for Human Rights. Given 
the ties of these activists to other Helsinki civic leaders from the former Soviet Union, 
Polish Helsinki Foundation “naturally” prioritized the former Soviet Union in its 
international activities by awarding small grants to human rights groups, organizing 
trainings for NGOs, journalists, and public officials, and monitoring the human rights 
observance there.68 
Through such transnational interactions Polish activists quickly “discovered” 
that their counterparts had similar problems69 and that the Polish experience might 
                                                 
65 Quotes from a description of the Institute’s mission available at http://www.woonidee.eu/page1.html. 
66 Interview with I. T., October 23, 2008; and interview with W. M., October 16, 2008. 
67 This case study is based on an interview with A. B., October 28, 2008. 
68 Interview with A. B., October 18, 2008. 
69 Interview with A. M., October 8, 2008. 
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thus be useful to them.70 Moreover, the activists abroad would frequently ask for help 
with a particular problem that they saw to have been resolved in Poland. For instance, 
a Foundation in Support of Local Democracy member reported that a few Ukrainian 
and even some Belarusian local government leaders had noted the success of the 
Polish decentralization reforms and asked the Foundation for assistance.71 Polish civic 
and political elites too not only see the restructuring of local governance as crucial to 
the democratization process but also consider the Polish reforms in this sector as one 
of the successes of the Polish transition.72 
Consequently, the international work of Polish NGOs usually started in the 
countries with the densest ties to Poland – the other countries in the Eastern European 
political space.73 Since neighbors such as the Czech Republic, Lithuania, and then 
Slovakia made significant progress in democratization, the efforts of Polish civic 
democracy promoters focused increasingly and predominantly on Ukraine and Belarus 
and then Russia. As Polish civic activists explain, Poland, together with Lithuania, 
Ukraine, and Belarus, have had centuries of shared statehood beginning in the 16th 
century with the Republic of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, which included 
Belarusian subjects as part of Lithuania and Ukrainians under the Polish crown. Most 
recently, while Poland regained its own state in the early 20th century and Lithuanians, 
Ukrainians, and Belarusians were included the USSR, all four republics were part of 
the communist bloc. This common history created multiple and very salient personal 
and professional ties between Poles and the other three nations.74 As a result, 93% of 
                                                 
70 Interview with L. S., October 11, 2008; interview with K. M., October 7, 2008; interview with G. G., 
October 13, 2008; interview with K. S., October 25, 2008. 
71 Interview with K. M., October 7, 2008. 
72 Interview with K. S., October 25, 2008. 
73 Author’s estimate based on interviews with the members of the Polish federation of international 
development NGOs. 
74 Interview with G. G., October 13, 2008. For example, half of Poland’s population has some sort of 
interaction with Ukrainians and millions of Ukrainians visit Poland each year; 4.8 millions Ukrainians 
visited Poland in 1998. Oleksandr Pavliuk, “The Ukrainian-Polish Strategic Partnership and Central 
European Geopolitics,” in Derek Muller, Kurt R. Spillman, and Andreas Wenger, eds., Between Russia 
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the current Zagranica members promoting democracy have had or currently have a 
significant project in Ukraine. In fact, Ukraine was the first international partner for a 
majority of those NGOs.75 The second most common recipient country has been 
Belarus. Despite the very hard working condition there, just 22% of the Zagranica 
democracy promoting members have not worked in Belarus. And finally, Russia – 
whose pro-democratic forces cooperated with the Polish ones before the collapse of 
communism and afterwards when Moscow’s commitment to democracy began to 
wane – was the third most popular recipient country with only 30% of the Zagranica 
democracy promoters not having been involved there. [For a list of Polish civic 
democracy promotion by target country see Table 3.1.] 
Thus most of the big sustained Polish civic democracy promotion programs 
started in solidarity with and demands by activists in the communist and post-
communist space with pre-existing ties to the Polish NGOs. Those ideas were then 
developed and proposed to different donors, which made such initiatives possible (in 
large numbers).76 It should be noted, however, that especially as the international work 
of Polish NGOs expanded in volume and geographical scope in the late 1990s the 
importance of direct ties seems to have diminished and with them the significance of 
the normative commitment of Polish civic democracy promoters as a driver of their 
efforts aboard. Especially towards the end of the 1990s, when Western donors began 
pulling out of Poland but still provided assistance further east and southeast, such 
available funding and subcontracting became a leading motivation for some Polish 
                                                                                                                                            
and the West: Foreign and Security Policy of Independent Ukraine (Bern, Zurich: Peter Lang, Center 
for Security Studies, ETH, 1999), 185–211. 
75 For example, interview with L. S., October 11, 2008; and interview with K. S., October 8, 2008. 
76 For many years, projects implemented by Polish NGOs in Eastern Europe were financed solely from 
foreign government support (USAID, the British Know How Fund, MATRA) or from private sources 
(the Ford Foundation, the Charles Stewart Mott Foundation, the National Endowment for Democracy or 
the Stefan Batory Foundation). Interview with M. P., October 8, 2008. 
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international projects in the outskirts of the post-communist region.77 15% of all the 
Zagranica democracy promoters have international programs up to 1/5 of which are 
donor driven. 26% of all the Zagranica democracy promoters have international 
programs up to 1/4 of which are donor driven. 15% of all the Zagranica democracy 
promoters have international programs up to 1/3 of which are donor driven.78  
Returning to the history of the Civil Society Development Foundation, one of 
the Foundation’s sponsors – USAID – hired the Polish civic trainers to implement the 
USAID’s “training for trainers” program idea in Croatia by “carefully adapting it to 
the local context.”79 Similarly, another of the Foundation’s donors, the East West 
Institute, invited the Polish activists to prepare a project in Kosovo; the Civil Society 
Development Foundation team decided to provide Kosovar civic leaders with 
technical assistance on fundraising. Likewise, the Foundation in Support of Local 
Democracy began its democracy promotion in the late 1990s in Ukraine and Belarus 
but soon moved to the Western Balkans because “they had started working on 
decentralization reforms and the Council of Europe had money for such projects.”80 It 
should also be noted that only some of such donor-driven project have turned into 
sustained programs; for example, the activities of the Civil Society Development 
Foundation in Croatia and Kosovo were not sustained beyond the end of each project 
whereas the Foundation in Support of Local Democracy has developed its activities in 
the Western Balkans and now has presence there.81 
                                                 
77 Such donors recognized that Polish NGOs have a more relevant experience to share with civil society 
further east and south than the expertise Western NGOs were bringing. Moreover, from the perspective 
of the foreign donors, such regional co-operation was a continuation of their work and realization of 
their values. So Polish groups were invited to participate in or to implement Western projects elsewhere 
in the post-communist region and/or funded to design their own initiatives. 
78 Author’s estimate based on interviews with the members of the Polish federation of international 
development NGOs. 
79 Interview with K. S., October 9, 2008. 
80 Interview with K. M., October 7, 2008. 
81 Interview with K. S., October 9, 2008; and interview with K. M., October 7, 2008. 
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Table 3.1. Democracy Promotion by Polish and Slovak NGOs by Target Country 
International Partner 
Country 
Percent of NGOs Working in 
Country out of all Zagranica 
Democracy Promoters 
Percent of NGOs Working in 
Country out of all PMVRO 
Democracy Promoters 
Ukraine 92.6 71.4 
Belarus 77.8 57.1 
Russia 70.4 21.0 
Moldova 55.6 35.7 
Georgia 48.1 21.0 
Azerbaijan 40.7 21.4 
Armenia 25.9 14.2 
Kyrgyzstan 29.6 14.2 
Kazakhstan 22.2 21.4 
Tajikistan 22.2 14.2 
Uzbekistan 18.5 21.4 
Turkmenistan 11.1 0 
Macedonia 29.6 35.7 
Serbia 25.9 85.7 
Albania 25.9 7.1 
Croatia 22.2 14.2 
Bosnia-Herzegovina 18.5 35.7 
Kosovo 14.8 42.8 
Africa 22.2 0 
Central America / Cuba 11.1 21.4 
Asia 22.2 14.2 
Middle East 18.5 35.7 
Latin America 7.4 0 
Note. Data from author calculations. 
At the same time, however, not all democracy promotion engagements in the 
developing world have been funding driven. For example, media accounts of the 
Solidarity struggles encouraged oppositions from distant countries, such as Cuba, 
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Tibet, or Burma, to seek the expertise of Polish dissidents. For instance, after his 
presidency ended in 1995, the iconic Solidarity leader, Lech Walesa has tried to serve 
those “who need a ‘moral leader’.”82 In 2005 he was invited to a conference on the 
Cuban question where he met with a Cuban dissident who asked for his “organized” 
and “systematic” help. The next year, Walesa set up an initiative run by his foundation 
in order to support the Cuban struggle for freedom. 
In sum, Polish civic democracy promotion is concentrated in countries in the 
post-communist region such as Ukraine, Belarus, and Russia where a strong sense of 
solidarity had developed as a result of the shared historical experience and consequent 
dense personal and professional ties. Most of these Polish efforts were normatively 
driven. However, the availability of funding was a sufficient condition to draw some 
Polish civic democracy promoters to work in contexts where they thought they could 
apply their expertise. Still, such opportunistic projects remain for the most part ad hoc 
and a fraction of the international activity of Polish NGOs supporting democracy 
abroad. 
2.3.2. Slovakia 
The activities of a majority of Slovak civic democracy promoters grew out of 
the transnational contacts of the elites who prepared the Slovak democratic 
breakthrough. Since these connections developed only in the late 1990s and since a lot 
of the leading Slovak NGOs were funded by US donors, who encouraged transnational 
cooperation, such donors were very influential in shaping the scope and direction of 
these transnational networks.83 For instance, USAID’s Democracy Network Program 
was set up in 1994 to encourage the development of civil society and citizen 
participation in policy-making in Eastern Europe; it had both in-country and regional 
                                                 
82 Interview with L. W., October 10, 2008. 
83 Interview with I. K., November 21, 2008. 
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components and served as a forum, where civic activists established contacts abroad 
and exchanged experiences. As a result, it was crucial in linking the Slovak and 
Serbian civil societies among others.84 This and other regional donor-sponsored 
programs showcased the distinctive expertise of Slovak NGOs and generated demand 
for it. At the same time, the solidarity that developed as result of such regional ties 
motivated Slovak NGOs to set up democracy promotion initiatives.85 
Consider the example of the Slovak election-monitoring group, Civic Eye. It 
was set up in 1998 with financial and technical assistance by the US International 
Republican Institute.86 Following its key role in the OK 98 campaign, the NGO was 
showcased in a Freedom House regional workshop and subsequently started receiving 
invitations and requests for cooperation. The first one came from Ukraine in 
connection with the 1999 elections. Given its limited funds, Civic Eye sent 20 
observers to the Carpathian lands of Ukraine, which border Slovakia. And as a result 
of Civic Eye’s participation in OSCE’s regional forum for election observers, the 
Slovak experts were asked to help train Croat monitors and send Slovak monitors to 
Croatia’s presidential elections in 2000. The Slovak NGO “wanted to help similar 
groups,” so it approached the Freedom House to finance the training and signed up 
with OSCE to participate in its election observation mission to Croatia.87 Again 
solidarity with civic activist in the Western Balkans motivated Civic Eye to seek US 
funding to train election observers in and to send monitors to Serbia. Also in 2000, 
                                                 
84 Interview with J. K., November 27, 2008. 
85 There were some Slovak NGOs, such as Partners for Democratic Change – Slovakia and 
Transparency International – Slovakia, which were set up as branches of an international network. As a 
Partners for Democratic Change – Slovakia member explains, when the Partners network was 
expanding east and southeast in the early 2000s and the members of the new branches needed to be 
trained, the Slovak Partners members were invited to instruct the new offices on issues with which the 
Slovak NGOs had successfully dealt. Interview with K. M., November 5, 2008. 
86 This case study is based on the organizational archives of Civic Eye and an interview with P. N., 
November 11, 2008. 
87 Interview with P. N., November 11, 2008.  
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Civic Eye approached the Slovak government to co-sponsor the election observers the 
Slovak NGO wanted to send to Bosnia and Kosovo. 
Moreover, foreign donors not only created opportunities for transnational 
cooperation by sponsoring regional forums but also sometimes directly brokered the 
diffusion of the Slovak transition experience by introducing Slovak NGOs to other 
pro-democratic groups. Back to the Civic Eye example as early as 1999, a US donor 
introduced the NGO’s director to a group of activists from Belarus because the donor 
believed that “the OK 98 experience can be transferred and inspiring” to the 
Belarusian opposition. After this first meeting, Civic Eye – much like Memo 98 – 
wanted to help their counterparts, so the NGO developed and secured funding for a 
few subsequent projects in Belarus. 
In other words, Civic Eye’s and most of the other big sustained Slovak civic 
democracy promotion programs started in solidarity with and demands by activists in 
the communist and post-communist space with pre-existing ties to the Slovak NGOs. 
Such cooperation proposals were then developed and submitted to different donors. 
Accordingly, Slovak civic democracy promoters have been most active in the 
countries with the densest historical ties to Slovakia – the democratization laggards 
amongst the descendants of the Austro-Hungarian Empire.88 The solidarity that 
formed between the nations in the Empire underpinned their continuing cooperation 
through the Small Entante and then the “special ties” between Czechoslovakia and 
Yugoslavia, where the Slovak minorities enjoyed “a prestigious position.”89 Slovak 
civic democracy promoters consider the Western Balkans countries “similar” – “small 
nations” with “close mentality” but still struggling with nationalism, arrested 
transitions, and thus setbacks on the road to Euro-Atlantic integration.90 86% of 
                                                 
88 Author’s estimate based on interviews with the members of the Slovak federation of international 
development NGOs. 
89 Interview with J. M., November 26, 2008. 
90 Interview with M. S., November 13, 2008. 
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PMVRO democracy promoters have had or currently have significant involvement in 
Serbia – the “closest” to Slovakia of the Western Balkans countries. Additionally, 
43% worked in Kosovo, 36% in Macedonia, also 36% in Bosnia, and 14% in Croatia. 
Slovak civic democracy promoters have also been very active in Ukraine and 
Belarus. While these two countries are both very big and traditionally part of the 
Polish/Lithuanian-Russian historical and cultural space, they also are – much like 
Slovakia – new European states, which emerged at the end of the Cold War and which 
initially made hesitant progress towards democracy and Europeanization.91 These 
similarities were articulated by US donors and opposition groups working in these 
countries and soon embraced by Slovak civic activists.92 As a result, 71% of PMVRO 
democracy promoters have had or currently have significant involvement in Ukraine 
and 57% – in Belarus. [For a list of Slovak civic democracy promotion by target 
country see Table 3.1.]93 
However, that available funding and subcontracting became a leading 
motivation for some of the latest programs of the Slovak NGOs promoting democracy 
abroad as well as for some of the latest recruits to the Slovak community of civic 
democracy promoters. For instance, the presence of Slovak NGOs in the Middle East 
was, according to their own accounts, mostly opportunistic. After Slovakia joined the 
US-led interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq, Afghanistan became a priority country 
for SlovakAid. Moreover, some US donors invited their former Slovak grantees to 
implement elections and civil society projects in the Middle East because the Slovak 
experience seemed more relevant and welcomed than the US expertise.94 For example, 
                                                 
91 Interview with J. K., November 27, 2008. 
92 Interview with J. M., November 26, 2008. 
93 The common experience of communism and post-communism expanded the circle of solidarity and 
thus the democracy promotion efforts of some Slovak NGOs to more distant countries in Eurasia, 
Central America (Cuba), and Asia (Burma and Tibet). Given the “special ties” between Cuba and 
Czechoslovakia during the communist era, Cuba is the country in the developing world, where the 
Slovak civic democracy promoters have the strongest presence. 
94 Interview with O. G., November 26, 2008. 
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IVO – a think tank with “the aim of promoting the values of an open society and a 
democratic political culture in public policy and decision-making” – implemented a 
civic training project in Iraq at the invitation of the US International Republican 
Institute.95 However, much like other Slovak civic democracy promotion efforts in the 
Middle East, IVO’s activities were not sustained beyond the end of the project. 96 
Still, donor-driven Slovak democracy promotion remains episodic and a small 
proportion of the activity of Slovak NGOs supporting democracy abroad. 36% of 
PMVRO democracy promoters have international programs up to 1/5 of which are 
donor driven. 9% of PMVRO democracy promoters have international programs up to 
1/4 of which are donor driven. 18% of PMVRO democracy promoters have 
international programs up to 1/3 of which are donor driven.97 In sum, a majority of the 
Slovak civic democracy promotion has been normatively driven and thus concentrated 
in post-communist countries such as the Western Balkans and Ukraine and Belarus 
where a strong sense of solidarity had developed on the basis of shared historical 
experiences, reinforced through the transnational linkages fostered by domestic actors 
but primarily by Western (US) donors. Opportunistic democracy promotion remained 
mostly episodic and only a small fraction of the international activity of Slovak NGOs 
supporting democracy abroad. 
*   *   * 
To conclude, both the Polish and the Slovak civic movements promoting 
democracy abroad developed around a core of normatively motivated activists/ NGOs. 
Given their roots in the national democratization movements in these countries, these 
                                                 
95 Interview with G. M., July 26, 2007. 
96 And another example: Transparency International – Bratislava decided to develop a project with 
Transparency International – Belgrade after the Slovak group saw the SlovakAid call for development 
projects proposals for Serbia. This partnership did not last beyond the end of the project either. 
Interview with E. B., November 28, 2008. 
97 Author’s estimate based on interviews with the members of the Slovak federation of international 
development NGOs. 
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civic elites feel a commitment to democracy and a responsibility to assist others 
struggling for it, since they themselves appreciate the external support they have 
received. The transnational ties of these activists – whether pre-existing or donors 
initiated – have created, reinforced, and allowed Polish and Slovak NGOs to express 
solidarity with other pro-democratic activists abroad.  However, as the Polish and 
Slovak civic democracy promotion movements grew at the level of individual 
organizations and the country as a whole, the importance of pre-existing direct ties 
diminished and with them – the significance of the normative commitment of Polish 
and Slovak civic democracy promoters as a driver of their efforts abroad. Still, 
although available funding and subcontracting became a leading motivation for some 
of the latest programs of the Polish and Slovak NGOs supporting democracy abroad as 
well as for some of the latest recruits to the Polish and Slovak community of civic 
democracy promoters, such more opportunistic activities have generally included a 
relatively small number of primarily episodic and ad hoc projects rather than the 
majority of sustained democracy promotion programs. 
However, it should be noted that even if Western donors have not been driving 
Polish and Slovak democracy promotion, the these donors’ expectations that the 
Eastern European NGOs would assist the region’s democratization laggards were in 
some cases formative (socializing and scope-defining) and in others – reinforced the 
obligation these post-communist elites felt to help others on the road to democracy. 
An early champion of the idea was the Open Society Institute, which created an East-
East program for cooperation within the post-communist space.98 In Poland, the 
Polish-American-Ukrainian Cooperation Initiative created in the late 1990s also 
clearly illustrated the expectations of the US donors, as did informally the members of 
the Board of Directors of the Polish American Freedom Foundation.99 Similarly, in 
                                                 
98 Interview with G. G., October 13, 2008. 
99 Interview with K. S., October 22, 2008; and interview with J. M., October 29, 2008 
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Slovakia, different donors would informally suggest to the local civic elites that the 
Slovak experience might be relevant in a particular context in the post-communist 
region and would introduce the Slovak activists to other recipients of US aid in the 
neighborhood.100 Such efforts were important, for example, in linking the Slovak and 
the Belarusian civil societies and thus helping develop the Slovak transnational 
networks on which Slovak civic democracy promotion would later build.101 
3. The Polish and Slovak Approach to Civic Democracy Promotion 
What type of democracy the Polish and Slovak NGOs have been promoting 
abroad and what activities they have preferred. Are the approaches of such civic 
democracy promoters informed by taken-for-granted institutions and processes and/or 
by calculations based on the effectiveness of particular processes and activities? Are 
the roots of these approaches international, national, and/or recipient-specific? 
Analyses of the rhetoric and practice of Polish and Slovak civic democracy promotion 
reveal that the approach of these NGOs is best understood as a strategic export of the 
local experience with democratization as it is understood to be appropriate to the needs 
of recipients. And although such exports include practices imported by Western 
donors in the process of assisting the Polish and the Slovak transitions, there are still 
distinct Polish and Slovak national approaches to democracy promotion. These 
approaches, however, differ according to the regime type of the recipient society. 
Just as in the previous section, the analysis here is based on the work of civic 
democracy promoters from Zagranica and from PMVRO. The statistics presented 
below are based on the annual reports of these NGOs and on their organizational 
profiles written up by officials from Zagranica or PMVRO. 
                                                 
100 Interview with M. S., November 13, 2008; and interview with E. K, November 19, 2008. 
101 Interview with J. K., November 27, 2008. 
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3.1. Rhetoric 
Through their participation in various transnational networks, Polish and 
Slovak civic democracy promoters realized that their post-communist counterparts 
throughout Eastern Europe and other partners around the world still living under 
communism or authoritarianism have similar problems and might benefit from the 
Polish/ Slovak experience. 
As a prominent civic democracy promoter from Poland explained: “We 
discovered the similarities [with other post-communist countries], so we thought that 
what worked in Poland would work there as well.”102 Many other Polish activists also 
agreed that they “could not pretend” that other Eastern European countries do not have 
“similar” transition problems and that the Polish democratization experience would 
not be “useful” to them.103 Polish activists seem to genuinely believe that the lessons 
they have drawn from the Polish transition could serve as “an inspiration,” “a model,” 
“success,” or “example” to other countries in transition.104 
Similarly, Slovak civic democracy promoters consider “the Slovak experience 
relevant there [the post-communist space] because their system is similar to the Slovak 
one.”105 Accordingly, many Slovak NGOs base “their programs abroad on the success 
of programs at home.”106 And if the Polish transition was extremely successful, it’s 
exactly overcoming the roadblocks on the Slovak road to democratization that Slovak 
NGOs see as “inspiring” and “interesting” “example” or “model” to other 
democratization laggards.107 
                                                 
102 Interview with A. K., October 21, 2008. 
103 Interview with L. S., October 16, 2008; interview with K. M., October 7, 2008; interview with G. G., 
October 13, 2008; interview with K. F., October 22, 2008; and interview with A. M., October 8, 2008. 
104 Interview with K. M., October 7, 2008; interview with M. S., October 13, 2008; interview with 
M. P., October 8, 2008; interview with P. K., October 19, 2008. 
105 Interview with E. B., November 28, 2008. 
106 Interview with J. K., November 26, 2008. 
107 Interview with B. S., November 28, 2008; interview with M. S., November 13, 2008; interview with 
K. M., November 5, 2008; interview with A. D., July 27, 2007; and interview with M. M., July 28, 
2007.  
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Both Polish and Slovak civic democracy promoters emphasized that they share 
with other activists abroad “what worked at home and what did not” and allow them to 
“adapt” such lessons learnt.108 Moreover, both Polish and Slovak NGOs pointed out 
that since they themselves participated in the democratic breakthrough and in the 
subsequent building of a democratic polity in their country, they offer their 
transnational partners a “recipe” for attaining those objectives. As a Polish activist 
succinctly described their approach – the emphasis in their various democracy 
promotion initiatives is on “demonstrating the progression from conceptualization to 
execution, the way solutions are developed – by way of example.”109 
In sum, the rhetoric of Polish and Slovak NGOs working abroad suggests that 
their democracy promotion efforts are based on a strategic calculation about the 
effectiveness of their own transition experience and therefore its strategic “usefulness” 
rather than normative appropriateness to others. 
3.2. Origin and Practice 
Polish and Slovak civic democracy promoters have been organizing a variety 
of activities in order to “exchange experiences and knowledge about the [donor’s] 
political, economic and societal transformations.”110 Some initiatives have been 
designed to transfer technical knowledge, including conferences or forums, trainings 
or seminars, the publication of different manuals or of research summarizing the 
donor’s transition experience as well as some more experiential forms of technical 
assistance such as inviting recipients to observe or participate in ongoing Polish or 
Slovak projects at home or to visit Poland or Slovakia to study the working of 
                                                 
108 First quote from interview with V. H., October 30, 2008; second quote from interview with B. S., 
November 28, 2008; interview with K. M., November 5, 2008; and interview with T. I., November 28, 
2008. 
109 Czubek, Social Diplomacy: The Case of Poland, 32. 
110 Ibid., 31. 
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different democratic institutions (civil society, local governments, independent media, 
parliament, etc). Moreover, Slovak and Polish NGOs have also been engaging in a 
variety of more political activities such as educating, lobbying, and monitoring their 
own diplomats, the EU, and recipient governments as well as raising awareness at 
home and abroad. Lastly, a third group of initiatives includes a transfer of financial 
assistance in the form of grants or scholarships to recipients. A majority of the Polish 
and Slovak NGOs working abroad usually employ a combination of the three 
strategies but the goal is always to share tried and tested practices from their own 
experience. This attention to the effectiveness of particular processes and activities 
and the resultant differences of approach to supporting democracy in Ukraine and in 




The preferred democracy promotion activities of Polish NGOs have been 
trainings, study tours, and conferences. [See Table 3.2.] While 78% of Zagranica 
democracy promoters provide some instruction for their international partners (and 
37% produce manuals/guides in the native language of the partners), 74% also 
organize study visits or exchanges to show their partners how democracy is practiced 
in Poland. A majority of Zagranica democracy promoters export their domestic 
programs abroad by coupling trainings with study visits. Additionally, 63% of 
Zagranica’s democracy promoters further put together regional conventions or 
meetings as forums for transferring the democratization experiences of a variety of 
Polish civic and political activists. 
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Table 3.2. Activities of Polish and Slovak Civic Democracy Promoters: Percent of 
NGOs Using a Particular Instrument out of all Democracy Promoters from the 
National Platform for Development NGOs 
  Country 
Instruments Poland Slovakia 
Financial/Material Re-granting 19 23 
 Own resources 19 8 
Technical Training 78 69 
 Study visits 74 46 
 Manuals 37 31 
 Send volunteers 19 15 
 Conferences 63 15 






 Educate/Lobby/Monitor EU  19 31 
 Consult/ Evaluate/ Monitor 
Recipient NGOs 
19 38 
 Public Awareness Raising/ 
Debates in Recipient Country 
7 54 
 Public Awareness Raising/ 
Debates in Donor Country 
22 31 
Note. Data from author calculations. 
For example, the School for Leaders Association was set up (with foreign 
assistance) in 1994 to support the development of local communities in Poland by 
educating young people, civic elites, and local government officials about democracy 
and local development.111 As early as 1996, the Association opened a similar “school 
for leaders” in Ukraine and soon thereafter another one in Belarus (which disbanded 
after a few years as the political situation in Belarus worsened).112 The Association 
couples such training on how to start a civic group, how to apply for funding, how to 
                                                 
111 This case study is based on an interview with L. S., October 16, 2008. 
112 Smaller similar programs were later also launched (but did not endure) in Moldova and Serbia. 
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involve businesses and NGOs in local government work, etc with study visits to 
Poland, so that foreign leaders can see in practice how local communities function in a 
cultural setting very similar to their own.113 Finally, the association also organizes 
regional conferences where domestic and foreign graduates of its programs can learn 
from each other and maintain and develop their contacts. And another example, the 
Institute for Strategic Studies (previously, International Center for Development of 
Democracy) builds on its research of Poland’s transition and foreign affairs to (publish 
various material on and) organize conferences and seminars for (Eastern) European 
politicians, scholars, journalists, NGOs and business people; the topics range from 
“Key Rules of Civil Society and Self-Government in Contemporary Democratic 
States” to “EU and NATO in the World Security System.” 
In addition to technical assistance, 37% of Zagranica’s democracy promoters 
provide some financial support towards democratization abroad. Some Polish activists 
send money to allow weak civic actors/groups abroad to continue working or provide 
them with equipment such as fax machines, computers, and printers. For example, the 
EEDC awards grants to independent newspapers in Belarus and the Nowy Staw 
Foundation has equipped the “offices” of a few Belarusian activists.114 Additionally, a 
few Polish NGOs award scholarships or small grants: for instance, the Education 
Society of Malopolska funds civic education projects and the Center for International 
Relations awards scholarships to “young management staff from countries of Central 
and Eastern Europe.”115 Lastly, there is a group of Polish organizations that have been 
administering the programs of major foreign donors under which grants are allocated. 
For instance, the Education for Democracy Foundation administers the RITA program 
                                                 
113 Similarly, in addition to or in lieu of the exchanges, other Polish NGOs such as the Nowy Staw 
Foundation invite their foreign partners to observe or participate in the ongoing activities of the Polish 
organizations. Interview with A. M., October 8, 2008. 
114 Interview with A. M., October 8, 2008. 
115 Interview with U. P., October 31, 2008. 
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of the Polish-American Freedom Foundation and PAUCI re-grants NED funding to 
Ukraine.116 
While most Polish civic democracy promoters participate in the formulation of 
Polish foreign policy – if not directly, then at least through their participation in 
Zagranica – a third of them prioritize educating, lobbying, and/or monitoring 
Warsaw’s efforts to support democracy abroad and a fifth of Zagranica democracy 
promoters seek to influence the broader democracy promotion debate in Poland.117 
Additionally, a forth of Zagranica democracy promoters consult, monitor, and publish 
research for the benefit of foreign states and a fifth – for foreign non-state actors. The 
Polish civic democracy promoters that employ such political instruments are mostly 
research centers such as College of Eastern Europe and think tanks such as the Center 
for International Relations, the Institute for Strategic Studies, the Institute for Public 
Affairs and the Batory Foundation. However, there are others too – for instance, the 
One World Association organizes annual public events (movies with discussions) on 
the state of freedom, human rights, and tolerance in Eastern Europe and beyond; the 
Polish Robert Shuman Foundation sponsors a yearly “Europe Day” celebrations meant 
to provide information about European integration to the Polish public and other 
Eastern European guests; the Foundation in Support of Local Democracy has advised 
the government of Kazakhstan on the development of local government; the 
Foundation for Civil Society Development evaluated the work of 13 NGO centers in 
Ukraine and the Helsinki Foundation for Human Rights monitored the presidential 
election held in Belarus in 2001.118 
It should be noted that in sharing their experience, Polish civic democracy 
promoters have often exported best practices that were initially imported into the work 
                                                 
116 Interview with A. K., October 15, 2008. 
117 The NGOs that monitor the EU’s support for democratization in the neighborhood (19%) and that 
actually seek to influence the EU Common Foreign and Security Policy (7%) are even fewer. 
118 Interview with K. S., October 9, 2008; and interview with K. M., October 7, 2008. 
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of Polish NGOs by their Western partners. A good illustration of this dynamic is the 
Polish investment in youth houses. Shortly after the fall of communism, a number of 
youth meeting centers, such as the European Meeting Centre – Nowy Staw 
Foundation, were set up to foster contacts between young people residing in the border 
regions of Germany and Poland.119 Such initiatives were part of a larger movement to 
develop civil society while also strengthening values such as democracy, self-
governance, tolerance and solidarity between these nations.120 The German partners of 
Nowy Staw organized a variety of study visits to Germany and a meeting/media center 
in Poland. As a member of the Foundation shares, “having learned a lot from them 
[German partners], we naturally did the same in Belarus, including literally opening 
meeting/media center.”121 Like Nowy Staw many of the Polish meeting centers soon 
moved east to Ukraine and in smaller numbers to Belarus. Moreover, as the Ukrainian 
centers strengthened, the Polish partners began suggesting that Ukraine export the 
practice to Russia.122 Equally fascinating is the fact that the tradition of the youth 
meeting centers began in Germany after WWII as a French reconciliation and 
democratization initiative. 
3.2.1.2. Sectors 
In terms of beneficiaries, Polish civic democracy promoters consider their 
strengths to include “supporting the development of local communities and promoting 
civic activity.”123 [See Table 3.3.] Indeed, Polish activists have prioritized working 
                                                 
119 This case study is based on an interview with A. M., October 8, 2008. 
120 During the first year of the programme, a total of 46,400 people (23,900 young Germans and 22,500 
of their Polish peers) participated in 1,646 different projects. By 2000, this number had grown to 
133,323 young people, roughly the same number from both countries, participating in 3,258 initiatives. 
In turn, the Polish civic democracy promoters involved 15,000 young leaders in 1999 alone. Czubek, 
Social Diplomacy: The Case of Poland. 
121 Interview with A. M., October 8, 2008. 
122 Interview with K. F., October 22, 2008. 
123 Czubek, Social Diplomacy: The Case of Poland, 32. 
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with organizations and individuals of civil society and to a lesser extent with local 
governments. A lot of the work of the Polish civic democracy promoters is about 
strengthening civil society aboard through activating local communities, educators, 
and youth. This is reflected in the relatively high proportion of Zagranica democracy 
promoters who work with youth – 74%, with educators – 41%, with community 
grassroots groups – 52%, and with local governments 37% in addition to working with 
various interest groups – 78%. Since the activities of the School for Leaders 
Association is a good example of Polish work with local communities abroad and the 
activities of the Nowy Staw Foundation is a good example of Polish work with young 
leaders in the neighborhood, consider the example of the Education for Democracy 
Foundation as an illustration of Polish work with educators in the post-communist 
region. The Foundation works with local communities throughout the former Soviet 
Union on civic education programs as well as on making schools truly participatory 
institutions as a way to encourage broader civic participation.124 
All Polish civic democracy promoters work with civil society – either with 
interest or grassroots groups or with civic “multipliers” / “alternative leaders” –
journalists, researchers, teachers, and young leaders, who embrace and in turn spread 
democratic norms in their home countries. Only a third of Zagranica democracy 
promoters target the recipient national-level governing institutions. Moreover, such 
work is almost exclusively with the individual political elites working in such 
institutions rather than with the institutions themselves as governing organizations. 
The example of the work of the Institute for Strategic Studies is an illustration of how 
politicians from the post-communist region are trained on to build democratic polities 
and join the Euro-Atlantic community and invited to participate in regional forums 
                                                 
124 Interview with A. K., October 25, 2008. 
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where they can learn from the civic and political actors who implemented or advised 
on the Polish transition.125 
Table 3.3. Democracy Sectors Targeted by Polish and Slovak Civic Democracy 
Promoters: Percent of NGOs Targeting a Particular Sector out of all Democracy 
Promoters from the National Platform for Development NGOs 
   Country 
Sectors Poland Slovakia 
Elections  - 15 Political 
Process Parties  4 38 
Executive & Legislature  33 46 
Judiciary  - - 
Governing 
Institutions 
Local Government  37 15 
Interest Groups 78 77 
Grassroots Groups 52 46 
Organized 
Think Tanks 11 38 
Media 30 15 
Youth 74 31 
Educators 41 15 
Civil Society 
Unorganized 
General Public 15 46 
Note. Data from author calculations. 
3.2.1.3. Different Approaches to Different Regimes? 
Polish civic democracy promoters working in Ukraine but also other countries 
in transition such as Georgia, Moldova, and the Western Balkans – have most actively 
supported the development of civil society as a platform for spreading democratic 
practices and values in these countries.126 Polish NGOs have invested in increasing the 
capacity of various interest groups and grassroots initiatives, which would allow the 
Ukrainian citizens to “take responsibility for their community and its problems.”127 
                                                 
125 Interview with U. P., October 31, 2008. 
126 Author’s estimate based on interviews with the members of the Polish federation of international 
development NGOs. 
127 Interview with K. S., October 9, 2008. 
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Moreover, the Polish civic democracy promoters have also further supported 
Ukraine’s systemic transformation by working with a number of national and local 
political elites to prepare them for implementing reforms in their country and for 
working in a European democratic polity. A common intersection of these two realms 
has been support for “civic and local self-government as a basic form of 
democracy.”128 And a lot of the Polish civic democracy promoters reported that as the 
capacity of their international counterparts improved, many of them were transformed 
from recipients into partners in new joint projects especially around EU integration/ 
cooperation themes.129 
The approach of the Polish civic democracy promoters working in Belarus has 
been somewhat different – it has centered on investing in civil society and civic 
multipliers in order to generate public demand and support for democratization.130 In 
the mid and late 1990s, a lot of Polish NGOs worked with a number of civic groups 
and political elites from the democratic opposition to Lukashenko. However, the 
opposition weakness and its suppression by the regime constrained the work of some 
Polish NGOs and forced others to re-evaluate their approach.131 Since the early 2000s, 
the Polish civic democracy promoters working in Belarus have most actively 
supported the development of civil society as a bulwark against Lukashenko’s control 
of Belarusian society. Just as importantly, many Polish NGOs have also invested in 
working with civic multipliers such as journalists and young leaders as important 
agents of democratization. In general, the Polish activists have sought to engage the 
Belarusian society in general in an effort to develop “a culture of freedom” in the 
country, so that the citizenry can then demand democratization.132 The Polish civic 
                                                 
128 Interview with K. M., October 7, 2008. 
129 Interview with A. M., October 8, 2008. 
130 Author’s estimate based on interviews with the members of the Polish federation of international 
development NGOs. 
131 Interview with P. K., October 19, 2008. 
132 Interview with A. B., November 28, 2008. 
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democracy promoters have adopted similar approach to other dictatorships in the 




The preferred democracy promotion instruments of Slovak NGOs have been 
trainings as well as monitoring the work of regimes in transition combined with public 
debates about the state of democracy in these countries and advocacy for keeping 
democracy promotion in these neighbors on Bratislava’s agenda. [See Table 3.2.] 69% 
of Slovak democracy promoters have provided some instruction for their international 
partners (and 46% coupled the trainings with study visits). Moreover, 62% of Slovak 
democracy promoters monitor the democratization track records of states in the 
neighborhood; 54% help organize public discussion in such countries about their 
regime’s performance and another 54% lobby the Slovak government to take steps to 
support democratization abroad. And much like their Polish colleagues, a majority of 
the Slovak democracy promoters often export their domestic programs abroad. 
For instance, the Pontis Foundation is perhaps Slovakia’s leading democracy 
promoter. The Foundation was set up in 1997 with US assistance to contribute to the 
“building of civil society and democracy in Slovakia and abroad.”133 Pontis, which 
had organized an impressive youth voter-mobilization campaign for the Slovak 1998 
elections, in 2000 began training several Belarusian youth organizations in various 
techniques for popular mobilization in time for the 2001 Belarusian presidential 
elections. Pontis soon realized that (unlike the OK 98 coalition) the Belarusian civil 
                                                 
133 Pontis is the successor to the Foundation for a Civil Society – the New York chapter of the 
Czechoslovak dissident initiative Chapter 77. This case study is based on an interview with M. S., 
November 13, 2008; an interview with J. K., November 27, 2008; and an interview with M. S., July 25, 
2007. 
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society and political opposition are disconnected and neither was prepared for the 
reforms Belarus would need after a democratic breakthrough. So Pontis brought 
independent Belarusian experts to Bratislava to learn about the reforms Slovakia 
implemented after 1998. Pontis continued providing technical campaign assistance for 
the Belarusian civil and political opposition and focused on training them to apply 
opinion polls and focus groups to prepare an effective pre-election communication 
strategy (much like OK 98 had done with assistance from the US International 
Republican Institute). Moreover, Pontis not only helped the Belarusian opposition 
begin a public debate about the meaning of the 2006 election but also helped them 
package their agenda. The result of this consultation was the slogan “For Freedom” 
that replaced “For Democracy” (which implied regime change and was thus deemed 
more divisive and controversial by the Belarusian citizenry). Finally, Pontis has 
actively cooperated with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Slovak 
Representation at the EU in an attempt to shape their policy towards Minsk. Pontis 
monitors the current situation in Belarus, regularly briefs both the Slovak Foreign 
Ministry and the European Council and European Parliament on it, and arranges 
meetings for representatives of the Belarusian opposition in Bratislava and Brussels. 
Pontis has also pressured Bratislava to come up with a policy on Belarus that goes 
beyond adhering to the common international sanctions and towards demanding 
specific reforms such as media and economic liberalization both bilaterally and 
through the EU.134 
Not only have Slovak democracy promoters sought to influence the policies of 
the Slovak government and the EU but the Slovak NGOs have also worked to keep 
                                                 
134 Another good example of a Slovak civic democracy promoter that has sought to shape Bratislava’s 
and the EU’s policy on Ukraine is the work of the Slovak Foreign Policy Association which worked to 
elevate Ukraine to the status of Slovakia’s strategic partner and then argued for immediate sectoral 
economic integration between the EU and Ukraine (including free-trade and visa-free travel) as a 
stepping stone towards future accession. Interview with A. D., November 21, 2008. 
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democracy promotion on the agenda of the Slovak public. An example comes from the 
People in Peril Association, which is the leading Slovak civic advocate for 
humanitarian and human rights issues abroad.135 In addition to financially, technically, 
and morally assisting human rights activists abroad, the Association seeks to educate 
the Slovak public and government about the violations of human rights and 
democratic practices in countries such as Belarus, Moldova, Chechnya, Cuba, Burma, 
China, and North Korea. The Association’s activities range from organizing visits of 
dissidents to Slovakia and human rights conferences and school debates to sponsoring 
human rights movies festivals and marches in solidarity with victims of human rights 
abuse. Moreover, in addition to monitoring the democracy track record of a number of 
regimes in the region, quite a few Slovak civic democracy promoters have also been 
evaluating and consulting for non-state actors in the region and generally helping them 
expose and deal with undemocratic practices in their countries. In this group of Slovak 
NGOs, there are strong think-tanks, such as MESA 10, the Slovak Foreign Policy 
Associations, and the Institute for Public Affairs as well as groups, such as Civic Eye 
and Memo 98, that have earned international reputation in doing and training others to 
do election observation and media monitoring.136 
Finally, about a third of the Slovak civic democracy promoters provide some 
financial or material assistance to their international partners. For instance, the People 
in Peril Association sends money to the families of Cuban political prisoners. Another 
example comes from the US German Marshall Fund in Bratislava, which awards 
grants “supporting the development of civil societies and democracy.”137 
It should be noted that in sharing their experience abroad, Slovak civic 
democracy promoters – much like the Polish ones – have often exported best practices 
                                                 
135 This case study is based on an interview with M. O. and G. S., November 6, 2008. 
136 Interview with Z. K., July 15, 2007. 
137 Interview with P. D., November 26, 2008. 
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that were initially imported into the work of Slovak NGOs from their Western 
partners. A good illustration of this dynamic is the Slovak movement for civil society 
sustainability. In preparing Slovak NGOs to be sustainable and survive after EU 
accession and after they leave the country, US donors advised Slovak activist to 
campaign that a percentage of each citizen’s and each business’ paid income tax be 
assignable NGOs. Pontis was central to the success of this campaign, so after working 
with youth groups in Serbia in the context of elections, local community development, 
and EU integration and after the Serbian civil society had matured, Pontis began 
preparing its partners to be sustainable in the long run. Since 2005, Pontis has been 
working on building partnerships between Serbian NGOs, local authorities, and 
companies to develop corporate philanthropy in the country. Just like US NGOs 
trained Pontis to present their mission and values and offer volunteering services to 
businesses, so Pontis trained their Serbian partners.  
3.3.2. Sectors 
In terms of beneficiaries, Slovak civic democracy promoters consider their 
strengths to include “supporting the development of civil society and citizen 
participation in policy-making.”138 [See Table 3.3.] Indeed, Slovak civic democracy 
promoters have prioritized working with a variety of civic organizations abroad – from 
interest groups, to community organizations, to think tanks. All Slovak civic 
democracy promoters have partnered with at least one of these groups of foreign non-
governmental actors. 77% of Slovak civic democracy promoters partner with interest 
groups abroad, 46% of Slovak NGOs work with community organizations in the 
neighborhood and beyond, and 38% of Slovak activists cooperate with foreign think 
tanks. For example, Partners for Democratic Change – Slovakia assists “various 
                                                 
138 Interview with K. M., November 5, 2008; and interview with P. D., November 26, 2008. 
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citizen groups but also […] nonprofit organizations.”139 Similarly, Pontis cooperates 
with both youth grassroots groups and think tanks in Belarus. 
Moreover, many Slovak civic democracy promoters also emphasize 
cooperation between civic actors and the citizenry on the one hand and on the other – 
cooperation between civic actors and political elites. Accordingly, in addition to 
partnering with non-state actors abroad, 38% of Slovak non-governmental groups have 
targeted political process institutions and 46% have worked with foreign political 
elites at the national level. The international activities of organizations such as Civic 
Eye (election monitoring and corruption monitoring, for instance) are a good example 
here. Another example is People in Peril’s work with political dissidents in countries 
such as Cuba, Burma, and Belarus. It should be noted that while half of such Slovak 
NGOs focus on individual political elites, the other half target these institutions as 
organizations. At the same time, 69% of all Slovak civic democracy promoters have 
also worked with the general public or with civic multipliers in a range of 
dictatorships and countries in transition. For example, 46% of Slovak NGOs target the 
citizenry directly through organizing public discussion about various democracy-
related topics such as the several rounds of debates in Ukraine about the country’s 
relations with the EU and NATO organized by the Slovak Foreign Policy Association. 
3.3.3. Different Approaches to Different Regimes? 
The Slovak civic democracy promoters have assisted both Ukrainian and 
Belarusian actors in organizing “electoral revolutions” in their countries through 
helping with voter mobilization (voter registration, get-out-the-vote campaigns, youth 
mobilization, and pre- and post- election debates) and media- and election-
monitoring.140 After the democratic breakthrough in Ukraine and in other countries in 
                                                 
139 Interview with K. M., November 5, 2008. 
140 Interview with M. M., July 27, 2007. 
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transition in the post-communist region such as Croatia and Serbia, the Slovak civic 
democracy promoters have focused on building the capacity of civil society to serve as 
“the government’s partner in shaping public policy and accelerating Ukraine’s EU 
integration.”141 Slovak activists have focused primarily on cooperating with various 
Ukrainian public interest groups and further on organizing a number of public debates 
about the speeding up of the reform process in the country and about Ukraine’s 
relationship with the EU and NATO.142 
After the failed electoral revolution attempts in Belarus in 2001 and then again 
in 2006, the Slovak civic democracy promoters working in the country have continued 
to work with interest groups in the country but also stepped up their assistance to the 
political opposition and the think tanks producing alternative campaign and reform 
ideas to ready the opposition to taking and assuming office.143 Moreover, the Slovak 
activists invested also in strengthening a number of grassroots and youth groups in 
order to increase “democratic political competition in Belarus through the promotion 
of a democratic alternative” – a new and young political elite.144 The Slovak NGOs 
have further sought to use economic development as a non-contentious issue around 
which community development and citizen participation could be strengthened.145 
4. The Intersection of Civic and Official Democracy Promotion 
Even before the collapse of communism in Poland in 1989, the Solidarity idea 
that Warsaw should support democratization in the neighborhood had gained 
acceptance among the elites and the citizenry alike.146 Given this commitment, both 
                                                 
141 Kucharczyk and Lovitt, Democracy’s New Champions. 
142 Author’s estimate based on interviews with the members of the Slovak federation of international 
development NGOs. 
143 Interview with J. K., November 27, 2008. 
144 Interview with J. K., November 27, 2008.  
145 Kucharczyk and Lovitt, Democracy’s New Champions. 
146 Jerzy Pomianowski, “Jerzy Giedroyc 1906–2000,” Tygodnik Powszechny 39 (September 2000); 
Snyder, The Reconstruction of Nations. 
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political and civic activists immediately began implementing the Polish democracy 
promotion agenda in their parallel spheres of activity. Moreover, the Polish activists 
continued to advocate – in the public sphere and in informal conversations with 
various public officials – that Warsaw keep democracy promotion a priority. Finally, 
at the end of the 1990s, the MFA signaled clearly (for the first time) its willingness to 
cooperate more systematically with the Polish civic democracy promoters, which in 
turn committed them to a close collaboration with each other as well as with the 
state.147 By 2001, the working group of internationally active Polish NGOs – Grupa 
Zagranica – was established.148 From the very beginning, the member NGOs played 
“an important role” in shaping the development assistance system in Poland.149 Polish 
NGOs working abroad have become the primary implementers of Polish aid projects. 
As a result, Zagranica not only advises the Polish MFA in the process of drafting laws, 
strategies, annual programs, etc but since 2006 it also monitors Warsaw’s foreign 
assistance activities. At the same time, through its development assistance system, the 
MFA provides a framework and funding for the international activities of Polish 
NGOs. Moreover, while Zagranica participates in Polish foreign policy-making mostly 
on assistance issues, there is also an informal group of experts from NGOs working in 
                                                 
147 In 1999, the Stefan Batory Foundation, in collaboration with the MFA, organized a conference 
“NATO, European Union, Central and Eastern Europe: NGOs in Poland’s Foreign Policy,” which 
gathered government officials and Polish NGOs working within the foreign policy field. The 
conference galvanized the leading NGOs working abroad to begin sharing information and experience 
more systematically and to move toward closer cooperation. They recognized that the scale of their 
commitment to democracy promotion and more traditionally development issues calls for institutional 
collaboration among NGOs and between NGOs and the state. Czubek, Social Diplomacy: The Case of 
Poland. 
148 A working group from Zagranica prepared a document, “Partnership for Foreign Policy,” with 
recommendations to the MFA for the institutionalization of development assistance and the role of civil 
society in it. In 2002, the Stefan Batory Foundation organized a conference, “Social Diplomacy,” which 
gathered 70 NGOs working abroad and government officials responsible for Polish foreign policy to 
discuss the Partnership for Foreign Policy recommendations. The MFA, Wlodzimierz Cimoszewicz, 
was very welcoming of the advice and initiative of the Polish NGOs working abroad. Czubek, Social 
Diplomacy: The Case of Poland. 
149 Ilona Ilowiecka-Tanska and Marta Pejda, “Poland Official Development Assistance and 
Peacebuilding,” Initiative for Peacebuilding, http://www.initiativeforpeacebuilding.eu/pdf/ 
Polish_Official_development_assistance_and_peacebuilding.pdf (accessed June 2009). 
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the post-communist region who meets several times a year with representatives from 
different state institutions to discuss Poland’s and the EU’s Eastern policy, including 
democracy promotion within it. In general, the two types of Polish democracy 
promoters have continued to work more in parallel with each other, even if working 
towards similar objectives and even if they have complemented each other’s work and 
been supportive of each other’s efforts. This is perhaps not surprising given the strong 
consensus on Poland’s priorities at least in the immediate neighborhood and given 
Polish beliefs that civic society practices social diplomacy that is equally important to 
public diplomacy.150 
Democracy promotion appeared on the Slovak foreign policy agenda only after 
the democratic breakthrough in the country. The civic elites, who prepared the 
democratic breakthrough in Slovakia and who quickly afterwards began supporting 
democratization abroad, not only successfully convinced their former political allies 
who were now in power to incorporate democracy promotion into the country’s 
foreign policy but also continued to advocate that the new democratic governments in 
the country keep democracy promotion high on the agenda. This advocacy was crucial 
in eventually expanding the scope of official Slovak democracy promotion and 
sustaining it through turnover in power, that is, in establishing it as a Slovak foreign 
policy tradition.151 The successes and external recognition the Slovak civic democracy 
promotion were immediately recognized by the Slovak political elites. This 
“appreciation” of the important role Slovak activists can play in fulfilling the foreign 
policy objectives of the young Slovak state has prompted Bratislava to frequently 
cooperate with, build on the work of, and delegate responsibilities to the Slovak civic 
democracy promoters. In fact, the NGO community has become “the main generator 
                                                 
150 Czubek, Social Diplomacy: The Case of Poland. 
151 For example, see the discussion of Slovakia’s democracy promotion in Belarus after 2006: the 
Belarusian question remained on Bratislava’s agenda because of the advocacy of the Slovak civic 
democracy promoters. See Chapter 5 in this dissertation.  
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of ideas in the field of democracy assistance (topics, issues, methodology)” and has 
served “as the engine of the whole endeavor.”152 The Slovak NGOs have been 
receiving strong financial and political support for their democracy promotion efforts 
by the Slovak MFA and the Slovak embassy officials in countries such as Serbia, 
Ukraine, and Belarus. Additionally, the MFA has set up an ODA Co-ordination 
Committee as an expert advisory body to the Minister of Foreign Affairs comprised of 
representatives of select central state administration organs and non-state actors 
operating in the field of development assistance. Finally, the Slovak civic democracy 
promoters have continued to wield the authority “to influence public opinion and the 
actions of the political elite” on Slovakia’s relations with countries in the 
neighborhood, including democracy promotion within it.153 The active participation of 
Slovak civic democracy promoters in public and policy debates about democracy 
promotion is perhaps not surprising given the tenuous national consensus on these 
issues and given the belief of many Slovak NGOs that official diplomacy should grow 
out of, further, and sometimes be delegated to civic diplomacy. 
5. Conclusion 
Both Polish and Slovak civic democracy promotion grew out of the efforts of 
the activists who prepared the democratic breakthroughs in these countries and who 
shared a commitment to democracy coupled with a perceived obligation to assist 
others on the road to democracy. This obligation was felt primarily towards other post-
communist countries in Europe, where a strong sense of solidarity had developed as a 
result of the shared experience of communism and post-communism. Consequently, 
this shared identity has shaped the scope and direction of post-communist civic 
                                                 
152 Kucharczyk and Lovitt, Democracy’s New Champions. 
153Juraj Marusiak et al., “Foreign Policy – Main Trends, Bilateral Relations, Regional Cooperation,” in 
Slovakia 2006: Global Report on the State of Society (Bratislava: Institute for Public Affairs, 2006). 
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democracy promotion. Such solidarity has moved many Polish and Slovak NGOs to 
create funding opportunities – instead of just following the available ones – to help 
similar neighboring oppositions by seeking the sponsorship of the their government 
and former and current donors. Although Polish and Slovak civic democracy 
promotion has developed around a core of normatively motivated projects and 
organizations, available funding and subcontracting became a leading motivation for 
some of the latest programs of the Polish and Slovak NGOs promoting democracy 
abroad as well as for some of the latest recruits to the Polish and Slovak community of 
civic democracy promoters. In other words, the normative and opportunistic 
motivations of various civic actors for participating in transnational activism might 
follow a cycle-like pattern: there are more opportunistic NGOs among the Eastern 
European late comers to the transnational democracy advocacy movement than among 
the early risers and even normatively-motivated NGOs are likely to run some 
opportunistic projects among their later programs.154 Still, it should be noted that the 
more opportunistic activities of the Eastern European civic democracy promoters have 
generally included a relatively small number of primarily episodic and ad hoc projects 
rather than the majority of sustained democracy promotion programs. 
Despite these similarities between the Polish and Slovak democracy promoters, 
some differences emerge; those differences, however, reflect the roots of the Polish 
and Slovak democracy promotion movements. First, given their relatively late 
development (late 1990s), the Slovak transnational civic pro-democratic networks 
appear to have been shaped more by the donors working in Slovakia. While Western 
donors have influenced the scope and direction of these networks in Slovakia, these 
                                                 
154 On contentious cycles, see Sidney Tarrow, Democracy and Disorder: Protest and Politics in Italy, 
1965–1975 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989) and Sidney Tarrow, Power in Movement: Social 
Movements, Collective Action and Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994). For a 
definition of early risers and late comers, see Doug McAdam, “‘Initiator’ and ‘Spinoff' Movements: 
Diffusion Processes in Protest Cycles,” in Repertoires and Cycles of Collective Action, ed. M. Traugott 
(Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1995), 217–39. 
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external actors have not produced a significantly larger contingent of opportunistic 
Slovak civic democracy promoters. Second, as a regional leader and a champion of 
democracy in the post-communist space, Poland has traditionally felt a larger 
responsibility for the fate of the region. Slovakia’s civic democracy promotion, on the 
other hand, seems more driven by demand from their international partners and by the 
desire to project the values of the transatlantic community of democracies, which 
Slovakia strived but also struggled to join. 
Returning to the two accounts of the motivations of Eastern European civic 
democracy promotion, it seems that there is less of a difference between Eastern and 
Western human rights and democracy activists than some of the more skeptical 
observers of post-communist civil society might suggest. What is more, the 
similarities with Western liberal activists do not stop with their similar motivations. A 
well-documented finding of the social movements literature is the “significant and 
enduring effect of [New Left] movement participation on the subsequent biographies 
of their subjects,” including the fact that former activists tended to remain politically 
active and leftist in their political orientation.155 The Eastern European civic elites who 
prepared the democratic breakthroughs in their countries seem to have followed a 
similar trajectory; whether they went into electoral politics, remained active civically 
on domestic issues or chose to also support democracy abroad, such former activists 
seem to have remained sensitive to and interested in questions of human rights and 
democracy at least at home, if not also abroad. 
And to the extent that post-communist democracy promotion is driven by 
actors with past pro-democratic mobilization experience and the normative 
commitments it produces, this dissertation suggests a new way to think about 
movement dynamics following democratization cycles of contentions. Such successful 
                                                 
155 See, for example, Ronald Aminzade et al., Silence and Voice in the Study of Contentious Politics 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001). 
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movements have been observed to become politicized and demobilize as their mission 
and leaders are incorporated into the mission and leadership of the fledgling 
democratic political parties.156 However, some have noted that as the national 
movements demobilized, their sub-national components became increasingly active 
sites of political contention.157 This dissertation documents that national 
demobilization is accompanied in some cases by an upward scale shift to transnational 
democracy advocacy activism.158 
In terms of their approach, while the Polish and Slovak exports often include 
practices that had been Western imports to their countries, there still are distinct Polish 
and Slovak approaches to democracy promotion that differ according to the regime 
type of the recipient. Both Polish and Slovak civic democracy promotion is based on a 
strategic calculation about the effectiveness of their own transition experience and 
therefore its strategic “usefulness” rather than normative appropriateness to others. 
Because the Polish transition was extremely quick and successful and the Slovak one 
was full of roadblocks but still a success story, Polish and Slovak NGOs see their 
experience as “inspiring” and “interesting” “example” or “model” to democratization 
laggards in the communist and post-communist space. However, because the approach 
of these NGOs is best understood as a strategic export of the local experience with 
democratization, there are some important national differences. Most important is the 
                                                 
156 Guillermo O’Donnell and Phillippe C. Schmitter, Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Tentative 
Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies, vol. 4 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986); 
Franco Arato, “Revolution, Civil Society, and Democracy,” in The Reemergence of Civil Society in 
Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, ed. Zbigniew Rau (Boulder: Westview Press, Przeworski, 1991), 
161–76; Adam Przeworski, Democracy and the Market: Political and Economic Reforms in Eastern 
Europe and Latin America (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991); David Ost, Solidarity and 
the Politics of Anti-Politics: Opposition and Reform in Poland Since 1968 (Philadelphia: Temple 
University Press, 1990); Michael Bernhard, “Civil Society and Democratic Transition in East Central 
Europe,” Political Science Quarterly 108, no. 2 (1993): 307–26; Petr Kopecky and Cas Mudde, 
“Rethinking Civil Society,” Democratization 10, no. 3 (2003): 1–14. 
157 Jennifer Johnson, “When Movements ‘Sub-Emerge’: Evidence for Rethinking Movement 
Demobilization following Democratic Transition” (paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the 
American Sociological Association, Atlanta Hilton Hotel, Atlanta, GA, August 16, 2003).  
158 On “scale shift” in transnational contention, see Tarrow, The New Transnational Activism.  
 142 
understanding of the role of civil society in the democratization and democratic 
consolidation of a polity. What distinguishes them from one another is Slovakia’s 
focus on more politically-oriented civil society compared to Polish emphasis on civil 
society as de-concentration of power away from the political center. Whereas 
Slovakia’s “electoral revolution” required and reinforced the work of NGOs involved 
in the political process (think tanks, watchdog groups, media and election monitors, 
etc.), the Polish transition involved empowering and mobilizing numerous local 
communities (both local governments and local grassroots groups). 
The Slovak more political approach and the Polish more technical approach 
have both been reflected in both the instruments and the targets preferred by the 
Slovak and the Polish civic democracy promoters. On the one hand, the Polish 
activists have prioritized working with interest groups and grassroots organizations 
and individuals of civil society and to a lesser extent with local governments through 
activating local communities, educators, and youth. Moreover, the preferred 
democracy promotion instruments of Polish NGOs have been trainings, study tours, 
and conferences as educational forums. On the other hand, the Slovak civic democracy 
promoters have prioritized working with a variety of civic organizations abroad – from 
interest groups, to community organizations, to think tanks – as a bridge between the 
citizenry and political elites. Furthermore, the preferred democracy promotion 
instruments of Slovak NGOs have been trainings as well as monitoring the work of 
regimes in transition combined with public debates about the state of democracy in 
these countries and advocacy for keeping democracy promotion in these neighbors on 
Bratislava’s agenda. 
Additionally, there are some differences between the Polish and the Slovak 
civic approaches to promoting democracy in countries in transition and in 
dictatorships. In repressive regimes such as Belarus, the Polish activists have more 
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actively supported the development of independent media as an alternative-to-the-
regime source of information in order to generate public demand and support for 
democratization whereas the Slovak activists have instead invested in the development 
of independent analytical centers so they can define a viable reform agenda, spread its 
message to the Belarusian citizenry, and support the political opposition. Moreover, at 
a time when the Polish civic democracy promoters are supporting primarily various 
civic multipliers who to ready society to call for change, the Slovak civic democracy 
promoters have stepped up their work with the Belarusian opposition and various 
grassroots groups so they can continue to challenge the increasingly repressive 
Lukashenko regime. 
In democratizing states such as Ukraine, the Polish civic democracy promoters 
have more actively supported the development of local democracy and have 
accordingly paid more attention to local governments and grassroots groups in order to 
nurture democracy from the bottom up. The Slovak civic democracy promoters, on the 
other hand, have rather chosen to work on helping Ukraine catch up with the other 
Eastern European EU and NATO candidates through supporting the reforms required 
for Euro-Atlantic accession. The Slovak activists have emphasized cooperating with 
think tanks generating reform proposals and organizing public discussion in order to 




WARSAW PROMOTES DEMOCRACY IN THE EASTERN 
NEIGHBORHOOD 
Previous work on Western democracy promotion has suggested two 
explanations of donors’ motivations and strategies: a strategic one that focuses on the 
benefits of having democratic international partners and a normative one, which 
emphasizes the emergence of a universal right to democracy. Since democracies are 
generally thought to be peaceful, stable, and prosperous, some suggest that states see it 
in their interest to export democracy to volatile and/or poor countries whose socio-
political developments affect the donor countries. Others argue that there has emerged 
an international norm that considers democracy promotion to be an accepted and 
necessary component of international behavior and that in promoting democracy 
abroad, states follow a cultural script based on taken-for-granted democratic values 
and institutions. This chapter examines Polish foreign policy to uncover why and how 
Warsaw promotes democracy. The argument is that even before 1989 the Polish 
dissidents elites forged a national consensus around the strategic importance of 
democracy promotion as an element of a geo-political strategy to create reliable 
partners in the Polish eastern neighborhood and to deter Russian aggression. 
Moreover, Warsaw’s democracy promotion approach is a strategic export of the local 
experience with democratization, including some of the best practices of the Western 
actors that supported the Polish transition. 
1. Democracy Promotion Motivations 
Is Polish official democracy promotion a strategic or a normative foreign 
policy commitment? Chapter 1 identified two sets of observable implications – one for 
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each of these explanations. Using these observable implications, this section examines 
how Warsaw’s motivations are reflected in the origin, rhetoric, and practice of 
Warsaw’s democracy promotion. All three analyses suggest that Poland’s commitment 
to supporting democracy abroad is best understood as a strategic one. 
1.1. The Origins of Polish Democracy Promotion 
How was democracy promotion incorporated into Polish foreign policy? Did 
Polish elites discover benefits of having democratic partners, and/ or were they 
compelled by an emerging international norm of a universal right to democracy? 
Polish democracy promotion grew out of the efforts of the Polish dissidents to 
translate their commitment to democracy into foreign policy by providing Polish 
society with a resonant answer to the question of Poland’s place in Europe. 
Many Poles consider their country’s “Golden Age” to be the era of the Polish-
dominated Republic of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth – a powerful state in the 
center of Europe that included Belarusian subjects as part of Lithuania and Ukrainians 
under the Polish crown. The Commonwealth stood out as a bastion of “liberty and 
tolerance” in the darkest hour of European religious wars.1 Since its founding in the 
16th century, the Republic was in constant conflict with what is now Russia until it was 
devoured in 1772 and then divided repeatedly over the next century among Prussia, 
Austria, and Russia. The Congress of Europe created a Kingdom of Poland, but this 
Polish state was dependent on Russia and included only a fraction of the 
Commonwealth’s territory; the eastern parts of the former Republic were incorporated 
directly into the Tzarist empire. Throughout the 19th c, the kingdom of Poland sought 
independence and strived for reunification with “its” eastern territories. Therefore, 
after gaining independence at the end of WWI, the Polish state sponsored the 
                                                 
1 Radoslaw Sikorski, current Minister of Foreign Affairs, “On the Republic of Poland’s Foreign Policy 
for 2008,” Address to the Polish Parliament, Warsaw, February 17, 2008. 
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Polonization of those territories that were however, already pursuing their own 
independence. During WWII, the Ukrainian Insurgent Army and the Belarusian 
Popular Association purged those lands of many Poles; Poland saw this cleansing as 
an attack on their “natural” right to reclaim the eastern territories of the former 
Commonwealth. Moreover, that Poland was dismantled by Germany and Russia at the 
beginning of WWII and that the Polish borders were moved west by hundreds of 
kilometers after the country’s occupation by the Soviet Union at the end of WWII felt 
to many Poles as yet another injustice against the integrity of Poland.2 
The post-WWII order on the Old Continent underscored to many Poles the 
importance of resolving the question of Poland’s place in Europe. Their inclination 
was to reclaim “Poland’s eastern” territories “stripped by Russia” and to reassert 
Polish superiority as the bearer of European culture in the east.3 However, in the 
1970s, the Polish dissident circle in exile, Kultura, offered another solution – that 
Poland give up its past territorial claims and notions of superiority.4 According to 
Kultura, efforts to dominate the mutual Polish-Russian neighbors had brought 
centuries of bloody struggle in Eastern Europe. The circle advocated that Poland 
support the independence of the nations that lie between Russia and Poland and form a 
strategic alliance with them – something like a security community – in the heart of 
Europe.5 Such a strong bloc of independent countries between Germany and Russia 
would deter threats against and “colonization” of any one of them from the east or 
                                                 
2 David Ost, “Using America Against Europe: Polish Foreign Policy Choices in the Early Twenty-First 
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3 Timothy Snyder, “Memory of Sovereignty and Sovereignty over Memory: Poland, Lithuania and 
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4 Jerzy Pomianowski, “Jerzy Giedroyc 1906–2000,” Tygodnik Powszechny 39, September 2000; 
Timothy Snyder, The Reconstruction of Nations (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2003). 
5 Giedroyc envisioned a federation based on liberal values (freedom) bound by the shared identity 
produced through the common history of the Polish, Lithuanian, Ukrainian, and Belarusian peoples. 
Pomianowski, Jerzy Giedroyc 1906–2000. 
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from the west. Therefore, the circle argued that the best assurance of lasting Polish 
independence, peaceful Polish-Russian relations, and stability in the region and in 
Europe in general was supporting the “freedom” of Poland’s eastern neighbors. 
Kultura’s ideas quickly spread among the Polish opposition because they 
resonated with important trends in Polish politics.6 The circle’s program did not 
contest the acceptance of Poland’s current borders by the country’s Communist 
regime. Kultura’s ideas also came at a time when uncensored (illegal) historiography 
works were questioning the entire tradition of Polish eastern expansion, and some 
Roman Catholic officials with ties to the secular intelligentsia were already speaking 
about the need for reconciliation with Poland’s eastern neighbors. Finally, the 
structure of the USSR – Lithuania, Belarus and Ukraine were political units that were 
a step away from statehood – allowed interwar nostalgia for the Commonwealth and 
aspirations for the creation of a federation united by Polish culture to be translated into 
solidarity with those nations and a “feeling of common fate under communist 
imperialist Russia.”7 This solidarity was crucial in allowing the Polish underground 
leaders, and later on Polish society in general, to accept the idea of giving up past 
territorial claims. 
Kultura’s ideas shaped and refined the goals of the revolt that had been 
growing within the population of communist Poland. By the end of the 1970s, there 
already was a consensus in favor of the Kultura program among the Polish 
intellectuals, who would later play an important role in the Polish dissident movement, 
Solidarity. In 1980-1981, the organized opposition grew to a mass movement of ten 
million members, a third of whom were also members of the communist party. The 
extensive influence of this organized political opposition on Polish society thus 
provided a platform for sharing the elite consensus in favor of the Kultura program 
                                                 
6 Snyder, The Reconstruction of Nations. 
7 Interview with P. W., October 21, 2008. 
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with Polish society as part of the program of national liberation. For Solidarity, the 
struggle against communism was also a struggle against Soviet imperialism.8 It was a 
“struggle for freedom” that was understood to have two mutually reinforcing 
dimensions – external freedom as independence but also internal freedom as 
democracy.9 
By the time communism collapsed in Poland in 1989, Kultura’s ideas had 
“gained universal acceptance and entered the canon of national common sense.”10 
They were translated into policy by the post-Solidarity elites who came into power 
after 1989, but their broad acceptance ensured policy continuity even when power 
turned over. Much of the Polish right passed through Solidarity in the 1980s and took 
for granted Poland’s interest in the freedom of its eastern neighbors. But so did a 
number of key figures in the young elite, cultivated by the communist party to replace 
the 1980s leaders when the time was ripe for reform. Just as the transformation of the 
Polish communist party resulted from its competition with Solidarity in the 1980s, so 
Polish socialists continued the foreign policy of Solidarity governments in the 1990s. 
When Warsaw’s eastern neighbors became independent in 1991, Poland had 
already confirmed its eastern border with Germany, now unified and committed to the 
EU; the potential of resurgent Russia loomed as the main security threat. Warsaw 
recognized the potential of “Europe” to stabilize “its” Eastern half as it had brought 
peace and prosperity to the Western half, so Kultura’s vision of a security community 
of the countries between Germany and Russia was substituted for these countries’ 
joining the West. Poland began seeking rapprochement and integration with the West 
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and encouraged Ukraine, Lithuania, and Belarus to do the same. Warsaw believed that 
membership in institutions such as the EU and NATO not only represented a larger 
civilizational commitment to liberal values such as “democracy, human rights and rule 
of law” but also protected these countries’ sovereignty as liberal democracies.11 As a 
result, consecutive Polish governments have pursued what they believed to be in 
Warsaw’s (and its neighbors’) best interest: to support the democratic transitions in 
Ukraine and Belarus and ultimately to help bring them into “Europe.” The 
“democratic enlargement” policies of the West in the 1990s towards Eastern Europe, 
including Poland, only reinforced subsequent Polish democracy promotion. 
In sum, democracy promotion was incorporated in the post-communist Polish 
foreign policy in response to Warsaw’s geopolitical security concerns. Polish 
democracy promotion has followed a certain counter-balancing logic; however, this 
logic has not been in the spirit of Realpolitik logic, as it has been traditionally 
understood by international relations scholars. Instead, it has built on the democratic 
commitment and the international solidarity of the Polish dissident society to redefine 
1) Warsaw’s national interest as the survival of Poland as a liberal democracy and 2) 
the means of achieving this interest by giving up expansionism and instead taking 
advantage of the benefits of having democratic allies/neighbors to counter-balance and 
contain revisionist powers in Poland’s neighborhood. Moreover, to the extent that 
Polish official democracy promotion has favored but not prioritized democratizing 
Russia – the country that has been considered the main security threat to post-
communist Poland, Warsaw’s commitment to democracy has also not followed the 
traditional Security Liberalism logic. The logic behind Poland’s commitment to 
democracy promotion is the result of the efforts of civil society to institutionalize its 
                                                 
11 Wlodzimierz Cimoszewicz, Foreign Minister of the Republic of Poland, “Government Information on 
the Polish Foreign Policy in the Year 2004,” presentation, Diet of the Republic of Poland, Warsaw, 
January 21, 2004. 
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commitment to liberal democracy by pointing not to a democratic entitlement but to 
the benefits of democracy for resolving the main Polish foreign policy challenges. 
Civic solidarity with those struggling for freedom and independence from Moscow 
focused Poland’s democracy promotion on the countries in the Russian sphere of 
influence and especially the mutual Russian-Polish neighbors. It is those domestically 
negotiated benefits of having certain international partners, constructed as important 
again domestically, be democracies that underlie the logic of Polish democracy 
promotion. 
1.2. The Rhetoric of Warsaw’s Democracy Promotion 
How do Polish foreign policy elites talk about their democracy promotion 
efforts? Do they refer to their responsibility to uphold a universal right to democracy 
and/or do they talk about the benefits of having democratic international partners? The 
official democracy promotion rhetoric captured in the archive of Polish Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs reveals some normative references as well as some discussions of the 
benefits of having democratic international partners. However, the fact that the latter 
are more frequent, especially in “domestic political conversations” about Polish 
foreign policy, provides further evidence to suggest that the Polish democracy 
promotion is best understood as a strategic commitment.12 61% of the references of 
Polish diplomacy to their democracy promotion activism are strategic, 23% are 
normative and the rest combine both normative and strategic explanations. [For those 
references, please see Appendix 3.] 
A lot of the Polish political elites from the left, the right, and the center passed 
through Solidarity in the 1980s and adopted the movement’s normative commitment 
to democracy. Traces of such a commitment – “democratic countries are duty-bound 
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published by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs from 2001 to the present. 
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not only to observe the principles of democracy and human rights at home, but also to 
propagate them elsewhere” – can be found in the speeches of various politicians on 
various occasions over time.13 Similarly, when assuring civic democracy promoters of 
the government’s support for their efforts, Polish foreign policy-makers also note that, 
“It is in Poland’s public interest that as many elements as possible of a civil society, a 
free and democratic state, and the rule of law be established in our immediate and not-
so-immediate surroundings. This desire emanates not only from the commitment to 
certain values but also from the understanding of national interests: security, co-
operation, and the existence of partners in other countries with whom we share similar 
goals and objectives.”14 However, such references to a universal right to democracy a 
more rare than discussions of the benefits of having democratic partners abroad. When 
explaining Warsaw’s foreign policies to and enlisting the support of Polish political 
elites, Polish diplomats frequently argue that democracy promotion “is not an old-new 
messianism, but a practical observation that strengthening liberty and democracy in 
our region also serves the interests of our Republic.”15 Finally, Warsaw has also 
sought to signal to its international partners that, “We believe that long-term security 
in the world depends on promoting values of democracy, modernized civilization and 
good governmental practice. We will contribute to that.”16 Discussions of democracy 
promotion by Polish diplomats are consistent over time and across governments. 
And how have Polish foreign policy elites discussed their democracy 
promotion efforts in Ukraine and Belarus – considered to be the most similar Polish 
international partners and therefore most likely to evoke Warsaw’s solidarity with 
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Ukraine and Belarus as well as Poland’s responsibility to uphold a universal right to 
democracy there? Polish diplomats have frequently noted the importance of these two 
countries for Polish security and the benefits of democracy in creating a stable and 
congenial international environment in Warsaw’s neighborhood. Consecutive Polish 
governments have declared that “Ukraine, due to its geographical location, and the 
importance it has in maintaining stability and security in the region, remains to be a 
vital strategic partner for Poland. The development of democracy in Ukraine, its total 
sovereignty and co-operation with European and Atlantic institutions are of great 
importance and should be supported by Poland.”17 Likewise, Polish elites note that 
“the existence of democratic, sovereign and stable Belarus is in the interest of 
Europe.”18 Accordingly, “policy towards Belarus [… has been declared to be] guided 
by the objective of consolidating its independence and sovereignty in international 
relations, as well as supporting the structures of civic society.”19 Polish diplomats also 
have offered Belarus “Polish support as long as it respects human rights, the political 
rights of the opposition, dialogue, compromise, and openness towards Europe.”20 Thus 
even when discussing Warsaw’s support for democracy in the country’s kindred 
neighbors (Ukraine and Belarus), Polish political elites have tended to emphasize the 
benefits of having those important international partners be democracy. 
1.3. The Practice of Warsaw’s Democracy Promotion 
The democracy promotion motivations of the Polish government can also be 
gleaned from the geographical priorities of Warsaw’s efforts – has the Polish 
                                                 
17 PolishAid promotion materials available at 
http://www.polishaid.gov.pl/Why,We,Provide,Assistance,204.html 
18 Sejm of the Republic of Poland, “A Message to the Belarusian Nation,” Statement, Warsaw, January 
15, 1999. 
19 Wlodzimierz Cimoszewicz, Foreign Minister of the Republic of Poland, “On the Polish Foreign 
Policy in the Year 2004,” presentation to the Diet of the Republic of Poland, Warsaw, January 21, 2004. 
20 Sikorski, “On the Republic of Poland’s Foreign Policy for 2008.” 
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government been most active towards the most important non-democratic international 
partners and/or towards the most similar? 
First, a good illustration of Warsaw’s priorities is the distribution of democracy 
aid through the Polish development assistance program. From 2004 to 2008 PolishAid 
sponsored 428 development assistance projects out of which 191 were in support of 
democratization abroad. Ukraine has consistently occupied the first position in the 
number of projects implemented – a total of 61 projects or 32% of all democracy 
assistance projects. Belarus has been the second democracy assistance priority of 
Warsaw. Poland has sponsored 49 democratization projects in Belarus and a total of 
26% of all Polish democracy assistance projects have gone to Belarus. Moreover, 
Ukraine and Belarus have the third and the first highest rates of democracy to overall 
development assistance projects – respectively 46% and 70%. These proportions 
reflect the fact that as Ukraine was becoming more and more democratic after 2004 
and Belarus remained the “last dictatorship in Europe,” the number of projects 
targeting Belarus has been steadily increasing and Warsaw sponsored a special 10-
project “Competitive Media and Internet” Initiative for Belarus in time for the 2006 
presidential elections in the country.  
The bulk of the remaining democracy assistance projects were awarded to 
Georgia and Moldova –17 and 16 projects respectively at a 55% and 41% democracy 
to overall development assistance projects respectively. Warsaw’s top democracy 
assistance priorities alone do not provide conclusive support for either the strategic or 
the normative explanation because Ukraine and Belarus are considered to be both the 
most strategically important as well as the most similar Polish international partners. 
However, the general focus on the “European” countries in the Russian sphere of 
influence and the lack of attention to the Western Balkans (which to Warsaw are not 
relevant to containing the possible resurgence of Russian imperialism) suggests that 
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Poland’s support for democracy in its neighborhood is best understood as a strategic 
commitment. 
Second, the limitations and contradictions of Polish democracy promotion 
diplomacy tell a similar story. Warsaw’s first and foremost diplomatic democracy 
promotion priority has been the democratization and Euro-Atlantic integration of 
Ukraine. Belarus has been a close second priority and the attention Warsaw has paid to 
it has only grown over time. [For more details about the Polish initiatives in these two 
countries see sections 3.1 and 3.2 below.] Moreover, Warsaw has not only supported 
the development of “free” Ukraine and Belarus but has also generally favored the 
democratization of the post-communist region. And while Polish elites have by and 
large supported democratization/independence movements in the former USSR 
republics, these efforts have been less concerted and sometimes overridden by what 
are thought to be more immediate foreign policy concerns. For example, some NGOs 
have criticized the Polish government for recognizing as free and fair some of 
Kazakhstan’s elections questioned by OSCE election monitors (Kazakhstan is 
considered by Polish elites as an important energy partner).21 Similarly, development 
aid to those countries has included a lower share of democracy assistance projects 
compared to the share of such projects in Poland’s immediate eastern neighbors.22 At 
the same time, the more autocratic Russia became after 2000, the more Polish 
statesmen sought to pull the countries formerly in the “Russian sphere of influence” 
closer to the democratic West. For instance, Poland’s reaction to what was seen as a 
Russian invasion of Georgia in 2008 was to pressure the EU to rein in Russia and to 
implement the Eastern Partnership for closer cooperation with Georgia and five other 
post-communist republics in the European neighborhood. Similarly, Polish diplomats 
have often expressed their preference for “stable, prosperous and democratic Russia” 
                                                 
21 Interview with M. P., October 8, 2008. 
22 Interview with M. S., October 11, 2008. 
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rather than a Russia that clings to “archaic, multi-polar ideas of ‘influence zones.’ ”23 
Still, Warsaw has been quite reluctant to express its disapproval of notorious breaches 
of democracy and human rights by Russia.24 
Even in Ukraine and Belarus, with which most solidarity has been professed by 
Polish political elites, democracy promotion has been prioritized below support for 
Ukrainian and Belarusian independence. Democracy and sovereignty are understood 
by many Poles to be the two (external and internal) manifestations of a society’s 
freedom. While external independence is thought to be an assurance that the 
government can act on the popular will, popular sovereignty is considered to be a 
guarantee that the state will act on the popular preference for international sovereignty. 
And although democracy promotion has been intertwined with support for Ukrainian 
and Belarusian independence, the Polish foreign policy priority in the east has been on 
the independence of and close relations with Ukraine and Belarus. “We keep 
supporting democratic movements but we do not want that support to clash with our 
efforts to improve our relations” is a candid statement by one of the staunchest Polish 
democracy promoters and a sentiment shared by the left, the center, and the right.25 
For example, despite the democratic reversal in Ukraine in the early 2000s, Poland 
continued to work closely with the regime there and even lobbied against Western 
sanctions against Kiev.26 Similarly, consecutive Polish governments have attracted 
accusations of opportunism and appeasement towards Belarus for the sake of 
                                                 
23 Adam Daniel Rotfeld, Foreign Minister of the Republic of Poland, “On Poland’s Foreign Policy,” 
presentation at a Sejm meeting, Warsaw, January 21, 2005. 
24 Democracy Coalition Project, “Poland,” Defending Democracy: A Global Survey of Foreign Policy 
Trends 1992–2002 (Democracy Coalition Project Report, 2002). The exception is recent activism by 
some Polish MEPs who have been outspoken in demanding a tougher approach to Russia, in particular 
with regard to democracy, civil society and human rights. 
25 Jaroslaw Kaczynski, President of the Council of Ministers of the Republic of Poland, Sejm Expose, 
Warsaw, July 19, 2006. 
26 Paul Kubicek, “The European Union and Ukraine: Real Partners or Relationship of Convenience,” in 
The European Union and Democratization, ed. Paul Kubicek (London: Routledge, 2003), 155. 
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maintaining good relations (as well as protecting the Polish minority there).27 In both 
cases, Warsaw warned against isolating the regime, which they saw as detrimental to 
the pro-Western (and therefore pro-democratic) development of those countries. The 
main concern of Polish diplomats, however, was that “if we do not talk to them, 
Moscow will.”28 This contradiction between support for the principle of democracy 
and support for democracy as a means to independence, stability, and security is yet 
another illustration that Polish democracy promotion has been a primarily strategic 
rather than a normative foreign policy commitment. 
It should be noted that many Polish political elites, especially the Solidarity 
graduates, have a personal commitment to democracy and at the individual level have 
paid much attention to democracy promotion issues for primarily principled reasons. 
Even at the state level, Poland has on occasion supported democratization abroad 
without an immediate strategic reason but rather in solidarity with a neighboring 
country – for example, when Slovakia’s democratic record began worsening in the 
mid-1990s, Warsaw criticized Meciar’s autocratic tendencies and after the democratic 
breakthrough in Slovakia assisted Bratislava in catching up with the first wave EU 
applicants. Still, for the most part, despite the personal and at times official solidarity 
that Polish elites have expressed with other democratizing countries in the region, 
                                                 
27 Interview with O. S., March 26, 2009. Consider another example: Poland, which was holding the 
OSCE Presidency at that time, did not condemn the government of Belarus in 1998 after it had expelled 
EU diplomats. (Vladimir Bilcik et al., Bigger EU, Wider CFSP, Stronger ESDP? The View from 
Central Europe (Paris: Institute for Security Studies, April 2002.) 
28 Jarabik and Silitski, “Belarus,” in Is the European Union Supporting Democracy in its 
Neighbourhood?, ed. Richard Youngs (Madrid: FRIDE, 2008), 101–20. The timing of Polish calls for 
the EU to lift its sanctions against Belarus is also suggestive. For example, after the release of political 
prisoners in August 2008, the Polish Foreign Minister, Radoslaw Sikorski, proposed a lifting of 
sanctions, on the basis that Cuba had been given a reprieve, so Belarus should be treated similarly. The 
Polish proposal also coincided with pressure from Russia on the Belarusian leadership to support the 
Kremlin’s policies towards Georgia, including recognition of the independence of Abkhazia and South 
Ossetia, so an opportunity was deemed to have emerged to strengthen the EU orientation of the regime 
in the face of Russian pressure. Marian Kowalski, “Belarus: Next Generation Democracy,” in 
Democracy’s New Champions: European Democracy Assistance after EU Enlargement, ed. Jacek 
Kucharczyk and Jeff Lovitt (Prague: PASOS, 2008), 189–215. 
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when such solidarity has come into conflict with Warsaw’s perceived strategic 
objectives, the strategic imperatives have been most frequently prioritized. Therefore, 
Polish democracy promotion is best understood as a strategic commitment – a solution 
to Poland’s post-communist geopolitical security concerns but a solution motivated by 
Warsaw’s understanding of the benefits of democracy for creating a stable and 
congenial international environment for Poland as those contributions have been 
articulated by Polish civil society. 
2. Democratization: “Made in Poland”? 
What type of democracy has Poland been promoting abroad? And what policy 
instruments has Warsaw preferred? Is this Polish strategy informed by a set of taken-
for-granted institutions, processes, and policy instruments and/or by calculations based 
on the performance of certain institutions and the effectiveness of particular processes 
and instruments? Analyses of the origin, rhetoric, and practice of Polish democracy 
promotion reveal that the Polish democracy promotion approach is best understood as 
a strategic export of the local experience with democratization as it fits recipient 
needs. 
Poland’s current Minister of Foreign Affairs succinctly summarizes Warsaw’s 
strategy: “We live in a free, sovereign and democratic Poland. We are members of the 
European Union and NATO. All of us, therefore, have reason to feel satisfied and 
secure. No one gave this to us. We alone – though with the help of our friends – 
achieved this. Having done so, Poland […] has become the standard and model of 
transformation for our Eastern neighbors.”29 In other words, Polish democracy 
promotion in the country’s immediate neighborhood and also in the post-communist 
                                                 
29 Sikorski, “On the Republic of Poland’s Foreign Policy for 2008.” 
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region in general centers on “encouraging” the “emulation” of Poland’s 
democratization and Europeanization by others.30 
Warsaw considers Poland’s post-communist experience helpful to others in the 
region facing similar transition objectives. Warsaw’s strategy is about exporting a 
process; it is about encouraging and supporting others to “travel the Polish path.”31 
However, it is not that Poland’s domestic experiences inform a taken-for-granted-
meaning of democratization. Rather, as the quotation above illustrates, this export is 
offered to others because democratization “worked so well” for Poland in creating 
security and prosperity in the country.32 Polish democracy promotion is thus based on 
a strategic calculation about the effectiveness of the Polish experience and therefore its 
“usefulness” to others. As the promotional materials of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
(MFA) explain, “Poland has a lot to offer to its closer and further neighbors. This 
includes, above all, experiences from its successful political transformation, which are 
extremely useful for the countries of our region.”33  
Still, Warsaw recognizes the specific needs of recipients with different regime 
types. It has adopted different approaches to supporting the democratization of 
autocracies and to improving the quality of democracy in countries in transition. The 
comparison of Poland’s approach in Ukraine to its approach in Belarus document this 
difference well. 
2.1. Warsaw’s Approach to Democracy Promotion in Ukraine 
Since Ukraine’s independence in 1991, close Polish-Ukrainian relations were 
seen as a means to and mostly conditioned on Ukraine’s development into a stable and 
                                                 
30 Dariusz Rosati, “Political System and Foreign Policy,” Polish Foreign Affairs Digest 1, no. 1 (2001): 
77–94. 
31 Statement by Ivan Drach, the leader of the Ukrainian Rukh (Parliament). Cited in Snyder, The 
Reconstruction of Nations, 263. 
32 Interview with M. M., October 17, 2008; interview with G. B., October 24, 2008. 
33 PolishAid promotional materials. 
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independent liberal democracy. Throughout the 1990s, the emphasis of Polish 
democracy promotion in Ukraine was on the creation and extension of the political 
consultation mechanisms, which were meant to not only facilitate the cooperation 
between Poland and Ukraine but also to exercise a democratization pull on Ukraine. 
As Kiev embarked on reforms in the mid-1990s, embraced EU integration as a 
strategic goal, and softened its negative stance on NATO, the Polish-Ukrainian 
Presidential Consultative Committee, established in 1993, became an especially active 
forum. Three additional forums were also created: a Ukrainian-Polish Forum for the 
two countries’ parliamentarians; a Polish-Ukrainian Social Forum for non-
governmental actors from the two nations; and a Polish-Ukrainian Self-Government 
Forum that links local governments from the two neighbors. In addition, a Polish-
Ukrainian European Conference began work as a forum for exchanging European 
integration experience. Moreover, Poland actively worked to embed Ukraine into the 
Euro-Atlantic international organizations, in which Warsaw was a member. Poland 
lobbied successfully for Ukrainian admission into the Council of Europe in 1995 and 
to the Central European Initiative in 1996 and actively supported a Ukraine-NATO 
partnership. 34 
By the end of the 1990s, Poland was already providing democracy assistance 
to Ukraine. The Polish government began implementing “twinning” consultancy and 
training programs for the central Ukrainian institutions responsible for the structural 
transformation and European integration of Ukraine.35 In addition, a trilateral 
governmental Polish-American-Ukrainian Cooperation Initiative was born to fund the 
sharing of “best practices” from Poland’s “successful transition” to a “liberal, market-
oriented democracy” with Ukraine.36 In the late 1990s, the MFA development 
                                                 
34 Interview with L. A., October 20, 2008.  
35 Ryszard Zieba, “The ‘Strategic Partnership’ between Poland and Ukraine,” Polish Foreign Affairs 
Digest 3, no. 4 (2002): 195–226. 
36 PAUCI (Polish-Ukrainian Cooperation Foundation) website, http://www.pauci.org/en/about/history/ 
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assistance program was created and immediately started supporting Ukraine’s 
transition and the activities of the Polish non-governmental organizations supporting 
the democratization of Ukraine.37 
After Poland concluded accession negotiations with the EU in 2002, the EU 
became another “ ‘tool’ for Polish Eastern policy.”38 Poland stepped up its efforts to 
intensify the EU-Ukraine cooperation and to eventually lock Kiev into this union of 
European democracies. Poland began campaigning for “strengthening and invigorating 
EU cooperation with its neighbors, in particular the Eastern ones, through the 
establishment of a [special] Eastern Dimension of the EU policy.”39 In co-operation 
with Polish NGOs, the Polish foreign ministry prepared a proposal for such a 
dimension; it would cover Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova, and Russia, but only the first 
three countries would be perceived as prospective EU members. Recognizing that it 
needs allies at the EU level, Poland successfully agued that these eastern neighbors 
should be a common priority for all the Visegrad countries, which consequently 
sponsored the development of an “Eastern Dimension” proposal.40 The European 
Neighborhood Policy (developed without consultation with the Eastern European 
applicants and) launched in 2003, however, targeted both the east and the south. 
Looking for an influential ally within the EU, Poland approached Germany, which had 
active (especially economic) interests in Ukraine. In October 2004, Poland and 
Germany presented a joint proposal for a new and enhanced agreement between the 
                                                 
37 Interview with T. K., March 24, 2009. 
38 Grzegorz Gromadzki, Raimundas Lopata, and Kristi Raik, Friends or Family? Finnish, Lithuanian 
and Polish Perspectives on the EU’s Policy Towards Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova (Espoo, Finland: 
Finnish Institute of International Affairs Report, 2005). 
39 Cimoszewicz Presentation, January 21, 2004. 
40 The proposal (in the form of a non-paper or a discussion paper) was developed by 4 Visegrad think 
tanks, close to their governments. It contained several concrete proposals including a membership 
perspective for Ukraine, Belarus, and Moldova, the upgrading of existing partnership and cooperation 
agreements to the standard EU association agreements, and the establishment of a European Democracy 
Fund to manage the implementation of NGO projects in the east. Interview with J. M., November 27, 
2008. 
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EU and Ukraine. However, in exchange for its support, the German side struck down 
the membership prospective the proposal offered to Ukraine.41 
The Polish-German proposal was publicized in the midst of a momentous 
presidential campaign in Ukraine to replace the outgoing president whose regime had 
grown corrupt and violent and suppressed the media and the political opposition. The 
Polish elites recognized that this succession crisis presented a historic opportunity to 
pull Ukraine in a pro-democratic and pro-Western direction. Polish politicians 
(parliamentarians, the MFA, and some Polish Members of the European Parliament 
(MEPs) appealed to the Ukrainian authorities to abide by all democratic standards for 
the election and to the EU to express “support for democratic Ukraine’s European 
aspirations.”42 When domestic and international observers reported gross election 
irregularities, the Ukrainian opposition campaign mobilized hundreds of thousands to 
protest. Both the opposition leader and the outgoing Ukrainian president invited the 
Polish president to mediate the conflict in Kiev. The Polish President, who had 
participated in the 1989 Polish roundtable, developed a roundtable plan for Ukraine 
but, wanting to act “on behalf of Europe,” he sought to involve both the Lithuanian 
President and the EU High Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy.43 
The roundtable committed to a rerun of the election and ended the crisis while 
avoiding the use of force and working within Ukrainian law. The second runoff was a 
much more fair election, which sealed the victory of the opposition. The mediators’ 
engagement helped launch, sustain, and speed up the negotiating process while 
keeping it peaceful. By many accounts, the Polish President made the most significant 
                                                 
41 Interview with P. W., October 16, 2010. 
42 During the Orange Revolution in Ukraine, the European Parliament played an exceptionally strong 
role, largely thanks to the activity of the representatives of Poland (and of other new member states). 
The European Parliament adopted three resolutions on the situation in the country and sent in three 
delegations. Centre for Eastern Studies, The Orange Ribbon: A Calendar of the Political Crisis in 
Ukraine, Autumn 2004 (Warsaw: Centre for Eastern Studies, 2005). 
43 Centre for Eastern Studies, The Orange Ribbon. 
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contributions of the international mediators and was critical in securing EU 
participation in the mediation.44 [For a more detailed account of Poland’s involvement 
in this so-called Ukrainian Orange (Electoral) Revolution, see Box 4.1.] 
Box 4.1. Polish Involvement in the Orange Revolution45 
 
Competing to replace the outgoing president Leonid Kuchma in the 2006 
presidential elections in Ukraine were his anointed pro-Russian successor, Victor 
Yanukovych, and the pro-Western opposition leader, Victor Yushchenko. The 
Ukrainian regime had grown corrupt and violent in suppressing the media and the 
opposition; the government mobilized the state administrative resources to support 
Yanukovych and poisoned Yushchenko, who almost died.  
The Polish elites recognized the democratization opportunity presented by 
this election. Before the election, the Polish political and civic elites appealed 
publicly to the Ukrainian authorities to abide by all democratic standards for the 
upcoming election. The Sejm offered to share Poland’s experience in organizing 
and conducting elections, while a few Polish NGOs sent election observers to 
Ukraine. In addition, Polish diplomats and Polish MEPs worked to keep European 
leaders informed and involved. After the first round of the presidential election on 
October 31, 2004, Polish politicians continued to insist and to pressure Western 
leaders to insist that the Ukrainian authorities refrain from electoral manipulations. 
The Polish MFA convinced the European Council to appeal to Ukraine for a free 
and fair second round of the election. Polish MEPs also worked toward a European 
Parliament (EP) resolution that expressed “support for democratic Ukraine’s 
European aspirations.” They only received a letter to that effect from the leadership 
of the European People’s Party, while the European Parliament resolution, passed 
in November 2004, only “recognized” these aspirations. 
On the eve of the runoff election, Yushchenko expressed publicly his 
concerns that the election would be fixed and asked Poland to “speak out on behalf 
of democracy in Ukraine.” The Polish Prime Minister sent a delegation to Ukraine, 
and the Polish MFA, Wlodzimierz Cimoszewicz, went to Kiev to meet with both 
camps in his capacity as the Chairman of the Council of Europe. In the meantime, 
Polish NGOs and students around the country began organizing to express 
“solidarity for a democratic Ukraine” and to pressure the Polish government to 
remain actively involved. Students in Warsaw began a series of pickets in front of 
the Ukrainian embassy that would continue until the resolution of the crisis in 
Ukraine.  
                                                 
44 Interview with S. P., June 20, 2007. 
45 The account here is based on several studies of the Ukrainian Orange Revolution: Centre for Eastern 
Studies, The Orange Ribbon; Anders Aslund and Michael McFaul, eds., Revolution in Orange: The 
Origins of Ukraine’s Democratic Breakthrough (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for 
International Peace, 2006); Andrew Wilson, Ukraine’s Orange Revolution (New Haven, CT: Yale 
University Press, 2005); and interview with S. P., July 17, 2007. 
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Box 4.1 (Continued) 
 
As polling came to a close for the second round of the election on 
November 21, 2004, domestic and international observers reported gross election 
irregularities. The Yushchenko campaign quickly mobilized its supporters to 
protest. This political crisis posed the threat of precipitating a street confrontation 
between the authorities and the opposition. Russian President, Vladimir Putin, who 
had visited Ukraine on the eve of the first and second ballots to campaign on 
Yanukovych’s behalf, congratulated him on his victory. Western capitals began to 
react publicly, too, with the US and the EU denouncing the results. Polish MEPs 
from the EP election observation mission co-edited many of the EP’s statements 
about the election to ensure “that sufficiently firm language” was used. The Polish 
MFA, Prime Minister, and the Polish President also expressed concern about the 
course of the election and its implications for the “Euro-Atlantic” aspirations of 
Ukraine. Yushchenko invited former Polish president Lech Walesa and current 
Polish President Alexander Kwasniewski to Kiev to help. On the second day after 
the second round, Kuchma also called the Polish President and “asked for help.” 
Kwasniewski, who had participated in the 1989 Polish roundtable, had the MFA 
develop a roundtable plan for Ukraine and dispatch a team of Polish experts to talk 
to local actors and prepare the government-opposition talks. However, the Polish 
president did not want Polish involvement to be interpreted as Polish imperialism 
or for the crisis to turn into a Polish-Russian dispute. Kwasniewski invited 
Lithuanian President Valdas Adamkus to help mediate and sought to involve the 
European Union, “a very important institution” that most Ukrainian political elites 
“agreed they would like to be a part of.” Kwasniewski urged the EU High 
Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy, Javier Solana, to join the 
mediation, ensuring that it had sufficient EU backing. 
The three meetings of the roundtable took place amidst growing protests 
throughout Ukraine. Tens of thousands of Poles also went to the Polish streets “in 
solidarity with Ukrainians” and in favor of Polish diplomatic activity in Ukraine. 
Organized by Polish NGOs or on their own, a lot of Poles crossed the border to 
participate in Ukrainian demonstrations and collected supplies to send to the 
Ukrainian demonstrators. Prominent Polish political leaders, including Lech 
Walesa, also went to Kiev to support the political agenda championed by “orange” 
opposition. At the negotiation table, Kwasniewski insisted on a rerun of the second 
round, while avoiding the use of force and working within Ukrainian law. In the 
end, the roundtable committed to a rerun of the election, which ended the crisis. 
In preparation for the rerun, Polish civic groups sent more than 3,000 
election observers to Ukraine. The second runoff on December 26, 2004 was a 
much more fair election and sealed the victory of the opposition. Immediately after 
Yushchenko was declared the winner, some Polish MEPs called upon European 
and American donors to “effectively support Ukrainian democracy.” Additionally, 
Warsaw organized a council at the Polish MFA with Yushchenko’s team to 
develop a package of proposals concerning Ukraine’s relations with the US, EU, 
and NATO.  
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Box 4.1 (Continued) 
 
The Orange Revolution was a critical juncture in Ukraine’s post-communist 
transition. It pushed the country in a decidedly more democratic direction and 
closer to the West. In that, the intervention of Polish political and civic elites and 
regular citizens alike played an important role. While non-state actors and some 
politicians were more openly supportive of the pro-democratic and pro-Western 
Orange forces, Polish diplomats sought to act “on behalf of Europe” and to ensure 
adherence to democratic procedures.  
 
After the 2004 democratic breakthrough in Ukraine, Warsaw’s democracy 
promotion efforts increasingly focused on supporting the European integration of 
Ukraine. Warsaw not only lobbied the EU for a membership prospective for Kiev but 
also supported Ukraine in assuming the obligations of EU membership by means of 
assistance, pressure, and persuasion. Frequent contacts between Ukrainian and Polish 
officials on different levels intensified.46 Poland enhanced its bilateral democracy 
assistance, as well. The government continued to increase the funding for Polish 
NGOs working in Ukraine and supported numerous projects. They mostly targeted 
civil society, youth, and local governments but as those actors matured over time, 
PolishAid projects increasingly focused on supporting Ukraine’s integration into the 
EU. [For a summary of the evolution of the distribution of Polish assistance to Ukraine 
by sector, see Table 4.1.] Many central and local state agencies also implemented 
various projects in Ukraine, including offering expert advise to the Ukrainian 
parliament, providing internships and training for local government officials, 
contributing judicial reforms, and enhancing the role of unions in economic policy-
making.47 In addition, in 2006 the Prime Minister set up a special Ukraine team within 
the Polish Committee (Ministry) of European Integration. By supplying advice and 
                                                 
46 Andrzej Szeptycki, “Poland’s Relations with Ukraine,” Yearbook of Polish Foreign Policy 1 
(2006): 132–45. 
47 Interview with M. S., October 13, 2008. 
 165 
trainings, the unit has been sharing the Polish experience of EU integration with 
Ukrainian cabinet ministers and mid-level officials as well as local governments.48 
Table 4.1. PolishAid Bilateral Democracy Assistance to Ukraine by Targeted 
Sector, 2004-2008: Percent of PolishAid Democracy Assistance Projects 
Implemented in Ukraine and Targeting a Particular Sector out of All PolishAid 
Democracy Assistance Projects Implemented in Ukraine for a Particular Year 
   Year 
Sectors   2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 Total 
Elections  - - - - - - Political 
Process Parties  - - - - - - 
Legislature  - - 2 - - 1 
Executive  - 4 11 8 12 9 





 25 30 23 42 23 29 
Organized Interest Groups 50 23 29 13 35 25 
 Grassroots 
Groups 
25 22 9 13 6 13 
 Think Tanks - - 3 - 6 2 
Unorganized Media - - 6 4 6 4 
 Youth - 13 6 8 - 7 
 Educators - 4 9 8 6 7 
Civil Society 
 General Public - 4 2 - 6 3 
Note. Data from author calculations. 
 
In addition, Polish elites recognized that Poland’s role during the Orange 
Revolution strengthened its position in the European Union and enhanced the 
credibility of the EU Common Foreign and Security Policy. Moreover, Warsaw 
believed that the Orange Revolution invalidated the stereotype of the EU’s eastern 
neighbors being unable to meet Western standards in the fields of democracy and 
                                                 
48 The Unit was formalized in 2008, but there was an informal team running such programs for 1–2 
years beforehand. The unit now also runs a few programs specializing in agriculture – the least political 
and most tangible benefits, which may be necessary because integration is a slow gradual process of 
low-level synchronization of standards. Interview with A. K., October 23, 2008. 
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human rights.49 Poland used all diplomatic channels (MFA participation in the 
European Council; Polish representatives to the European Parliament; bilateral and 
multilateral meetings between Polish and European diplomats) to push the EU to 
define clear conditions and precise dates for beginning accession negotiations with 
Ukraine.50 In January 2005, the European Parliament adopted a resolution in which it 
called upon the European Council and the European Commission to redefine the 
policy towards Ukraine, reminding these institutions that the Union should remain 
open to all European countries that meet the relevant membership criteria and 
requirements, including Ukraine. However, the EU was not yet ready to commit to 
Ukraine. Moreover, the increasingly unstable political situation in Ukraine, as well as 
its ambivalence towards Europe, made it even more difficult for Poland to promote its 
eastern neighbor in the EU.51 Finally, the 2004 enlargement of the Union focused its 
attention on internal reforms meant to deepen democracy and institutional 
effectiveness at the supra-national level. Thus, after 2005-2006, Poland increasingly 
focused on keeping the Ukrainian question on the EU agenda and on achieving 
beneficial provisions in the Ukraine-EU agreement, which was scheduled to be signed 
in 2008. 
In preparation for the negotiations of the 2008 EU-Ukraine agreement, Warsaw 
unveiled The Eastern Partnership – an initiative “designed to facilitate the [gradual] 
approximation and integration of six Eastern European countries with the European 
                                                 
49 Interview with J. S.-W., February 25, 2009. 
50 Poland argued that a new cooperation agreement be signed to reflect the new situation in Ukraine to 
resemble the association agreements signed with the countries of Central and Eastern Europe and 
reiterate “European prospects” for Ukraine. Rotfeld, “On Poland’s Foreign Policy.”  
51 Yushchenko’s administration did not launch the expected ambitious reforms and did not undertake 
consistent actions towards a rapprochement with the Euro-Atlantic structures. Instead, Ukrainians 
focused on restoring regular relations with Russia following the 2006 January gas crisis. After the post-
election political chaos in the country, an “anti-crisis coalition” was led by Yanukovych, who allowed 
Ukraine’s accession to Euro-Atlantic structures to vanish in the background. 
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Union.”52 Poland partnered with Sweden, which was known for its interest in 
democracy promotion and in Eastern Europe. In May 2008, Warsaw and Stockholm 
presented a joint proposal to the EU. The partnership covered Ukraine, Belarus, 
Moldova, Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan and featured regional and bilateral 
cooperation. The Georgian-Russian war in August 2008 accelerated the EU’s 
consideration of the Eastern Partnership.53 Pressured by some of the Eastern European 
EU member states, including Poland, the EU moved to pull those countries closer to 
the West to enhance stability in the region. The Eastern Partnership was approved in 
March 2009 and launched in May 2009. 
2.2. Warsaw’s Approach to Democracy Promotion in Belarus 
Initially, Polish democracy promotion in Belarus was similar to the Polish 
policies towards Ukraine in that Warsaw focused on the creation of bilateral political 
consultation mechanisms and on supporting the embedding of Belarus in cooperation 
schemes within regional (European) institutions, such as the Council of Europe, 
OSCE, and the EU. However, such Polish efforts were undermined by the tenuous 
appeal within Belarus for Belarusian independence and Belarusian affiliation with the 
West.54 
In 1994, Alexander Lukashenko was elected president of Belarus. He began a 
“dictatorship of integration with Russia.”55 Polish relations with Belarus started 
progressively deteriorating, limiting Warsaw’s democracy promotion options and 
impact. In 1996, Lukashenko manipulated a referendum to reform the constitution to 
                                                 
52 Polish MFA promotion materials about the Eastern Partnership available at 
http://www.msz.gov.pl/Eastern,Partnership,19898.html 
53 Interview with K. R., March 6, 2009. 
54 Margarita M. Balmaceda, James I. Clem, and Lisbeth L. Tarlow, eds., Independent Belarus: 
Domestic Determinants, Regional Dynamics, and Implications for the West (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 2002). 
55 Snyder, The Reconstruction of Nations. 
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expand his powers. The Polish elites unanimously condemned Lukashenko’s actions, 
downgraded diplomatic relations with Minsk, and tried, unsuccessfully, to establish a 
common regional policy toward supporting democratization in Belarus with Ukraine 
and Lithuania.56 Hoping to restore some degree of dialogue within the country, Poland 
made several attempts to organize a roundtable in Belarus to bring the government and 
opposition together with the assistance of Polish mediators.57 Recognizing that it 
lacked the close contacts necessary to exert peer pressure and to persuade Minsk to 
commit to democratization, Warsaw reoriented its policy to actively engage the 
Belarusian political and civic opposition. Warsaw sponsored informal contacts 
between the Belarusian opposition and Polish NGOs led by former Solidarity activists. 
Moreover, the Polish parliament offered even greater unambiguous and public support 
to the Belarusian opposition politicians and social activists.58 Polish deputies did not 
suspend inter-parliamentary contacts and hosted numerous visits by Belarusian 
parliamentarians to demonstrate the benefits of and to socialize them in the practices 
of democracy. In addition, Polish parliamentarians joined Polish NGOs working in 
Belarus in supporting and training political leaders, civil society, and journalists.59 
The 2001 presidential election in Belarus gave Warsaw the opportunity to 
express publicly and openly its support for the Belarusian democratic opposition.60 
Lukashenko’s challenger was welcomed in Poland, signaling Warsaw’s support for the 
pro-reform and pro-Western presidential candidate. Warsaw also informally supported 
the work of some Polish NGOs, which were helping to train and organize the 
                                                 
56 Relations began to be coordinated at the level of under-secretary of state and to be limited to 
resolving the challenges resulting from the fact that the two countries are neighbors (mainly economic, 
cultural and cross-border issues). Interview with R. D., October 19, 20088. 
57 Bronislaw Geremek, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Poland, “Main Lines of Polish 
Foreign Policy,” Expose to the Diet of the Republic of Poland, Warsaw, March 5, 1998. 
58 Balmaceda, Clem, and Tarlow, Independent Belarus. 
59 Ibid. 
60 Interview with P. W., October 16, 2008. 
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Belarusian opposition, which was preparing an electoral revolution.61 The opposition, 
however, was unsuccessful in defeating Lukashenko. Polish elites began worrying that 
while the isolation of Belarus had not harmed Lukashenko, it had slowed down the 
development of parties and democratic NGOs in Belarus.62 After 2001, Polish foreign 
policy and democracy promotion focused on preventing the complete isolation of 
Belarus, while more actively supporting the Belarusian opposition directly and 
indirectly through Polish NGOs. 
After the 1996 referendum, most Western countries had downgraded their 
contacts with Minsk and later imposed travel bans on the high-ranking Belarusian 
officials who were directly implicated in the political repression wave of 1999. 
Moreover, the EU suspended the majority of its funding for Belarus, except for a few 
humanitarian and democracy promotion programs. The referendum had also cost 
Belarus the ratification of its Partnership and Cooperation Agreement with the EU and 
the country’s membership in the Council of Europe. At the turn of the century, the 
OSCE was the only European international organization that was working with Minsk; 
its mission in Belarus was tasked by the West with supporting a three-way dialogue 
among the regime, its opposition, and the international community. Poland too sought 
to engage the Lukashenko regime in limited, unofficial, and often non-political ways. 
While Polish elites at various levels continued to criticize the autocratic practices in 
Belarus and to support the sanctions against top Belarusian officials, the Polish elites 
                                                 
61 The German OSCE Mission Chief, Hans-Georg Wieck, worked closely with the US Ambassador, 
Michael Kozak, to help the Belarusian opposition emulate the Serbian electoral revolution of 2000. The 
US funded key organizers of the electoral revolutions in Serbia and Slovakia to share their experience 
and train the Belarusian opposition. In addition, the OSCE mission in Belarus offered seminars, 
conferences, and training for both government and state institutions as well as parties and associations 
outside the government framework. In the end, the opposition could not mobilize enough public support 
to protest the electoral fraud it claimed Lukashenko had organized. http://www.diplomatshandbook.org/ 
62 Interview with A. B., interview with R. D., October 13, 2008. 
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also tried to convince political elites in Belarus that “democracy is well worthwhile.”63 
Warsaw also made efforts to point out to Minsk that there are “forms and areas of co-
operation [with the EU such as economy and culture] that can be developed in the 
present political reality in Belarus.”64 In attempting to convince Belarus to begin 
working with the EU, Polish elites were happy to point to the many benefits of 
Poland’s own integration with the EU. At the same time, in many bilateral and 
multilateral meetings with other European officials, Polish statesmen argued that the 
EU should “build a dialogue with Belarus so as to overcome its isolation in the 
European arena and thereby stimulate the development of democracy and the civil 
society in that country.”65 Accordingly, Belarus was included in the 2002 Polish 
proposal for a special Eastern Dimension of the EU policy. 
After Minsk forced the closure of the OSCE mission in Belarus in 2002 
(because of the OSCE’s support to the opposition around the 2001 presidential 
elections), the EU proposed a scheme for a step-by-step normalization of relations 
with Minsk. Each further step in the process was conditional on substantial 
improvements in the protection of democratic principles and human rights in Belarus. 
However, the Union excluded the country from the European Neighborhood Policy in 
2003. And after Lukashenko orchestrated a referendum abolishing the term limit of the 
presidency in 2004, the EU strengthened its sanctions against Belarus by freezing the 
assets of key political figures in Minsk. Still, given the insistence of a number of new 
                                                 
63 Wlodzimierz Cimoszewicz, Foreign Minister of the Republic of Poland, “The Eastern Policy of the 
European Union” (speech, Institute of Political Science, Paris, April 22, 2004); Quote from Tusk 
expose, November 23, 2007. 
64 Wlodzimierz Cimoszewicz, Foreign Minister of Poland, and Mikhail Khvastov, Foreign Minister of 
Belarus (declaration after an unofficial meeting held in Bialystok, March 10, 2002); Aleksander 
Kwasniewski, President of the Republic of Poland, statement at a meeting with journalists to Valdas 
Adamkus, President of the Republic of Lithuania, during a working visit to Poland, Warsaw, January 3, 
2003. 
65 Aleksander Kwasniewski, President of the Republic of Poland, “Vision of a United Europe in the 21st 
Century: The Polish Point of View” (lecture at the Accademia Nazionale dei Lincei, Rome, February 
27, 2002); and Wlodzimierz Cimoszewicz, Foreign Minister of the Republic of Poland, “Information of 
the Government of the Republic of Poland on the Subject of Polish Foreign Policy” (statement made in 
Warsaw, January 22, 2003). 
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member states (mostly Lithuania, but also Poland, Slovakia, and the Czech Republic) 
after 2004, the EU refashioned and reinforced its existing policy into a two-pronged 
approach, which mirrored the approach of these Eastern European countries towards 
Belarus: 1) trying to work with Belarusian bureaucrats through on-going aid programs 
with approval from Minsk while still being critical of the regime’s undemocratic 
policies, and 2) widening contacts with opposition figures and assisting civil society 
development through aid when government approval is not required.66 
The efforts of the representatives of the Polish government at the EU level 
were supported by the work of the Polish MEPs. They have been especially active in 
keeping the issue of Belarus on the EU agenda and making sure that the voices of the 
Belarusian opposition and civil society are heard in Brussels. Polish MEPs have also 
been crucial in organizing the EP to not only respond to violations of democratic 
procedures and human rights by Minsk but also to lending support and legitimacy to 
the opposition. For instance, since 2004 the EP has passed more resolutions on 
Belarus than on any other country. And another example: the prestigious Sakharov 
(Human Rights) Prize was bestowed to Belarusian nationals twice: in 2004 to the 
Belarusian Association of Journalists and in 2006 to the opposition candidate in the 
presidential elections. Finally, with their Eastern European colleagues, Polish MEPs, 
NGOs, and diplomats have successfully steered the reforms of the European 
Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights to include supporting the Belarusian 
opposition and to increase aid to Belarus.67 
                                                 
66 Jarabik and Silitski, “Belarus.”  
67 The EU was pressed by member states and NGOs to increase aid from €10 million annually to around 
€12 million for 2005 and 2006. The extra funding was made available through the European Initiative 
for Democracy and Human Rights and divided between the needs of the population and direct support 
to democratization and civil society at 70 to 30 percent. Interview with K. P., March 27, 2008. 
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Table 4.2. PolishAid Bilateral Democracy Assistance to Belarus by Targeted 
Sector, 2004-2008: Percent of PolishAid Democracy Assistance Projects 
Implemented in Belarus and Targeting a Particular Sector out of All PolishAid 
Democracy Assistance Projects Implemented in Belarus for a Particular Year 
   Year 
Sectors   2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 Total 
Political 
Process 
Elections  - - - - - - 
 Parties  - - - - 7 - 
Governing 
Institutions 
Legislature  - - - - - - 
 Executive  - - - - - - 
 Judiciary  - - - - - - 
 Local 
Government 
 25 - 5 7 - 6 
Civil Society Organized Interest Groups 25 43 19 36 29 28 
  Grassroots 
Groups 
25 33 - 7 - 8 
  Think Tanks - - - - - - 
 Unorganized Media 12 8 29 14 29 22 
  Youth 13 8 19 22 14 17 
  Educators - 8 12 - 7 7 
  General Public - - 16 14 14 12 
Note. Data from author calculations. 
 
The Polish democracy promotion efforts at the EU level became even more 
important after 2005 when an open diplomatic conflict erupted around Lukashenko’s 
efforts to subordinate the organization of the Polish minority in Belarus and the Polish 
ambassador was recalled to Warsaw for 2 years.68 Polish political and civic elites 
mobilized to strengthen the political and civic opposition in Belarus in time for the 
2006 presidential elections. On multiple occasions, Polish elites welcomed 
Lukashenko’s challenger and introduced him to leaders and high-level politicians in 
                                                 
68 Interview with R. D., October 19, 2008. 
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several other European capitals.69 The Polish government also wanted to assure “those 
who would like to become involved in opposition activity, that in the case of being 
repressed by the authorities they will not be left without help.”70 The Polish MFA set 
up a scholarship program to fund up annually to 300 (politically active) Belarusian 
students to attend Polish universities while the Polish Prime Minister launched a 
traineeship for young working Belarusians to learn “how democracy functions in 
action.”71 The Polish government also decided to “temporarily employ” some people 
who had lost their jobs in Belarus for political reasons.72 In addition, Warsaw 
continued supporting Polish NGOs training the opposition and sending election 
observation missions to Belarus. Lastly, Polish diplomats and MEPs, together with 
their Lithuanian counterparts, played an instrumental role in uniting the EU to 
condemn the conduct witnessed in the 2006 presidential election. However, the second 
electoral revolution attempt in Belarus failed, as well. 
Polish elites recognized that the Belarusian opposition was not only weak and 
fragmented but also isolated from Belarusian society. After 2006, Warsaw continued 
to work against the isolation of the country and refashioned and reinforced its 
assistance to target not just Belarusian NGOs but also to reach out to Belarusian 
society more systematically. Poland increased its bilateral assistance to Belarus and in 
2007, Belarus became the single largest recipient of Polish MFA-funded assistance 
projects. [For a summary of the evolution of the distribution of Polish assistance to 
Belarus by sector, see Table 4.2.] Warsaw launched two state-run media projects – 
“Radio Racyja” and the “Belsat” TV channel for Belarus – to provide alternatives to 
the official line in Belarus. Moreover, PolishAid continued to fund Polish NGOs 
                                                 
69 Interview with M. J., October 27, 2008. 
70 Grzegorz Gromadzki, Wojciech Kononczuk, and Lubos Vesely, “Belarus after the ‘Election.’ What 




developing the institutional capacity of Belarusian civil society, independent media, 
and alternative leaders. At the insistence of Polish (and other Eastern European) 
officials, the EU also increased its support for civil society and people-to-people 
contacts with Belarus. The Union also launched a campaign to inform Belarusians 
“What the European Union Could Bring to Belarus” and outlined proposals for 
economic, educational, environmental, and humanitarian cooperation and aid, 
conditioned on the fulfillment of twelve demands for improvements in the protection 
of democratic principles and human rights in Belarus. At the same time, the EU 
expanded and enlarged the targeted sanctions imposed after the 2004 referendum. 
While Poland supported the sanctions, it opposed the EU decision to withdraw its 
Generalized System of Preferences for Belarusian goods.73 The withdrawal coincided 
with the energy conflict between Belarus and Russia and Lukashenko’s subsequent 
turn to the West. Poland sought to seize the moment and included Belarus in its 
Eastern Partnership proposal. The Russian-Georgian war in the summer of 2008 
pushed the EU to accept the few signs of liberalization in Belarus – the release of 
political prisoners and greater freedom of assembly and press in the fall of 2008 – to 
admit Belarus into the Eastern Partnership. 
2.3. The Origins of Warsaw’s Democracy Promotion Approach 
Warsaw has not adopted the kind of “cookie-cutter” or “one-size-fits-all” 
approach to democracy promotion that is often ascribed to Western donors exporting a 
taken-for-granted set of domestic institutions.74 Instead, Poland exported its transition 
                                                 
73 These economic sanctions were opposed by those with close economic ties with Belarus, including 
Poland, Lithuania, Latvia (all of which voted against), and the Czech Republic and Slovakia (both of 
which abstained). 
74 On the US, see Thomas Carothers, Aiding Democracy Abroad (Washington, DC: Carnegie 
Endowment for International Peace, 1999), and on the EU, see Tanja Borzel and Thomas Risse, “One 
Size Fits All! EU Policies for the Promotion of Human Rights, Democracy and the Rule of Law” (paper 
prepared for the Workshop on Democracy Promotion, Stanford University, 2004). 
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experience while also tailoring its approach to the democratization needs of the target. 
[For a summary of Warsaw’s approaches to democracy promotion in Ukraine and in 
Belarus, see Table 4.3.] Such effectiveness considerations reveal that the Polish 
approach to democracy promotion is based on strategic calculations about the 
pragmatic usefulness (rather than normatively appropriateness) of Warsaw’s strategies 
in different recipient countries. 
Table 4.3. Polish Democracy Promotion Approach According to Regime Type 
 Target 
Approach Ukraine (Hybrid/Democracy) Belarus (Autocracy) 
Instruments & 
Sectors 
Diplomacy: Governing Institutions > 
Civil Society > Political Process 
 cooperation networks for state 
actors but also some for civil 
society 
Assistance: Governing Institutions* 
> Civil Society > Political Process 
 for state actors and for civil 
society  
Assistance: Civil Society >  
Political Process 
 for the civic and political opposition 
and later for society in general 
Diplomacy: Political Process > 
Governing Institutions 
 “critical dialogue” with regime and 
support for the opposition 
Sanctions: Governing Institutions 
 downgraded ties and sanctions 
against key regime officials 
 
To summarize, since the collapse of the Soviet Union, Polish elites have been 
working to create a dense institutional network of cooperation to induct various 
Ukrainian state officials and some civic actors into the practices and to demonstrate to 
them the benefits of democracy, in addition to exerting peer pressure and persuading 
these Ukrainian leaders to keep up the democratization reforms. Such consultation and 
cooperation mechanisms involved primarily state actors but included civil society as 
                                                 
* Warsaw has provided strong support for the EU integration efforts of Ukraine and by its very nature 
this process is very state-centric; however, close to half of the rest of the Polish assisance projects 
implemented in Ukraine have also focused on the Unrianian state by providing support for 
administrative and local government reforms in the country. Therefore, Polish democracy assistance to 
Ukraine is most accurately described as privileging the state over society. 
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well. Moreover, these networks were not just bilateral in nature. Poland has sought to 
lock Ukraine in the club of liberal democracies in Europe by lobbying for the 
country’s membership in various regional international organizations, especially the 
EU. If diplomacy has been Poland’s most preferred democracy promotion instrument, 
assistance has been the second most used one. By the late 1990s, the Polish state also 
began increasingly funding Polish NGOs working in Ukraine and implementing its 
own programs to share the lessons of the Polish transition and European accession 
process with Kiev. 
In autocratic Belarus, Polish democracy promotion efforts have relied most 
heavily on technical and some financial assistance to the political and civil opposition 
to Lukashenko’s regime. Recognizing the weakness of these dissidents, Warsaw has 
also sought and encouraged others to reach out to and engage Belarusian society in 
general. At the same time, Poland has been one of the key proponents of “critical 
dialogue” with Lukashenko – criticizing the regime without isolating it while also 
morally and politically supporting the democratic opposition. With diplomacy being 
the second most used democracy promotion policy instrument, conditionality was the 
third – Poland has, somewhat reluctantly, participated in the international sanction 
against Belarus. 
Thus, in Belarus, Warsaw focused on sharing the lessons learned during the 
pre-1989 Polish struggle against communism; in Ukraine, Poland sought to transfer 
mostly the post-1989 experience of developing the institutions and actors that make 
and guarantee a democracy. Some of the exported practices have been Polish 
“democratization inventions.” For example, recognizing the success of the Polish 1989 
roundtable in bringing together the illiberal regime and its opposition to agree to 
commit to democratization, Polish policy makers have over the years offered to help 
organize several roundtables to precipitate democratic breakthroughs abroad; some of 
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these offers were never accepted (Belarus in the late 1990s), but where Polish 
mediation was welcomed, it has met great success in pushing the recipient in a 
decidedly more democratic direction (Ukraine in 2004). 
However, sometimes the practices shared abroad have also included some of 
the Western imports in Poland from the 1990s when the country was itself still mostly 
a target of democracy promotion. For example, a lot of the political cooperation 
forums and the twinning assistance programs that Warsaw has used to support the 
democratization of Ukraine took a page from Poland’s post-1989 inclusion in an array 
of overlapping Western (and predominantly European) multilateral institutions and 
their various cooperation schemes and assistance programs. Another example is the 
concept of a “critical dialogue” with an autocracy, which was the West’s (especially 
the US’) approach to pre-1989 Poland and to the Soviet Union in general.75 Thus, to 
the extent that the Polish transition successes are a product of domestic and external 
efforts (as the MFA quote above suggests), Warsaw’s approach also refracts and 
integrates the democracy promotion approaches of the Western donors from both sides 
of the Atlantic working in Eastern Europe in the 1990s. 
3. Conclusion 
The normative commitment of the former Solidarity activists to the spread of 
democracy in the post-communist region became the foundation of not just non-
governmental but also governmental democracy promotion. Polish civil society groups 
sought to translate their international solidarity into foreign policy. To do so the civic 
activists appealed to the benefits of democracy for resolving the main Polish foreign 
policy challenges centered on the question of Poland’s place in Europe. It is those 
domestically negotiated benefits of having certain international partners be 
                                                 
75 Interview with A. B., October 18, 2008. 
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democracies that underlie the logic of Polish democracy promotion. Accordingly, 
Polish democracy promotion has been a strategic response to Warsaw’s post-
communist geopolitical security concerns about deterring Russian aggression and 
creating reliable partners in the Polish eastern neighborhood. As a result, every Polish 
government since 1989 has supported – at least tacitly if not also actively – the 
development of free (independent and democratic) Ukraine and Belarus and has 
favored the general democratization of the post-communist region. 
Warsaw’s democracy promotion strategy has been the strategic export of what 
are understood to be the successes of the Polish transition. It has been about exporting 
a process – the Polish path to market democracy, which is believed to have worked 
very well for Poland and to therefore be useful to other countries in the post-
communist region. With autocracies, such as Belarus, Poland has focused on sharing 
its pre-1989 experience and the lessons learnt during the Solidarity struggle against the 
Polish military dictatorship from 1981-1989. With hybrid regimes, such as Ukraine, 
Warsaw has sought to transfer mostly its post-1989 experience of developing the 
institutions and actors that make and guarantee a democracy. Moreover, since a 
variety of American and European democracy promoters supported the Polish 
transition, the lessons from it also borrow some of the lessons of these most effective 
Western democracy promotion efforts. 
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CHAPTER 5: 
BRATISLAVA PROMOTES DEMOCRACY IN THE EAST AND 
SOUTHEAST 
Having analyzed the motivations and approaches of Polish official democracy 
promotion, this dissertation proceeds by examining why and how Bratislava has 
championed democratization in the neighborhood. Like chapter 4, this chapter too uses 
the observable implications of the two types of accounts of democracy promotion – 
democracy promotion as a strategic commitment and democracy promotion as a 
normative commitment – to uncover the motivations and approaches to Bratislava’s 
support for democracy abroad. The argument is that the civic activists who prepared 
the democratic breakthrough in Slovakia sought to involve the Slovak state in 
supporting the democratization of the eastern but especially the southeastern 
neighborhood as a solution to the political and economic destabilization in these 
European regions. Moreover, the chapter further argues that Bratislava’s democracy 
promotion approach is a strategic export of the local experience with democratization, 
which differed according to the recipient regime type and included some of the best 
practices of the Western actors that supported the Slovak transition. 
1. Democracy Promotion Motivations 
Is Slovak official democracy promotion a means to creating a favorable 
international environment premised on the donor’s understanding of the benefits of 
having democratic international partners? And/Or is Slovak official democracy 
promotion a principled commitment that stems from the understanding of democracy 
as an emerging international norm? Using the observable implications of these two 
types of accounts, this section examines how Bratislava’s motivations are reflected in 
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the origin, rhetoric, and practice of Slovak official democracy promotion. All three 
analyses suggest that Slovakia’s commitment to supporting democracy abroad is best 
understood as a strategic one. 
1.1. The Origins of Slovak Democracy Promotion 
How was democracy promotion incorporated into Slovak foreign policy? Did 
Slovak foreign policy-makers discover some benefits of having democratic partners 
and/or were they compelled by an emerging international norm of a universal right to 
democracy? The origins of Slovak democracy promotion can be found in the efforts of 
the Slovak civic activists who prepared the democratic breakthrough in the country to 
persuade Bratislava to build on their democracy promotion initiatives as a way to 
stabilize the neighborhood, thus creating a favorable international environment for 
Slovakia and also earning Slovak membership in the EU and NATO. 
Slovakia’s road to joining the democratic (and Euro-Atlantic) community was 
longer and more full of twists and turns than the journeys of the other Visegrad 
countries. After the breakup of Czechoslovakia in 1993, Slovakia’s transition was 
complicated by Meciar’s nationalist populism and lack of tolerance for democratic 
practices. Civil society began mobilizing to fight the “temptations of authoritarian 
rule.”1 The OK 98 campaign for “open nonpartisan public initiative, designed to help 
ensure free and fair elections” coupled with Euro-Atlantic carrots (membership 
prospective) and sticks (pressure to reform) pushed Slovakia in a decidedly democratic 
and pro-Western direction.2 The success of the campaign did not just lead to turnover 
in power; it also created a popular mandate for a radical break with the previous 
illiberal regime. 
                                                 
1 Joerg Forbrig and Pavol Demes, Reclaiming Democracy, Civil Society and Electoral Change in 
Central and Eastern Europe (Washington, DC: The German Marshall Fund of the United States, 2007).  
2 Forbrig and Demes, Reclaiming Democracy. The OK 98 campaign was awarded a prestigious 
Democracy and Governance Award by USAID in 1999. 
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Many OK 98 activists felt “a duty to share their experience” with other pro-
democratic forces in Eastern Europe.3 In 1999 these Slovak civic leaders were already 
assisting activists preparing for the presidential elections in Ukraine and Belarus 
scheduled for the same year and for the parliamentary elections in Serbia and in 
Croatia scheduled for 2000.4 Given the “special ties”5 between Slovakia and Serbia, 
the democratic commitments and activism of the Slovak political figures interested 
and working in Serbia, and the democratization challenges in Serbia – one of the most 
illiberal and war-torn countries in the post-communist region, the Slovak NGOs 
working with the opposition groups in Serbia approached their former political OK 98 
allies who were now in power in Bratislava.6 The civic democracy promoters pointed 
to the potential of the OK 98 civic campaign to serve as a model for defeating illiberal 
incumbents reigning over unstable “electoral democracies” throughout the 
neighborhood.7 
The Slovak government quickly joined forces with the Slovak civic democracy 
promoters because their arguments resonated with political realities perceived as 
important in Slovakia. After gaining independence, post-communist Slovakia found 
itself a vulnerable country faced with the numerous and complex challenges of a 
quadruple transition: establishing a democratic polity, setting up a market economy, 
building state institutions (including a modern defense and foreign policy apparatus), 
and defining priorities and strategies for participating in international relations. 
                                                 
3 Interview with P. D., November 26, 2008. Also, several foreign parliamentary delegations showed 
interest in visits to Slovakia during 1999 and 2000. 
4 The vote in Belarus was organized by the underground and eventually canceled, the elections in 
Ukraine were fraudulent and reaffirmed the status quo, but the ones in Croatia provided an opportunity 
for regime change since they followed the death of the long-serving Croatian dictator, Franjo Tudjman.  
5 The relationship that formed between the nations in the Austro-Hungarian Empire underpinned their 
continuing cooperation through the Small Entente and then the communist era “special ties” between 
Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia, where the Slovak minorities enjoyed “a prestigious position.” Slovak 
political elites have come to consider the Western Balkans countries “important partners” to Slovakia 
and Serbia – the “closest” especially after the late 1990s. Interview with J. M., November 26, 2008. 
6 Interview with E. K., November 28, 2008. 
7 Interview with E. K., November 28, 2008. 
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Slovakia’s transition was complicated by the new regime’s nationalist populism and 
lack of tolerance for democratic practices, which also strained Bratislava’s relations 
with the West. Security-wise, Slovakia found itself a young state in the neighborhood 
of the unstable and failing European fringes.8 Economically, as “a little country with 
economy deeply depending on its ability to export and with a long-term negative trade 
balance,” Slovakia was in a need of access to markets.9 Thus, 1998 democratic 
breakthrough in Slovakia was also a foreign policy critical juncture for the country, 
which committed to Euro-Atlantic integration to address its security and economic 
concerns as much as to acquire a new “civilizational” democratic home in the 
international system in the long run. 
In this context, democracy promotion emerged as a response to the security 
threats Bratislava identified but a response that was very much in line with the broader 
foreign policy goals of Slovakia. Since democratization (and EU integration) were the 
Slovak solution to nationalist authoritarianism, Bratislava saw it in its “interest” to 
support the democratizations of the Western Balkans in order to ensure the 
                                                 
8 In the late 1990s Slovak political elites understood the two main security risks for Slovakia to be the 
country’s exclusion from Euro-Atlantic integration and the disintegration and instability in the 
European east and southeast. Juraj Marusiak et al., “The Foreign Policy and National Security of the 
Slovak Republic,” in Slovakia 1999: Global Report on the State of Society (Bratislava: Institute for 
Public Affairs, 1998/1999), 167–96. Also, Slovakia’s security strategy of that period states that 
“Slovakia simply cannot be left out [of the EU and NATO]” and that the “fundamental and long-term 
threats to the stability and prosperity of Slovakia” “result from the social and economic 
underdevelopment of certain states, deficits of human rights and democratic principles, as well as from 
persistent ethnic and religious intolerance.” Ministry of Defense of the Slovak Republic, Security 
Strategy of the Slovak Republic (Bratislava, 2001). Last, in the words of the Chairman of the National 
Council of the Slovak Republic, Jozef Magish, “The NATO membership is not an aim, but a way to the 
extension and ensuring regional security in the scope of a new developing security system in Central 
Europe from which Slovakia simply cannot be left out. The European Union does not automatically 
equal with a better standard of living, but it is an inevitable condition for reaching it… The NATO and 
EU memberships are manifestations of stability and guarantee for positive future development. The 
NATO and EU memberships mean security for foreign investors.” Jozef Magish, “Presentation of the 
Chairman of the National Council of the Slovak Republic,” in Slovak Institute for International Studies, 
Yearbook of Foreign Policy of the Slovak Republic 2000 (Bratislava, 2001). 
9 Peter Weiss, “Presentations the Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the National Council of 
the Slovak Republic,” in Slovak Institute for International Studies, Yearbook of Foreign Policy of the 
Slovak Republic 2002 (Bratislava, 2003). 
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stabilization, security, and even economic prosperity of this region.10 Moreover, since 
the EU and NATO had themselves identified political and economic instability as a 
security threat to the Euro-Atlantic community, Slovakia saw a chance to contribute to 
the work of these organizations and earn its membership in them by working for the 
stabilization of the European fringes. Having fallen off the fast track to Euro-Atlantic 
integration in the mid-1990s, Slovakia needed to demonstrate that it is a reliable 
member that does not just seek to benefit from but also contributes to the security of 
the continent. Western encouragement and support for Slovak civic democracy 
promotion in the neighborhood were an important signal about the perceived potential 
for Slovak contribution in the region.11 
Slovak diplomats and NGOs together successfully mobilized major European 
international multilateral organizations (Council of Europe, OSCE, EU), Southeastern 
European regional international initiatives (Southeast European Cooperative Initiative 
and Stability Pact) and international foundations (the East West Institute, the Fund for 
an Open Society, the Rockefeller Foundation, the German Marshall Fund of the 
United States) to support political change in former Yugoslavia.12 In July 1999, the 
Slovak Ministry of Foreign Affairs together with the East-West Institute launched the 
so-called Bratislava Process.13 It had two goals: 1) to enable dialogue and joint action 
among members of different pro-democracy (and pro-European) forces in Serbia and 
2) to enable their cooperation with and thus legitimation by organizations from the 
international community. A Donors’ Forum, similar to the one working in Slovakia, 
was proposed by Bratislava and set up by the international community to ensure a 
flow of Western and regional technical and financial assistance in order to consolidate 
                                                 
10 Ibid. Also interview with I. B., November 26, 2008: “We have some interested in democratization 
abroad.” 
11 Interview with K. V., November 19, 2008. 
12 Interview with M. V., November 27, 2008. 
13 The Bratislava Process at the idea of Pavel Lukac from the Slovak Foreign Policy Association – an 
independent Slovak think tank. Interview with M. S., November 13, 2008. 
 184 
the Serbian civil society as an engine for “renovation of the democratic life in 
Serbia.”14 Moreover, the Slovak embassy in Belgrade worked hard to unite the anti-
Milosevic opposition and provided political and logistical support to the Slovak 
activist training their Serbian counterparts.15 
In 2000, Serbia voted in a new president in the name of the democratization 
and Europeanization of the country.16 However, the Bratislava Process cooperation 
forum and training seminars continued into 2002. By then, Slovakia was accepted into 
OECD, which has development assistance requirements for member states. Bratislava 
complied by following up on the Process and setting up a special Bratislava-Belgrade 
Fund for the implementation of development – including democracy – assistance 
projects in Serbia and Montenegro, including Kosovo.17 (Another fund was also 
established to provide aid to all other countries and the two funds merged in 2007). 
Democracy assistance became one of the three priorities of the Slovak development 
aid. 
Moreover, at about the same time diplomatic democracy promotion was also 
beginning to gain prominence in Slovakia’s eastern policy. When Bratislava 
negotiated its membership in the EU and NATO, the very immediate Slovak security 
concerns diminished significantly but the still unstable European neighborhood 
continued to pose some threats.18 At the suggestion of the Slovak civic democracy 
promoters, Slovakia continued to use democracy promotion to participate in the EU’s 
external relations and to stabilize the southeast but also increasingly the east as well, 
                                                 
14 Pavol Luka, “Slovak Foreign Policy towards the Western Balkans – A Need for Continuity, 
Differentiated View and Flexibility,” in Slovak Institute for International Studies, Yearbook of Foreign 
Policy of the Slovak Republic 2002. 
15 “Kostunica was born in the Slovak Embassy in Belgrade.” Interview with M. S., July 25, 2007. 
16 In Croatia, the turnover in power was a symbolic achievement, since real power is vested in 
parliament, but it was an achievement, which was cemented by the return of the opposition coalition to 
power in parliament three years later. Valerie J. Bunce and Sharon L. Wolchik, Democratizing 
Elections, Diffusion and Democracy Assistance (New York: Cambridge University Press, forthcoming). 
17 Interview with K. V., November 19, 2008. 
18 Slovak Republic Security Strategy 2005, approved by the Government on July 13, 2005. 
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since the democratization of countries on that EU border were increasingly slowed 
down and even reversed. In the east, Slovakia focused on Ukraine, which is both a 
neighbor, a significant trade partner and strategic energy supplier, and perceived as 
“an important factor of European security.”19 It should also be noted that democracy 
promotion in the “European” parts of the post-communist world became increasingly 
synonymous with and offered in the form of support for Euro-Atlantic integration. 
In sum, the success of the Bratislava Process in helping the Serbian opposition 
to defeat one of the most-authoritarian regimes in the post-communist world 
demonstrated to Slovak democratic actors the potential of democracy promotion to 
transform the regional international environment and provided the young Slovak state 
with a foreign policy agenda, which allowed Bratislava to (politically and 
economically) stabilize its southeastern and eastern neighborhood while also earning 
Slovak membership in the Euro-Atlantic club. As in the Polish case, many of the 
political OK 98 elites have a personal commitment to democracy, which has 
influenced their receptivity to the arguments of their OK 98 civic partners for 
incorporating democracy promotion into Slovakia’s foreign policy and later on for 
keeping democracy promotion issues high on Bratislava’s agenda. Moreover, the 
notion of taking “responsibility in Europe” also resonates with the individual 
principled beliefs of some Slovak politicians about “good European citizenship.” 
However, it was exactly the strategic importance of Slovakia’s democracy promotion 
agenda that would allow it to be sustained over time at the state level and to survive 
turnover in power. 
                                                 
19 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Slovak Republic, The Main Aims and Interests of Slovakia in 
Relations with Ukraine (Bratislava, 2001). 
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1.1.1. The Rhetoric of Bratislava’s Official Democracy Promotion 
How do Slovak foreign policy elites talk about their democracy promotion 
efforts? Do they refer to their responsibility to uphold a universal right to democracy 
and/or do they talk about the benefits of having democratic international partners? The 
argument here is that even though Slovak political elites have been divided in their 
personal beliefs about and support for democratization abroad, there has been some 
convergence around the understanding of the strategic significance of democracy 
promotion. 
The official democracy promotion rhetoric reflects the facts that Slovak 
political elites have different levels of personal commitment to democracy and 
accordingly to democracy promotion as well. On the left, there are those few who turn 
a blind eye to authoritarian practices, declaring they are not “aware of any democratic 
deficit” or who advocate that “special stances” be taken towards violations of human 
rights and democratic principles in states such as Ukraine, Cuba, Belarus, and 
Russia.20 On the right, there are those who consider dissidents “brave, responsible and 
courageous citizens who deserve our highest respect, because they are a conscience of 
their nation” and use the Slovak diplomatic podium to express solidarity with and 
support those fighting for freedom around the world.21 However, the majority of the 
Slovak policy-makers converge rhetorically around the strategic importance of 
democracy promotion and Euro-Atlantic integration of the European post-communist 
countries. 16% of the references of Slovak diplomacy to their democracy promotion 
                                                 
20 The first quote is from Juraj Marusiak et al., “Foreign Policy – Main Trends, Bilateral Relations, 
Regional Cooperation,” in Slovakia 2002: Global Report on the State of Society (Bratislava: Institute 
for Public Affairs, 2002). The second quote is from Juraj Marusiak et al. 2006. “Foreign Policy – Main 
Trends, Bilateral Relations, Regional Cooperation,” in Slovakia 2006: Global Report on the State of 
Society (Bratislava: Institute for Public Affairs, 2006). 
21 Pavol Hrusovsky about the Cuban opposition, in Pavol Hrusovsky, “Presentation of the Chairman of 
the National Council of the Slovak Republic,” in Slovak Institute for International Studies, Yearbook of 
Foreign Policy of the Slovak Republic 2003, n.p. 
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activism are normative, 64% are strategic and the rest combine both normative and 
strategic explanations. [For those references, please see Appendix 4.] 
When discussing democracy promotion, most Slovak diplomats talk about a 
direct link between democracy and security. For example, the Slovak foreign minister 
from 1998 to 2006, Eduard Kukan, points out that democracy is an “important 
prerequisite for stability of any region”22 and the Speaker of the Slovak parliament 
from 2002 to 2006, Pavol Hrusovsky maintains that “spreading of democracy in the 
world is an issue directly connected to the issue of peace and worldwide security.”23 
Slovak diplomats also frequently argue that “democracy and stability in the immediate 
neighborhood of the EU is in the best interest of all of us.”24 Similarly, Slovak official 
development assistance promotion materials explain that one of the Slovak aid aims is 
to “ensure global peace and security, in particular by enhancing democracy, the rule of 
law, human rights and good governance in developing countries.”25 
Slovak diplomats further link democracy promotion with their contribution to 
the success of the Euro-Atlantic structures. In the words of a Slovak member to the 
NATO Parliamentary Assembly: “Slovakia must ask itself a basic question – where 
can it best help to strengthen the EU and the NATO so that it is respected and so that 
its contributions get reciprocity.”26 The response of former foreign minister Kukan is: 
                                                 
22 Intervention by Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Slovak Republic, H. E. Mr. Eduard Kukan at 
NATO HQ Meeting of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council December 15, 2000. 
23 Hrusovsky, “Presentation of the Chairman of the National Council of the Slovak Republic,” n.p. 
24 Magdalena Vasaryova, “Lessons Learned from Building a Civil Society in Slovakia –  
Spreading Democracy and Stability in Central and Eastern Europe” (Round Table at the School of 
Slavonic and East European Studies, London, November 9, 2005). Also, interview with I. B., 
November 26, 2008. 
25 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Slovak Republic, Medium-Term Strategy for Official Development 
Assistance of the Slovak Republic for the Years 2009–2013 (Bratislava, 2008), approved by the 
Government of the Slovak Republic on March 4, 2009. 
26 Jozef Banas, “Slovakia and its Elites in Global Environment,” in Slovak Institute for International 
Studies, Yearbook of Foreign Policy of the Slovak Republic 2003, n.p. Another good example, here, is 
the cabinet’s discussion of the Slovak involvement in “the reconstruction of south-eastern Europe, and 
peace and security in that part of Europe and, as a result, on the continent as a whole”: “Although it 
does not represent a direct and automatic road to NATO for Slovakia, since invitations are political 
decisions, we expect that our progress in our preparation [to contribute to security in the Western 
Balkans] will be the decisive impetus for the necessary political decision in our favor.” Ministry of 
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“Due to its enlargement, the EU became a neighbor of regions that are potentially 
unstable. We do not wish for their isolation. On the contrary, we chose the Balkans 
and Ukraine as the priority regions of Slovak foreign policy. Our contribution was and 
remains the sharing of our experience on the way to stability and democracy and 
through the help of our non-governmental organizations.”27 In this context, it’s also 
relevant to note that most Slovak foreign policy strategic documents understand Euro-
Atlantic integration to be “an instrument for expanding the space of stability and 
democracy.”28 
In sum, having democratic partners is considered important by a majority of 
the Slovak political elites because undemocratic partners are “unstable” politically and 
economically, which makes them “untrustworthy” (capricious and non-transparent) 
partners and causes of regional instability.29 Moreover, not only has democracy 
promotion been considered a “responsible” and “long-term” foreign policy choice in 
that it represents an investment in securing neighborhoods whose development affects 
Slovakia,30 but democracy promotion has also been deemed an investment in earning 
and saving Slovakia its place in the Euro-Atlantic structures. It should be noted, 
however, that the right governments have emphasized democracy promotion more, 
whereas the left governments have preferred to talk more about European integration, 
which implies democratization among other things. 
                                                                                                                                            
Foreign Affairs of the Slovak Republic, Orientation of the Slovak Republic’s Foreign Policy for 2000, 
(Bratislava, 1999) MFA archive. 
27 Eduard Kukan, “Presentation of the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Slovak Republic,” in Slovak 
Institute for International Studies, Yearbook of Foreign Policy of the Slovak Republic 2004 (Bratislava, 
2005), 87–93.  
28 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Slovak Republic, Medium-Term Foreign Policy Strategy of the 
Slovak Republic until 2015 (Bratislava, 2004). 
29 Interview with Brencic and his replacement; interview with Kukan; It should be noted that these 
beliefs were informed by the way the international community related to Slovakia before 1998. 
30 Kukan, “Presentation of the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Slovak Republic,” in Slovak Institute 
for International Studies, Yearbook of Foreign Policy of the Slovak Republic 2003, n.p.  
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And how have the Slovak foreign policy elites discussed their democracy 
promotion efforts in Bratislava’s democracy promotion priority countries – the 
Western Balkans (Serbia) and Ukraine? Serbia is a crucial case for understanding the 
motivations behind Slovak support for democratization abroad through Bratislava’s 
rhetoric because Serbia is considered to be the most similar Slovak international 
partner and therefore most likely to evoke Bratislava’s solidarity as well as its 
responsibility to uphold a universal right to democracy. Yet, the former (right) 
governments mostly note the importance of “peace and security in that part of Europe 
and, as a result, on the continent as a whole. […] Slovakia is ready to continue its 
contribution to the recovery of stability and regional security in the Western Balkans 
and the future prosperity of this region within European and Euroatlantic structures.”31 
Similarly, the current (left) cabinet has also declared that “The significant impact of 
the situation in the Western Balkans on the stability and development in Central 
Europe and the historic links make this region a priority of Slovakia’s foreign 
policy.”32 
Likewise, the former governments talked about the “special significance of 
Ukraine” for Bratislava’s foreign policy: “It is its largest neighbor that has traditional 
social, economic and cultural ties with Slovakia, and reciprocal presence of minorities. 
[…] Slovakia supports the efforts at building a democratic, economically strong and 
stable Ukraine and its integration into the European structures.”33 And the current 
cabinet has agreed that “With respect to Ukraine as a neighboring country the main 
objective of Slovakia will be supporting the development of the country, its 
democratic institutions and the development of good neighborhood. Continuation of 
                                                 
31 Orientation of the Slovak Republic’s Foreign Policy for 2000. 
32 Orientation of the Slovak Republic’s Foreign Policy for 2007. 
33 Slovak Government, “Slovakia’s Key Goals and Interests as regards Ukraine.”  
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European and Euro-Atlantic orientation of Ukraine and a pro-integration direction of 
Ukrainian foreign policy is the strategic interest of Slovakia.”34 
1.2.1. The Practice of Bratislava’s Official Democracy Promotion 
The motivation behind Slovak democracy promotion can also be gleaned from 
the territorial focus of Bratislava’s efforts. Has Slovak diplomacy been most active 
towards the most important non-democratic international partners or towards the 
international partners Slovakia considers to be most similar to it and therefore an 
object of solidarity? The argument here is that the fact that Slovakia has been most 
involved in democracy promotion in the European neighborhood countries defined 
domestically and at the EU level to be of strategic importance for the continent’s 
security suggests that Bratislava had sought to use the benefits of having democratic 
international partners to create a stable and prosperous international environment for 
Slovakia. 
First, the best illustration of these priorities is the distribution of democracy 
assistance through the Slovak development aid program because they reflect 
Bratislava’s diplomatic priorities as well.35 From 2004 to 2007, Serbia and 
Montenegro, including Kosovo attracted 47% of all the official democracy assistance 
projects sponsored through SlovakAid.36 Bratislava’s second and third priorities were 
Ukraine and Belarus respectively with 16% and 12% of Slovakia’s democracy aid. In 
                                                 
34 Orientation of the Slovak Republic’s Foreign Policy for 2007. 
35 The exception is Croatia, which is not eligible for development assistance but whose democratization 
has been diplomatically supported by Slovakia. After the democratic breakthrough in Croatia (carried 
out with some assistance by leading Slovak civic democracy promoters), Bratislava has strongly backed 
Zagreb’s EU bid. In fact, Slovakia supported the EU integration of Croatia when Poland and Czech 
Republic blocked it because of Croatia’s poor cooperation with the Hague Tribunal. Such support for 
democracy as a means to stability and prosperity rather than support for the principle of democracy 
suggests that Slovak democracy promotion has been a primarily strategic rather than a normative 
foreign policy commitment. 
36 Jacek Kucharczyk and Jeff Lovitt, eds., Democracy’s New Champions: European Democracy 
Assistance after EU Enlargement (Prague: PASOS, 2008). 
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addition to SlovakAid, in 2006 Bratislava launched a pilot program for small grants 
projects chosen by Slovakia’s embassy in Ukraine.37 And while serving as a NATO 
contact point in Ukraine, Bratislava funded some additional projects relevant to the 
goals of its mandate; similarly, when presiding the Council of Europe, Bratislava 
focused on Belarus as a territorial priority and provided assistance to Belarus for 
enhancing its relations with the international organization.38  
The choice of Serbia as the top priority for Slovak democracy assistance alone 
does not provide conclusive support for either the strategic or the normative 
explanation because Serbia is claimed by Slovak policy-makers to be the most 
culturally similar international partner.39 Similarly, Bratislava’s second priority 
Ukraine is the neighbor in the east where there are the most “traditional social, 
economic and cultural ties with Slovakia, including similarities of languages and 
religions, and reciprocal presence of minorities.”40 Still, as a democracy promotion 
priority, Ukraine is ranked higher than other Western Balkan nations which are 
considered to be more ”similar” and perhaps “closer” to Slovakia.41 Moreover, there is 
no special solidarity between Slovakia and Belarus at the state level. On the other 
hand, as the last dictatorship in Europe, Belarus is not only understood to be 
“problem” neighbor for Brussels but has also been targeted by the leading Slovak civic 
democracy promoters. As a result, the Slovak state, interested in contributing to 
European security but with limited foreign policy capacity, has supported, cooperated 
                                                 
37 Kucharczyk and Lovitt, Democracy’s New Champions. 
38 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Slovak Republic, Annual Report: Foreign Policy in 2007,  
(Bratislava, 2008). 
39 Most SlovakAid assistance to the Western Balkans went to Serbia; still, Slovakia is looking to 
gradually expand the coverage of its aid to include the other descendants of Former Yugoslavia. 
Moreover, the second country in the Western Balkans closest to Slovakia – Croatia – has been actively 
supported by Bratislava by diplomatic means. As former Prime Minister Mikulas Dzurinda notes, 
Slovakia has sought to be one of the most vocal advocates of Croatia’s accelerated accession to the EU. 
40 Slovak Government, “Slovakia’s Key Goals and Interests as regards Ukraine.” 
41 Miroslav Lajcak, “Slovak Foreign Policy in 2008 through the Eyes of the Slovak Foreign Minister,” 
in Slovak Institute for International Studies, Yearbook of Slovakia’s Foreign Policy 2008 (Bratislava, 
2009). 9–19.  
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actively with, and delegated some responsibility to prominent Slovak NGOs working 
on supporting the democratization of Belarus.  
Further evidence of the strategic logic behind the SlovakAid democracy 
assistance distribution comes from the Slovak support for the democratization of 
Afghanistan and (the lack of aid to) Cuba. Slovaks speak of “special ties” between 
Czechoslovakia and Cuba during the Cold War.42 Moreover, there are Slovak 
politicians and civic activists among the elites who prepared the democratic 
breakthrough in Slovakia who feel solidarity with the Cuban dissidents and who, as a 
result, provide political, moral, technical, and financial support to the Cuban 
opposition both bilaterally and through the EU.43 However, there is no political 
majority behind democracy promotion in Cuba because the Cuban problem lacks 
strategic immediacy; thus, no official assistance provided to Cuba. On the other hand, 
Slovakia, like many other Eastern European NATO members, supported the US 
efforts in Afghanistan. Given the general and security instability in the country, 
Bratislava sought to involve the Slovak civic sector in implementing democracy 
assistance as an investment in the stability and securitization of the region. Half the 
SlovakAid projects implemented in Afghanistan supported the development of civil 
society and democratic procedures in the country (the other half focused on 
infrastructure rebuilding).  
After power turned over to the left, there was a lot of domestic and 
international concern over the inclusion of pre-1998 ruling elite in the new left 
governing coalition.44 Moreover the new prime minister had as recently as 2005 
                                                 
42 Interview with M. H., November 14, 2008. 
43 Interview with G. S., November 6, 2008. 
44 Moreover, the new prime minister had as recently as 2005 criticized what he called Slovakia’s one-
sided orientation towards the US administration and its neglect of relations with Russia and had also 
called for “special stances” to be taken towards states such as Ukraine, Cuba, Belarus and Vietnam. 
Juraj Marusiak et al. “Foreign Policy – Main Trends, Bilateral Relations, Regional Cooperation,” in 
Slovakia 2006: Global Report on the State of Society. Institute for Public Affairs, (Bratislava., 2006)  
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criticized what he called Slovakia’s one-sided orientation towards the West and 
neglect of relations with Russia and had also called for “special stances” to be taken 
towards states such as Ukraine, Cuba, Belarus and Vietnam.45 At the same time, there 
were other left leaders and politicians who actively supported Slovakia’s commitment 
to democracy promotion.46 To allay concerns about the new coalition’s commitment to 
democracy at home and abroad and to pull the ranks together behind a single foreign 
policy line, the ruling parties signed a foreign policy priorities agreement that 
committed the new cabinet to the priorities followed by the previous right 
governments. Moreover, the government appointed a foreign minister with experience 
in various European regional organizations and personal and professional commitment 
to European values (including democracy).47 Still, on 2006 Human Rights Day, a 
group of civic activists, intellectuals and former politicians signed and presented to the 
cabinet an Appeal to Preserve Slovakia’s Democratic Solidarity, calling on the 
government to follow the existing national foreign policy consensus, part of which 
was democratization support to various actors in countries in transition around the 
world. The new Deputy Foreign Minister responded by officially committing the 
ministry to continuity in support for democratic processes in Eastern Europe.48 
Indeed, the left coalition has emphasized strengthening the economic 
dimension of diplomacy and was therefore more interested in creating economic 
stability abroad through some democracy promotion but mostly through European 
                                                 
45 Juraj Marusiak et al., “The Foreign Policy and National Security of the Slovak Republic,” in Slovakia 
2004: Global Report on the State of Society (Bratislava: Institute for Public Affairs, 2004). 
46 Juraj Marusiak et al., “The Foreign Policy and National Security of the Slovak Republic,” in Slovakia 
2006: Global Report on the State of Society (Bratislava: Institute for Public Affairs, 2006). 
47 Jan Kubis had served as secretary general of the OSCE (1999–2005) and was crucial to involving the 
OSCE in the mediation between the warring Ukrainian parties during the 2004 Orange Revolution. 
Kubis later served as the special EU representative for Central Asia. He was succeeded by another 
internationally recognized career diplomat with experience in the (democratization and stabilization of 
the) Western Balkans, Miroslav Lajcak. Lajcak was the EU supervisor for the 2006 Montenegrin 
independence referendum and the EU’s Special Representative for Bosnia-Herzegovina, 2007–2009.  
48 Ingrid Brocova, “Rozvojova pomoc poskytovana Slovenskou republikou,” in Slovakia 2004: Global 
Report on the State of Society (Bratislava: Institute for Public Affairs, 2006). 
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integration for the existing and potential important Slovak trading partners. Moreover, 
while the new government continued to cooperate with Slovak civic democracy 
promoters, the cabinet has relied much more on leveraging the resources of various 
international organizations such as the UN, EU, NATO, and the Council of Europe to 
support democratization in the post-communist region.49 The share of democracy 
assistance within SlovakAid (implemented by Slovak NGOs) declined a bit to allow 
the share of infrastructural development projects carried out by Slovak firms abroad to 
grow.50 There was a decline of democracy assistance funding within total SlovakAid 
from 48% to 14% for project in Serbia and Montenegro but growth of the share of 
democracy aid for the rest of the priority countries from 26% to 32%.51 However, 
diplomatically Bratislava continued to support the democratization and EU integration 
of the Western Balkans and even stepped up Slovak efforts in Ukraine and Belarus. 
Yet, outside of such (consensus) priority countries for democracy promotion, Slovak 
official democracy promotion has been uneven and often undermined by more 
immediate (economic) interests. The Prime Minister has sought to deepen economic 
ties with autocratic countries such as Russia, China, and Libya without concern for the 
violation of human rights and democratic practices by regimes.52 So the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs is often reduced to explaining the positions of the Prime Minister or 
                                                 
49 Bratislva’s initiatives within the EU, NATO, and the Council of Europe are described in section 2, so 
a word on the Slovak priorities within the UN is in order. Slovakia’s main concerns when serving as a 
non-permanent member of the Security Council were the West Balkans (above all the future status of 
Kosovo), Cyprus, Eastern Europe and the Middle East. Slovakia also ran and was elected a Member of 
the UN Human Rights Council for 2008–2011. Together with Slovakia’s agenda for its chairmanship of 
the Council of Europe, Bratislava’s initiative within the UN “signaled the beginning of a period in 
which Slovakia started to focus on human rights on an institutional basis within its foreign policy. 
Slovakia continues to do so both intensively and systematically.” Martina Hvorlova, “Slovakia’s 
Chairmanship of the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe,” in Slovak Institute for 
International Studies, Yearbook of Slovakia’s Foreign Policy 2008: 51–61. 
50 There was a decline of democracy assistance funding within total SlovakAid from 48% to 14% for 
project in Serbia and Montenegro but growth of the share of democracy aid for the rest of the priority 
countries from 26% to 32%. Kucharczyk and Lovitt, Democracy’s New Champions. 
51 Kucharczyk and Lovitt, Democracy’s New Champions. 
52 Alexander Duleba, “Slovakia’s Relations with Its Eastern Neighbors in 2008,” in Slovak Institute for 
International Studies, Slovakia’s Yearbook of Foreign Policy 2008 (Bratislava, 2009), 105–22. 
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the Chairmen of other coalition parties while also trying to maintain continuity in the 
priority areas of Slovakia’s foreign policy.53 
2. Democratization: “Made in Slovakia”? 
What type of democracy has Slovakia been promoting abroad? And what 
policy instruments has Bratislava preferred? Is this Slovak strategy informed by a set 
of taken-for-granted institutions, processes, and policy instruments, and/or by a 
calculation based on the performance of certain institutions and the effectiveness of 
particular processes and instruments? The Slovak approach to democracy promotion is 
best understood as a strategic export of the local experience with democratization as it 
fits the democratization needs of recipients. 
Like many other Slovak politicians, Slovakia’s Minister of Foreign Affairs 
from 1998 to 2006 recognizes Slovakia’s transition successes: “It is not a long time 
ago when Slovakia by its own mistakes put itself into a position of isolation. Only 
recently we had to face demarches and we were considered a black sheep of the 
European family or enfant terrible of Central Europe. […] The enfant terrible has 
become a Tatra tiger. […] Today nobody put into questions that Slovakia is one of the 
most dynamically developing, democratic, stable, and pro-reform countries of the old 
continent.”54 As the 2003 Slovak development assistance strategy notes, this is “a 
particular experience not shared with the traditional [Western] donors.”55 Moreover, 
                                                 
53 For example, there were differences in the positions of both the Minister of Foreign Affairs and the 
President, on the one hand, and on the other, the Prime Minister who has sought to align Slovak with 
Russian stances about crucial international issues such as the recognition of Kosovo’s independence, 
the deployment of a national missile defense system by the US in the Czech Republic and Poland, the 
Russian-Georgian war in August 2008, and the Russian-Ukrainian natural gas conflict at the beginning 
of 2009. Duleba, “Slovakia’s Relations with Its Eastern Neighbors in 2008.” 
54 Kukan, “Presentation of the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Slovak Republic,” in Slovak Institute 
for International Studies, Yearbook of Foreign Policy of the Slovak Republic 2004. “Tatra Tiger” is a 
nickname that refers to the Slovak economy following the ascendance of a right-wing coalition in 
September 2002 which engaged in a program of liberal economic reforms. 
55 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Slovak Republic, Medium-Term Strategy for Official Development 
Assistance: 2003–2008 (Bratislava, 2003). 
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this Slovak experience is considered by Bratislava an “inspiration” or at least “not an 
improbable role model” for post-communist hybrid regimes.56  
In other words, the Slovak export of its transition experience is based on a 
strategic calculation about the effectiveness of the Slovak democratization practices 
and of “how fast Slovakia achieved European integration after having to catch up” 
with the other Eastern European applicants to the EU and NATO.57 Much like Poland, 
Slovakia is promoting, not a set of institutions, but rather a “journey”58 – a set of 
processes related to turning a transition laggard into a “success story.”59 Moreover, 
rather than informing a taken-for-granted route to democratization, the sharing of 
Slovakia’s transition experience is understood as “the means in which to practically 
achieve and more effectively implement this [Slovak foreign policy] interest [of 
supporting democratization in the European neighborhood].”60 And finally, like 
Poland, Slovakia has adopted different approaches to supporting the democratization 
of autocracies and to improving the quality of democracy in countries in transition. 
2.1. Bratislava’s Approach to Democracy Promotion in Ukraine 
Slovakia and Ukraine were both born in the aftermath of the end of the Cold 
War. Even though they became neighbors, these countries played a fairly minor role in 
each other’s foreign and domestic policy (at least initially).61 In the period between the 
                                                 
56 First quote by Hvorlova, “Slovakia’s Chairmanship of the Committee of Ministers of the Council of 
Europe.” Second quote by Lajcak, “Slovak Foreign Policy in 2008 through the Eyes of the Slovak 
Foreign Minister.” 
57 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Slovak Republic, Annual Report: Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the 
Slovak Republic Foreign Policy in 2007 (Bratislava, Slovakia). 
58 Mikulas Dzurinda, “Presentation of the Prime Minister of the Slovak Republic,” in Slovak Institute 
for International Studies, Yearbook of Foreign Policy of the Slovak Republic 2003 (Bratislava, 2004). 
59 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Slovak Republic, Annual Report 2007. 
60 Ibid. 
61 Juraj Marusiak et al., “The Foreign Policy and National Security of the Slovak Republic,” in Slovakia 
2004: Global Report on the State of Society (Bratislava: Institute for Public Affairs, 2004). While there 
are few historic disputes, which could become the source of bilateral conflicts, the national stereotypes 
across the Slovak-Ukrainian border are not always positive. Many Slovak myths about Ukraine include 
imagery of the “Ukrainian mafia,” organized crime, a cheap labor force, and unreliable business 
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breakup of Czechoslovakia and the democratic breakthrough in Slovakia in 1998, 
Bratislava related to Ukraine as a “gate to Russia” (or at least Russian markets and 
energy supplies) rather than a partner worthy of direct Slovak attention.62 After 1998, 
Slovakia began pursuing a pro-Western foreign policy and consequently, sought to 
conduct a “more balanced” eastern policy, including enhanced cooperation with 
Ukraine. However, bilateral relations continued to be cold for some time because 
Bratislava was preoccupied with (and somewhat overwhelmed by the demands of) 
bringing the country closer to membership in the Euro-Atlantic club; moreover, 
Slovakia did not want to be associated with a transition laggard such as Ukraine for 
fear of being put on a slower accession track. Finally, the accumulation of several 
unresolved problems (visas, energy security, Ukrainian debt, minority rights, and 
competition for a UN Security Council Seat) significantly strained Slovak-Ukrainian 
relations in the late 1990s.63 
Relations between Kiev and Bratislava intensified and improved in 2001 when 
compromises were reached on some of those issues and as Ukraine was becoming 
more interested in close relations with the EU. Slovak diplomats recognized the need 
to “support the building of Ukraine as a politically and economically stable and 
prosperous country with transparent market economy and advanced democracy [… 
and] in reaching its declared objective of cooperation with the developed Europe.”64 
Slovakia readily invested in the further liberalization of mutual trade by improving 
                                                                                                                                            
partners. On the other hand, many Ukrainians portray Slovaks as too nationalistic and inward looking, 
uninterested in Ukraine and preferring relations with Russia or scarifying Ukraine because of Slovakia’s 
ambitions for Euro-Atlantic integration. Interview with E. W. I., April 30, 2009. 
62 Interview with A. D., July 27, 2007. 
63 Alexander Duleba, “Relations with Ukraine as Slovakia’s Foreign Policy Priority,” in Slovak Institute 
for International Studies, Yearbook of Foreign Policy of the Slovak Republic 2005 (Bratislava: Slovak 
Institute for International Studies, 2006). 
64 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Slovak Republic, The Main Aims and Interests of Slovakia in 
Relations with Ukraine (Bratislava, 2001). 
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regional and cross-border cooperation with Ukraine and by supporting Kiev’s 
integration in regional and global economic regimes such as the WTO and CEFTA.65 
However, Slovak foreign policy-makers (the government and the presidency in 
particular) were not consistent and united in structuring Bratislava’s political relations 
with Ukraine. On the one hand, even though the Slovak president was criticized by 
other Slovak diplomats as well as by some Slovak civic experts and journalists about 
his indulgence of Kiev’s authoritarian practices, there were frequent and warm official 
and unofficial meetings between Slovak and the Ukrainian presidents.66 On the other 
hand, during bilateral and multilateral events, the Slovak government expressed 
publicly its support for the “democratic development of Ukraine” and “its direction to 
a [European] community on a similar journey as did we in Slovakia.”67 Moreover, 
during some of their visits to Ukraine, the Slovak delegations (even ones in which the 
Slovak president participated) met with representatives of the Ukrainian regime as 
well as with opposition leaders.68 
                                                 
65 Duleba, “Relations with Ukraine as Slovakia’s Foreign Policy Priority.” 
66 Against the background of rising Western criticism of Kuchma’s undemocratic methods, power 
abuse, and his restriction of media freedom in Ukraine, the Slovak president announced that he was not 
aware of any democratic deficit in Ukraine and that he saw no similarity between the democratically-
elected Kuchma and Belarus’ Lukashenko, who had shown himself to be antidemocratic. Similarly, 
when the Ukraine president visited Slovakia in 2003, it was precisely at the moment that the Ukraine 
opposition, in a big demonstration in Kiev, was commemorating the events of March 9, 2001, when the 
Ukraine police had brutally put down an anti−presidential demonstration. The Ukraine press dubbed 
Kuchma’s stay in Slovakia a “flight to safety.” Juraj Marusiak et al., “The Foreign Policy and National 
Security of the Slovak Republic,” in Slovakia 2003: Global Report on the State of Society (Bratislava: 
Institute for Public Affairs, 2003). 
67 Mikulas Dzurinda, “Presentation of the Prime Minister of the Slovak Republic.” It should also be 
noted that beginning in 2001–02, Poland, which had very actively assisted Slovakia in catching up with 
the first wave of Eastern European EU applicants, began encouraging Bratislava to more actively 
support the Ukrainian transition. Warsaw argued for the strategic importance of Ukraine for “peace in 
Europe” as well as for Central European “responsibilities towards the East,” given the support Central 
Europe received from the West after 1989. Moreover, since three of the four Visegrad countries were 
direct Ukrainian neighbors, the Visegrad Group became a platform for cooperation on assisting Kiev’s 
European integration. Juraj Marusiak et al., “The Foreign Policy and National Security of the Slovak 
Republic,” in Slovakia 2002: Global Report on the State of Society (Bratislava: Institute for Public 
Affairs, 2002). 
68 Juraj Marusiak et al., “The Foreign Policy and National Security of the Slovak Republic,” in Slovakia 
2003: Global Report on the State of Society (Bratislava: Institute for Public Affairs, 2003). 
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A new phase in Bratislava-Kiev relations began in 2004 when the outline of 
Slovakia’s post-EU accession foreign policy priorities began to emerge. Following a 
conversation with representatives of civil society, the Slovak government declared 
Ukraine (together with the Western Balkans) to be Slovakia’s strategic partners.69 This 
consensus and turnover in the Slovak presidency improved the coherence and 
consistency of Slovakia’s eastern policy. Bratislava began supporting more openly and 
actively the democratization and Euro-Atlantic integration of Ukraine by stepping up 
its assistance and diplomatic efforts. 
Bratislava recognized the historic opportunity to pull Ukraine in a pro-Western 
and pro-democratic direction through political and civic popular mobilization on 
occasion of the 2004 Ukrainian presidential elections. So in the summer of 2004, the 
Slovak prime minister visited Ukraine to offer Bratislava’s help in improving 
Ukraine’s relations with NATO and the EU. Moreover, since Bratislava was in the 
process of setting up an official development assistance system, the Slovak delegation 
presented Bratislava’s draft program for assistance to Ukraine. It included a number of 
projects, implemented by Slovak NGOs in cooperation with Ukrainian civic groups 
but also with some Ukrainian state actors as well; these projects were meant to share 
the “lessons” leant from Slovakia’s transition experience with Ukraine.70 The Slovak 
prime minister also expressed support of the pro-democratic forces in Ukraine by 
receiving leading opposition figures to discuss “democratization in Ukraine and the 
[upcoming] presidential elections.”71 At the request of the challenger, the Slovak 
prime minister promised to (and subsequently did) provide election-monitoring 
assistance to Ukraine.72 Additionally at multilateral and bilateral events before the 
                                                 
69 Interview with A. D., July 27, 2007. 
70 Marusiak et al., “The Foreign Policy and National Security of the Slovak Republic,” 2004. 
71 Ibid.  
72 The Slovak government covered half of the costs related to sending a mission of 108 long- and short-
term observers to the three rounds of the presidential elections in Ukraine Marusiak et al., “The Foreign 
Policy and National Security of the Slovak Republic,” 2004.  
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elections, Bratislava called on the outgoing Ukrainian president to launch democratic 
reforms and guarantee free and fair presidential elections.73 
Then, during the election struggle over the character and nature of the political 
regime in Ukraine, the foreign ministry released a statement and the Slovak parliament 
adopted a resolution condemning the fraud during the presidential elections in Ukraine 
and expressing support for democratic practices and pro-democratic forces in 
Ukraine.74 Additionally, a Slovak diplomat serving as the OSCE Secretary General at 
the time steered the OSCE to participate in the mediation efforts between the warring 
parties – despite the hesitation of the Chairman-in-Office; the Slovak diplomat is 
recognized as having “contributed to the peaceful and just outcome to the crisis.”75  
After the democratic breakthrough in Ukraine in 2004, Slovakia intensified its 
assistance to Ukraine as well as its advocacy on behalf of Ukraine in front of the EU 
and NATO. Bratislava leveraged its official development aid system to continue to 
contribute to the strengthening of civil society in Ukraine. [See Table 5.1.] Moreover, 
Bratislava began supporting reform implementation in Ukraine by sponsoring the 
sharing of “best practices” in legislation and institutional reform from the EU 
                                                 
73 Marusiak et al., “The Foreign Policy and National Security of the Slovak Republic,” 2004. The 
Slovak NGO, Civic Eye, which sent the 108 observers, sponsored by the Slovak government, also 
trained, organized, and dispatched 160 Slovak observers within the mission of the OSCE and the 
ENEMO (a federation of 17 NGOs from Central and Eastern Europe). Additionally, several Slovak 
civic activists were working as advisers to the Ukrainian opposition and as experts in media monitoring 
for OSCE. Most notably, the German Marshall Fund’s office in Bratislava acted as the principal 
consultant for PORA, a civic movement in Ukraine, regarding the communication strategy for and 
preparation of a civic campaign, and MEMO 98 worked in Kiev until the end of 2004 as an OSCE 
expert in the field of media analyses. Marusiak et al., “The Foreign Policy and National Security of the 
Slovak Republic,” 2004.  
74 Hrusovsky, “Presentation of the Chairman of the National Council of the Slovak Republic.”  
75 Prepared Statement of the Honorable Daniel Fried, Assistant Secretary, Bureau of European and 
Eurasian Affairs, United States Department of State. “Kubis’s presence was valuable in that it signaled 
OSCE interest in developments in Ukraine and brought in the institution’s reputation for supporting 
democratic norms. OSCE’s broader membership could have been an advantage in the mediation effort; 
while the European Union was regarded as a ‘Western’ institution, OSCE had a much more balanced 
East-West membership. This broader membership, however, also posed an institutional constraint. […] 
Given the wide differences among the member-states, Kubis could not engage in a more pointed way.” 
Interview with S. P., June 20, 2007. Still, Kubis maintained a busy schedule, holding his own bilateral 
meetings with the warring parties. 
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integration process of various Slovak institutions with their Ukrainian counterparts. In 
2005, Bratislava began running annual programs, “Slovak Aid in the Implementation 
of the Action Plan EU-Ukraine.” They have included dozens of trainings, study visits, 
consultations, and information seminars by various Slovak governmental and non-
governmental actors working to further Ukraine’s Euro-Atlantic integration and 
improve state-society cooperation in this process. 76 At the EU level, Slovak diplomats 
supported the (Polish/ Visegrad Four) initiatives in the European Parliament and the 
European Council to commit the EU to defining clear conditions and precise dates for 
beginning accession negotiations with Ukraine.77 And even when the EU membership 
prospective for Ukraine became a distant reality, Bratislava continued to prepare Kiev 
for it. 
When power turned over in Slovakia in 2006, the new government followed 
the priorities of the previous cabinet and kept actively supporting Ukraine’s Euro-
Atlantic integration. Slovak-Ukrainian cooperation on deepening of the democratic 
transition and on fulfilling the annual Ukraine-EU action plans continued and the 
Slovak parliament launched a complementary parliament-to-parliament initiative. 
Slovak diplomats also supported a number of new Slovak civic efforts to shape the 
EU’s eastern policy.78 And from the Visegrad presidency, Slovakia put forth ideas for 
and presented at various EU level meetings a common Visegrad proposal for 
strengthening the bilateral and regional eastern dimension of the European 
                                                 
76 After the first such program, Ukrainian Prime Minister at the time, Viktor Yanukovych, shared: 
“Several countries offered assistance to Ukraine in implementing the Action Plan. The proposal of 
Slovakia is the best though.” H Treteckyj, “V Jevropu – razom iz Slovaccynoju” [Towards Europe 
together with Slovakia], Den 18 (February 2006). 
77 Also, the foreign ministry and Slovak civil society organized an international conference, “Ukraine 
on Its Path to the EU: Expectations, Possibilities and Limits.” 
78 A notable example is the international conference “Strategic Framework for the EU’s Eastern Policy: 
Seeking a New Approach,” organized by the Slovak Foreign Policy Association, which brought 
together European think-tank experts and European and EU diplomats and argued for immediate 
sectoral economic integration with Ukraine (including free-trade and visa-free travel) as a stepping 
stone towards future membership when Ukraine meets the EU’s criteria. 
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Neighborhood Policy. Slovakia also initiated a series of consultations and negotiations 
between the Visegrad and the former USSR Baltic republic, the Visegrad countries 
and the European Commission, and the Visegrad countries and individual EU 
neighbors such as Ukraine about formulating a more ambitious eastern policy; the 
process culminated (under the Czech Visegrad presidency) with the presentation of the 
Polish-Swedish Eastern Partnership proposal. Slovak diplomats then promoted the 
proposal until its adoption at the end of 2008.79  
Bratislava also continued to lobby for NATO membership for Ukraine and 
successfully ran for the Slovak embassy in Kiev to gain the status of a NATO contact 
embassy for 2007 – 2008.80 Slovakia’s mission was to support the dialogue between 
Ukraine and the Alliance. Bratislava worked with media, civil society, and political 
elites throughout Ukraine to “contribute to the build up of transparency and trust 
between Ukraine and NATO.” 81 To that end, Slovakia sought to improve Ukrainian 
public awareness about the Alliance and about Slovakia’s accession experiences as 
well as to enhancing the cooperation and communication on the Ukrainian question 
within NATO and between the Alliance and the Ukrainian central and regional 
authorities. Slovakia’s flagship project was the preparation and opening of a NATO 
Information Centre at the Uzhgorod National University in 2008.82 Moreover, at 
Kiev’s request, the Slovak embassy administered a special grant scheme that awarded 
small grants to Ukrainian organizations participating in the public debate on Ukraine’s 
                                                 
79 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Slovak Republic, Annual Report 2007 and Annual Report 2008. 
80 Slovak diplomats argued, “we have good knowledge of Ukraine’s situation and bilateral relations 
without any conflicts, which in connection with our recent accession process and membership 
experience, gives our statements additional authority. In the dimension of NATO-Ukraine relations we 
are considered a friendly country, with a similar language and culture and a similar historical 
experience, which has already made its decision in favor of the European and transatlantic community 
and unambiguously supports the integration ambitions of Ukraine to the extent to which Ukraine itself 
is prepared. That is why we are a trustworthy source of information and experience from NATO for 
many in Ukraine.” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Slovak Republic, Annual Report 2007. 
81 Interview with A. D., July 27, 2007. 
82 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Slovak Republic, Annual Report 2008. 
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NATO membership and the necessary political and defense reforms.83 In addition, the 
Slovak foreign ministry supported additional projects in this domain. 
Table 5.1. SlovakAid Bilateral Democracy Assistance by Country by Targeted 
Sector, 2004-2008: Percent of SlovakAid Democracy Assistance Projects 
Implemented in Ukraine and Belarus and Targeting a Particular Sector out of 
All SlovakAid Democracy Assistance Projects Implemented in Ukraine and 
Belarus for a Particular Year 
   Country 
Sectors Ukraine Belarus 
Elections  6% - Political 
Process 
Parties  3% 10% 
Legislature  - - 
Executive  9% - 
Judiciary  - - 
Governing 
Institutions 
Local Government  6% - 
Interest Groups 29% 30% 
Grassroots Groups 3% 15% 
Organized 
Think Tanks 9% 15% 
Media - - 
Youth 9% 15% 
Educators 6% 5% 
Civil Society 
Unorganized 
General Public 23% 15% 
Note. Data from author calculations.  
 
The 2009 natural gas dispute between Ukraine and Russia and the resultant 
interruption of supply to Slovakia for two weeks tested Slovak-Ukrainian relations. 
The Slovak prime minister took Russia’s side and threatened to withdraw Slovak 
                                                 
83 Kucharczyk and Lovitt, Democracy’s New Champions. 
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support for Ukraine’s EU integration.84 However, even if the dispute cooled off 
bilateral ties, Bratislava took no concrete steps to change its approach towards Kiev. 
In sum, Slovak support for Ukraine’s democratization emerged slowly, fairly 
late, and after a period of inconsistent and contradictory diplomacy in this direction. 
However, by the mid-2000 Slovakia had launched an ambitious assistance program to 
support the development of civil society in Ukraine and the implementation of the 
reforms necessary for the country’s democratic consolidation and Euro-Atlantic 
integration. Moreover, Slovakia has become increasing active in its diplomatic 
advocacy on behalf of Ukraine in front of the EU and NATO. 
2.2. Bratislava’s Approach to Democracy Promotion in Belarus 
Throughout the 1990s, Slovakia’s political relations with Belarus were weak. 
Slovakia does not share a common border with Belarus and the bilateral trade between 
the two countries has remained negligible. A Slovak Embassy to the Republic of 
Belarus was opened only in 2001.85 Moreover, like Ukraine, Belarus too remained in 
the “shadow of Russia” in the period between the breakup of Czechoslovakia and the 
democratic breakthrough in Slovakia in 1998.86 Bratislava’s foreign policy after 1998 
was shaped by Slovakia’s aspirations to join the EU and NATO. This priority guided 
not only Slovakia’s western policy but also its eastern policy.87 Since Brussels 
downgraded its contacts with Belarus after the authoritarian turn in the country in 
1996-97, Bratislava’s political relations with Minsk after 1998 were limited to 
                                                 
84 Duleba, “Slovakia’s Relations with its Eastern Neighbors in 2009,” in Slovak Foreign Policy 
Association, Yearbook of Foreign Policy of the Slovak Republic (Bratislava: Slovak Institute for 
International Studies, 2010).  
85 Previously Slovakia was represented in Minsk on the level of the Consulate General only. 
86 Interview with A. D., July 27, 2007. 
87 Alexander Duleba, “Slovakia’s Relations with Its Eastern Neighbors in 2008,” in Slovakia 2008: 
Global Report on the State of Society (Bratislava: Institute for Public Affairs, 2008). 
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meetings during multilateral events.88 At the same time, the Slovak government has 
dedicated a substantial part of its activities in Belarus to supporting Slovak NGOs 
promoting civil society and democratic reforms in this last dictatorship in Europe.89 
Slovak civic activists from the OK 98 campaign were invited to Belarus by the 
Belarusian opposition and their US sponsors as early as 1999.90 With support from the 
US, the OSCE, and the Slovak government, several Slovak NGOs played key roles in 
training the Belarusian opposition to prepare an “electoral revolution” modeled after 
the OK 98 campaign (and the 2000 campaign in Serbia).91 Following the 2001 
presidential elections in Belarus and especially after Slovakia had negotiated its entry 
into the EU and NATO, the Slovak government in cooperation with Slovak NGOs got 
“significantly involved” in supporting the Belarusian opposition.92 Bratislava began 
more openly providing political and moral support as well as foreign assistance to the 
civic and political democratic forces in Belarus. Slovak diplomats and 
parliamentarians invited Belarusian opposition leaders to Bratislava in the months 
preceding the 2004 parliamentary elections in Belarus, which were scheduled together 
with a referendum abolishing the term limit of the Belarusian presidency. At the 
request of the Belarusian opposition, Bratislava worked with the Slovak NGOs to send 
international observers to monitor the election. And after Lukashenko manipulated the 
vote, representatives of the Belarusian opposition were again received in Bratislava at 
                                                 
88 The Slovak priority for bilateral relations with Belarus was improving Slovak exports and settling the 
Belarusian debts towards Slovakia. Between 1998 and 2008, only 5 agreements were concluded: on 
promotion and reciprocal protection of investment in 2001 and then again in 2005; on plant quarantine 
in 2001 and on cooperation in veterinary medicine in 2001; and on the liquidation of the Belarusian 
debt in 2002.  
89 Duleba, “Slovakia’s Relations with Its Eastern Neighbors in 2008.”  
90 Interview with J. K., November 26, 2008. 
91 Pavol Demes, “The Third Sector and Volunteerism,” in Slovakia 2001: Global Report on the State of 
Society (Bratislava: Institute for Public Affairs, 2001). Juraj Marusiak et al., Foreign Policy – Main 
Trends, Bilateral Relations, Regional Cooperation, in Slovakia 2004: Global Report on the State of 
Society (Bratislava: Institute for Public Affairs, 2004). Belarus became Bratislava’s third democracy-
promotion priority after the Western Balkans and Ukraine. Moreover, a Slovak diplomat was serving as 
the OSCE Secretary General during the organizaiton’s intense involvement in Belarus (1999–2001), 
which allowed Slovak democracy promoters some additional influence. 
92 Interview with J. M., November 26, 2008. 
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the highest level as recognition of their legitimacy and struggle.93 The Slovak policy-
makers committed to also support the Belarusian democratic forces on international 
stage and especially at the EU level. Slovak diplomats together with other Eastern 
European diplomats successfully lobbied for a refashioned and reinforced critical 
dialogue between the EU and Belarus. Together with Slovak civic activists, Slovak 
diplomats also worked to organize the EP to not only respond to violations of 
democratic procedures and human rights by Minsk but also to lend support and 
legitimacy to the Belarusian opposition.94 
By 2004, the Slovak system for official development assistance was 
institutionalized and Bratislava began providing democratization aid to Belarus more 
systematically.95 In addition to continued support for various elections projects, the 
Slovak assistance focused on strengthening civic actors and public debate in non-
political areas such as local environmental, education, and economic development as 
well as developing the capacity of independent think tanks to formulate viable reform 
strategies for the post-Lukashenko era. [See Table 5.1.] With SlovakAid support, 
Slovak NGOs also continued preparing the Belarusian opposition for the March 2006 
presidential elections. When Lukashenko again manipulated the vote to remain in 
power, the Slovak government criticized the undemocratic practices of the Belarusian 
                                                 
93 Juraj Marusiak et al., “The Foreign Policy and National Security of the Slovak Republic,” in Slovakia 
2005: Global Report on the State of Society (Bratislava: Institute for Public Affairs, 2005). 
94 Interview with T. K., March 18, 2009. 
95 Until 2003 Slovakia’s interest in Belarus was minimal but the Slovak NGOs working there convinced 
the government that Slovakia could make a contribution there because of the similarities between 
Slovakia and Belarus – both nations had no state of their own for a long time, had rural populations and 
problems with their national identity and post-communist authoritarians. Slovakia was the first Visegrad 
country to open its aid mechanism to Belarus in 2003. Lukashenka has not welcomed Slovak activism 
in Belarus, but Bratislava-Minsk relations are not bad because there are no historical problems between 
the two countries and Slovakia’s relations with Russia are good. Interview with J. K., November 27, 
2008. 
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authorities and worked with Slovak civic activists to shape the EU’s response to the 
direction of political developments in Belarus.96 
Even though Lukashenko remained in control, there was turnover in power in 
Slovakia shortly thereafter. Despite the tension between the Slovak civic democracy 
promoters and the new Slovak coalition in power, the NGOs continued to wield the 
authority “to influence public opinion and the actions of the political elite.”97 A 
coalition of civic groups working in Belarus prepared in Belarusian a manual Slovak 
Hope: the Experience of Democratic Transformation to share Slovakia’s reform 
experience with the Belarusian opposition and to get them ready to assume office. The 
Slovak NGOs invited the challenger in the 2006 presidential elections in Belarus to 
receive the manual at a ceremony in Slovakia on Human Rights Day. He was received 
at the highest level. Moreover, the Slovak parliament condemned the persecution of 
the political opposition in Belarus. The Slovak MFA further passed the Slovak Hope 
manual to Belarusian officials via diplomatic channels. The visit was crucial in 
reviving the Slovak debate on Belarus and “helped strengthen the consensus between 
government and opposition parties on ‘the Belarus question’.”98 
With its emphasis on economic diplomacy, the new Slovak governing coalition 
sought to improve the trade and investment climate between Bratislava and Minsk but 
did so at the expert and working levels.99 Slovak diplomats argued that “human rights 
are not for sale. Slovakia is convinced that developing economic relations and 
supporting human rights in Belarus are compatible, and therefore, supports the 
                                                 
96 The chairman of the parliamentary Human Rights Committee, Laszlo Nagy, and Communist Party 
MP, Dagmar Bollova, also took part in Belarus elections. While the chairman of the parliamentary 
Human Rights Committee, Laszlo Nagy, who took part in the Slovak short-term election observation 
group condemned the results, Communist Party MP Dagmar Bollova gave an interview on Belarus TV 
in support of the regime of President Lukashenko. Also while the future Slovak prime minister, Robert 
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coalition declared support for the Belarus opposition (Euractiv.sk, October 27, 2005).  
97 Marusiak et al., “Foreign Policy – Main Trends, Bilateral Relations, Regional Cooperation,” 2006. 
98 Ibid. 
99 Radio Station Belarus, News, March 27, 2007. 
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participation of Belarus in both the Eastern Partnership project and in the activities of 
the Council of Europe, providing that Belarus adopts certain specific measures. 
Abandoning the human rights angle, especially at a time when Belarus is displaying a 
pressing interest in cooperating more closely with the EU, would be pointless and 
counterproductive.”100 
Moreover, Slovakia managed to profile as one of the main agents of the 
European policy towards Belarus on the European level. Bratislava continued to 
cooperate with Slovak NGOs not just in its bilateral diplomacy towards Belarus but 
also in an attempt to influence the policies of various European international 
organizations towards Belarus. In 2007 Slovakia began organizing bi-annual briefings 
in the European Parliament and the European Council with the participation of 
Belarusian experts (from the civic and political opposition).101 And while presiding the 
Visegrad Four group, Bratislava participated in the preparation and promotion of a 
concept for the strengthening of the eastern dimension of the ENP, including relations 
with Belarus.102 The same year, Portugal asked Slovakia to exercise the EU presidency 
in Belarus in recognition of Bratislava’s “significant expertise and experience in 
relations with Belarus” and lack of historical tension between Slovakia and Belarus.103 
                                                 
100 Hvorlova, “Slovakia’s Chairmanship of the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe.” As a 
member of the EU, Slovakia joined the international sanctions against Belarus, although Bratislava was 
not convinced that they would work. Many Slovak politicians believe that if Slovakia’s international 
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J. M., November, 26, 2008. However, Slovakia has been less openly against the sanctions than Poland. 
Similarly, after the Russian-Georgian war in 2008, Poland, Lithuania, and Latvia met with the 
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improving the economic relations between the two countries. Duleba, “Slovakia’s Relations with Its 
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101 Interview with T. K., March 18, 2009. 
102 On behalf of the V4 the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the SR, Jan Kubis, presented the Joint 
Political Statement of the V4 countries on the Strengthening of the European Neighborhood Policy at 
the January 2007 session of the GAERC and then presented a common document of the V4 including 
particular concepts of the V4 countries on the realization of the reinforced ENP on the informal meeting 
of the EU foreign ministers in March 2007 in Bremen, Germany. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the 
Slovak Republic, Annual Report 2007. 
103 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Slovak Republic, Annual Report 2007. Also, interview with S. R., 
November 27, 2008. 
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The Slovak embassy in Minsk presented EU positions to relevant institutions in 
Belarus, coordinated the cooperation and contacts of the EU with Belarusian regions, 
and cooperated with the democratic forces and the citizenry in Belarus. It also 
formulated and coordinated the preparation of basic documents and EU positions 
towards Belarus. Slovakia effectively mobilized “the embassies of member states and 
increased EU pressure, issuing 15 official statements in six months, and organizing 
several regional visits and press conferences.”104 Moreover, Slovakia organized the 
EU’s campaign What the EU Can Bring to Belarus. It was also during the Slovak 
presidency that Minsk agreed on the opening of a EU Delegation in Belarus as a 
precondition for the deeper involvement of Belarus in the ENP. 
When Slovakia assumed the Presidency in the Committee of Ministers of the 
Council of Europe in late 2007, Belarus became the geographical priority while human 
and minority rights – the thematic one.105 Bratislava worked to bring Belarus closer to 
membership in the Council of Europe. The establishment of a Council of Europe 
Information Centre in Minsk was negotiated to promote the advantages of membership 
in the Council for the both the state (security) and civil society (human rights).106 
Slovakia also organized an international expert seminar on the “Use of International 
Instruments for Protecting Individual Rights, Freedoms and Legitimate Interest 
through National Legislation and the Right to Legal Defense in Belarus – Challenges 
and Outlook.” More than 200 representatives of political and cultural life in Belarus, 
including the opposition, attended the event. Slovak diplomats “emphasized the 
aspects of Slovakia’s history which became the cornerstones of modern statehood and 
                                                 
104 Balazs Jarabik and Vitali Silitski, “Belarus,” in Is the European Union Supporting Democracy in Its 
Neighbourhood? ed. Richard Youngs (Madrid: FRIDE, 2008), 101–20. 
105 Interview with M. H., November 14, 2008. 
106 Slovakia also contributed financially to the Information Centre, which ceremonially opened its doors 
in June 2009. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Slovak Republic, Annual Report 2007. 
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democratic development in Slovakia, with a clear message for Belarus today.”107 
Similarly, the Slovak MFA called on the Belarusian authorities to “respect 
international obligations regarding freedom of expression and to stop the unjustified 
violation of human rights and civic freedoms of the Belarusian citizens.”108 
Even though the political reality in Belarus did not favor a change in the EU 
and the CoE positions towards Minsk, the perceived geopolitical shifts as a result of 
the Russian-Georgian conflict of August 2008 earned Belarus its inclusion in the 
Eastern Partnership. Since the Partnership’s objectives is to assist the countries of 
Eastern Europe in implementing reforms in compliance with EU standards, it was seen 
by Slovak diplomats to open up new opportunities for the development of Slovak-
Belarusian relations. 
Over the year, Bratislava has criticized the authoritarian practices of Minsk and 
has provided significant political, moral, and technical support to the civic and 
political democratic forces in Belarus. Additionally, consecutive Slovak governments 
have also actively supported Slovak NGOs promoting civil society and democratic 
reforms in Belarus. And lastly, Bratislava has actively steered various European 
international organization towards an enhanced cooperation with the Belarusian state 
and citizenry. 
2.3. The Origins of Slovakia’s Democracy Promotion 
Much like Warsaw, Bratislava did not adopt a “one-size-fits-all” approach to 
democracy promotion but exported its own transition experience to the extent that it fit 
the democratization needs of recipients. [For a summary of Slovakia’s approaches to 
democracy promotion in Ukraine and in Belarus, see Table 5.2.] Such effectiveness 
                                                 
107 Duleba, “Slovakia’s Relations with Its Eastern Neighbors in 2008,” in Slovakia 2008: Global Report 
on the State of Society (Bratislava: Institute for Public Affairs, 2008). 
108 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Slovak Republic, Annual Report 2007. 
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considerations reveal that the Slovak approach to democracy promotion is based on 
strategic calculations about the pragmatic usefulness (rather than normative 
appropriateness) of Bratislava’s strategies. 
Table 5.2. Slovak Democracy Promotion Approach According to Regime Type 
 Target 
Approach Ukraine (Hybrid/Democracy) Belarus (Autocracy) 
Instruments & 
Sectors 
Assistance: Civil Society* > 
Governing Institutions >  
Political Process 
 for civil society development 
and civic participation in and 
debate about EU/NATO 
accession and for state actors 
towards Euro-Atlantic 
integration and reforms 
Diplomacy: Governing Institutions > 
Political Process 
 advocacy on behalf of Ukraine 
in front of the EU and NATO 
Diplomacy: Civil Society >  
Governing Institutions 
 efforts to enhance the cooperation 
between the international 
community and the society and state 
in Belarus, criticism of the regime, 
and support for the opposition 
Assistance: Civil Society >  
Political Process 
 for civil society and free elections 
Sanctions: Governing Institutions 
 downgraded ties and sanctions 
 
To summarize, Slovak democracy promotion in Ukraine has relied most 
heavily on assistance to state and non-state actors. Bratislava’s aid has focused on the 
development of civil society in Ukraine and on the implementation of the reforms 
necessary for the country’s democratic consolidation and Euro-Atlantic integration. 
Moreover, Slovakia has also lobbied the EU and NATO to intensify their cooperation 
with Kiev and to eventually to accept Ukraine as a member. In autocratic Belarus, 
Bratislava has preferred to demonstrate its support for the opposition and to criticize 
                                                 
* SlovakAid projects in Ukraine and the projects implemented by the Slovak Embassy in Kiev have 
targeted primarily the non-state sector in Ukraine. On the other hand, Slovak support for the 
implementation of the annual Ukraine-EU action plans have - because of the character of the EU 
integration process - targted primarily the Ukrainian state institutions. It should be noted however, that 
even in these project, there has been a strong emphasis on the cooperation between state and society in 
Ukraine. Thus, even though there are three times as many projects in support of the EU integration of 
Ukraine than there are development assistance projects, the Slovak democracy assistance to Ukraine is 
most accurately described as privileging civil society over the state. 
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the regime around key elections. Slovakia has also advocated ending the isolation of 
Belarus as a way to strengthen the pro-democratic forces in the country. The second 
most preferred democracy promotion instrument of Slovak diplomats has been 
assistance to Belarusian civic actors for strengthening the non-state sector as a 
reservoir of resistance against the regime. 
The Slovak “democratization invention” has been investment in the 
development of politically-oriented civil society (think tanks, watchdog groups, media 
and election monitors, etc.). As former State Secretary of the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs of Slovakia, Magdalena Vasaryova, explains: “Slovakia’s story from ‘black 
hole on a map of Central Europe’ (as former Secretary of State Madeline Albright 
once said) to successful ‘Tatra Tiger’ started sometime in 1996. […] The successful 
creation of a democratic civil society, built upon involvement of a relatively large 
group of civic activists and strong and politically independent civic communities and 
associations, is what is now known as the Slovak story. […] The Slovak story is very 
popular. […] We hope that this model of co-operation between state and non-state 
players in the transformation of an autocratic regime into a democratic one will also 
prove practical in the long run in Ukraine (the Pora movement) or Serbia (the Otpor 
movement).”109 Moreover, this Slovak approach was also tested through Slovakia’s 
help for the democratization of Serbia. As former foreign minister Kukan reflected on 
Bratislava’s accomplishments as a democracy promoter: “Recent experience of the 
Former Republic of Yugoslavia [with its electoral revolution modeled on the OK 98 
                                                 
109 Vasaryova, “Lessons Learned from Building a Civil Society in Slovakia – Spreading Democracy and 
Stability in Central and Eastern Europe.” It was in Slovakia that all the elements of the so-called 
electoral revolutions came together for the first time and were later diffused across transnational civic 
networks throughout the post-communist region. Successful electoral breakthroughs that led to the 
defeat of authoritarian incumbents or their anointed successors took place in Croatia in 1999, Serbia in 
2000, Georgia in 2003, Ukraine in 2004, Kyrgyzstan in 2005, and Moldova in 2009–10 – and 
unsuccessful ones in Azerbaijan in 2003 and again in 2008, Armenia in 2004 and 2008, Belarus in 2001 
and 2006, and Kazakhstan in 2005. Bunce and Wolchik, Democratizing Elections, Diffusion and 
Democracy Assistance. 
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campaign] showed that civic society is capable of building elements of stability and 
democratic principles.”110 
Not only has Bratislava been investing civic development abroad but it has 
also frequently cooperated with and built on the work of the actors with the experience 
and expertise in building democracy – Slovak civic democracy promoters. Thus 
Slovakia has “utilized the potential of the [Slovak] non-governmental sector in 
achieving the foreign policy goals of the Slovak Republic” by allowing it to both 
generate ideas (topics, issues, methodology) as well as to implement them.111 Such 
cooperation and delegation has centered around political and technical support for 
target civil society and around Slovak efforts to influence the eastern policy of various 
European international organizations. Here Bratislava has taken a page from Western 
democracy promotion in Slovakia. The country’s political and civic elites understand 
external financial and technical assistance to have been important to the development 
of a strong civic sector, which not only prepared the Slovak democratic breakthrough 
in 1998 but then also contributed to the consolidation of democracy in the country.112 
Similarly, having recognized the importance of Euro-Atlantic accession as 
powerful incentive for successful democratization (and economic successes) in 
Slovakia’s own transition experience, Bratislava argued against the isolation of 
autocratic Belarus and assisted Ukraine in its preparation for EU integration, the way 
Warsaw and Prague assisted Slovakia when it was trying to catch up with the Czech 
Republic and Poland – by sharing best practices in legislation and institutional reform. 
Thus, much like the Polish approach to democracy promotion, the Slovak one refracts 
and integrates the democracy promotion approaches of the Western as well as Eastern 
donors working in the Eastern European hybrid regimes of the 1990s.  
                                                 
110 Intervention by Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Slovak Republic, H. E. Mr. Eduard Kukan at 
NATO HQ Meeting of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council, December 15, 2000. 
111 Kucharczyk and Lovitt, Democracy’s New Champions. 
112 Forbrig and Demes, Reclaiming Democracy. 
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3. Conclusion 
The Slovak civic activists who prepared the democratic breakthrough in the 
country in the late 1990s and who soon afterwards began assisting other pro-
democratic forces challenging nationalist electoral autocrats in the neighborhood also 
sought to convince the new Slovak democratic government to build on their 
democracy promotion efforts. These Slovak activists appealed not to the democratic 
entitlement that motivated their efforts but to the benefits of democracy for resolving 
the main Slovak foreign policy goals – creating a secure and prosperous international 
environment for Slovakia and also earning Slovak membership in the EU and NATO. 
Accordingly, democracy promotion has been a response to instability in the 
southeastern and eastern European fringes. Moreover, Bratislava has targeted the 
European neighborhood countries defined domestically and at the EU level to be of 
strategic importance for the continent’s security. Therefore, if the Polish case points to 
the domestic sources of the perceived benefits of having democratic international 
partners, the Slovak case suggests that such domestic constructions can build on and 
be further defined by their interaction with the security agenda of the international 
community. 
Lastly, Bratislava’s democracy promotion strategy has been the strategic 
export of what are understood to be the successes of the Slovak transition – the 
invention of the electoral breakthrough and the feat of catching up with Euro-Atlantic 
integration. This export has been about sharing a set of experiences – the Slovak 
journey to the Euro-Atlantic community of democracies. Still, Bratislava has pursued 
a differential approach depending on the regime type of the recipient. With 
autocracies, such as Belarus, Bratislava has focused on sharing its pre-1998 experience 
and the lessons learnt in preparation of the country’s electoral breakthrough. With 
hybrid regimes, such as Ukraine, Slovakia has sought to transfer mostly its post-1998 
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experience of developing the institutions and actors that make and guarantee a 
democracy and catching up with EU and NATO accession. Again, as the Polish case, 
the Slovak democracy promoters have borrowed some of the lessons of the Western 




Supporting the spread of democratic norms and practices around the globe has 
become a significant element of the security and foreign policy of many developed 
countries and of the operation of many international governmental and non-
governmental organizations. Therefore, a better understanding of this phenomenon is 
important; yet much of our knowledge about it comes from studying the activities of a 
handful of established Western democracies. Would fledgling non-Western 
democracies support democratization abroad? What would motivate such efforts and 
how would they be undertaken? 
I answered these questions empirically by unraveling the puzzle of the quick 
turnaround of the Eastern European members of the EU from being primarily 
democracy promotion targets in the 1990s to democracy promoters in the 2000s. To 
that end, the dissertation examined the motivations of the Eastern European 
governmental and non-state actors supporting democratization abroad and their 
distinctive approaches to such democracy promotion. The dissertation argued that the 
local civic elites who prepared the democratic breakthroughs in the region 
subsequently became the norm entrepreneurs who championed the incorporation of 
democracy promotion into their country’s foreign policy and then continued to 
advocate for keeping support for democracy abroad high on the agenda. The 
dissertation further maintained that the Eastern European civic activists have been 
motivated by a normative commitment to democracy while the Eastern European 
official efforts are best understood as strategic foreign policy commitments; still, both 
governmental and non-governmental approaches to supporting democratization abroad 
have been based on strategic calculations about the pragmatic usefulness (rather than 
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normatively appropriateness) of the transition experiences these actors have exported. 
As a result, there are distinct national approaches to democracy promotion that are 
based on the local model of democratization but vary according to the regime types of 
the recipient. 
This chapter summarizes the dissertation’s main arguments about the 
motivations of the Eastern European governmental and non-state actors supporting 
democratization abroad and their distinctive approaches to such democracy promotion. 
The efforts of the Eastern European democracy promoters are then situated among the 
activities of other actors supporting the spread of democracy abroad. The chapter also 
discusses some of the key strengths and weaknesses of the Eastern European 
democracy promoters to argue that they represent a new generation of donors: they 
might not be assistance “heavy hitters” but their first-hand democratization experience 
and local knowledge and connections give them important assets. These include 
credibility, allow them to tailor their approach to the needs of recipients, and make 
them resolute in their support for democratization abroad. Lastly, the chapter assesses 
the theoretical contributions of this dissertation to three debates in work on 
comparative and international politics: democracy promotion, social movements, and 
transnational diffusion. 
One such contribution is that the dissertation articulated two distinct theoretical 
approaches to democracy promotion: democracy promotion as a strategic commitment 
and democracy promotion as a normative commitment. The thesis further applied 
them to studying the activities of non-Western young democracy promoters through an 
in-depth inductive analysis of their motivations and strategies. As a result, this study 
pointed to the importance of civic advocacy in favor of spreading democracy abroad 
and explored the interaction between the strength of social movements and the 
advocacy frames. The thesis also documented that as some successful national pro-
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democratic movements demobilize, the transnational components of these movements 
become increasingly active, that is, demobilization in some cases is accompanied by 
an upward scale shift to transnational democracy advocacy activism. A final set of 
contributions of the dissertation is tracing the diffusion of democracy and its regional 
quality through everyday political and social interactions in one such region – the 
post-communist European space. As a result, the thesis illustrates why and how 
regional effects exist and matter. Lastly, looking at diffusion by focusing on the 
transmitter allowed this study to suggest that the perceived success of certain practices 
and their fit with recipient needs privileged them for diffusion over other practices in 
cases when both the transmitter and the adopter are interested in the exchange of 
experience. 
1. Summary of Findings about the Motivations of the Eastern European 
Democracy Promoters 
Why would the Eastern European actors invest in supporting democratization 
abroad as they are consolidating democracy at home? As Chapter 3 argued, Slovak, 
Polish, and in general, Eastern European civic support for democratization abroad 
emerged from and built on the normative commitments and the transnational networks 
of the activists who brought democracy to the region. Leaders such as Lech Walesa, 
Vaclav Havel, Pavol Demes, Vytautas Landsbergis and their fellow activists have a 
deep personal commitment not just to democracy but also to assisting others fighting 
for it. The moral obligation to help those struggling for democracy, as the West had 
assisted them, was felt most acutely by the civic elites with ties to activists in other 
countries in the neighborhood. In the context of the shared experience of communism 
and post-communism, such contacts produced solidarity. It motivated activists from 
successfully democratizing countries to help activists in transition laggards. So with 
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the support and encouragement of the West and primarily the US, many Eastern 
European activists maintained and further developed the pro-democratic regional 
networks put in place before the local breakthroughs to democracy. Moral, technical, 
and even financial assistance continued to flow through such networks. And the 
solidarity that produces and is produced and reinforced within this web of contacts has 
shaped the scope of such civic democracy promotion. 
Thus, the Eastern European civic movements promoting democracy abroad 
developed around a core of normatively motivated activists/ NGOs, rooted in the 
movements that prepared the democratic breakthroughs in their country and linked to 
other pro-democratic actors in the neighborhood. However, as support for democracy 
abroad grew at the level of individual organizations and the country as a whole, the 
importance of pre-existing direct ties diminished and with them – the significance of 
the normative commitment of Polish and Slovak civic democracy promoters as a 
driver of their efforts abroad. Still, although available funding and subcontracting 
became a leading motivation for some of the latest programs of the Polish and Slovak 
NGOs supporting democracy abroad as well as for some of the latest recruits to the 
Polish and Slovak community of civic democracy promoters, such more opportunistic 
activities have generally included a relatively small number of primarily episodic and 
ad hoc projects rather than the majority of sustained democracy promotion programs. 
By uncovering this combination of normative and opportunistic motivations for civic 
support for the diffusion of democracy around the globe, this dissertation improves on 
previous accounts of transnational advocacy coalitions and on existing works on 
democracy promotion. The theoretical implication here is that normative and 
opportunistic motivations of transnational activism might interact in a cycle-like 
fashion: there are more opportunistic NGOs among the late comers to a transnational 
movement than among the early risers and even for normatively-motivated NGOs later 
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projects are more likely to be opportunistic than early programs.1 Additionally, in 
documenting the domestic roots of the transnational democracy advocacy network, the 
dissertation further contributes to the social movement literature by suggesting that 
successful pro-democratic movements might demobilize at home while mobilizing 
transnationally. 
Moreover, their normative commitment to democracy and solidarity with 
others struggling for democracy compelled the Eastern European civic democracy 
promoters not only to take steps to support democratization aboard but also to 
advocate that democracy promotion become an important element in their country’s 
foreign policy. The latter civic efforts benefited from the fact that in the 1990s 
democracy promotion was increasingly seen as an accepted and necessary component 
of the international behavior of states. Moreover, some of the former opposition allies 
of these civic norm entrepreneurs had entered electoral politics and continued to pay 
attention to issues of democracy at home and broad. However, as Chapter 3 argued, 
only in cases where these civic (and political) activists articulated strong and 
compelling arguments about the answers democracy promotion provided to the 
important external relations questions facing these young democracies, did support for 
democracy abroad become part of their foreign policy traditions. Moreover, the 
stronger the civic voices in favor of democracy promotion, the more easily it was 
embraced by local political elites. Following such victories, civic supporters of 
democratization abroad continued to advocate that democracy promotion remain high 
on their state’s agenda and began participating in its realization though implementing 
                                                 
1 On contentious cycles, see Sidney Tarrow, Democracy and Disorder: Protest and Politics in Italy, 
1965–1975 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989); and Sidney Tarrow, Power in Movement: Social 
Movements, Collective Action and Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994). For a 
definition of early risers and latecomers, see Doug McAdam, “‘Initiator’ and ‘Spinoff’ Movements: 
Diffusion Processes in Protest Cycles,” in Repertoires and Cycles of Collective Action, ed. M. Traugott, 
217–39 (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1995). 
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projects under their country’s official development assistance system.2 The interaction 
between movement strength and framing documented here suggests that some types of 
resources are more important to some types of frames – in this case, the introduction 
of causal ideas benefited from the strength of the movement championing these ideas. 
Thus official democracy promotion emerged as a solution to the main foreign 
policy concerns of the Eastern European countries, which invested in supporting 
democratization of their neighborhood to improve the international environment and 
thus the stability and the survival chances of their young democratic orders. Many of 
the Polish, Slovak, and other Eastern European political elites, especially the ones who 
prepared the democratic breakthroughs in their countries, have a personal normative 
commitment to democracy. It has often compelled them to pay attention to democracy 
promotion issues for principled reasons. It has also made them supportive of civic 
democracy promotion by local activists as well as receptive to the arguments of civic 
norm entrepreneurs for incorporating democracy promotion into their country’s 
foreign policy and later on for maintaining an active policy of official support for 
democracy abroad. However, for the most part, despite the personal and at times 
official solidarity that Eastern European political elites have expressed with other 
countries in the region, when such solidarity has come into conflict with their 
country’s perceived strategic objectives, the strategic imperatives have most 
frequently received priority. Moreover, it was exactly the strategic importance of their 
                                                 
2 Civic advocacy in favor of democracy promotion has been especially important in cases such as the 
Slovak one, where democracy promotion was introduced after a critical foreign policy juncture such as 
the OK 98 campaign in the Slovak case. While the Polish democracy promotion agenda was embedded 
in the Polish program of national liberation before 1989, the Slovak democracy promotion agenda was 
incorporated into Slovak foreign policy after the democratic breakthrough in the country. Consequently, 
there has been much more continuity and consistency in Polish democracy promotion efforts. 
Additionally, the Slovak civic democracy promoters have had to continuously and actively advocate 
that democracy promotion remain high on their government’s agenda, especially in times when power 
has been in the hands of the only partially reformed left. Accordingly, the Polish governmental and 
civic democracy promoters have worked more in parallel with each other, even if working towards 
similar objectives. In contrast, the Slovak civic democracy promoters have sought to have Slovak 
diplomacy cooperated with, built on the work of, and delegate responsibilities to Slovak NGOs 
supporting democracy abroad. 
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country’s democracy promotion agenda that would allow it to be sustained over time 
at the state level and to survive turnover in power. Therefore, as Chapters 4 and 5 
argue, Eastern European democracy promotion is best understood as a strategic 
commitment. 
As discussed in Chapter 2, Poland and the other Baltic countries deem 
containing Russian imperialism, which had for centuries threatened the independence 
of these nations, one of the most important foreign policy objectives in the post-
communist period. The former Baltic dissidents persuaded their country’s political 
elites that democratizing the nations of the former USSR, especially the founding 
ones, would counter-balance Russia’s power and weaken Moscow’s temptation to 
revive the Soviet imperial order. For Slovakia and the other Central and Southeastern 
European countries, some of the most important foreign policy challenges stemmed 
from their vulnerability to spillover from and outside shocks such as political 
instability, capricious dictators, interethnic volatility, and weak states in the Western 
Balkans but also the former Soviet republics. The Central and Southeastern European 
civic elites pointed to the potential of democratic rules and practices to stabilize the 
neighborhood and improve economic and political cooperation in it. 
In other words, there are two different types of strategic logics underpinning 
Eastern European democracy promotion: 1) a geo-political strategy to create reliable 
partners in the Russian “sphere of influence” and to thus deter Russian aggression and 
2) a solution to the political and economic destabilization as a result of the 
disintegration of the eastern but especially the southeastern European fringes. This 
finding suggests that the benefits of having democratic international partners, which 
underlie the logic of the Eastern European strategic commitment to democracy 
promotion, are negotiated domestically. In other words, this dissertation improves on 
previous accounts of democracy promotion as a strategic commitment by arguing that 
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the benefits of having democratic international partners should be investigated rather 
than assumed. Moreover, this insight speaks to the value of studying democracy 
promotion by paying attention to state-society relations in foreign policy-making. 
Finally, Poland and Slovakia emerged as donors in two consecutive waves of 
turnaround from recipients to donors. However, even though the international norm of 
universal right to democracy was much stronger when Slovakia began promoting 
democracy, Bratislava’s motivations are no more normative and no less strategic than 
Warsaw’s. Still, the strength and scope of the democracy promotion industry, which 
had contributed to the consolidation of the universal right to democracy, was greater in 
the late 1990s. This has had several consequences for Slovakia. First, the Slovak civic 
and political activists joined and extended the Euro-Atlantic transnational pro-
democracy networks of the donors working in Slovakia; in contrast, the Polish civic 
and political activists developed their own Eastern European transnational pro-
democracy network, which was later incorporated into and extended by the donors 
working in Poland. However, while Western donors had more influence over the reach 
of the Slovak networks, these Western donors did not have more influence over the 
motivations of the Slovak activists in these networks – there is not a significantly 
larger contingent of opportunistic Slovak civic democracy promoters or a significantly 
larger number of principled Slovak official democracy promotion efforts. At the same 
time, however, the democracy promotion advocacy of the Slovak civic democracy 
promoters drew in logic from the efforts of Western democracy promoters and in 
strength from their approval. 
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2. Summary of Findings about the Eastern European Approaches to Democracy 
Promotion 
What are the roots of the Eastern European approaches to democracy 
promotion – are they international, national, and/or recipient-specific? Each of the 
Eastern EU members has a distinct national approach to democracy promotion that 
varies according to the regime type of the recipients and is based on the local model of 
democratization. Having recently prepared democratic breakthroughs in their own 
countries and then participated in the political transformations at home, both 
governmental and non-governmental actors are consciously and purposefully passing 
along their “best practices” and the “transition lessons” they learned on the road to 
democracy and to the Euro-Atlantic community. Given the shared donor-recipient 
experience with communism and/or post-communism, the Eastern European 
democracy promoters work on the assumption that the strategies that were effective at 
home would also be useful abroad, especially in countries with similar authoritarian 
legacies. At the same time, however, out of all the democratic breakthrough strategies 
and the reform “recipes” they have, both types of actors share those that they 
understand to fit the needs, that is, advance the democratization, of individual 
recipients. 
That is why, for example, Polish activists working in authoritarian Belarus 
propose tactics they understand to have worked in the years when communist Poland 
was under martial law whereas the activists working in the more democratic Ukraine 
suggest practices that come from Poland’s post-1989 transition experience. 
Accordingly, Polish civic activists supporting the democratization of Belarus have 
aided the development of independent media as an alternative-to-the-regime source of 
information in order to generate public demand and support for democratization. They 
have also worked to socialize various civic multipliers (such as youth and educators) 
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into embracing democratic values and norms in order to ready society to call for 
change. The Polish NGOs have further assisted the strengthening of civil society so it 
can resist the concentration of power in the state and mobilize society to create a 
popular mandate for change. Warsaw’s approach to supporting the democratization of 
Belarus has been very similar but has also included upholding the international 
sanctions against Lukashenko’s regime as well as advocacy against isolating the 
country. On the other hand, Polish civic democracy promoters working in Ukraine 
have assisted the development of civil society and local democracy and to a lesser 
extent various civic multipliers; the goal of the Polish activists has been to nurture 
consolidation of the fragile Ukrainian democracy from the bottom up. The efforts of 
the Polish state to support the development of democracy in Ukraine have paralleled 
the activities of the Polish civic democracy promoters. Additionally, Warsaw has 
lobbied for Ukrainian membership in the Euro-Atlantic community institutions and 
has provided assistance and diplomatic support for reforming the Ukrainian state in 
line with democratic practices and especially EU membership requirements. 
The Slovak approaches to supporting the development of democracy in 
Ukraine and in Belarus are different as well. For instance, Slovak civic activists 
working in Belarus have invested in the strengthening of civil society in general. In 
particular, they have assisted the development of interest and grassroots groups so they 
can work with the political opposition to continue challenging the regime. The Slovak 
civic democracy promoters have also supported the growth of independent analytical 
centers so they can define a viable reform agenda, work with other civic groups to 
spread its message to the Belarusian citizenry, and thus support the strengthening of 
the Belarusian political opposition. Bratislava’s approach to promoting democracy in 
Belarus has been very similar to the efforts of the Slovak non-governmental activists. 
Moreover, much like Warsaw, Bratislava has upheld the international sanctions 
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against Minsk and has advocated that regional European structures not isolate Belarus. 
On the other hand, Slovak NGOs supporting the democratization of Ukraine have 
worked on helping the country catch up with the other Eastern European EU and 
NATO candidates through supporting the reforms required for Euro-Atlantic 
accession. To that end, the Slovak non-governmental activists have been cooperating 
with think tanks generating reform proposals and with interest groups organizing 
public discussion in order to educate the citizenry about and generate support for the 
reforms ahead of Ukraine. The official Slovak approach to supporting the 
democratization in Ukraine has additionally included preparing the Ukrainian state to 
apply to the EU and NATO and advocating for Ukrainian membership in these 
organizations. 
Thus, there are distinct national approaches to Eastern European democracy 
promotion: governmental and non-governmental democracy promoters from the same 
donor country use many of the same instruments and target many of the same 
beneficiaries abroad. This finding parallels the trends documented in studies of 
Western support for the development of democracy around the globe.3 Such national 
approaches have been explained by the fact that Western democracy promoters often 
export replicas of their own political institutions. Similarly, the emergence of Eastern 
European national approaches to democracy promotion is a consequence of the fact 
that both political and civic activists from each post-communist donor are borrowing 
best practices from their country’s democratization experience. However, mature 
donors are criticized for “one-size-fits-all” approaches, whereas, as discussed above, 
                                                 
3 Such national approaches to democracy promotion are documented in comparative perspective by 
Peter Schraeder, ed., Exporting Democracy: Rhetoric vs. Reality (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner 
Publishers, 2002). A similar argument about development assistance in general is made by Peter 
Schraeder, Steven W. Hook, and Bruce Taylor, “Clarifying the Foreign Aid Puzzle: A Comparison of 
American, Japanese, French, and Swedish Aid Flows,” World Politics 50, no. 2 (1998): 294–323. 
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the Eastern European national approaches vary according to the regime type of the 
recipient. 
Moreover, while established democracies are said to often export their national 
democracy models, the young democracies seek to export their national 
democratization models.4 These democratization models are often more like recipes 
about defeating authoritarians (breakthrough) and achieving particular reform 
objectives (consolidation) rather than full-blown, explicit, and well-articulated models 
of what democracy is or how democratization unfolds. Such democratization models 
are based on a particular type of state-society interactions, which have produced a 
particular national repertoire of struggle against unchecked and concentrated state 
power and lack of political representation. Such national repertoires are further 
embedded in the repertoires of the wave of democratization in which the country’s 
transition begins. The repertoires of Poland and of the other first wave of Eastern 
European democratization countries reflect the general strategies, tactics, and practices 
designed in the struggle against communism; the Polish repertoire further and 
uniquely is grounded in the Polish “negotiated transition.” The repertoires of Slovakia 
and the other first wave of Eastern European democratization countries is based on 
their struggle to transform hybrid democracies into truly competitive liberal orders; 
also, the Slovak repertoire additionally and distinctly includes the specific innovations 
of the Slovak “electoral breakthrough” in 1998. Such breakthrough repertoires are 
further developed and strengthened through various reform recipes, strategies, and 
sequences in the period of “democratic consolidation.”5 
                                                 
4 On established democracies exporting their national democracy models, see Thomas Carothers, 
“Taking Stock of US Democracy Assistance,” in American Democracy Promotion: Impulses, 
Strategies, and Impacts, ed. Michael Cox, G. John Ikenberry, and Takashi Inoguchi (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2000), 181–99. 
5 The Eastern European donors have not limited themselves to working with recipients whose level of 
political repression corresponds to the circumstances in which these donors’ national democratization 
repertoires were invented. Still, some recipients have asked for and been especially receptive to advice 
from donors whose national democratization repertoires are understood to have emerged in periods with 
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For example, Slovakia’s electoral revolution required and reinforced the work 
of NGOs involved in the political process (think tanks, watchdog groups, media and 
election monitors, etc.), whereas the Polish transition involved empowering and 
mobilizing numerous local communities (including local governments and grassroots 
groups and civic leaders). Since Eastern European democracy promotion is about 
sharing a donor’s democratization experience from the periods before and after the 
country’s democratic breakthrough, Slovak democracy promoters have supported the 
capacity of civil society to do political work by serving as a bridge between the public 
and political elites; Polish democracy promoters, on the other hand, have invested in 
civil society development as a means to de-concentration of power away from the 
political center. Similarly in terms of instruments used for democracy promotion, 
given the role of civil society in demanding compliance with democratic rules and 
practices in the Slovak model, Bratislava has relied heavily on democracy assistance 
and as a result has one of the strongest and most developed aid systems. In contrast, 
the Polish model accords great importance to having the ruling elites be at the 
negotiating table ready to embrace political liberalization and follow through 
afterwards. Accordingly, Warsaw has worked on creating a dense institutional 
network of bilateral and multilateral cooperation to demonstrate the benefits of 
democracy and induct recipients to its practices.6 
Lastly, some of the best practices the Eastern European democracy promoters 
have shared with their recipients have included practices imported to these countries 
                                                                                                                                            
levels of repression similar to those in these recipients’ countries. For example, the Polish rather than 
the Slovak democratization repertoire has been of interest to some Russian activists because these 
activists see Russia to be much more of an autocracy than a hybrid regime.  
6 These trends are further replicated through the actors implementing Slovak and Polish democracy 
assistance: all of the Slovak projects in Ukraine and Belarus have been implemented by Slovak NGOs, 
whereas 47% of Polish aid has been implemented through the Polish public administration, 13% of 
Polish projects have been channeled through the Polish Embassies in these countries, and 40% of Polish 
assistance has been administered by Polish NGOs. Jacek Kucharczyk and Jeff Lovitt, eds., 
Democracy’s New Champions: European Democracy Assistance after EU Enlargement (Prague: 
PASOS, 2008). 
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earlier by Western democracy promoters. For example, in supporting the development 
of independent media in Belarus, Polish democracy promoters took a page from the 
work of US democracy promoters who provided technical and financial assistance to 
the Polish underground media in the 1980s. Similarly, the emphasis on election 
monitoring by Slovak democracy promoters has its roots in the work of the US 
International Republican Institute in Slovakia. And a final example of East-East-East 
diffusion: some of Slovakia’s efforts to Ukraine prepare its EU integration homework 
include some of the activities Poland and the Czech Republic used to help Bratislava 
catch up with the first wave of EU accession candidates. Such democracy promotion 
imports that later become exports are perhaps even more abundant among the Eastern 
European civic supporters of democracy abroad. These NGOs tend to help their 
international partners run projects very similar to the ones these democracy promoting 
groups have at home; such domestic programs, however, had frequently been set up 
with help and standard operating procedures from the West. In this way, the Eastern 
European democracy promoters have contributed to the convergence of best practices 
among democracy promoters around the globe.  
In sum, there are some important differences between the approaches of 
established and young donors. Established donors are said to seek to export replicas of 
their domestic institutions. New donors, given their recent democratization experience, 
seek to export transition recipes. Moreover, they choose best practices that they 
understand as appropriate to the democratization level of their recipients. The result is 
the export of “breakthrough” and “consolidation” models / strategies that vary 
according to the regime types of the beneficiaries. Consider the contrast of such 
nuanced approaches with the one-size-fits-all approaches of Western donors. Such 
distinct characteristics of the Eastern European approaches to democracy promotion 
suggest that young donors should not be overlooked in future studies of democracy 
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assistance. Lastly, although the Eastern European approaches to democracy promotion 
are based on distinct national repertoires of struggles against authoritarianism, some of 
their constituent practices were initially imported to these post-communist countries 
by Western democracy promoters. This is not to suggest that the Eastern European 
actors are agents or clones of the Western players but that their work presents a unique 
snapshot of and thus a valuable opportunity to study multi-stage diffusion as well as 
the success of Western democracy promotion efforts. 
3. The East, the West, and the International Democracy Promotion Community 
In transitioning from being predominantly targets of democracy promotion in 
the 1990s to being primarily democracy promoters in the 2000s, the Eastern European 
members of the EU have joined a donor community of governmental and non-
governmental actors linked in a complex and dynamic system of transnational, 
transgovernmental, and international networks.7 Such networks are not just bilateral, 
organizational or even country, contacts but often include multiple organizations from 
multiple countries, forming a web of competition and collaboration within the 
transatlantic space.8 These networks gravitate around influential donors and 
                                                 
7 In the work of scholars of transnational relations, such “interactive networks of state, non-state and 
international actors who gravitate around both national and international institutions” have been defined 
as instances of “complex internationalism.” Sidney Tarrow, The New Transnational Activism (New 
York: Cambridge University Press, 2005). 
8 As a result of this embeddedness of the Eastern European actors, several older members of the 
democracy promotion community – Western NGOs, aid agencies, quasi-governmental and private 
foundations, party federations, labor unions, and international organizations – starred in some of the 
case studies and illustrations of the Eastern European efforts described in the previous chapters. For 
example, aid agencies such as CIDA and USAID trained and cooperated with Eastern European aid 
agencies; quasi-governmental foundations such as the NED, the IRI, the German Marshall Fund of the 
United States, and the Westminster Foundation for Democracy assisted pro-democratic political and 
civic leaders in the post-communist region and then encouraged them to themselves start supporting 
democracy abroad; private foundations such as the Rockefeller Brothers Fund and the Open Society 
Institute funded Eastern European NGOs and then partnered with them to support democratization 
further east and southeast; Western NGOs such as the Freedom House and the German youth meeting 
houses worked and opened branches in Eastern Europe; and international organizations such as the EU, 
OSCE, CoE, UNDP, and NATO supported the democratization of the Eastern European actors and later 
became platforms through which these actors could implement their own democracy promotion agenda.  
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international organizations and are further uneven in that the links between some 
countries and types of actors are denser than those between others. Lastly, only a few 
recipient countries have galvanized the development of these networks of formal and 
informal transnational contacts into coalitions or advocacy campaigns, which 
additionally involve coordinated tactics and popular mobilization respectively.9 
The advocacy campaign of the democracy promotion community active in 
Belarus illustrates these points well. There are a number of countries, which actively 
support the democratization of Belarus – the US, the UK, Sweden, Denmark, 
Germany, Poland, Lithuania, Latvia, Slovakia, and the Czech Republic. Additionally, 
there are a number of European regional organizations, which also seek to spread 
democratic norms and practices in Belarus – the EU, the OSCE, and the Council of 
Europe. Representatives of these governments and international organizations convene 
frequently to coordinate formally and informally their policies towards Belarus. 
Experts on Belarus note that especially after the imposition of international sanctions 
against Minsk, there has been a “bad cop – good cop” division of labor between the 
US and Europe.10 Also, within Europe, the EU avoided all but low-level contacts with 
the Belarusian regime in the late 1990s and early 2000 while the OSCE maintained 
structured formal dialogue with both the regime and the opposition. On the other hand, 
the Eastern European EU members – if to varying degrees – have been the most vocal 
supporters of engagement with Belarus bilaterally and within/ through the EU and 
have coordinated their positions towards Minsk through the Visegrad Group and 
                                                 
9 The definition of transnational networks, coalitions, and campaigns used here is borrowed from 
Sanjeev Khagram, James V. Riker, and Kathryn Sikkink, Restructuring World Politics: Transnational 
Social Movements, Networks, and Norms, vol. 14 of Social Movements, Protest, and Contention 
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2002). 
10 Interview with W. B., October 13, 2008. 
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several Visegrad + Baltic forums. Lastly, there are also informal annual meetings of 
donors working in Belarus.11 
Moreover, these governmental actors are also partners with and targets of the 
civic actors seeking to influence national and transatlantic policies towards Minsk and 
to implement assistance in Belarus. Such NGOs interested in supporting the 
democratization of Belarus (and often also active in other democratizing countries as 
well) are in turn connected not just to their Belarusian recipients but also to each other. 
In Poland for instance they “help each other” through forums such as the national 
development NGO umbrella group Zagranica and such as the informal caucus of 
democracy promoters interested in Belarus.12 At the international level, these civic 
activists are connected through the European-level NGO federations (such as 
Trialogue) as well as through various donor networks (such as the Open Society East-
East Program and the US DemNet programs). Also, while rare, there have been some 
trilateral – for example, Polish-Czech and Polish-Slovak – civic initiatives as well. At 
the same time, at both the governmental and the civic level, contacts between Poland 
and Belarus have been much more dense than the contacts between Sweden and 
Belarus. Similarly, the cooperation between Poland and Lithuania on the ground and 
in the context of putting Belarus on the EU agenda has been much stronger than the 
cooperation on the Belarus question between Poland and Slovakia, for instance. 
Both governmental and civic democracy promoters working in Belarus have 
gravitated towards the EU – which is understood to have the most tangible and 
intangible carrots and sticks to offer to the elites and the citizenry of Belarus. Again, 
both governmental and civic activists have become particularly active around elections 
                                                 
11 Richard Youngs, ed., Is the European Union supporting democracy in its neighborhood? (Madrid: 
FRIDE, 2008). Interview with M. M., October 18, and interview with S. R., November 27, 2008. 
12 Interview with G. G., October 13, 2008. The caucus leader reported that activists not only discuss 
their strategies but also advise each other on how to best navigate the dangerous work in this repressive 
state.  
 233 
in Belarus. For instance, Poland launched not one but two big state-run “Independent 
Media” initiatives and approved a special “Independent Media” PolishAid 
appropriation before the 2006 elections in Belarus. Similarly, elections have served as 
focal points for popular mobilization against the Minsk regime as well. For example, 
in an award-winning 2005 campaign “Freedom of Speech in Belarus,” Amnesty 
International-Poland organized hundreds of thousands letters written by Poles and sent 
to Belarusian President Lukashenko in protest of human rights abuses by Minsk.13 In 
general, the work of the Eastern European democracy promoters has encountered little 
domestic resistance and much support from the citizenry and other non-state groups.  
Lastly, while there has been some coordination of efforts on the part of the 
international community as well as a lot of parallel work, there has also been some 
competition: for example, there are two foreign radios broadcasting in Belarus from 
abroad – one supported by Poland, the US, and the UK and another one supported by 
the Czech Republic, Lithuania, and the EU.14 There has been further competition 
between the transnational democracy advocacy networks working in Belarus and other 
regional networks pulling the country towards Russia and its model of “competitive 
authoritarianism.”15 Each democratic breakthrough in the former Soviet Union in the 
2000s has strengthened the pro-democratic forces in other countries through both 
demonstration and diffusion effects but it has also allowed dictators in the 
neighborhood to learn from the mistakes of their fallen counterparts in order to 
strengthen their grip on society.16 
                                                 
13 The campaign won several awards. Amnesty International–Poland, Annual Report 2006 (Warsaw, 
2006). 
14 The US initially supported the Polish-run radio but later began financing the EU-sponsored radio 
instead. Interview with K. S., August 18, 2010. 
15 Steven Levitsky and Lucan A. Way, “The Rise of Competitive Authoritarianism,” Journal of 
Democracy 13, no. 2 (2002): 51–65; and Lucan Way, 2004. “The Sources and Dynamics of 
Competitive Authoritarianism in Ukraine,” Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics 20, 
no. 1 (2004): 143–61.  
16 Vitali Silitski,” Contagion Deterred: Preemptive Authoritarianism in the Former Soviet Union (the 
Case of Belarus),” in Democracy and Authoritarianism in the Postcommunist World, ed. Valerie Bunce, 
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Thus, the Eastern European democracy promoters have been working among, 
have been seeking and have been mostly benefiting from the support and partnership 
of other Eastern and Western actors. And as the chapter discussed earlier, the actors 
who joined the democracy promotion community early on – as Polish activists did – 
quickly began building on their dissident networks, which were incorporated and 
extended by the networks of other donors working in the region and beyond. On the 
other hand, the actors who became members of the democracy promotion community 
later on – as Slovak activists did – joined and extended the networks of other donors in 
the post-communist space and eventually further afield. In general, as latecomers to 
the democracy promotion industry, the eastern European actors have tried to 
maximally utilize their “comparative advantages [as democracy promoters] arising 
from the[ir] transformation experience” and from their good relations with certain 
non-democratic countries by focusing on the (global) post-communist space and by 
further establishing some informal division of labor within it.17 
For the most part, the Eastern European democracy promoters have been 
supportive of each other’s bilateral and multilateral initiatives and each other’s efforts 
on the ground. Trilateral projects have been rare because of the different national 
approaches to democracy promotion and because of the logistical difficulties of 
implementing such activities.18 At the state level, there have been some joint efforts, 
for instance, the Visegrad Fund Scholarship program for Ukraine and Belarus and 
some coordination of activities both bilaterally – for example Poland and Slovakia on 
policies towards Ukraine – and multilaterally at forums such as the Visegrad group 
                                                                                                                                            
Michael McFaul, and Kathryn Stoner-Weiss (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009); and 
Bunce and Wolchik, Democratizing Elections, Diffusion and Democracy. 
17 Quote from Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Slovak Republic, National Programme of the Official 
Development Assistance for 2009 (Bratislava, 2009), 20. There is some reference to Slovakia’s 
comparative advantages as a democracy promoter in all such national aid programs. Similarly, most of 
the other donors also discuss their comparative advantages in the programmatic official development 
assistance documents as well. 
18 Interview with M. S., November 13, 2008. 
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and Visegrad + Baltic meetings.19 At the EU level, the Eastern European actors have 
been able to count on each other for support for their democracy promotion initiatives. 
For instance, all the Eastern members lined up behind the Eastern Partnership. Even 
when the issue at stake has been not a major initiative but, for example, a simple 
European Parliament resolution criticizing the undemocratic practices in Belarus, the 
Eastern representatives have usually successfully mobilized the support of their post-
communist colleagues.20 It should be mentioned, however, that there has been some 
competition between the Czech Republic and Poland about Eastern European 
leadership on democracy promotion questions as well as some competition between 
post-communist countries interested developing the Black Sea Synergy and ones eager 
to develop the Eastern Partnership.21 
The older members of the democracy promotion community have also 
generally welcomed the new Eastern European recruits. Western donors recognized 
that Eastern EU members have valuable experience that is often more relevant to 
countries further east and south than the expertise Western donors bring.22 Moreover, 
the West has seen post-communist democracy promotion as a continuation of their 
work and further diffusion of their values.23 As a result, Western and especially 
American donors have played an important role in stimulating and strengthening post-
communist democracy promotion. They have formally and informally conveyed their 
expectation that Eastern European democratization success stories should assist 
democratization laggards in the region (and beyond). Joint ventures such as the Polish-
                                                 
19 Slovak Foreign Policy Association, Yearbook of Foreign Policy of the Slovak Republic 2006 
(Bratislava, 2007); Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Czech Republic, Report on the Foreign Policy of 
the Czech Republic 2007 (Prague, 2007); interview with P. W., October 16, 2008. 
20 Interview with J. S.-W., February 25, 2008. 
21 Open Society Institute, Not Your Grandfather’s Eastern Bloc: The EU New Member States as Agenda 
Setters in the Enlarged European Union: Comparative Policy Report (Prague: PASOS–Sofia, April 
2009).  
22 Interview with R. P., October 19, 2008. 
23 Interview with M. G, April 12, 2009, and interview with B. H., April 18, 2009. 
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American-Ukrainian Cooperation Initiative or CIDA’s institutional partnership with 
the young Eastern European aid departments speak just as loudly as Western donors’ 
suggestions that the Eastern European actors “should not ignore the pro-democracy 
desires” of other countries in the region.24 In some cases, Western democracy 
promoters have also directly brokered the diffusion of the Eastern European transition 
experience – for example, US donors introduced Slovak to Belarusian activists.25 In 
other cases, Western actors have let out work on sub-contract to their former eastern 
recipients, allowed them to re-grant Western aid, hired former recipients as 
consultants, and funded their work partially or in full. And finally, Western donors 
further indirectly encouraged and supported the democracy promotion activism of the 
Eastern European players by sponsoring regional civic and governmental forums (such 
as the Political Academy for Central and Eastern Europe organized by the IRI), which 
created at once demand for democratization expertise of the Eastern EU members and 
solidarity among them and other civic and governmental activists in the region.26 
Although the West has played a formative role in the development of the 
young Eastern European democracy promoters, it would be a mistake to overlook the 
independent and organic Eastern European movements behind post-communist 
democracy promotion and to treat these movements as Western intermediaries or 
agents in the European neighborhood and beyond. The independence of the Eastern 
European initiatives is most clearly demonstrated by the domestic logic underpinning 
                                                 
24 On informal suggestions to Polish elites, interview with J. M., October 29, 2008; and to Slovak elites, 
interview with B. S., November 30, 2008. An example of a similar but more formal suggestion is US 
Vice President Joseph Biden’s speech in Romania in 2009: “You’ve delivered on the promise of your 
revolution,” he said. “You are now in a position to help others do the same.” “Biden Asks Eastern 
Europe to Spread Democracy,” New York Times, October 22, 2009. 
25 On brokerage as a “route” within “scale shift” from national to transnational mobilization, see 
Tarrow, The New Transnational Activism. 
26 It should be noted, however, that the support of the Western democracy promoters has been a mixed 
blessing. On the one hand, their activities have created an international environment in which 
supporting democracy around the globe has become a legitimate undertaking, which has further 
facilitated and validated the activities of the Eastern players as well. On the other hand, disillusionment 
and disappointment with the activities of the Western democracy promoters has made their work and 
the work of their younger Eastern European counterparts somewhat more difficult. 
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such efforts. As a result, democracy promotion in the countries that are of concern to 
the West but not to the East has not been prioritized by the post-communist actors, if it 
has taken off at all. A good example here is Eastern European involvement in Iraq and 
Afghanistan, which are a development assistance priority for a lot of the post-
communist donors but a democracy promotion priority for just one – the Czech 
Republic has invested both aid and diplomatic efforts in supporting the 
democratization of Iraq. Similarly, as discussed in Chapter 2, despite the 
encouragement of Western donors, some Eastern EU members such as Hungary have 
mostly shied away from supporting democracy even in their neighborhood. 
Moreover, the Eastern European actors have left their mark on Western 
democracy promotion as well. The transnational democracy advocacy networks not 
only expanded when the Eastern Europe joined the international democracy promotion 
community but they also changed in important ways. To continue with the Belarusian 
example, two facts illustrate this point well. First, the West and especially the EU used 
to pay relatively little attention to Belarus because of the Western European “Russia-
first” approach to the eastern neighborhood and because autocratic Belarus has been 
relatively stable.27 However, the advocacy of the Eastern EU members has put Belarus 
much higher on the EU’s agenda.28 Second, while the West has traditionally 
responded to grave human rights and democracy abuses by imposing sanctions against 
violating regimes – and has done so in the Belarusian case in 1999 – the Eastern 
democracy promoters have been proponents of “critical dialogue;” they convinced the 
EU to adopt this approach by including Belarus in the Eastern Partnership.29 In this 
                                                 
27 Balazs Jarabik and Vitali Silitski, “Belarus.” 
28 Interview with J., S.-W., February 25, 2009; and Marian Kowalski, “Belarus: Next Generation 
Democracy,” in Kucharczyk and Lovitt, Democracy’s New Champions: European Democracy 
Assistance after EU Enlargement, 189–215. 
29 It should be mentioned that there is a debate within the democracy assistance community in 
Washington and some other Western capitals on how to deal with the Belarusian dictatorship. The 
Eastern EU democracy assistance community, however, speaks in one voice in favor of engagement 
and argues for it using examples from their recent democratization experience.  
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sense, the Eastern European democracy promoters have influenced both the scope and 
the instruments of Western democracy promotion. 
Just as importantly, some Eastern European donors have – usually successfully 
– sought to assume leadership of the international community’s efforts in particular 
countries – for example, Poland has taken the lead on the Ukrainian question. Such 
championship ambitions of the Eastern EU democracy promoters have emerged at a 
time of Western skepticism about the advisability of exporting democratic norms and 
practices. These ambitions have also developed at a time when the democracy 
promotion leader, the US, has shifted its attention to regions other than the ones of 
interest to the Eastern European actors. And even though these activists have faced 
some competition from Western European big players interested in the east and 
southeast such as Germany and from ardent democracy promoters such as the Nordic 
countries, the expertise and zeal of the Eastern Europeans has helped make their 
voices heard.30  
In sum, with joining the complex and dynamic system of transnational 
democracy advocacy networks, the Eastern European actors have both contributed to 
and been influenced by the activities of other players within those networks. In 
general, there have been a lot of parallel efforts and more coordination and 
cooperation than competition among the Eastern and Western players in these 
networks. The Eastern European actors have not only collectively shaped the 
geographical reach of these networks and the instruments used to promote democracy 
in the recipients of concern to the post-communist donors but have also individually 
assumed leaderships of external efforts to support democracy in particular countries. 
Additionally, by re-granting Western aid and serving as consultants or subcontractors 
in Western projects, the Eastern European activists have also influenced how Western 
                                                 
30 Interview with E. M.-S., February 16, 2009; interview with C. O.-A., March 7, 2009; and interview 
with J. M. W., March 18, 2009. 
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assistance has been implemented. The Western democracy promoters have in turn 
encouraged and supported Eastern European democracy promotion, thus stimulating 
and legitimizing such activism. The West has also shaped the reach of Eastern 
European democracy promotion through brokering the diffusion of the their 
transformation experience (within the space dictated by the domestic logic of post-
communist democracy promotion). Additionally, to the extent that some of the best 
practices the Eastern European democracy promoters have exported abroad have 
included practices imported earlier in these countries by Western democracy 
promoters, the Western activists have further influenced how Eastern European 
democracy promotion has been implemented. Still, the general independence and 
organic development of the Eastern European movements behind post-communist 
democracy promotion should not be underestimated. 
4. A New Generation of Democracy Promoters? 
An important question, a detailed answer to which is well beyond the scope of 
this dissertation, is how the Eastern European democracy promoters compare to other 
(Western) democracy promoters in terms of their motivations, their approaches, and 
their overall effectiveness as supporters of the diffusion of democracy around the 
globe? Have the Eastern democracy promoters managed to avoid the mistakes for 
which they have criticized their donors? The efforts of the Eastern European actors 
surveyed in this dissertation suggest that these players represent a new generation of 
democracy promoters. They are not the richest or the most influential donors in the 
international democracy promotion community but they do stand out in their priority 
countries. There, the Eastern European donors have earned a “good reputation” and 
have had “considerable” impact in strengthening recipient democratic practices 
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because of their local knowledge, unique and highly relevant expertise in and nuanced 
approach to democracy promotion.31 
4.1. On the Motivations of the Eastern European Democracy Promoters 
In terms of motivations, the democratic commitments of the Eastern European 
civic activists and the “idealist” reputation of the Eastern EU member states have by 
and large made their support for democratization in the neighborhood welcomed and 
even appreciated. Still, the strategic motivations behind Eastern European official 
democracy promotion have at times compromised their support for democracy abroad. 
The normative commitment to democracy of the Eastern European civic 
activists stands in contrast with criticism of the perceived opportunism of Western 
consultants working in the post-communist region in the 1990s. For example, these 
Western activists came to be known colloquially in Poland as the “Marriott brigades,” 
after the name of the expensive hotel at which they preferred to stay.32 In contrast, 
with words and with deeds, the Eastern European democracy promoters working in 
their neighborhood spoke the language of solidarity. As mentioned before, many of 
these Eastern European NGOs were founded and/or run by participants in the 
democratization movements in their countries. Through the international activities of 
those movements, many of the Eastern European civic democracy promoters had ties 
to other pro-democratic forces in the region. They thus had little reason to doubt 
commitment of the Eastern European civic democracy promoters to democracy and to 
assisting others on the road to democracy. According to recipients, this “genuine 
                                                 
31 Quotes from Kucharczyk and Lovitt, Democracy’s New Champions, 192, 205. 
32 So great was the Eastern misperception and Western criticism of the motivations of these actors that 
some observers felt compelled to explicitly comment on their normative motivations – “These NGOs 
[… “from the United States, Britain, Germany, and elsewhere in Europe”] are motivated mainly by 
ideals, not profits.” Sarah E. Mendelson, “Democracy Assistance and Political Transition in Russia: 
Between Success and Failure,” International Security 25, no. 4 (Spring 2001): 68–106. “Marriott 
Brigades” reference from Janine R.Wedel, Collision and Collusion: The Strange Case of Western Aid to 
Eastern Europe, 1989–1998 (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1998). 
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interest” in their country’s democratization predisposed them positively towards 
working with the Eastern European civic democracy promoters.33 
At the state level, Western donors have been harshly criticized for the fact that 
democracy promotion has for the most part remained an ad hoc and low priority policy 
relative to other conflicting but more “traditional foreign policy goals.”34 What is 
interesting about the Eastern European donor states is that despite their strategic 
motivations for supporting democratization in the neighborhood, they have gotten a 
reputation of democracy promotion “idealists.”35 This reputation is in part a result of 
the fact that a lot of these political activists prepared the democratic breakthroughs in 
their countries and do have a personal normative commitment to democracy. The 
reputation is also partly based on the fact the Eastern European officials emphasize 
that they are pursuing a “value-oriented diplomacy.”36 Indeed, the Eastern EU 
members generally pay a lot more attention and act more resolutely to support the 
spread of democracy in their neighborhood than many of the other major Western 
European players such as Germany, France, Spain, and often even the UK.37 Both the 
Eastern European donors and their recipients acknowledge that this reputation has 
increased the receptivity of beneficiaries and thus improved the impact of the Eastern 
democracy promoters.38 
It should be noted, however, that even if their assistance has generally been 
well received, there have been questions raised about the motivations of the Eastern 
                                                 
33 Interview with O. S., March 18, 2009; Natalia Shapovalova and Olga Shumylo, “Ukraine: Supporting 
Elusive Consolidation,” in Kucharczyk and Lovitt, Democracy’s New Champions, 267–95.  
34 Peter Burnell, ed., Democracy Assistance: International Cooperation for Democratization (London: 
Frank Cass, 2000); Abraham F. Lowenthal, Exporting Democracy: The United States and Latin 
America (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1991). David Sogge, Give and Take: What’s the 
Matter with Foreign Aid? (New York: Zed Books, 2002). 
35 David Kral, Enlarging EU Foreign Policy: The Role of New EU Member States and Candidate 
Countries (Prague: EUROPEUM Institute for European Policy, June 2005). 
36 Quote from Kucharczyk and Lovitt, Democracy’s New Champions, 29. 
37 Interview with E. S.-M., February 16, 2009. 
38 On Poland, interview with K. F., October 22, 2008; and on Slovakia, interview with K. M., 
November 5, 2008. 
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European democracy prompters. At the state level, Poland’s activities in Ukraine and 
Belarus and Romania’s efforts during the Moldovan political crisis of 2009 have also 
raised some suspicion in certain recipient circles. When civic riots erupted against the 
repressive and corrupt regime of the former communists in Moldova, their leaders 
claimed that Romania was behind the unrest.39 These accusations, however, did not 
gain wide acceptance and did not prevent the regime from losing power in favor of the 
pro-democratic and pro-Western (including pro-Romanian) forces. 
Similarly, the notion of “Polish imperialism” vis-à-vis Ukraine and Belarus 
came up in a few of the narratives of Polish activists and their recipients.40 Such 
notions are based on the shared history of the Polish-Ukrainian-Belarusian-Lithuania 
state under the Polish crown and the current ambitions of Warsaw to become the 
regional leader. Recipients of the assistance of Polish NGOs brought the issue up as a 
criticism of the sometimes-paternalistic attitude of Polish activists (rather than a sense 
of threat to their identity and national political project). At the same time, the 
Ukrainian recipients were mostly grateful for the Polish help.41 At the state level, 
Ukraine has also been most welcoming of Polish advice, advocacy, and assistance.42 
This is well illustrated by the fact that during the Orange Revolution, both the regime 
and the opposition invited independently Polish mediation of the crisis. 
In Belarus, Lukashenko has been understandably hostile to Polish efforts to 
support the opposition against him. The regime in Minsk has pointed to the fact that 
some of the activities of the Eastern European NGOs are funded by the US to discredit 
                                                 
39 BBC News, “Romania Slams Moldova’s sanctions,” April 9, 2009, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/ 
europe/7992259.stm (accessed April 2009). 
40 Interview with K. F., October 22, 2008; Radoslaw Sikorski, current Minister of Foreign Affairs, “On 
the Republic of Poland’s Foreign Policy for 2008,” Address to the Polish Parliament, Warsaw, February 
17, 2008.  
41 Interview with U. U., March 18, 2009. 
42 Timothy Snyder, The Reconstruction of Nations: Poland, Ukraine, Lithuania, Belarus, 1569–1999 
(New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2003). 
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them by arguing that they represent US interests.43 Moreover, a few of the key Polish 
civic activists working in Belarus have been “blacklisted” and denied entry visas.44 
That said, the majority of the civic groups supporting the democratization of Belarus 
report that their activities in Belarus have not been threatened by Lukashenko and are 
valued by the general population.45 
Even if the Eastern European democracy promotion efforts in the 
neighborhood have generally been welcomed and appreciated by most recipients 
(despite representing a strategic commitment on the part of the Eastern EU member 
states), the motivations of the Eastern donors might have compromised their impact in 
other ways. First, the Eastern European diplomats have tended to be lenient towards 
countries in transition and to criticize their reform record mostly in private.46 Second, 
Eastern European support for democratization in the neighborhood has sometimes 
been prioritized under and even sacrificed for good neighborly relations or other 
political or economic considerations. Therefore, the effect of such democracy 
promotion compromises in the name of higher strategic goals on the impact of such 
efforts deserve further detailed scrutiny. 
4.2. On Approaches of the Eastern European Democracy Promoters 
In terms of approaches, the established Western donors have attracted most 
criticism for their “one-size-fits-all” approaches and ignorance about local 
                                                 
43 Marian Kowalski, “Belarus: Next Generation Democracy.” 
44 Interview with P. K., October 19, 2008. 
45 Some Polish NGOs such as the School for Leaders Association nonetheless decided to end their 
programs in Belarus when repression heightened in the late 1990s. The Slovak civic democracy 
promoters working in Belarus report that their activities have met no resistance from Minsk. Both 
Eastern European activists and their Belarusian recipients noted that Lukashenko does not seem to be 
“worried” about Eastern European democracy promotion in Belarus primarily because despite such 
external efforts the opposition is very weak and fragmented and because his regime still has a tight grip 
on the citizenry by controlling the workplace. Interview with J. K., November 17, 2008; and interview 
with L. S., October 16, 2008. 
46 Interview with L. M., April 1, 2010. 
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conditions.47 Not only have the Eastern European supporters of democracy around the 
globe avoided making these mistakes but their recent democratization experience has 
provided them with an additional advantage in better supporting democratization in 
their neighborhood. Thus, while the priorities of the Eastern and the Western 
democracy promoters do not differ much, the implementation of these priorities has 
been improved by the contributions of post-communist actors as a result of their 
attention to the needs of their recipients, better knowledge of their beneficiaries, and 
their ready-to-use transition experience. [For a comparison of the Eastern and Western 
sectoral priorities, see Box 6.1.] 
Box 6.1. Eastern and Western Sectoral Priorities for Democracy Promotion in 
Ukraine and Belarus 
 
Except for a few distinct and innovative practices – such as Slovak attention 
to think tanks in Belarus, Polish work with the Ukrainian youth or Hungary’s 
human rights dialogue in China – the democracy promotion priorities of the Eastern 
European actors do not differ much from those of Western players. For instance, 
like all Western actor, the Eastern European ones support the civic opposition in 
Belarus. Moreover, Poland and the Czech Republic, for instance, also support the 
development of independent media, much like the US, the EU, the UK, and 
Denmark. Also, Poland, Lithuania, the Czech Republic and Slovakia support the 
socialization of youth leaders into a number of civic and democratic values, as do 
the US and the EU. The Czech Republic further focuses on human rights issues; so 
does Sweden. And finally, the US, Germany, and the UK assist the opposition party 
development in Belarus but so do, even if to a lesser extent, Slovakia, Poland and 
Lithuania.  
                                                 
47 “Whomever they turn to, potential grantees will find similar standards and expectations, and virtually 
identical conceptions of political development and democratization.” Philippe Schmitter and Imco 
Brower, “Conceptualizing, Researching and Evaluating Democracy Promotion and Protection” (EUI 
Working Paper SPS No. 99/9, 1999). On the US, see Thomas Carothers, Aiding Democracy Abroad 
(Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1999). On the EU, see Tanja Borzel 
and Thomas Risse, “One Size Fits All! EU Policies for the Promotion of Human Rights, Democracy 
and the Rule of Law” (paper prepared for the Workshop on Democracy Promotion, Stanford University, 
2004).  
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Box 6.1 (Continued) 
 
Similarly in Ukraine, civil society, and especially interest groups, are 
supported by all Eastern and Western donors. The development of Ukraine’s 
political parties is the focus of US, Germany, the UK. The US, the UK, the EU, 
Sweden, Hungary, Slovakia, the Czech Republic, and the Baltic countries direct 
assistance to strengthening public administration. Local government is emphasized 
by the US, Poland, Hungary and the Netherlands. The US, the EU, the UK support 
the establishment of an independent judiciary and rule of law. The US, the EU, and 
the Czech Republic work with journalists in Ukraine and Poland – with the youth. 
Lastly, human rights issues are a special concern to the US, the EU, the UK, and 
Sweden.  
4.2.1. Nuanced Approaches 
Although they have tended to export best practices from their own transition 
experience, the Eastern European democracy promoters have at least somewhat 
tailored their efforts to the democratization needs of the recipients. Western donors are 
said to support the global spread of democratic norms through activities that are 
suitable to promote either regime change or stabilize countries that have had a 
democratic breakthrough but rarely both.48 The Eastern European donors, however, 
have demonstrated a fairly nuanced democracy promotion approach, which differs 
according to regime type. As the previous chapters documented, the Polish and the 
Slovak approaches to supporting democracy in Ukraine have been respectively 
different from the Polish and the Slovak approaches to supporting democracy in 
Belarus. Moreover, given the progressive entrenchment of the Belarusian regime, the 
approaches of Poland and Slovakia have also evolved over time. For instance, Warsaw 
moved beyond support for the political and civic opposition and toward also 
                                                 
48 “The EU democracy-promotion strategy is that it is designed more to stabilize countries that are 
already democratic whereas the US one – to promote “regime change” in nondemocracies.” (Jeffrey 
Kopstein, “The Transatlantic Divide over Democracy Promotion,” Washington Quarterly 29, no. 2 
[2006]: 85–98.) However, there are also those who point to convergence and learning among different 
actors as well as sub-national variation in strategy. See, for example, Thomas Carothers, “Democracy 
Assistance: Political vs Developmental?” Journal of Democracy 20, no. 1 (January 2009): 5–19. 
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strengthening much more actively the independent media and the democratic 
commitments of various Belarusian civic multipliers. 
Similarly, there are some differences between the Eastern European 
approaches to countries in the same regime category. For example, Slovakia has 
actively worked with both Ukraine and Serbia shortly before and especially after the 
democratic breakthroughs in each country. After the opening of the EU Association 
Agreement process with Serbia, Slovak NGOs continued assisting civic groups, think 
tanks, and journalists advocating for the benefits of EU membership but also started 
working with parliamentarians and local officials to increase their competence and 
capacity to meet the Union’s requirements and to gain from membership in it. In 
Ukraine (where there is still some ambivalence towards the EU), the Slovak civic 
approach has emphasized training interest group and think tank trainings as well as 
organizing public debates to educate Ukrainians about the requirements and benefits 
of membership in the Union. 
In other words, unlike their Western counterparts, the Eastern European donors 
seem to have improved on the “general discrepancy between the fairly coherent and 
unified agenda [of their established Western counterparts] and the diversity of 
objectives and working methods among the recipients.”49 And this stronger link 
between recipient needs and assistance is understood by beneficiaries to constitute a 
“big part” of the “value” of Eastern European support.50 
4.2.2. Local Knowledge 
As the previous chapters documented, the post-communist donors have tended 
to work in their neighborhood and especially in countries with which they have 
                                                 
49 Schmitter and Brower, “Conceptualizing, Researching and Evaluating Democracy Promotion and 
Protection.” 
50 Shapovalova and Shumylo, “Ukraine: Supporting Elusive Consolidation.”  
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historical and political ties. As a result, the Eastern European democracy promoters 
not only know their counterparts better but have a lot more knowledge about their 
recipients’ cultural traditions, authoritarian practices or legacies, and local power 
relations than most of the Western donors working in the same countries. Both 
recipients and Western donors pointed to such local knowledge and personal 
relationships as an important advantage of the Eastern European democracy 
promoters.51 
For example, Western and Ukrainian political actors involved in responding to 
the Orange Revolution in Ukraine in 2004 note that “Kwasniewski was the most active 
of the mediators” and “made the most creative contributions” because of his 
“relationships with key Ukrainian players,” “his knowledge of the situation on the 
ground,” and the fact that he “was best prepared” and “could draw upon his own 
experience as a participant in the 1989 Polish roundtable negotiations.”52Also, while 
the institutional presence of the European Union “carried great weight,” pre-existing 
personal relationships appear to have nonetheless been “more important” to the 
credibility of the mediators: according to Western and Ukrainian observers, 
Kwasniewski’s success as a moderator seems to have been based on the fact that he 
sought to speak for and involve the EU but much more importantly that the two camps 
“knew” and had “confidence” in him.53 
Western donors value the importance of the local knowledge and social capital 
of the Eastern European democracy promoters not just during democratic 
breakthrough interventions but also in the context of day-to-day diplomacy and 
assistance work in the post-communist neighborhood. A good illustration of this 
                                                 
51 Interview with L. M., April 1, 2010; interview with R. P., October 19, 2008; interview with L. S., 
February 19, 2009; and interview with R. S., March 19, 2009. 
52 Interview with S. P., June 20, 2007.  
53 Interview with S. P., June 20, 2007. Among the mediators, Kwasniewski had the closest relationship 
with Kuchma, whom he had known since 1996. He had also dealt previously with both Yushchenko and 
Yanukovych. 
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appreciation is the fact that the functions of most of the NATO contact points in the 
former Soviet Union and Yugoslavia are delegated to Eastern European embassies in 
these countries.54 And as discussed earlier in this chapter, there are a number of 
institutional partnerships between Eastern and Western donors and even more 
numerous cases of funding and sub-contracting of Eastern European activists by 
Western democracy promoters as well as consulting and re-granting by post-
communist actors for Western players. 
Recipients of Eastern European democracy promotion efforts have also 
expressed appreciation for the local knowledge and connections of their post-
communist counterparts. For example, unlike some Western donors, the Eastern 
European actors have a good understanding of the “current situation facing their 
counterparts” and do not require their Belarusian partners to interact with state 
authorities, to keep a paper trail of their activities, to co-finance joint projects, or to 
have an official bank account.55 Also, because of their better understanding of the 
situation on the ground, Eastern European players have not been “afraid” to fund and 
partner with “small and sometimes unknown” NGOs and NGOs “outside the capital 
city.”56 Similarly, because of their previous “trust-based dialogue” with recipients, the 
Eastern European activists have been able to broach “areas that can be very tricky for 
post-Soviet societies, such as combating corruption or engaging NGOs in the 
policymaking process.”57 What is more, criticism coming from the Eastern European 
actors has been felt more like peer pressure and has thus been accepted “much more 
patiently” in hybrid regimes in the neighborhood than criticism coming from Brussels 
                                                 
54 For example, NATO is represented by Lithuania’s embassy in Belarus and Moldova, by the Slovak 
embassy in Ukraine, by the Czech embassy in Serbia, the Hungarian embassy in Montenegro, the 
Latvian embassy in Georgia, the Polish embassy in Turkmenistan, and the Romanian embassy in 
Azerbaijan. 
55 Kowalski, “Belarus: Next Generation Democracy.” 
56 Kucharczyk and Lovitt, Democracy’s New Champions, 267–95. 
57 Shapovalova and Shumylo, “Ukraine: Supporting Elusive Consolidation.”  
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or other EU-15 capitals.58 And especially at the civic level, recipient NGOs report 
feeling “ownership” as they were able to help shape the “objectives, activities, target 
audience” of projects as equals to their Eastern European partners thus also ensuring 
that assistance reflects better the needs of beneficiaries.59 All these advantages 
contribute positively and greatly to the impact of the Eastern European donors. 
Moreover, the Eastern European actors supporting democracy abroad have 
tended to export best practices from their own transition experience thus improving 
the fit between recipient and promoted practices given the general donor-recipient 
similarities. For instance, not only do Poland and Ukraine have a shared recent 
experience of communism but they also have centuries of shared statehood and history 
in the same Eastern European political space. Therefore, the model of the Polish local 
government reform, for example, is much more applicable to the Ukrainian social and 
political realities than the model of the US intergovernmental system. Such fit between 
recipient and promoted practices is consistently found by scholars of transnational 
advocacy networks and students of diffusion as one of the most important factors for 
the success of the norm adoption by recipients.60 
                                                 
58 Interview with S. P., June 20, 2007; interview with U. U., March 18, 2009. 
59 Shapovalova and Shumylo, “Ukraine: Supporting Elusive Consolidation.” It is important to mention 
that representatives of the Polish foreign ministry hold consultations on the assistance priorities with 
representatives of the Ukrainian government and NGOs, the Belarusian civic and political opposition, 
as well as the international donor community active in Ukraine and Belarus. On lack of sense of 
ownership of practices promoted by Western donors, see Schmitter and Brower, “Conceptualizing, 
Researching and Evaluating Democracy Promotion and Protection.”  
60 For example, many identify “cultural match” – or the resonance of international norms with domestic 
ones – as a key factor affecting the successful diffusion. Jeffrey T. Checkel, “Norms, Institutions, and 
National Identity in Contemporary Europe,” International Studies Quarterly 43, no. 1 (1999) 83–114; 
Amitav Acharya, “How Ideas Spread: Whose Norms Matter? Norm Localization and Institutional 
Change in Asian Regionalism,” International Organization 58 (2004): 239–75; Andrew P. Cortell and 
James W. Davis. “How Do International Institutions Matter? The Domestic Impact of International 
Rules and Norms,” International Studies Quarterly 40, no. 4 (1996): 451–78; Ann Marie Clark, 
Diplomacy of Conscience: Amnesty International and Changing Human Norms (Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton Press, 2001); Richard Price “Reversing the Gun Sights: Transnational Civil Landmines,” 
International 52, no. 3 (Summer 1998), 613–44, 628. Price argues that the term “grafting” should be 
used because it avoids the overly static connotations of the terms “fit” or “resonance” or “cultural 
match” and better conveys the framing work done by norm promoters.  
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4.2.3. Recent Democratization Experience 
Another advantage of the Eastern European democracy promoters comes from 
the fact that they are all recent democratization graduates themselves. The personal 
experience as the architects and construction workers of their country’s transition to a 
market democracy gives the Eastern European democracy promoters’ determination to 
act, credibility, as well as a set of tried breakthrough and reform “recipes.” 
First, having lived under and struggled against authoritarian regimes, the 
Eastern European democracy promoters are more resolute in their support for 
democracy. Not only are they more sensitive to the hardship incurred on the 
population by authoritarian regimes but also to the international threats posed by 
capricious dictators.61 As a result, the Eastern European activists were also much more 
sensitive to the need to support democracy abroad resolutely and confident that such 
democracy promotion endeavors could be as successful as they were in their home 
countries. Consequently, these post-communist democracy promoters have acted 
quickly and decisively in moments of crisis while also recognizing much more that 
democratization is a process full of twists and turns and therefore requires long-term 
commitment and a dynamic and evolving approach. For example, when Georgia’s war 
with Russia erupted, presidents from Poland, Lithuania, Estonia, Latvia, and Ukraine 
quickly flew to Tbilisi to stand “in support of the Georgian people” and “for European 
values such as democracy” (despite the risks of angering Russia that such gesture 
unnecessarily entailed).62 And since the evolving approach to supporting democracy in 
                                                 
61 A lot of my Slovak interviewees talked about the fact that Meciar made an unreliable international 
partner who would change his stance and domestic rules unpredictably and thus thwarted Western 
investment in and political cooperation with Slovakia; they further reasoned that other dictators cannot 
be trusted either. A lot of my Polish interviewees talked about the fact that if the citizenry has a voice, 
they would not chose to be subservient to a foreign power and further argued that for that reason 
democracies in the Russian sphere of influence reduce the pull of the former empire and make the 
region safe. 
62 “Estonia’s President Says Georgia Crisis Has Changed Everything,” RFE/RL News Bulletin, August 
14, 2008. 
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the neighborhood in the long term was discussed above, consider the following 
commitment contrast between the work of Western and Eastern civic democracy 
promoters: recipients note that the efforts of the first group of players have an ad hoc 
nature and limited scope whereas the initiatives of the second group often started from 
small projects and rolled over to bigger initiatives better tailored to recipient needs.63 
Second, the recent democratization experience of the Eastern European 
activists who support democratization in the neighborhood provides them with tested 
breakthrough and consolidation recipes. As discussed above, while established 
democracies are said to often export replicas of their own political institutions, the 
young democracies seek to export not democracy models but rather democratization 
models.64 An anecdote from my interviews illustrates this point well. A group of 
Ukrainian officials were invited for a study visit to the German stock exchange to help 
them in the process of setting up a similar marketplace. The Ukrainians reported being 
in awe of how great the German stock exchange worked and strongly wishing they 
could set up one just like it. However, while they felt confident that they knew what 
the marketplace should look like and work like, they were far less certain what steps to 
take to make that happen. They got the help they needed from their Polish colleagues 
who had had to set up the Polish stock exchange not that long ago and who related the 
process through which they themselves established their own stock exchange.65 In 
sum, the West is prepared to export certain democratic outcomes but the East offers 
the process of getting there. And as both the Eastern European democracy promoters 
and their beneficiaries note, the democratization models of their post-communist 
                                                 
63 Shapovalova and Shumylo, “Ukraine: Supporting Elusive Consolidation.” See also Chapter 3 in this 
dissertation.  
64 On West, Carothers, Aiding Democracy Abroad. 
65 Interview with K. F., October 22, 2008. 
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counterparts are more “immediately” and “readily applicable” to recipients in the 
European neighborhood.66 
Third, the Eastern European actors who support the spreading of democracy in 
their region command a lot of respect in part because of their domestic 
democratization work. As a Western donor representative who funded a Polish project 
for a study visit of Georgian politicians in Warsaw recalls, the Polish officials “had the 
ear” of the Georgians because many of these same Polish officials had successfully 
implemented similar reforms in similar (post-communist) circumstances just a decade 
ago. Moreover, the same donor representative remembers having many subsequent 
conversations with the Georgian officials taking part in this study visit, in which they 
would refer to what they saw and heard in Poland.67 Another example: my interviews 
with a Belarusian opposition group, which had just recently worked with both a 
Western and an Eastern NGO, revealed a similar picture – when talking about their 
day-to-day activities, representatives of the Belarusian group made 3 times more 
references to lessons they learned from their Eastern counterpart than to lessons they 
learned from their Western counterpart. What seemed to have impressed the 
Belarusians about the Eastern NGO was that it found ways to “get things done” in the 
“dysfunctional” post-communist region.68 The importance of the credibility of the 
Eastern European democracy promoters can hardly be overstated since the authority of 
                                                 
66 Kucharczyk and Lovitt, Democracy’s New Champions, 267–95; interview with K. F., October 22, 
2010. Western donors have been criticized for lack of cultural sensitivity because by exporting 
democracy models they expect that their recipients’ democratic institutions will look like their own. 
(Carothers, Aiding Democracy Abroad). From this perspective exporting democratization rather than 
democracy models might offer the additional advantage of allowing recipients the much-valued 
opportunity not to look like their donors. Moreover, even if the mature donors could share how 
democracy developed in their countries decades and in some cases centuries ago, would their 
experience be still relevant to today’s world? 
67 Interview with L. M., April 1, 2010.  
68 Interview with O. S., March 18, 2010. 
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transnational advocates has consistently found by scholars of transnational advocacy 
networks as “the key sources of influence” of norm promoters.69 
4.2.4. Some Weaknesses 
Despite significantly improving on the practices of established donors, the 
Eastern European democracy promoters have some limitations as well. First, they still 
provide modest (if growing) funds. Such funding is usually absorbed by donor country 
actors rather than directly by the beneficiaries because it goes mostly towards project 
implementation rather than towards recipient institutional development.70 Second, the 
administrative capacity of the young Eastern European donors to provide aid is still 
rather underdeveloped, especially at the embassy level. As previously discussed, most 
of the EU member states do not even have independent aid agencies but provide 
democracy assistance through development cooperation departments within their 
foreign ministries. Moreover, most of these aid departments have only been set up 
within the last 5 years and still do not systematically support multi-annual or 
multilateral programs. And while some of the Eastern European embassies in the 
neighborhood do provide small grants, funds distributed through them have been 
reduced since 2008 because of “lack of administrative capacity.”71 Third, much like 
their Western counterparts, the Eastern European donors coordinate aid priorities and 
funds poorly, so there is some overlap and some gaps in the assistance they provide. 
An exception here are the joint multilateral activities of the Visegrad Group towards 
                                                 
69 Quote from Richard M. Price, “Transnational Civil Society and Advocacy in World Politics,” World 
Politics 55, no. 4 (2003): 579–606. Activist authority established on the basis expertise in the issues 
area is also discussed by Matthew Evangelista, Unarmed Forces: The Transnational Movement to End 
the Cold War (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1999); Ann Florini, ed., The Third Force: The Rise 
of Transnational Civil Society (Tokyo and Washington: Japan Center for International Change and 
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1999); Richard Higgott, Geoffrey Underhill, and Andreas 
Bieler, Non-State Actors and Authority in the Global System (New York: Routledge, 2000).  
70 Kucharczyk and Lovitt, Democracy’s New Champions: 267–95. 
71 Kucharczyk and Lovitt, Democracy’s New Champions: 267–95. 
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Belarus and Ukraine in general and in particular in the case of the International 
Visegrad Fund’s scholarship program, which has also filled a niche not serviced by the 
Western donors. At the civic level, transnational contacts between NGOs working 
abroad are seldom transformed into direct co-operation in implementing joint projects 
in the neighborhood.72 
In sum, despite their limitations (little funding, underdeveloped assistance 
capacity and poor donor coordination), their advantages – nuanced approach, local 
knowledge, credibility, and recent democratization experience – have earned the 
Eastern European democracy promoters a “good reputation” among their beneficiaries 
and among other donors.73 Moreover, Western donors have also acknowledged that 
the Eastern European actors “have the ear” of their partners in the neighborhood and 
have had “the most impact” in a lot of these cases.74 Finally, recipients assessed the 
impact of the Eastern European democracy promoters as “important,” “considerable,” 
“tremendous,” and “crucial” not only in strengthening democratic forces in recipients 
and/or pushing for political reforms but also in bringing these countries closer to the 
EU.75 
To take stock: As Chapter 2 discussed the Eastern European donors are not the 
most influential and generous donors but they stand out in the recipient countries of 
concern to them, especially since a high percent of their bilateral projects assistance 
goes to supporting democracy in these countries. Moreover, the day-to-day bilateral 
                                                 
72 The biggest and most influential civic democracy promoters, however, are the exception here. For 
instance, the Belarus Public Policy Fund programme of the Pontis Foundation in Slovakia, whose 
activities were co-financed by the Transition Promotion unit of the Czech MFA; Pontis has also 
implemented Slovak-Hungarian projects in Serbia. Another example is the co-operation between People 
in Need (PIN), which is focused on supporting local activists, and Poland’s East European Democracy 
Center. Both organizations regularly arrange visits of Belarusian opposition activists to Poland and the 
Czech Republic.  
73 Kowalski, “Belarus: Next Generation Democracy.” 
74 Interview with R. P., October 19, 2008. 
75 For example, the number of advocacy activities in support of Ukraine’s accession, organized in 
Brussels and other EU member states’ capitals by Eastern European civic democracy promoters greatly 
outnumbers the activities of Ukrainian NGOs in this area. Shapovalova and Shumylo, “Ukraine: 
Supporting Elusive Consolidation.” 
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diplomatic involvement of the Eastern European democracy promoters in their 
neighborhood – from cooperation at the highest political levels to daily people-to-
people contacts – has also been very important (and perhaps more significant than the 
amount of democracy assistance) because it has allowed democratization laggards a 
glimpse of what democracy looks like close to home combined with peer pressure and 
support for making progress with further reforms. In addition, keeping transatlantic 
international organizations engaged in the European neighborhood has been very 
important in helping pro-democratic forces in the region make some further reform 
gains through the electoral revolutions in the early 2000s and in providing a generally 
congenial environment for the diffusion of democracy. And it is exactly in those cases 
of hybrid democracies in the European space – the Western Balkans, Ukraine, and 
Moldova – that the Eastern European democracy promoters have had most impact.76 
5. Theoretical Implications 
This study lies at the intersection of several political science research agendas 
– democracy promotion including democracy assistance, the role of ideas and of 
domestic social forces in foreign policy, transnational activism and social movements, 
diffusion (of democracy), and the role of external actors in regime change and 
survival. This section discusses the contribution of this thesis to these debates. 
5.1. Democracy Promotion 
This dissertation contributes to the study of democracy promotion 
theoretically, methodologically, and empirically. Democracy promotion has 
previously been examined primarily as a project of the Western economically 
                                                 
76 This finding parallels works on the diffusion of democracy that find that partially free countries 
appear to be more sensitive to diffusion effects than non-free countries. Harvey Starr, and Christina 
Lindborg, “Democratic Dominoes Revisited: The Hazards of Governmental Transitions, 1974–1996,” 
Journal of Conflict Resolution 47, no. 4 (August 2003), 490–519. 
 256 
developed and politically established democracies. Moreover, in these studies “closely 
informed analysis of what might be called the ‘high politics‘ of international 
democracy promotion [that is, “the place of democracy promotion in the foreign-
policy process”] seems to have lagged behind.”77 Systematizing previous accounts, 
this dissertation defined two distinct theoretical approaches to analyzing support for 
the diffusion of democratic norms – democracy promotions as a normative 
commitment and democracy promotion as a strategic commitment. In doing so, this 
study has explored the theoretical corollaries of the democratic peace literature – how 
and why policymakers might try to produce democratic peace.78 
Not only have the arguments in this dissertation been vetted against 
theoretically alternative accounts but they have also been developed on the basis of 
methodological triangulation.79 While most studies of democracy promotion either 
                                                 
77 Quote by Jonas Wolff & Iris Wurm, “Towards a Theory of External Democracy Promotion? 
Approximations from the Perspective of International Relations Theories” (paper prepared for the 51st 
Annual Convention of the International Studies Association [ISA], New Orleans, LA, February 17–20, 
2010). Most of the studies of democracy promotion on the impact of democracy promotion policies and 
on paradigms of “compliance” and “international socialization.” See for example, Frank 
Schimmelfennig and Ulrich Sedelmeier, eds., The Politics of European Union Enlargement: 
Theoretical Approaches (New York: Routledge, 2005); John O’Brennan, “Re-Conceptualizing Europe: 
Social Constructivism and EU Enlargement,” in Actors and Models: Assessing the European Union’s 
External Capability and Influence, by Perre Willa and Nicolas Levrat (Genève: Institut European de 
lUniversite de Genève, 2001); Ulrich Sedelmeier and Helen Wallace, “Eastern Enlargement: Strategy or 
Second Thoughts?” in Policy-Making in the European Union, ed. Helen Wallace and William Wallace 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 357–87; Maria Green Cowles, James A. Caporaso, and 
Thomas Risse-Kappen, Transforming Europe: Europeanization and domestic change (Ithaca, NY: 
Cornell University Press, 2001). 
78 For examples of democratic peace work see Bruce Russett, Grasping the Democratic Peace 
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993); Thomas Risse-Kappen, “Democratic Peace – 
Warlike Democracies? A Social Constructivist Interpretation of the Liberal Argument,” European 
Journal of International Relations 1, no. 4 (1995): 491–517; John Owen, Liberal Peace, Liberal War: 
American Politics and International Security (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1997); and David 
Lake, “Peaceful Pacifists: Democratic States and War,” American Political Science Review 86, March 
(1992): 24–37. For a review of the democratic peace literature, see Sebastian Rosato, “The Flawed 
Logic of Democratic Peace Theory,” American Political Science Review 97, no. 4 (2003): 585–602. 
79 Research on transnational advocacy networks has been criticized for forgoing rigorous assessment of 
alternative theoretical approaches by Richard M. Price, “Transnational Civil Society and Advocacy in 
World Politics”; and research on democracy promotion has been criticized by Jonas Wolff and Iris 
Wurm, “Towards a Theory of External Democracy Promotion?” On the benefits of triangulation, see 
for example, Sidney Tarrow, “Bridging the Quantitative-Qualitative Divide,” in Rethinking Social 
Inquiry: Diverse Tools, Shared Standards, ed. Henry E. Brady and David Collier (Lanham, MD: 
Rowman & Littlefield, 2004), 171–81. 
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assume the motivations of the actors involved or derive them deductively, this 
dissertation treated motivations (and strategies) as a question to be answered 
inductively. To that end, three different types of analysis are used. The dissertation 
studies the origin, the rhetoric, and the practice of the post-communist democracy 
promoters. Additionally, these different dimensions of democracy promotion are 
examined through three different research techniques: process tracing, discourse 
analysis, and the qualitative comparative method. Such triangulation of analyses 
allows not only for a multifaceted presentation of the democracy promotion initiatives 
of various Eastern European actors but also for highlighting the theoretical approach 
that is most useful in explaining the motivations behind their efforts. 
This dissertation also looks at the activities of young non-Western democracies 
as democracy promoters. The efforts of the Eastern European actors pointed to the 
importance of state-society interactions to the origins, the logic, and level of official 
democracy promotion. Attention to the domestic politics of democracy promotion is 
not completely new. For example, some have looked at domestic public and elite 
ambivalence towards supporting democracy abroad as factors, which compromise 
commitment to and funding for official democracy promotion efforts.80 Others have 
examined the bureaucratic context from which democracy promotion emerges to 
explain the incoherent US strategies on the ground.81 And finally, some Foucauldian 
takes on democracy promotion have emphasized not only that such efforts have been 
                                                 
80 Jason Ralph, “ ‘High Stakes’ and ‘Low Intensity Democracy’: Understanding America’s Policy of 
Promoting Democracy,” and Ole R. Holsti, “Promotion of Democracy as a Popular Demand?” in 
American Democracy Promotion Impulses, Strategies, and Impacts, ed. Michael Cox, G. John 
Ikenberry, and Takashi Inoguchi (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 200–217 and 151–80; 
Steven W. Hook, “Inconsistent US Efforts to Promote Democracy Abroad,” in Schraeder, Exporting 
Democracy, 109–30; Steven W. Hook, ‘‘Building Democracy’ through Foreign Aid: The Limitations of 
United States Political Conditionalities, 1992–96,’ Democratization 5, no. 3 (1998): 156–80; Heather 
Grabbe and Kirsty Hughes, “Central and East European Views on EU Enlargement: Political Debates 
and Public Opinions,” in Back to Europe: Central and Eastern Europe and the European Union, ed. 
Karen Henderson (London: UCL Press, 1999), 185–202. 
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Democracy Promotion” (paper presented at the Workshop on Democracy Promotion Center for 
Democracy, Development, and the Rule of Law, Stanford University, October 4–5, 2004). 
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hegemonic but also that they have sought to protect an economic program favored 
domestically.82 
Much less attention, however, has been paid to civic advocacy in favor of 
spreading democracy abroad. On the one hand, this is not surprising since democracy 
promotion has often been linked to the security agenda of the donor countries and 
conventional wisdom assumes that such high politics is where the state ought to be the 
most autonomous from society.83 On the other hand, the transnational democracy 
advocacy networks have in many ways been successors of the transnational human 
rights movement, non-governmental organizations from which have been found to be 
“influential in introducing human rights ideas and reinforcing human rights policies” 
by serving as “a key carrier of human rights ideas and a lobby for human rights 
policies.”84 This dissertation parallels such accounts: some Eastern European civic 
democracy promoters, in cooperation with their political allies and with the 
encouragement and support of Western democracy promoters, have successfully 
incorporated support for democracy abroad within the foreign policies of their states. 
                                                 
82 Steve Smith, “US Democracy Promotion: Critical Questions,” Ralph, “‘High Stakes’ and ‘Low 
Intensity Democracy’: Understanding America’s Policy of Promoting Democracy,” and Holsti, 
“Promotion of Democracy as a Popular Demand?” in Cox, Ikenberry, and Inoguchi, American 
Democracy Promotion, 63–82, 200–217, 151–80. These accounts point out that there is some tension 
between the expansion of freedom worldwide and the economic program favored by the US, a program 
which is broader that the interests of the American corporate class. This economic program is argued to 
have limited the US’s democracy export to a particularly narrow version of democracy. 
83 For a review on this issue, see Price, “Transnational Civil Society and Advocacy in World Politics.”  
84 Kathryn Sikkink, “The Power of Principled Ideas: Human Rights Policies in the United States and 
Western Europe,” in Ideas and Foreign Policy: Beliefs, Institutions, and Political Change, ed. Judith 
Goldstein, Robert O. Keohane, and Social Science Research Council (U.S.) (Ithaca, NY: Cornell 
University Press, 1993), 139–73. It should be noted, however, that the efforts of human rights advocacy 
groups resulted in the incorporation of human rights concerns in the foreign policies of the West for 
primarily principled reasons. Underlying the US human rights policy was a concern that their 
observance was a “necessary and legitimate” factor in foreign policy. Similarly, underlying the Western 
European human rights policy was an effort to codify and unify the moral standards and practices on 
which the European project was based as well as the rights that Western countries guaranteed their 
people. See Sikkink, “The Power of Principled Ideas.” However, even though the transnational human 
rights movement became the precursor of the transnational democracy advocacy movement, the efforts 
of the normatively motivated civic democracy promoters in Eastern Europe have resulted in the 
incorporation of democracy promotion in the foreign policies of the post-communist EU countries as a 
strategic commitment rather than a normative commitment. 
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Moreover, the dissertation also argued that the Eastern European civic democracy 
promoters have influenced not just the introduction and level of official support for 
democracy abroad but also the logic behind such state initiatives. Therefore, this study 
improves on previous strategic explanations of democracy promotion by suggesting 
that the perceived benefits of having democratic international partners are not fixed 
and universal but negotiated domestically as democracy promotion is incorporated in 
the country’s foreign policy tradition. 
More generally, this dissertation suggests the primacy of state-society 
interactions in the negotiation of national security interests and practices through 
ideational change. Traditionally, liberal international theory has emphasized the causal 
importance of state-society relations.85 However, many of its variants have privileged 
preexisting domestic preferences as decisive drivers of the process of foreign policy 
formation. What this dissertation suggests instead (like other studies of transnational 
activism) is that such domestic preferences are often formed at the international level 
and in the case of the Eastern European civic democracy promoters – through their 
interaction with other regional actors, solidarity with whom motivates the Eastern EU 
civic advocacy for official support for democracy abroad.86 
5.2. Social Movements and Transnational Activism 
This dissertation also builds on the literature on social movement outcomes. 
Scholars within this tradition have identified three general groups of factors that 
contribute to the impact of social movements on states: strong organizations, effective 
                                                 
85 Andrew Moravcsik, “Taking Preferences Seriously: A Liberal Theory of International Politics,” 
International Organization 51, no. 4 (1997): 513–53. 
86 For an example of other studies of transnational activism that makes a similar argument, see Jutta 
Joachim. “Framing Issues and Seizing Opportunities: The UN, NGOs, and Women’s Rights,” 
International Studies Quarterly 47, no. 2 (2003): 247–74. 
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claim-making frames, and favorable political opportunities.87 Indeed, the Eastern 
European civic democracy promotion advocates did benefit from the fact that a lot of 
the activists who helped prepare the local democratic breakthrough then moved into 
electoral politics and were sympathetic to the idea of incorporating democracy 
promotion on their country’s foreign policy. The Eastern EU norm entrepreneurs also 
exploited critical junctures in their countries’ external relations (the period immediate 
before and after the democratic breakthrough or before and after EU accession) to 
introduce and consolidate democracy promotion as part of their states’ foreign policy 
agendas. Moreover, the Eastern European civic democracy promoters themselves 
emerged from the movements that brought democracy to their country and thus 
benefited from their resources, including the strong organizations-successors of these 
movements. Finally, the framing of democracy promotion as a solution to the main 
foreign policy challenges in Eastern Europe was also very important to the successful 
institutionalization of post-communist support for democracy abroad.88 
As chapter 2 discussed, there were political activists with personal 
commitments to democracy in all of the Eastern European cases, even the ones least 
active in supporting democracy abroad. What distinguished the states most active in 
promoting democracy was a combination of 1) a strong contingent of civic advocates 
for supporting democracy abroad and 2) their effective framing of their principled 
                                                 
87 Doug McAdam, John D. McCarthy, and Mayer N, Zald, Comparative Perspectives on Social 
Movements: Political Opportunities, Mobilizing Structures, and Cultural Framings (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1996). For a critique of this approach to the study of social movement 
development and outcomes, see Jeff Goodwin and James M. Jasper, Rethinking Social Movements: 
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88 Thus this dissertation adds to the works that document strategic framing of moral causes and thus 
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seeking support outside their home states to confront powerful opponents enhance their appeals by 
strategically framing their demands to match the agendas, missions, and needs of such international and 
transnational actors. Clifford Bob, The Marketing of Rebellion: Insurgents, Media, and International 
Activism (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005).  
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beliefs into causal ideas. Because causal ideas “derive authority from the shared 
consensus of recognized elites,” the more civic democracy promotion advocates, the 
more they have been able to get their state to pay attention to supporting 
democratization in the neighborhood.89 In other words, the organizational strength of 
these movements has been particularly important for the incorporation of causal 
foreign policy ideas at the state level. The dissertation thus documents an interesting 
interaction of movement resources and framing: some types of frames (relying on 
causal ideas) more so than others (relying on principled or worldview ideas) are more 
effective when used by strong movements.  
Additionally, the fact that a majority of the civic democracy promoters have 
emerged from the movements that prepared the democratic breakthroughs in Eastern 
Europe has some important implications for the literature on social movement 
demobilization. The demobilization phase of the development of social movements is 
perhaps the least studied one.90 Successful pro-democratic movements have been 
observed to become politicized and demobilize as their mission and leaders are 
incorporated into the mission and leadership of the fledgling democratic political 
parties.91 However, some have also noted that while national pro-democratic 
movements demobilized, sub-national components of these movements became 
                                                 
89 Quote from Goldstein and Keohane, Ideas and Foreign Policy. 
90 Charles Tilly and Sidney G. Tarrow, Contentious Politics (Boulder, CO: Paradigm Publishers, 2007); 
Ruud Koopmans, “Protest in Time and Space: The Evolution of Waves of Contention,” in The 
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Sarah Anne Soule, and Hanspeter Kriesi (Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishers, 2004), 19–47; Dirk 
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Nonconversion of Support,” American Sociological Review 59, no. 5 (October 1994): 703–22. 
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Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies, vol. 4 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986); 
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Eastern Europe and Latin America (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991); David Ost, 
Solidarity and the Politics of Anti-Politics: Opposition and Reform in Poland Since 1968 (Philadelphia: 
Temple University Press, 1990); Michael Bernhard, “Civil Society and Democratic Transition in East 
Central Europe,” Political Science Quarterly 108, no. 2 (1998): 307–26; Petr Kopecky and Cas Mudde, 
“Rethinking Civil Society,” Democratization 10 no. 3 (2003): 1–14.  
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increasingly active sites of political contention.92 This thesis documents that in 
addition to or perhaps instead of such a downward “scale shift” to the local level, 
some movements opt for an upward “scale shift” by mobilizing transnationally to 
support democratization abroad.93 Moreover, by tracing this process, the dissertation 
also adds to the works on transnational activism that argue that a lot of such efforts are 
actually deeply rooted in domestic political conflicts, including the transposition – 
rather than the transformation – of frames, networks, and forms of collective action to 
the international level without a corresponding liquidation of the conflicts and claims 
that gave rise to them in their arenas of origin.94 Lastly, this study builds on previous 
works on the motivations behind such upward scale shifts. The argument here is that 
normative and opportunistic motivations for transnational activism might interact in a 
cycle-like fashion: there are more opportunistic NGOs among the late comers to a 
transnational movement than among the early risers and even for normatively-
motivated NGOs later projects are more likely to be opportunistic than early programs. 
5.2. Diffusion 
This dissertation contributes both theoretically and empirically to the diffusion 
literature and especially to study of diffusion of democracy. The temporal and spatial 
clustering of democracy and democratization in several waves, which have produced 
political processes and institutions specific to different political regions, have led 
students of comparative politics to suggest that intraregional demonstration and 
                                                 
92 Jennifer Johnson, “When Movements ‘Sub-Emerge’: Evidence for Rethinking Movement 
Demobilization following Democratic Transition” (paper presented at the annual meeting of the 
American Sociological Association, Atlanta Hilton Hotel, Atlanta, GA, August 16, 2003). 
93 On “scale shift” in transnational contention, see Tarrow, The New Transnational Activism. 
94 Sidney Tarrow and Doug McAdam, “Scale Shift in Transnational Contention,” in Transnational 
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diffusion effects are often at work.95 However, much of the diffusion work has been 
“pattern finding” – it is limited to demonstrating that the structures of covariance and 
temporal/geographic ordering are generally consistent with diffusion dynamics.96 
Additionally, much of the “process tracing” work, which follows the spread of 
democratic practices from one location to another, has focused on rare and spectacular 
events such as the democratic breakthrough cycles in Eastern Europe in 1989-91 and 
the “color revolutions” in the region in the early to mid 2000s.97 Therefore, this 
dissertation fills a gap in the literature on comparative democratization and diffusion 
works within it: the study traces the diffusion of democratization strategies within the 
post-communist space not just during democratization waves but also through the 
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everyday political and social interactions within the region before and after such 
waves. This is an important empirical contribution because of previous work 
suggesting that not only neighboring transitions to democracy but also the democracy 
status of a country’s neighbors have an effect at the time of that country’s own 
transition.98 More generally, this thesis also contributes to previous studies of 
democratization, which – with the exception of the studies of the waves of 
democratization – have focused almost exclusively on global actors and have ignored 
the role of regional players when examining the influence of external factors in the 
process of democratization.99 
Moreover, this study adds to a growing body of works documenting the 
regional aspects to many political processes and institutions.100 However, while there 
has been some recognition that “regions” are symbolic constructions, there has not 
been much work documenting their production. This is a gap that this work fills: it 
illustrates how transnational and transgovernmental networks are produced by and 
create and reinforce the solidarity that defines the “boundaries” of a region. This study 
also described how day-to-day interactions as well as dramatic events serve to (re-
)construct certain political contexts as similar in particular ways and therefore 
facilitate intra-regional diffusion. 
This analysis also suggests some ways in which “pattern finding” studies can 
be improved. A lot of these models of regional diffusion test for “neighbor 
emulation.”101 However, as some critics of this approach have pointed out, “space is 
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more than geography.”102 This dissertation too points to the importance of networks 
not based on geographical proximity but on shared regional “colonial”, cultural, 
economic, or political ties.103 Just as a reminder, Slovakia’s democracy promotion 
priority has been Serbia, to which Slovakia was linked through their participation in 
the Austro-Hungarian Empire, the Danube River trade route, a political relationship 
building on the Small Entente and the special Czechoslovak – Yugoslav ties during the 
communist era. A next generation of diffusion work has developed around the concept 
of dependence networks – a set of partner states with which a country regularly 
engages in exchanges of valued goods, which would be costly to break; such 
dependence has been measured by an index composed of the unweighted average of 
that state’s trade partners, security alliance partners, and international organization 
partners.104 Through the prism of this thesis such improvements appear as two steps 
forward and one step back – unlike some previous work on diffusion, studies of 
dependence networks do not distinguish between regional and extra-regional 
dependence.105 As this dissertation and other works have demonstrated regional 
interactions, especially in the democratization domain, are qualitatively different from 
global ones. Thus, regional networks’ dependence should perhaps be weighed 
differently than extra-regional ones. Alternatively, just as the democracy status of 
global leaders has been included in some diffusion models, so the inclusion of the 
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democracy status of regional and/or sub-regional leaders makes both theoretical and 
empirical sense. 
Lastly, most of the diffusion studies (in both political science and sociology) 
focus primarily on the diffusion channels and the adoption/adaptation of the diffused 
social practice from the perspective of the recipient.106 This dissertation examines the 
diffusion process through the perspective of the “transmitter.” Therefore, the 
dissertation sheds some light on important questions not previously studied such as 
why certain innovations diffuse over others.107 The argument made here is that in 
cases of reciprocal diffusion – that is, where both the donor and the recipient are 
interested in the sharing of democratization experience – the perceived success of the 
practice developed by the donors as well as the needs of the recipient (which are in 
turn partly shaped by the repressiveness of the recipient state) play an important role 
in determining which practices get exported.108 As argued above, the Eastern 
European democracy promoters consciously and purposefully sought to share their 
“best practice” as those were appropriate to the recipient’s democratization needs. 
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APPENDIX 1: 
RULES FOR CODING THE DEMOCRACY PROMOTION ACTIVISM 
SCORES 
ACTIVITIES CODING RULES  
Diplomacy  Start Countries that have engaged in significant 
democracy promotion activities or demonstrated 
democracy promotion initiative in the first 10 years 
following their democratic breakthrough were given 
a score of 2. Countries that have engaged in 
democracy promotion activities or demonstrated 
democracy promotion initiative following the 
negotiation of their acceptance in the euro-atlantic 
community were given a score of 1. Countries that 
have yet to engage in significant democracy 
promotion activities were given a score of 0. 
 Initiative Countries that have demonstrated some bilateral 
democracy promotion initiative or initiative at 
multilateral forums were given a score of 1. 
Countries that have shown initiative both bilaterally 
and multilaterally were given a score of 2. Examples 
of bilateral initiatives include the szeged process set 
up by hungary, Poland’s involvement in the Orange 
Revolution in Ukraine, Slovakia’s work in uniting 
the opposition during the democratic breakthrough in 
Serbia, and Lithuania’s hosting of the European 
Humanitarian University in exile. Exampled of 
multilateral initiatives include the Bratislava Process 
organized by Slovakia, the Eastern Partnership 
sponsored by poland, the EU Consensus for 
Democracy championed by the Czech Republic, and 
Romania’s leadership in the Community of 
Democratic Choice. 
 Engagement Countries with a low level of overall bilateral and 
multilateral engagement in democracy promotion 
were given a score of 0. Countries with a medium 
level of overall bilateral and multilateral engagement 
in democracy promotion were given a score of 1. 
Countries with a high level of overall bilateral and 
multilateral engagement in democracy promotion 
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were given a score of 2. The level of engagement is 
based on 18 interviews with democracy promotion 
experts in the international donor community and 
international policy think tanks and non-
governmental organizations. 
Assistance  Start Countries that started providing democracy 
assistance before their EU accession were given a 
score of 2. Countries that began providing 
democracy assistance within a year (by 2005 and 
2008 for each of the two enlargement waves 
respectively) of their EU accession were given a 
score of 1. Countries that have yet to start providing 
democracy assistance were given a score of 0. 
 Institutionalization Countries that delegated democracy assistance 
provision to a department within the foreign ministry 
were given a score of 1. Countries that had created a 
special implementation agency in addition to their 
development cooperation department within the 
foreign ministry were given a score of 2. Countries 
that created a special ministry for democracy 
assistance provision were given a score of 3. 
Countries, which had not yet started providing 
democracy assistance, were given a score of 0.  
 Level I used three measures of the importance of 
democracy promotion relative to the overall official 
assistance provided: the percent of democracy 
assistance out of overall official development 
assistance; the percent of democracy assistance out 
of all bilateral project assistance; and the percent of 
the number of democracy assistance projects out of 
all development assistance projects. These data are 
presented in Table 2.1 and Table 2.2. 
 Countries that provided democracy assistance, 
which was less than 1% of their official 
development assistance, were given a score of 1. 
Countries that provided democracy assistance, 
which was between 1% and 2% of their official 
development assistance, were given a score of 2. 
Countries that provided democracy assistance, 
which was more than 2% of their official 
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development assistance, were given a score of 3. 
 Countries that provided democracy assistance, 
which was less than 20% of all bilateral project 
assistance, were given a score of 1. Countries that 
provided democracy assistance, which was between 
20% and 30% of all bilateral project assistance, 
were given a score of 2. Countries that provided 
democracy assistance, which was more than 30% of 
all bilateral project assistance, were given a score of 
3. 
 Countries that sponsored democracy assistance 
projects, which were less than 30% of the number of 
all development assistance projects, were given a 
score of 1. Countries that sponsored democracy 
assistance projects, which were between 30% and 
40% of the number of all development assistance 
projects, were given a score of 2. Countries that 
sponsored democracy assistance projects, which were 
more than 40% of the number of all development 
assistance projects, were given a score of 3. 
These scores were added up and averaged as 
follows: Countries that scored between 0 and 3 
points were given an overall assistance level score of 
0. Countries that scored between 4 and 6 points were 
given an overall assistance level score of 1. 
Countries that scored more than 6 points were given 
an overall assistance level score of 2. 
Data was missing for 2 of the 3 Lithuanian measures, 
so the country’s average score was the score for the 
only dimension on which Vilnius provided 
information. Data was also missing for Slovenia; 
given the country’s general low level of democracy 
assistance offered, Slovenia was an overall 




OVERVIEW OF THE DEMOCRACY PROMOTION EFFORTS OF 
INDIVIDUAL EASTERN EUROPEAN MEMBERS OF THE EU AS AN 
EXPLANATION OF THEIR DEMOCRACY PROMOTION ACTIVISM 
SCORES 
1. The Baltic Countries 
Post-communist Poland not only sought to make quick progress on its own 
transition to a market democracy but also prioritized fairly early on support to other 
democratizing countries in the region. By the early 1990s, Polish diplomacy had 
already started working on developing close diplomatic contacts with Warsaw’s 
neighbors (especially to the east) in part to encourage, pressure, and assist them to 
keep up with democratization reforms.1 At the same time, Polish political elites have 
frequently and publicly criticized leaders who did not respect human rights and 
democratic procedures: for example, in Belarus from the mid-1990s to present, 
Slovakia in the mid-1990s, Yugoslavia in the mid- to late 1990s, and Ukraine in the 
early 2000s.2 Moreover, by the late 1990s, Warsaw had already started providing 
democracy assistance to these and other countries.3 In addition to a special fund for 
transition assistance to Ukraine and another one for the post-communist region in 
general, the foreign ministry began offering additional aid through the newly set up 
development cooperation system.4 
In addition to such bilateral initiatives, Warsaw has also actively promoted 
democracy thought its participation in a number of multilateral fora. As Poland began 
integrating into the international structures of Euro-Atlantic democracies in the early 
and mid-1990s, it began encouraging its international partners to do the same, again in 
part to further strengthen their reform progress.5 Poland has not only lobbied for the 
inclusion of many post-communist democratization laggards in various regional 
cooperation frameworks such as the OSCE and Council of Europe but has also 
supported (with experts, funds, and advice) the efforts of such international 
                                                 
1 Timothy Snyder, The Reconstruction of Nations (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2003). 
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Poland’s external actions is increasingly significant because since 2007 democracy promotion has been 
mainstreamed – all development projects are to contain a democratization element. Interview with M. 
P., October 8, 2008. 
5 Interview with A. K., October 23, 2008. 
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organizations in Eastern Europe. Most important has been Warsaw’s activism within 
the EU and NATO. Membership in these structures has been understood by Polish 
elites to especially anchor reforms by providing the incentive of EU/ NATO accession 
as well as to lock such applicants in the club of market democracies. So Warsaw 
lobbied for a membership prospective for Slovakia in the 1990s and in the 2000s – for 
Ukraine, and to a lesser extent, Moldova, and Georgia and even for autocratic Belarus 
conditional on its democratization.6 At the same time, bilaterally, Poland has also 
devoted a lot of diplomatic resources and given much aid to helping these countries 
prepare for Euro-Atlantic integration.7 
Most of Warsaw’s assistance and diplomatic democracy promotion efforts 
have targeted the former Soviet Union republics, especially Ukraine and Belarus and 
more recently also Georgia and Moldova. Diplomatic and assistance support for the 
democratization of other countries in the South Caucusus and Central Asia have been 
less concerted. Poland also invested in assisting Bratislava with catching up with the 
first wave of EU accession candidates as well as implemented some democratization 
projects under the Stability Pact for Southeastern Europe and under its development 
assistance system.8 In general, however, with the notable exception of hosting the 
inaugural Community of Democracies meeting, the focus of Polish democracy 
promotion has been largely limited to the post-communist region in Eastern Europe 
and primarily to its eastern neighborhood. 
Polish diplomacy has received recognition for its mediation during the 
democratic breakthrough in Ukraine in 2004 and for getting the EU to participate in 
the resolution of the crisis and to bring Ukraine closer in the following years. Warsaw 
succeeded in mobilizing support within the EU for its proposal for a special 
cooperation mechanism for 6 of the EU’s immediate eastern neighbors – the so-called 
Eastern Partnership – as well as for offering Ukraine a membership prospective. Since 
Poland has only reluctantly supported international sanction against the regime in 
neighboring Belarus, Warsaw also considers a success the EU inclusion of Belarus in 
the Eastern Partnership in the general spirit of engaging with the authorities in Minsk 
(without disengaging with the Belarusian opposition).9 However, Poland was 
criticized by some for having acted not out concern for democratization in Belarus.10 
Moreover, Poland is further criticized for having been quite reluctant to express its 
disapproval of notorious breaches of democracy and human rights in powerful 
countries such as China and Russia and even of undemocratic practices in smaller but 
important partners such as Kazakhstan.11 
After declaring independence in 1990, Lithuania prioritized rapprochement 
with and later integration into the Euro-Atlantic structures while also working to 
normalize relations with Russia and to maintain good relations with other neighboring 
states – a “strategic” partnership with Poland, “friendly” relations with Latvia and 
                                                 
6 Interview with B. O., March 26, 2009. 
7 Interview with P. W., October 16, 2008. 
8 Democracy Coalition Project, “Poland.”  
9 Interview with R. D., October 22, 2008. 
10 Balazs Jarabik and Vitali Silitski, “Belarus,” in Is the European Union Supporting Democracy in its 
Neighborhood?, ed. Richard Youngs (Madrid: FRIDE, 2008), 101–20. 
11 Democracy Coalition Project, “Poland.”  
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Estonia, and “moderate” policies toward Belarus.12 Thus much of the early democracy 
promotion efforts of Vilnius focused on Minsk. Lithuanian elites recognized that “the 
internal political situation in Belarus is sufficiently stable” but even early on insisted 
(more behind closed doors than in public) that “problems in Belarus be decided 
according to the universally recognized principles of democracy and a legitimate state, 
strictly adhering to the principles of human rights and freedoms.” 13 Additionally, 
Vilnius supported the EU, OSCE, and the CoE in condemning democratic abuses by 
Minsk but has only reluctantly upheld the international sanctions against Belarus.14 
Moreover, Lithuania tried to maintain as broad as possible ties with Belarusian NGOs, 
youth groups, independent media, and the Belarusian community in Lithuania.15 
However, elites in Vilnius have been more reluctant and slow to begin supporting the 
Belarusian political opposition and official contacts with leading opposition figures 
were established only in the late 1990s. Moreover, this early on, Lithuania also tried to 
avoid too controversial democracy promotion projects.16 
After negotiating its EU and NATO accession, Vilnius became more active in 
supporting democratization abroad and broadened its geographical priorities. 
Lithuania has lobbied for a proactive EU policy aimed at bringing the new Eastern 
neighbors closer to the union and has tried to organize consultations among member 
states with similar interests in the East.17 Vilnius also continued to actively cooperate 
with local governments, civil society, and the political opposition from Belarus and 
provided shelter for a significant number opposition groups repressed by Minsk – a 
notable example is the European Humanities University closed by the Belarusian 
authorities in 2004, which was re-launched in Vilnius with support from the 
Lithuanian government and the EU.18 Additionally, Lithuania assumed an active role 
in developing EU-Russia relations but has been less critical of Moscow’s democratic 
record than the other Eastern European Baltic states.19 Moreover, beginning in the 
early 2000s, Vilnius (with encouragement from Warsaw) began building on its 
traditionally good relations with Kiev to enhance the institutional cooperation between 
                                                 
12 Evaldas Nekrasas, “Lithuanian Foreign Policy: Concepts, Achievements, and Predicaments,” 
Lithuanian Foreign Policy Review 13–14 (2004): 28–35. 
13 Algirdas Gricius, “Lithuania and its Belarusian Policy,” Lithuanian Foreign Policy Review 3 (1999): 
6. 
14 Interview with L. S., March 20, 2009. 
15 Gricius, “Lithuania and its Belarusian Policy.” 
16 For example, the Lithuanian parliament distanced itself from the initiative of a prominent member of 
parliament to launch an independent radio broadcasting into Belarus, and the cabinet chose to try 
working out an agreement with the regime in Minsk for state cross-border broadcasts. Margarita M. 
Balmaceda, James I. Clem, and Lisbeth L. Tarlow, eds., Independent Belarus: Domestic Determinants, 
Regional Dynamics, and Implications for the West (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2002). 
17 Such EU member states included Austria, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Hungary, 
Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia and Sweden. (Grzegorz Gromadzki, Raimundas Lopata, and Kristi 
Raik, Friends or Family?: Finnish, Lithuanian and Polish Perspectives on the EU’s policy towards 
Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova [FIIA Report No. 12. Helsinki: Finnish Institute of International Affairs, 
2005].) Lithuania has also supported the activities of international and regional organizations in 
preventing and combating human rights violations but has not yet taken initiative in this field. 
Lithuanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs website, http://www.urm.lt/index.php?-1434607850 
18 Balmaceda, Clem, and Tarlow, Independent Belarus. 
19 Gromadzki, Lopata, and Raik, Friends or Family?: Finnish, Lithuanian and Polish Perspectives. 
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the two countries in part to push Ukraine in a more democratic direction.20 As a result, 
like Warsaw, Vilnius was invited to mediate during the Orange Revolution in Ukraine. 
Lithuania subsequently lobbied for a membership prospective for Kiev in both the EU 
and NATO. Vilnius has also supported the EU integration of Moldova and lobbied for 
a NATO membership prospective for Georgia and for the inclusion of the South 
Caucusus in Eastern Partnership while also helping these countries move closer to the 
Euro-Atlantic space.21 
While Lithuania has been fairly active diplomatically, it was slow to begin 
providing democracy assistance.22 In 2002 Vilnius began providing modest 
development and democracy aid but only in 2006 did the development aid system 
become fully institutionalized and the number of projects – meaningful. Priority has 
been given to Belarus, Ukraine, and Georgia but other countries in Eastern Europe 
(Moldova and Russia) and in the South Caucusus (Armenia and Azerbaijan) received 
some modest assistance as well. Since the mid-2000s Lithuanian leaders have also 
frequently spoken of the need to spread democracy further east into Central Asia but 
they have yet to implement such ambitions.23 
 
Estonia re-established its statehood in 1991 and immediately sought to leave 
the Russian “sphere of influence.” Euro-Atlantic integration soon became the main 
goal of Estonia’s foreign policy to be “achieved through friendly and sound bilateral 
relations.”24 Estonia cooperated mostly with the other Eastern and Western European 
Baltic countries and to a much lesser extent with some of the “European” former 
Soviet Republics. Thus even though Estonia was supportive of OSCE’s security and 
democracy promotion missions in the post-communist region (for instance, Moldova, 
Georgia, Armenia, and later Yugoslavia), Tallinn rarely took the initiative on 
democracy promotion questions there.25 By 1998 Estonia had started allocating 
development aid and – through it – some democracy assistance to democratizing 
countries in the neighborhood. When the development aid system became fully 
institutionalized in 2001 and especially after Tallinn negotiated its entry into the EU 
and NATO, good governance, human rights, democracy and the rule of law have 
emerged as thematic priorities for Estonia’s development cooperation, and Georgia, 
Ukraine, and Moldova as the geographic priorities for Tallinn’s democracy aid.26 
However, Estonia – often in cooperation with Western donors – has also been 
organizing trainings for some additional countries in the post-communist region from 
Kosovo and Macedonia to Armenia and Uzbekistan.27 
                                                 
20 From “Lithuania’s New Foreign Policy,” a speech delivered by H. E. Mr. Arturas Paulauskas, Acting 
President of the Republic of Lithuania, at Vilnius University, May 24, 2004. 
21 Interview with L. S., March 20, 2009. 
22 Lithuanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs website, http://www.urm.lt/index.php?1809419855 
23 Laurynas Jonavicius, “Geopolitical Projections of New Lithuanian Foreign Policy,” Lithuanian 
Foreign Policy Review 17 (2006): 15–40. 
24 Estonian Foreign Policy Yearbook 2000, available at http://www.vm.ee/?q=en/node/4040. 
25 Estonian Foreign Policy Yearbook 2001, available at http://www.vm.ee/?q=en/node/4041. 
26 European Parliament Committee on Development, The Challenge of the EU Development 
Cooperation Program for New Member States (Brussels, 2007). 
27 Estonian Foreign Policy Yearbook 2001.  
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However, “being a small state, Estonia considers countries where the 
environment for cooperation is friendlier to be more important from the point of view 
of the neighborhood policy and development cooperation. This explains why Estonia 
does not concern itself so much with Belarus”28 and why Tallinn began developing 
contacts with the Western Balkans but much more importantly significantly improved 
relations with Ukraine, Georgia, and Moldova after the democratic breakthroughs in 
these countries and the resultant “internal political stabilization and fast economic 
development.”29 Moreover, Estonia has seen its EU membership as “a chance to opt 
out of external affairs, delegate its competencies to the EU level.”30 At the same time, 
Estonia has focused on keeping human rights as a priority on the EU (and the Council 
of Europe’s) agenda (for example, by encouraging a more critical stance on Russia) 
and has also sought to serve as a representative of the EU on human rights issues with 
third countries.31 Moreover, Tallinn has been supportive of closer cooperation with the 
Eastern Partnership countries as a way to encourage their democratization.32 Tallinn 
has also enhanced its bilateral diplomatic relations with the EU’s immediate eastern 
neighbors, which has allowed Estonia to encourage and advise neighbors on further 
democratic reforms and Euro-Atlantic integration.33 However, although democracy 
promotion in Georgia, Ukraine, and Moldova has become one of Tallinn’s main post-
accession priorities, Estonian diplomacy has kept “a rather low profile” in relation to 
Russia and has shown “less activity and enthusiasm as regards the EU’s policy 
towards the new neighbors than the two other Baltic states, apart from being the most 
active supporter of Georgian reforms.”34 
Since the restoration of its independence, Latvia’s key foreign policy 
objectives were withdrawing from the sphere of Russian political and economic 
influence, while at the same time rapproaching and later integrating into the Euro-
Atlantic structures.35 Of all Baltic countries, Latvia is the host of the largest 
unassimilated Russian minority, so Russia caused much trouble for Riga when settling 
the issue of borders (the treaty is still not ratified), troop withdrawal, and minority 
politics in the context of Latvia’s membership in regional organizations such as the 
OSCE, CoE, and the UN.36 As a result, the tense relations with Russia largely 
consumed Latvia’s early post-communist eastern policy and democracy promotion 
                                                 
28 Laurynas Jonavicius, “The Democracy Promotion Policies of Central and Eastern European States” 
(working paper, Fundacion para las Relaciones Internacionales y el Dialogo Exterior, 2008). 
29 Estonian Foreign Policy Yearbook 2001. 
30 Jonavicius, “The Democracy Promotion Policies of Central and Eastern European States.” 
31 Tallinn has been supportive politically and financially of the UN’s activities in the field of human 
rights but has taken no initiative. Estonian Ministry of Foreign Affairs website, 
http://www.vm.ee/?q=en/node/9141. 
32 Estonian Foreign Policy Yearbook 2008, available at http://www.vm.ee/?q=en/node/8324. 
33 Estonian Foreign Policy Yearbook 2009, available at http://www.vm.ee/?q=en/node/8324. 
34 Vahur Made, Foreign Policy of the Post-Enlargement European Union: Russian Dimension 
(Research Report No. 1, Tallinn: Estonian School of Diplomacy, 2004). 
35 David J. Galbreath, “Latvian Foreign Policy after Enlargement: Continuity and Change,” 
Cooperation and Conflict 41, no. 4 (2006): 443–62. 
36 On Latvian-Russian relations, see, for example, Gundar J. King and David E. McNabb, “Crossroads 
Dynamics in Foreign Policy: The Case of Latvia,” Problems of Post-Communism 56, no. 3 (June 2009): 
29–41. 
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became a real part of Riga’s foreign policy agenda only after Latvia’s accession into 
the EU and NATO in the mid-2000s. 
On the one hand, Riga has been keen to see the EU and NATO encourage the 
democratization of Russia.37 Latvia has also been one of the main critics of Russia’s 
reversion towards more authoritarian practices and has tried to convince these 
organizations to take a more critical stand on Moscow’s undemocratic practices. On 
the other hand, Latvia has sought to encourage reform in and even the European 
integration of Ukraine, Moldova, and Georgia.38 Latvia has lobbied the EU and NATO 
that a membership prospective be provided to these states and has been supportive of 
the OSCE and the CoE’s democracy promotion efforts in the post-communist region.39 
However, Riga has had a difficult time integrating into the often loose and disjointed 
NATO and EU foreign policy agenda40 and in general has not taken the initiative on 
questions of multilateral democracy promotion. Bilaterally, Latvia takes part in regular 
political dialogue, ministerial cooperation and cooperation with other state institutions 
in Moldova, Georgia, and Ukraine about administrative reform and support for Euro-
Atlantic integration.41 Moreover, since the setting up of its system for development 
cooperation in 2005 and especially since its full institutionalization in 2007, Riga has 
also provided democracy assistance to Moldova, Georgia, Ukraine, and Belarus, 
focusing on the last two but especially on Moldova.42 
2. Central Europe 
The early post-communist foreign policy of the Czech Republic was geared 
mostly towards one central goal – gaining EU and NATO membership as quickly as 
possible. However, when several transitions in post-communist Europe (Slovakia, 
Belarus, and Ukraine) were slowed down and even reversed, Prague vocally and 
strongly criticized the electoral irregularities and the concentration of power in these 
countries.43 The Czech Republic also supported UN and EU criticism of and sanctions 
against other regimes that violated human rights and democratic principles both in the 
neighborhood and further field and in 1999, Prague began taking the initiative by 
sponsoring a UN resolution condemning human right abuse in Cuba and then 
                                                 
37 Galbreath, “Latvian Foreign Policy after Enlargement.” 
38 David J. Galbreath and Jeremy W. Lamoreaux, “Bastion, Beacon or Bridge? The Role of the Baltic 
States in the EU’s Relationship with the Eastern ‘Neighbours,’’’ in Promoting Democratic Values in the 
Enlarging Europe, ed. Heiko Paabo (Tallinn: University of Tartu Press, 2006), 97–109. 
39 Latvia Ministry of Foreign Affairs website, http://www.mfa.gov.lv/en/DevelopmentCo-
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40 Galbreath, “Latvian Foreign Policy after Enlargement.” 
41 European Parliament Committee on Development, The Challenge of the EU Development 
Cooperation Program for New Member States. 
42 The establishment of an official development policy started in 1999, but it was fully set up and 
running only in 2005. In the early stages, the priority countries for democracy promotion were Bosnia-
Herzegovina and Macedonia in the Western Balkans and Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Kazakhstan, 
Russia, and Ukraine in the former Soviet Union. European Parliament Committee on Development, The 
Challenge of the EU Development Cooperation Program for New Member States, and Latvian Ministry 
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43 Democracy Coalition Project, “Czech Republic,” in Defending Democracy: A Global Survey of 
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volunteering to serve on the steering committee of the Community of Democracies set 
up in 2000.44 
After the democratic breakthrough in Slovakia, Prague began investing 
bilaterally in Bratislava’s EU and NATO accessions.45 Soon thereafter, the Czech 
government also began working to help the countries in the former Yugoslavia build 
democratic institutions and prepare for EU integration in the context of various 
regional initiatives such as the Stability Pact for South-Eastern Europe and the Central 
European Initiative.46 Thus since the later 1990s, the Czech diplomacy had moved 
beyond democracy promotion that was primarily diplomatic and mostly exercised in 
the form of criticism of offending states in bilateral and especially multilateral forums. 
Prague began assisting the post-communist transformations of several of its traditional 
international partners and since the late 1990s and especially after 2000 when the 
development aid system was set up, the Czech government began providing 
democracy assistance as well.47 In 2004, Prague additionally set up a special Human 
Rights and Transition Promotion Department within the foreign ministry to administer 
funds allocated specifically to democracy assistance.48 In order of funding allocated, 
the priority countries have been: Belarus, Iraq, Serbia, Ukraine, Burma, Moldova, 
Cuba, and Georgia. 
Consecutive Czech governments also stepped up their diplomatic democracy 
promotion. Democratization and human rights issues figured prominently in the 
regional foreign policies of the Czech Republic, which in the early 2000s began 
focusing not only on the South-East European region but also increasingly in the 
former Soviet republics on the EU border as well.49 Moreover, Prague lobbied for EU 
enlargements towards the Western Balkans and for a special Eastern Partnership-like 
initiative.50 The Czech government was also the first EU government to pledge 
funding to the European Partnership for Democracy (€ 100,000 for activities in the 
post-Soviet space).51 And more generally, the Czech diplomacy was one of they key 
                                                 
44 Prague supported the actions of the international community not only in Serbia and Belarus but also 
in developing countries such as Pakistan, North Korea and Cote d’Ivoire. Democracy Coalition Project, 
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46 Czech Foreign Policy Annual Report 1998/99. 
47 European Parliament Committee on Development, The Challenge of the EU Development 
Cooperation Program for New Member States. 
48 The unit was initially established in 2004 to manage the implementation of € 376,000 worth of 
democracy assistance projects in Iraq. However, after the positive experience there and strong lobbying 
from the NGO sector, the government decided in February 2005 to extend the application of transition 
promotion also to other countries and increased its funding for the year 2005 to € 470,000. Moreover, 
some development assistance, which covers good governance issues, is additionally provided through 
the Czech UNDP Trust Fund. Jacek Kucharczyk and Jeff Lovitt, eds., Democracy’s New Champions: 
European Democracy Assistance after EU Enlargement (Prague: PASOS, 2008).  
49 Izabela Albrycht, ed., The Eastern Partnership in the Context of the European Neighborhood Policy 
and V4 Agenda (Krakow; Brussels: Kosciuszko Institute, 2009). 
50 The Czech Republic used its presidency of the EU to officially launch the Eastern Partnership and to 
organize accompanying activities intended to push substance into the framework. Interview with K. P., 
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supporters of the so-called “European Consensus on Democracy” – an initiative to 
commit the EU to a stronger, long-term focus on democracy promotion as well as of 
strengthening the European Initiative for Democracy and Human Rights.52 
More uniquely, Prague has sought to emerge as a defender of dissidents around 
the globe, specializing on Belarus and Cuba and to a lesser extent on Burma. Czech 
diplomacy not only continued to criticize these regimes about their human right 
records and to lend political and moral support to the democratic oppositions against 
them but also actively sought to shape the EU’s policies towards these countries. In 
the case of Belarus, the Czech diplomacy argued that the EU should “offer Belarus a 
“road to Europe” [ . . . ] on the condition, however, that the Belarus political 
leadership genuinely adopts democratic principles.”53 In the case of Cuba, Prague 
threatened to veto any decision of the European Council that did not make restoration 
of diplomatic relations with Cuba conditional on further improvements in the situation 
of the dissidents there.54 Prague was successful in getting the EU to adopt a tougher 
stance towards Havana and to include Belarus in the Eastern Partnership. 
It should be noted that Czech support for dissidents around the globe has in 
some cases continued even in the face of resistance of the offending regimes conveyed 
through expulsion of diplomats and downgrading of relations by the authorities in 
Cuba, Belarus, and North Korea.55 Similarly, Czech criticism of the Beijing human 
rights record and support for the Dalai Lama persisted despite costly losses in trade 
with China.56 At the same time, however, Tibet was not included in the geographic 
priorities of the Czech Transition Promotion Department and the Czech government 
has been happy to welcome Chinese trade delegations to Prague.57 Similarly, the 
Czech government decided not to argue for multilateral sanctions on Russia for human 
rights violations in Chechnya, even though the issue was raised in the Czech Senate.58 
After the break up of Czechoslovakia, Slovakia set out to complete the 
transition to a market democracy and to (re-)integrate with the Euro-Atlantic 
structures. However, the slow pace and even reversal of reforms in Slovakia took 
Bratislava off the fast track to EU and NATO accession. Thus the main foreign policy 
priority of Slovakia after the democratic breakthrough in the country in 1998 was 
Euro-Atlantic integration.59 Still, almost immediately Slovakia also began supporting 
the democratization of other transition laggards. At the end of the 1990s and the 
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beginning of the 2000s, Bratislava invested in the democratization of the Western 
Balkans (especially Serbia and Croatia).60 Slovak diplomacy criticized undemocratic 
practices in the region and through the so-called Bratislava Process organized the 
international community to and itself did provide assistance and political support to 
the Serbian opposition. Such efforts continued after the democratic breakthrough in 
Serbia in 2000 and when Bratislava set up its development assistance system in 2004, 
democracy assistance to Serbia was stepped up and expanded in scope to cover other 
countries in the Western Balkans.61 
Having negotiated its EU and NATO membership, Bratislava identified 
democracy promotion in the Western Balkans and Ukraine as one of its post-accession 
foreign policy priorities.62 Slovakia has not only provided assistance to such 
democratizing states but has also emphasized the benefits of democracy in its bilateral 
relations with other post-communist countries and provided advice to their elites about 
catching up on their transitions.63 Moreover, Slovakia has leveraged its membership in 
various international organizations by prioritizing its democracy promotion agenda 
when occupying key posts in regional frameworks.64 For example, it was Slovak 
activism that got the OSCE involved in the mediations during the Orange Revolution 
in Ukraine and that steered the CoE to work on convincing Belarus to implement the 
necessary political reforms to join the organization. Slovakia has also lobbied for EU 
enlargement to the Western Balkans, has been supportive of Ukraine’s membership 
aspirations, and has worked to keep the Belarusian question on the EU agenda.65 
Slovak diplomats have criticized regimes, which do not respect democratic 
procedures (for example, Yugoslavia in the late 1990s and Belarus to present) but 
have reluctantly joined sanctions against them. In some cases, such as Ukraine in the 
early 2000s, Slovak diplomacy was even willing to look the other way.66 More 
recently, Slovakia has pursued good relations with autocratic regimes such as Russia 
and Cuba.67 
In the 1990s, post-communist Hungary pursued three foreign policy goals: 1) 
Euro-Atlantic integration; 2) protection and representation of the more than three 
million ethnic Hungarians living abroad; and 3) establishing good relations with the 
country’s neighbors, many of which either hosted these Hungarian minorities or were 
new states that emerged from the disintegration of the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia, 
and Yugoslavia.68 In its relations with its neighbors, Budapest adopted a cautious 
approach by emphasizing economic cooperation while at the same time seeking to 
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commit these countries to the protection of minorities. Thus by the mid-1990s, 
Hungary had signed agreements on the mutual protection of minorities with Slovakia, 
Romania, Ukraine, Croatia, and Slovenia.69 Moreover, beginning in the late 1990s and 
early 2000s, Hungary also began lobbying for the Euro-Atlantic integration of its 
neighbors to ensure protection of the Hungarian minorities there.70 
At the same time, Budapest has tended to avoid outright condemnation of 
nearby states that violate human rights and democracy abroad (such as Slovakia and 
Serbia in the 1990s, Ukraine in early 2000s and Belarus from the mid-1990s to 
present) and instead has preferred to join with regional or global organizations when 
criticizing such regimes.71 Consequently, Hungary has supported efforts to protect 
human rights undertaken by the international organizations to which it belongs. For 
example, Hungary sent observer missions to the Western Balkans through OSCE, 
played a major role in the 2005 resurrection of the minority expert group within the 
Council of Europe, and initiated resolutions within the UN Human Rights Council in 
2008: one related to the independence of the judiciary and another dealing with the 
protection of human rights defenders co-operating with UN human rights bodies.72 
Hungary’s expertise in the area of human (/minority) rights has been 
recognized and already in demand. China, which has seen Hungary as a good example 
of a democratic transition, invited Budapest to present the evolution and functioning of 
its key democratic institutions, such as the Constitutional Court or the Ombudsman’s 
Office. In April 2000, a Human Rights dialogue was launched in Beijing between 
Hungary and China. Building on its success, a similar Human Rights dialogue was 
launched between Hungary and Vietnam in 2009.73 
If Hungary’s agenda for diplomatic democracy promotion has been somewhat 
ad hoc and rather narrow (that is, limited mostly to questions of minority rights), 
Hungary’s democracy assistance has been rather fragmented and also ad hoc.74 In 
1999, the Hungarian government launched the so-called Szeged Process within the 
Stability Pact for South-Eastern Europe. Similarly, in 2003, Budapest also launched 
the so-called “Nyíregyháza Initiative” as a “part of Hungary’s contribution” to the 
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Kulpolitikank/Nemzetkozi_fejlesztes/. 
74 Horvath, “Hungary’s Democracy Assistance Policies and Priorities.”  
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EU’s eastern neighborhood policy. Both the Process and the Initiative focused on 
cross-border local government cooperation with a democratization dimension.75 In 
addition to the democracy assistance provided through the Szeged Process and the 
Nyíregyháza Initiative and the aid offered through the Chinese and Vietnamese 
Human Rights dialogues, the Hungarian government has provided some additional 
support through its development aid system. However, a clear strategy defining the 
priority areas, countries, and objectives of Hungarian democracy assistance is still 
missing.76 In 2005, Budapest also set up an International Centre for Democratic 
Transition as the Hungarian contribution to the Community of Democracies and is 
currently financing the operation of the institute, which, however, relies on external 
donors for funding of individual projects. Lastly, in 2007, the Hungarian government 
authorized a Promotion of Democratic Transition Fund appropriation.77 
Lastly, like many other Eastern European democracy promoters, Hungary has 
indirectly supported the democratization of the EU neighbors to the east and southeast 
by arguing in favor of their Euro-Atlantic integration. Budapest has been most active 
in speeding Croatia’s accession and the integration of the other countries in the 
Western Balkans.78 However, Hungary has also been generally supportive of bringing 
Ukraine but also Moldova and Belarus closer to the EU.79 As a result, Hungary 
participated in the elaboration of the EU’s Eastern Partnership concept and argued for 
the inclusion of Belarus in the partnership.80 Still, Hungary continued to “see the 
Eastern neighborhood region through the general debate that is held at the EU-level.”81 
                                                 
75 The Process was meant to strengthen the pro-democratic forces in Serbia and prepare the region for 
Euro-Atlantic integration through creating sister-municipality relationships between Hungarian local 
governments and Serbian opposition-governed municipalities as well as by linking Serbian independent 
media and NGOs with similar Hungarian organizations. The Initiative focused on cross-border 
municipal cooperation, education, and support for small and medium businesses primarily in the 
Ukrainian lands bordering Hungary and hosting Hungarian minorities. However, to the extent that the 
Initiative sought to further Ukraine’s European integration through some civic society and public 
administration capacity building, the Initiative had some democracy promotion significance as well. 
Hungary also proposed the establishment of the so-called Budapest Forum through which the Visegrad 
Countries, Austria, and Slovenia transfer their transition and European integration experience to the 
countries of the former Yugoslavia; however, within the Forum, Budapest chose to be responsible for 
the Internal Affairs and Justice Co-operation cooperation. Horvath, “Hungary’s Democracy Assistance 
Policies and Priorities.”  
76 Horvath, “Hungary’s Democracy Assistance Policies and Priorities.” For example, Hungary’s 
declared priority countries kept changing throughout the 2000s.  
77 Ibid.  
78 Robert Ondrejcsak, “Security Policies of the Slovak Republic and Hungary – the ‘Limited 
Differentiation’ in Central Europe,” International Issues & Slovak Foreign Policy Affairs 15, no. 3–4 
(2006): 76–90. 
79 “Hungary is well aware of the limitations of her size, economic and political power, if compared 
either to the Eastern Partnership region or to the EU in general.” As a result, Moldova is the only 
country in the Eastern Partnership region, where Hungary ambitions a real policy-making role and holds 
important individual EU-positions related to Moldova. However, the democracy promotion dimension 
of this interest is minor. Albrycht, The Eastern Partnership in the Context of the European 
Neighborhood Policy and V4 Agenda: 38. 
80 Jonavicius, “The Democracy Promotion Policies of Central and Eastern European States.” 
(Moreover, in 2008, Budapest opened an embassy in Minsk and tasked it with “promoting dialogue 
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3. The Balkans 
Slovenia, Bulgaria, and Romania are the least experienced democracy 
promoters in the region. In the 1990s, all three countries sought to integrate into the 
Euro-Atlantic institutions, and if Slovenia was among the applicant frontrunners, 
Sofia’s and Bucharest’s efforts were hindered by the slow pace of reforms in these 
countries. Still, all three countries have been slow to transition from being democracy 
promotion recipients to becoming donors supporting democratization abroad. 
Having emerged from crumbling Yugoslavia in 1991, Slovenia recognized that 
its national security and economic development depend, among other things, on the 
security, democratic development, and economic stability of its neighbors. However, 
Slovenian diplomacy has prioritized economic integration with Western Europe and 
similarly economic cooperation with the Western Balkans.82 Still, Ljubljana 
participated in the Stability Pact for South-East Europe, including its democratization 
component and supported the efforts of other regional frameworks such as CoE and 
OSCE to further political liberalization in southeastern Europe.83 Slovenia has also 
been one of the most active advocate of the Euro-Atlantic ambitions of the other 
countries in former Yugoslavia – Slovenia made EU enlargement towards the Western 
Balkans a centerpiece of its EU presidency in 2008 – and thus further indirectly 
supported the democratization of the region.84 
Much of the official foreign assistance Slovenia provided in the late 1990s and 
early 2000s, including a number of human right projects, was executed in the 
framework of the Stability Pact for South-East Europe. Slovenia has been rather slow 
to establish a development cooperation system – a development cooperation 
department was set up in 2004 but a strategy for its operation emerged only in 2006.85 
Slovenia has signed bilateral development cooperation agreements with a number of 
countries in the region: Serbia and Montenegro in 2003, Bosnia-Herzegovina and 
Macedonia in 2005, Moldova in 2007 and Albania in 2008, and Kosovo and Ukraine 
(still to be ratified).86 However such bilateral aid has prioritized strengthening trade 
and investment possibilities, international disputes conciliation, assisting conflict 
                                                                                                                                            
between the regime and civil society (and fostering economic cooperation between Belarus and 
Hungary).” Ibid., 11. 
81 Albrycht, The Eastern Partnership in the Context of the European Neighborhood Policy and V4 
Agenda. 
82 Jonavicius, “The Democracy Promotion Policies of Central and Eastern European States.” Slovenia 
has very modest (Moldova and Ukraine) and in some cases even non-existent (Belarus, Southern 
Caucusus, Central Asia) policies towards the former Soviet Union states.  
83 MFA website, http://www.mzz.gov.si/en/foreign_policy/human_rights/; and Stability Pact website, 
http://www.stabilitypact.org/loc-dem/default.asp. 
84 Open Society Institute, Not Your Grandfather’s Eastern Bloc: The EU New Member States as Agenda 
Setters in the Enlarged European Union: Comparative Policy Report (Prague: PASOS–Sofia, April 
2009). 
85 The National Assembly of the Republic of Slovenia adopted an International Development 
Cooperation Act only in 2006. European Parliament Committee on Development, The Challenge of the 
EU Development Cooperation Program for New Member States.  
86 MFA website, http://www.mzz.gov.si/si/zunanja_politika/ 
mednarodno_razvojno_sodelovanje_in_humanitarna_pomoc/dokumenti/  
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victims, energy cooperation, and migration; still, some aid has also been provided to 
assisting countries in drawing closer to Euro-Atlantic structures.87 
At the time of its democratic breakthrough in the mid-1990s, three of 
Romania’s five neighbors were democratization laggards and two of them in the 
midst of a frozen and a hot ethnic conflict. Romania has actively supported OCSE’s 
conflict resolution efforts as well as minority rights and election-monitoring missions 
in these and other countries in the Western Balkans, the Southern Caucusus, and even 
Central Asia. And especially since it negotiated its own NATO and the EU accession, 
Bucharest has also actively lobbied these organizations to open their doors to 
Bucharest’s three non-EU neighbors – Moldova, Serbia, and Ukraine and a traditional 
partner from the Black Sea region – Georgia. However, Bucharest has yet to put 
together programs with concrete measures to help bring these countries closer to 
Europe. 
The most important target of Romanian democracy promotion is perhaps 
Moldova.88 Although Bucharest-Chisinau relations were at times rather strained, by 
the mid-2000s the Romanian political elites had achieved a political consensus around 
the importance of building diplomatic relations with Moldova based on the Euro-
Atlantic integration of both countries. Romania has actively advocated for enhancing 
NATO’s Partnership with Moldova “with the purpose of supporting its democratic 
development and its European vocation.”89 Additionally, Romania (unsuccessfully) 
insisted on the inclusion of Moldova in the Western Balkan group of countries that 
were promised EU accession. Perhaps most successfully, Romania was also generally 
supportive of the pro-Western and pro-democratic forces, which in 2009 attempted to 
organize an electoral revolution and eventually gained power to push the country in a 
more democratic and pro-European direction.90 
Romania has also demonstrated some initiative at the EU level in shaping the 
Brussels’ broader eastern agenda. In 2006 Romania prepared an informal proposal 
(“non-paper”) for a special policy towards the Union’s immediate neighbors to the 
east. Bucharest was also active in subsequent discussion of what later became the 
Eastern Partnership and lobbied for the inclusion of the Southern Caucusus in it. 
Moreover, Bucharest although not active, has been supportive of the involvement of 
various European regional organizations in Belarus. And perhaps most impressively, 
Bucharest was an active founder of the Community of Democratic Choice – an 
organization of the countries between the Baltic, Black and Caspian Seas that are 
interested in promoting democracy, human rights, and the rule of law in that region. 
Just as Bucharest has been rather slow to develop specific bilateral democracy 
promotion programs, it has also taken a long time to begin providing democracy 
assistance. Romania is still setting up its development cooperation system but the 
concept developed for it by the government includes good governance among the 
                                                 
87 Ibid. 
88 Jonavicius, “The Democracy Promotion Policies of Central and Eastern European States.” 
89 MFA website, http://www.mae.ro/en/node/2110 
90 However, Bucharest’s involvement was complicated by the fact that in the midst of the crisis the 
Romanian government changed its citizenship requirements to allow foreigners who had ancestors who 
had Romanian citizenship (including most Moldovans) to gain Romanian citizenship. 
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country’s priorities. Bucharest also intends to support the EU aspirations – and thus 
the democratization – of countries such as Moldova, Ukraine, Serbia, and Georgia. 
For the moment, Bulgaria is perhaps least interested in democracy promotion. 
Support for democratization abroad has not been mentioned in Bulgaria’s foreign 
policy priorities and rarely comes up in the rhetoric of the country’s diplomats. 
Bulgaria is still setting up its development cooperation system but the concept 
developed for it by the government does not include democracy promotion (or 
activities that might fall under the rubric of democracy promotion) among the 
country’s priorities. In general, Bulgaria avoided being involved in the conflicts in the 
Western Balkans in the 1990s and has pursued the intensification of economic 
cooperation in this region as well as in the Black Sea area in the 2000s.91 Bulgaria has 
only indirectly supported the democratization of these two regions by actively 
participating in the Stability Pact for Southeastern Europe and later by supporting the 
EU integration of the countries in both areas but especially in the Western Balkans, 
“provided that they carry out the required reforms and not before they fully meet the 
criteria for membership.”92 Bulgaria has also supported the OSCE and Council of 
Europe democracy promotion efforts in both areas but more towards conflict 
prevention than towards their democratization.93 Bulgarian diplomacy believes that the 
country’s “traditional tolerant attitude towards the representatives of minority groups 
and the successes in their equal integration into society are the foundation of the 
Bulgarian national model of interethnic relations”; yet the country’s elites have done 
little to share this model abroad. 
                                                 
91 Stephane Lefebvre, “Bulgaria’s Foreign Relations in the Post-Communist Era: A General Overview 
and Assessment,” East European Quarterly 28, no .4 (1994): 453–61. 
92 MFA website, 
http://www.mfa.bg/en/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=8682&Itemid=451 
93 Sofia also claims to have been supportive of “further boosting the importance of the effective 
protection and promotion of human rights within the UN system” but has taken no initiative in this 
policy area. http://www.mfa.bg/en/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=7960&Itemid=386 
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APPENDIX 3: 
EXPLANATIONS OF POLISH DEMOCRACY PROMOTION BY POLISH 
POLITICAL ELITES IN OFFICIAL FOREIGN POLICY DOCUMENTS AND 
SPEECHES 
Strategic References: 
1. All Europe needs a democratic and stable Russia. 
Leszek Miller, Prime Minister of the Republic of Poland, address at the 
10th Poland-Germany Forum Warsaw, January 26, 2002. 
2. The leading idea of integration cannot be shutting oneself up either in an 
exclusive club or in a fortress. Everything that fosters openness and co-
operation is in Europe’s interest. The future Union even more than before 
should to promote democratic and economic changes in the states outside its 
institutions. 
Aleksander Kwasniewski, President of the Republic of Poland, “Vision of 
a United Europe in the 21st Century. The Polish Point of View,” lecture at 
the Accademia Nazionale dei Lincei, Rome, February 27, 2002. 
3. Even with all of the difficulties, we do not wish to leave out another one of our 
neighbors, Belarus. Poland is conducting something like a “critical dialogue” 
with that state – to use a term that was coined in Germany, although it applied 
to a different country. I believe that it is in the long-range interest of the Union 
community to overcome the isolation of Belarus in the European arena and 
thereby to stimulate the development of democracy and the civil society in that 
country. 
Aleksander Kwasniewski, President of the Republic of Poland, “Poland 
and Germany – Partners in United Europe,” lecture at the Friedrich Ebert 
Foundation, Berlin, March 6, 2002. 
4. I would like to make some observations now about the eastern policy of the 
European Union. Poland, due to its location, is particularly interested in 
making an input to that policy as a member state. Let me note here that Poland 
is developing good-neighborly relations with all its eastern neighbors. We have 
a rich experience in transforming the economic and political system, building a 
democratic state with a market economy, and adapting to the Union’s 
standards. We are willing to share that experience with states to the east of the 
enlarged EU, to facilitate their adaptation to being neighbors of the Union. We 
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wish to develop co-operation with the border states and regions of the enlarged 
European Union – Russia (Kaliningrad District and the north-western parts of 
the Russian Federation), with Ukraine and Belarus. 
Wlodzimierz Cimoszewicz, Foreign Minister of the Republic of Poland, 
“Poland on the Road to the European Union,” address to the Nobel 
Institute, Oslo, March 8, 2002. 
5. Poland, due to its location, is particularly interested in making an input to that 
policy [the eastern policy of the European Union] as a member state. [ . . . ] We 
have a rich experience in transforming the economic and political system, 
building a democratic state with a market economy, and adapting to the 
Union’s standards. [ . . . ] Special attention is due to development of relations 
with Ukraine – considering the geopolitical significance of that country for the 
stability and security of our region. 
Aleksander Kwasniewski, President of the Republic of Poland, address 
delivered during the opening of the conference “Strengthening Stability in 
Eastern Europe,” Warsaw, March 11, 2002. 
6. Central-Eastern Europe is an area of stability, mutual trust and predictability. 
Poland has a considerable share in this work. Thanks to our common 
accomplishments [“our victories of freedom and democracy”], all Europe has 
benefited – it is more stable and secure, it is better. Here, in our region of the 
continent, where conflicts once raged and many wars were waged, there now is 
a strong pillar of Europe’s success. This is also vital for the world order. 
Aleksander Kwasniewski, President of the Republic of Poland, address 
delivered during the opening of the conference “Strengthening Stability in 
Eastern Europe” Warsaw, March 11, 2002. 
7. Out of concern for ensuring the world peace and security, it is becoming ever 
more clearer that Europe needs to be united on the basis of respect for the 
cultural identity and spiritual heritage of each nation. Poland wishes to make 
its contribution not only to the creation of a common economic space on our 
continent but also to strengthening the values of democracy and solidarity in a 
united Europe. 
Aleksander Kwasniewski, President of the Republic of Poland, telegram of 
congratulations to Pope John Paul II on the occasion of his 82nd birthday, 
Warsaw, May 18, 2002. 
8. The United States and Poland share an interest in encouraging the aspirations 
of the people of Ukraine to prepare for a future in Europe. We agreed to work 
together to support Ukraine’s efforts to implement needed economic and 
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democratic reforms. Our two nations urge Belarus to join its neighbors in 
seeking a democratic and free market future. 
President George W. Bush and President Aleksander Kwasniewski, joint 
statement, Washington, DC, July 17, 2002. 
9. We are a democratic country, politically and economically stable. We are a 
country that shares its success and experience with others to make the whole 
Central, Eastern and Southern Europe the area of close cooperation and secure 
development. 
Aleksander Kwasniewski, President of the Republic of Poland, address 
delivered during the official welcoming ceremony, Washington, July 17, 
2002. 
10. We are convinced that Ukraine will maintain its significant role in the 
geopolitics of the 21st century; that not only geographical position, not only the 
size of its population, but the importance of tradition and the role that Ukraine 
could play in the future will make it an important participant of European 
processes today and in the future. We are convinced that Europe will look 
different with a democratic, developing Ukraine than if such a Ukraine were 
missing. We are convinced that precisely here the important battle is being 
waged for the future of a secure, democratic Europe of the 21st century based 
on these same values. 
Aleksander Kwasniewski, President of the Republic of Poland, address 
delivered during the opening of the conference “Ukraine in Europe,” 
Warsaw, October 15, 2002. 
11. In Poland’s interest is the development of Russia as a modern, democratic and 
law-abiding state with a healthy market economy, actively and constructively 
working together with other states in the international arena. Poland believes 
that the strengthening of ties between Russia and European institutions is a 
process that is beneficial for all of Europe. No one can dictate to Russia how it 
is supposed to carry out the transformation. But we are convinced that Russia’s 
“European choice” lies in the strategic interest of all of us. 
Marek Borowski, Diet Speaker of the Republic of Poland, “Poles and 
Russians in a Common Europe,” lecture delivered to students of Michael 
Lomonosov, Moscow University, December 9, 2002. 
12. Our relations with Belarus are guided by the principle of good-
neighbourliness. We fully share the premises that underpinned the restrictions 
of the European Union and the USA towards the members of the Byelorussia 
leadership. Our specific neighbourly contacts have called for a different 
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approach and it was understood properly. Our goal is to promote, despite 
obvious obstacles, Byelorussia independence, democracy, economic reforms 
and pro-European tendencies. [ . . . ]The fact that democracy is in short supply, 
the existence of persecutions, and the absence of respect for human rights, 
corruption and bad governance are a source of tensions and problems [in the 
world today]. 
Wlodzimierz Cimoszewicz, Foreign Minister of the Republic of Poland, 
“Information of the Government of the Republic of Poland,” on the subject 
of Polish foreign policy in 2003, Warsaw, January 22, 2003. 
13. I believe there is a logic to this policy [NATO enlargement], and there is a 
strategic goal behind it. It is, however, not to build a new international security 
institution. It is to support the domestic democratic transformation. [ . . . ] This 
quest for democracy is not an ideological crusade. NATO does not promote 
democracy just for the sake of doing it. We do it because it is a tested 
mechanism for ensuring lasting domestic stability, and – by extension – also 
international stability and peace. In simple words, democracies do not fight 
each other. They rather trade and co-operate with each other. 
Wlodzimierz Cimoszewicz, Foreign Minister of the Republic of Poland, 
remarks delivered during EAPC Session, II Panel, Madrid, June 4, 2003. 
14. It is in our interest to have as our neighbors countries which share our values, 
which are stable, democratic, well governed and prosperous, which are 
partners for the EU in solving common problems as well as problems of a 
broader nature. Therefore, we need a strong consensus in the Union over its 
future Eastern Policy. 
Wlodzimierz Cimoszewicz, Foreign Minister of the Republic of Poland, 
“The EU’s New Neighborhood: Strategies for an Eastern Policy for the 
Enlarged Union,” address at Think Tank Forum 2003, Konrad Adenauer 
Stiftung, July 1, 2003. 
15. The safest guarantee of peace is respect for the law in each country, a 
democratic structure of government, freedom of speech and conscience. What 
was very important for Poland was the fact that the United States and Western 
Europe never lost the conviction that the societies locked behind the Iron 
Curtain are able to build a democratic state of the rule of law. 
Aleksander Kwasniewski, President of the Republic of Poland, “How to 
Win the Peace in the Contemporary World,” lecture delivered to the Nobel 
Institute during his official visit to the Kingdom of Norway, Oslo, 
September 16, 2003. 
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16. Respect for democracy and human rights are important weapons in the fight 
against terrorism, because promotion of the rule of law, freedoms and 
democracy will deprive terrorism of its life-giving nature. 
Wlodzimierz Cimoszewicz, Foreign Minister of the Republic of Poland, 
address delivered during the Human Dimension Implementation Meeting 
of the OSCE, Warsaw, October 6, 2003. 
17. The main threats to peace in the world today are terrorism and aggressive 
dictatorships. 
Marek Borowski, Diet Speaker of the Republic of Poland, address 
delivered during the 1st Session of the Polish-Ukrainian Parliamentary 
Assembly, Kiev, October 13, 2003. 
18. On the road to democratisation and the building of a health free-market 
economy Poland gathered and it’s still gathering many valuable experiences, 
which it will willingly share with its neighbours. The development of friendly 
relations with Moldova will play an important role in the project of regional 
collaboration. We support the aspirations of your country to build a civil 
society, democratic institutions and stable state structures. 
Aleksander Kwasniewski, President of the Republic of Poland, address 
delivered during a sitting of the Parliament of the Republic of Moldova 
Chisinau, October 23, 2003. 
19. It is imperative for all of us to prevent the potential negative consequences that 
may result from the growing modernization gap between the EU and its eastern 
neighbors. [ . . . ] Poland – situated on the border of the European Union – 
would be the first to feel the impact of those negative consequences. Therefore, 
Poland believes that promoting the modernization of Eastern Europe on the 
basis of the EU standards of democracy, a market economy, the rule of law and 
social justice should remain a priority in the EU approach to that area. [ . . . ] 
We have no illusions about how far away we are at present from 
accomplishing this vision. The main source of our concerns today is the 
deepening deficit of democracy in the majority of our eastern neighbors. 
Wlodzimierz Cimoszewicz, Foreign Minister of the Republic of Poland, 
speech delivered to Institute of Political Science, Paris, April 22, 2004. 
20. Our states have a special role to play in the Union. On account of geographical 
position we can do a lot to develop the good-neighbor policy of the EU with 
states of our immediate surroundings. Poland and Portugal can bring them 
valuable help in developing stable democracies and strengthening the 
principles of a law-abiding state and mechanisms of a free-market economy. 
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Aleksander Kwasniewski, President of the Republic of Poland, toast 
delivered during the official dinner given in his honor by Mr. Jose Manuel 
Durao Barroso, Prime Minister of the Portuguese Republic, Lisbon, July 1, 
2004. 
21. [ . . . ] both NATO and the EU play an immensely important role in the 
building of stability and security in the world. Not only in the strictly formal 
sense, by creating military structures that offer mutual assistance and guarantee 
that no threat is ignored if it concerns the member states. The EU and NATO 
are above all factors of stability owing to their role of transferring institutions 
of the values that are the bases of security and stability. As long as NATO and 
the EU above all defend democracy, freedom, sovereignty of states, human 
rights, and require from their members tolerance for national minorities, 
observance of the rule of law and civilian control over the armed forces – each 
new member will extend the area of security and stability in Europe and the 
world. That is why the decision on enlarging the EU by another 10 states was 
so important. 
Aleksander Kwasniewski, President of the Republic of Poland, address 
delivered at the meeting of the 14th Economic Forum, Krynica, September 
9, 2004. 
22. Helplessness in view of the authoritarian system in Belarus. All those who 
would like to see Belarus as a democratic, stable state are disappointed and 
deeply concerned about the situation in that country. [ . . . ]We resort to the 
instruments of influence that are legally accessible and sometimes, we have to 
admit, we fail to reach fundamental, final goals, at least in the desired period of 
time. Nevertheless we maintain our ability to cooperate with these authorities 
as far as it is required from the point of view of economic and neighborly 
interests as well as the interests of scores of thousands of Poles living in 
Belarus. 
Wlodzmierz Cimoszewicz, Foreign Minister of the Republic of Poland, 
statement in connection with Sejm debate on no-confidence vote on 
October 13, 2004. 
23. Poland may enormously benefit from its EU entry. This relates not only to 
economic and financial issues, structural funds, it also relates to out political 
position. Poland as the European Union member could incomparably more 
actively and more effectively act for the sake of Ukrainian democracy than it 
could being out of the European Union. Poland can be today a factor of 
stability export, the agreement of the whole Central and Eastern Europe, 
because it is a European Union member, and at the same time shows some 
extraordinary abilities and knowledge in this sphere. 
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Aleksander Kwasniewski, President of the Republic of Poland, address at a 
conference inaugurating the “National Development Plan 2007–2013” 
consultations, Warsaw, January 20, 2005. 
24. As a full EU member Poland is actively involved in co-shaping the Union’s 
image. We feel co-responsible for the EU’s fate in coming years and believe 
that all initiatives designed to spread fundamental and just European values 
like democracy and respect for human rights enhance the building of a brighter 
common future. It was in this belief that we decided to mediate during the 
recent social and political tension in Ukraine. 
Longin Pastusiak, Senate Speaker, address delivered at a New Year 
meeting with the Diplomatic Corps, Warsaw, January 25, 2005. 
25. I am also convinced that the EU further enlargement to include new countries, 
but mainly Ukraine the European and Christian nature of which cannot be 
questioned, can enrich Europe not only with a significant country, with 50 
million people and with an important geographical position but that it can also 
broaden the zone of stability, cooperation of the same democratic standards 
further to the East. I do not have to explain to anyone here that this lies in the 
interest of Poland and central Europe. The point is to prove this to our partners 
in the West. 
Aleksander Kwasniewski, President of the Republic of Poland, statement 
delivered at the Annual Debate of Polish Ambassadors, Warsaw, June 27, 
2005. 
26. Poland is the only state in Europe to have changed all her neighbors in results 
of political changes. The GDR ceased to exist, Czechoslovakia broke up into 
two independent states and several of them appeared in the East when the 
Soviet Union disintegrated. Regaining her sovereignty Poland was able to 
reach agreement with all neighbors in a spirit of reconciliation and 
partnership, although the history of our mutual relations was often dominated 
more by rivalry and conflict rather than co-operation and peace. [ . . . ] The 
Polish experience of the last dozen-or-so years leads to the crucial conclusion: 
we must not forget about our neighbors. We must be loyal to them and support 
them in times of change and transition. From the very beginning they should 
be involved in partnership-based co-operation, stimulated to undertake 
essential reforms and transformation and supported on this difficult track. 
Above all however – we must have confidence in them and believe in a 
common future in united Europe. And if one can hear questions being asked 
today as to what we, the Poles can contribute to the EU’s Eastern policy, we 
can answer: the trust that our Eastern partners have in us, the experience in co-
operation and the knowledge and understanding of changes going on in these 
countries. One of the greatest challenges facing the enlarged European Union 
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and NATO is building friendly neighborly relations with Russia. The question 
about relations between the Union, Poland included, and Russia is to a 
significant extent a question to Russia itself – what is its vision of the future, 
how Russia defines her place in the future world. Does it intend to follow the 
path of partnership and co-operation with countries of the Western hemisphere 
or will she attempt to create some sort of imperial policy. The Kremlin’s 
approach to events in Georgia and the Ukraine or with respect to Belarus 
shows that Russia may strive to rebuild and strengthen her influence in 
countries arisen after the disintegration of the USSR. This is why a good co-
operation of America, the European Union and the Russian Federation is so 
much needed. It is necessary to support those forces in Moscow, which aspire 
to modernize and democratize the state, to build a civic society and 
partnership-based relations with neighbors. 
Aleksander Kwasniewski, President of the Republic of Poland, lecture 
delivered at the Aspen Institute, Washington, DC, September 14, 2005. 
27. Poland is vitally interested in stability beyond our eastern frontiers. From our 
own experience we know that stability is ensured above all by democracy and 
a free market. We shall therefore continue to support our eastern partners and 
societies in the job of reform, in the building of a democratic and law-abiding 
state and a citizens’ society. 
Aleksander Kwasniewski, President of the Republic of Poland, address 
delivered to the inaugural sitting of the newly elected Sejm, Warsaw, 
October 19, 2005. 
28. I believe that Russia is an important participant in the regional cooperation. It 
is in the interest of Europe, the Baltic Sea region and Russia to clear up all 
question marks and doubts concerning democracy development in Russia. 
[ . . . ] We are watching the development of situation in Belarus with real 
worry. The existence in our direct neighborhood of a political regime, broadly 
considered to be dictatorship, poses a threat for the stability of the region and a 
challenge for democratic community. 
Kazimierz Marcinkiewicz, Prime Minister of the Republic of Poland, 
statement delivered during a plenary meeting of prime ministers of the 
Council of Baltic Sea States, Reykjavik, June 8, 2006. 
29. We would like to have the best relations with our eastern neighbors. We keep 
supporting democratic movements but we do not want that support to clash 
with our efforts to improve our relations. But let me assure you that there is no 
other area where hastiness, and sometimes even hysteria, is as damaging as 
here. 
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Jaroslaw Kaczynski, Prime Minister of the Republic of Poland, remarks 
delivered to Sejm expose, Warsaw, July 19, 2006. 
30. Democracy can only develop in a favorable international environment, 
otherwise it will be destroyed, as the Polish historical experience shows. This 
is why after the year 1989, when Poland rebuilt the foundations of its 
democratic statehood, it also became a propagator of democratic development 
in the international arena. Poland decided that support for democracy on an 
international scale was important for the security of its own democratic 
development. 
Bogdan Borusewicz, Senate Speaker, address at the conference “Promotion 
of Democracy: Stronger Role for Parliamentary Diplomacy,” during his 
visit to Georgia, November 30–December 1, 2006. 
31. That which the Piasts’ lacked several centuries ago – integration with the main 
current of European civilization – we have accomplished today in the blink of 
an eye. No one gave this to us. We alone, though with the help of our friends, 
achieved this. Having done so, Poland, just as 600 years ago, has become the 
standard and model of transformation for our Eastern neighbors, in particular 
for the kindred nation of Ukraine. Then, in the Jagiellonian era, the Republic 
spread examples of noble liberty and tolerance, become the cohesive force that 
over subsequent centuries kept together the multiethnic mosaic of elites in our 
region. It is for this reason that we believe that the mandate of the Lublin 
Union will be fulfilled only when our Eastern European brothers find 
themselves within the European Union. This is not an old-new messianism, but 
a practical observation that strengthening liberty and democracy in our region 
also serves the interests of our Republic. 
Radoslaw Sikorski, Foreign Minister of the Republic of Poland, address 
delivered to the Sejm, Warsaw, May 7, 2008. 
Combined Strategic and Normative References: 
1. Poland strongly supports Slovakia’s bid for membership in NATO. It is not 
only affection for a neighbor but also a matter of common interests. For us in 
Poland, it is important that the zone of stability and security in Europe in the 
region of Central Europe be expanded. It is extremely important for the gains 
of freedom and democracy to be strengthened. 
Aleksander Kwasniewski, President of the Republic of Poland, address 
delivered at Komensky University, Bratislava, April 26, 2002. 
2. We also have similar painful experiences from the recent past, which to this 
day arouse many controversies and disputes. Our countries went through a 
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period when our people were not able to enjoy full liberty, when many of our 
citizens were persecuted. That time taught Poles great respect for democratic 
values and human rights that are inseparably connected with them. For us they 
are a universal and supreme value. We are aware that only the observation of 
these values can ensure the harmonious development of nations and a bright 
future for the world. 
Aleksander Kwasniewski, President of the Republic of Poland, address 
delivered before a joint session of the Parliament of Chile, Valparaiso, 
April 11, 2002. 
3. It is also in our interest and in the interest of all Europe that after our entry 
into the European Union the eastern border of our countries would not become 
for decades a line dividing our continent. [ . . . ] Our region – and this is the 
great responsibility of Poland and Slovakia – cannot permit the Union to turn 
its back on those partners in the east who will not be members of the Union. To 
prevent this from happening we must strengthen democratic processes, 
economic reforms and advances in civilization that are taking place in the 
countries of our eastern neighbors. Contacts must be developed, dialogue 
strengthened, and co-operation promoted. Just as for all of the post-war 
decades we counted on the solidarity of the western societies, so now we have 
moral obligations to the countries of Eastern Europe with whom we shared a 
common fate. 
Aleksander Kwasniewski, President of the Republic of Poland, address 
delivered at Komensky University, Bratislava, April 26, 2002. 
4. Poland’s engagement has recently reached far away. Being convinced that 
international security was at stake, that this was about combating evil, about 
regaining freedom and establishing justice in place of a bloody dictatorship – 
Poland took part in the military action in Iraq. Now we want to contribute to 
stabilization of the country, to appointment of democratic authorities by the 
Iraqi people, to reconstruction and economic development. 
Aleksander Kwasniewski, President of the Republic of Poland, address 
delivered at the III Forum of the Foreign Policy with the attendance of the 
President of Ireland, Mary McAleese, Warsaw, June 3, 2003. 
5. It lies in our common interest to strengthen the zones of stability, democracy 
and rule of law in the East. Poland has special obligations to its neighbours. It 
also pins special hopes on them. In formulating these obligations and hopes we 
are guided by the principle of solidarity, for we share a similar and often the 
same fate. 
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Leszek Miller, Prime Minister of the Republic of Poland, address delivered 
during the plenary session “Enlargement of the European Union: First or 
Last Stage of Integration?,” during the XIII Economic Forum, Krynica, 
September 6, 2003. 
6. Credit for the triumph of democracy in Ukraine reached by peaceful means 
should be given to millions of Ukrainians. It is also our, Polish success. 
Mediation of President Aleksander Kwasniewski and the fact that we managed 
to gain for the cause representatives of the European Union, the involvement of 
a number of Polish politicians, operations of Polish parliamentarians acting 
above all party divisions, engagement of Polish members of the European 
Parliament and thousands of young observers of the elections – all these 
actions contributed to the successful solution of the crisis and are a serious 
investment in the future. Mass solidarity of Poles with the democratic Ukraine 
is a good springboard for a breakthrough in relations between our societies. 
Relations at the level of presidents are important but the future of our nations 
will be decided by the nations. In those weeks and months Ukrainian and Poles 
gave a proof of political maturity and a proper comprehension of the reason of 
state. [ . . . ] The state of affairs in Belarus arouses understandable concern in 
Poland as we share a common border. We support democratic and Europe-
oriented aspirations of that country. Jointly with our European and cross-
Atlantic partners we try to shape the western policy in such a way so as to 
provide full support for democratic and freedom-oriented movements in 
Belarus. 
Adam Daniel Rotfeld, Foreign Minister of the Republic of Poland, 
presenting a government report on Poland’s foreign policy at a Sejm 
meeting, Warsaw, January 21, 2005. 
7. We are concerned with the situation in Belarus and this can be well-
understood. We have not only a common border but also ties of historic, 
cultural and inter-human nature. We support democratic and Europe-oriented 
aspirations of the considerable part of the Ukrainian society. However they 
have been brutally thwarted by the regime of Aleksandr Lukaszenko, who 
readily abuses the authority resorting to different type of pressures and 
repressions. It is our intention to persuade the Belarussian authorities to respect 
the rules of the law. Jointly with our European and cross-Altantic partners we 
try to co-create the Western policy in such a way so that democratic forces and 
freedom-oriented tendencies in Belarus could meet with understanding, 
solidarity and support. We deeply believe that future belongs to them. 
Adam Daniel Rotfeld, Foreign Minister of the Republic of Poland, “Polish 
Foreign Policy in View of New Threats and Challenges,” address to the 
Conference of Ambassadors, Warsaw, June 27, 2005. 
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8. The United Nations today is facing an unprecedented challenge to provide the 
humanity with a new hope to build the 21st century’s civilization on a solid 
foundation of universal values: freedom, security, democracy and solidarity. 
[ . . . ] The principle of solidarity remains inextricably linked to that of 
freedom. For many, freedom is still an unfulfilled dream. On different 
continents, people are deprived of their basic rights. [ . . . ] I hope that recently 
established Democracy Fund, which Poland supports and is ready to contribute 
to it, would offer a genuine assistance for those who uphold and aspire for 
freedom and solidarity. [ . . . ] We cannot build a secure and just world without 
a strong commitment to act together through the United Nations. Freedom, 
security, democracy, and solidarity must be the key guidelines that will lead 
the Organization in the 21st century. 
Aleksander Kwasniewski, President of the Republic of Poland, speech 
summing up the debates of the 2nd round table of the High Level Meeting 
at the United Nations, New York, September 16, 2005. 
Normative References: 
1. We sympathize with all of the countries of Eastern Europe that are taking up 
the challenge of transformations. 
Aleksander Kwasniewski, President of the Republic of Poland, during a 
meeting with the Diplomatic Corps, Warsaw, January 9, 2002. 
2. The democratic form of government and observance of the highest standards of 
human rights is a norm in Europe. [ . . . ] Therefore, democratic countries are 
duty-bound not only to observe the principles of democracy and human rights 
at home, but also to propagate them elsewhere. For obvious historical and 
geographical reasons, in Poland we attach particular importance to the 
development of relations with our Eastern neighbors. I have in mind at this 
point first of all Ukraine, where democracy is not yet firmly established, and 
Belarus, which will need much more time and effort to achieve democracy. 
Poland is also making every effort to develop the best possible political and 
economic relations with Russia. I am confident that following our accession to 
the EU, and with the Union’s full backing, we shall be even more successful in 
this field of endeavor. 
Wlodzimierz Cimoszewicz, Foreign Minister of the Republic of Poland, 
address, Copenhagen, February 1, 2002. 
3. A new international order is taking shape before our eyes, one that renders 
obsolete the hitherto prevailing doctrine of spheres of influence and paves the 
way towards a new security system rooted in the “open door” philosophy. We 
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are striving to build a system based on adherence to a shared set of values: 
freedom, democracy, human rights and the rule of law. 
Aleksander Kwasniewski, President of the Republic of Poland, address 
delivered during the deliberations of the VI Stockholm Conference on 
Security and Co-operation in the Baltic Region, Stockholm, April 24, 2002. 
4. Poland is especially pleased that seven new countries have been invited to join 
the Alliance. We shared a common fate behind the Iron Curtain. Together we 
dreamed of freedom. Together we spoke up for it and entered onto the road of 
independence, democracy and the rule of law. The North Atlantic Alliance in 
the most fundamental sense is a community of values. That is why when 
Poland entered NATO, I said: “We are returning to where our place is.” We 
think the same of the aspirations of the Baltic peoples and the other nations of 
Central and Eastern Europe. Poland always has been in favour of NATO’s 
“open door” policy and the enlargement of the zone of common security in 
Europe and the complete healing of the wounds after the disgraceful 
Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact and the post-Yalta divisions. We have supported you 
in solidarity and have shared our experiences with you. 
Aleksander Kwasniewski, President of the Republic of Poland, address 
delivered during the ceremonies connected with invitation of the Baltic 
countries to NATO, Vilnius, November 23, 2002. 
5. In our view, the future international order should not be defined by the number 
of poles. The concept of multipolarity, sometimes used in other European 
capitals to criticize the U.S, is not appealing. It brings back the memories of 
spheres of influences or zones of domination. For us, the new order should be 
based on solid values and principles, including democracy, human rights, 
democratic governance, and social justice. 
Wlodzimierz Cimoszewicz, Ph.D., Minister of Foreign Affairs of the 
Republic of Poland, “The EU Enlargement and the Polish-American 
Special Relationship,” presentation at the School of International and 
Public Affairs, Columbia University, New York, September 22, 2004. 
6. every capital of Central and Eastern Europe which went along the road of 
transformations over the recent years should be asked if we still want and 
know how to show solidarity. Poland and I myself have taken upon ourselves a 
mission of goodwill. [ . . . ] We are taking part in the mediations because of on 
e reason. Ukrainians should be given the opportunity to decide their own 
affairs in a free, honest and transparent way during the elections. And this is it. 
[ . . . ] We cannot be indifferent to situations in which democratic rules and 
human rights are broken anywhere, and also behind our eastern border. 
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Aleksander Kwasniewski, President of the Republic of Poland, address 
delivered during a working visit to Poland by President of the Republic of 
Austria Heinz Fisher, Warsaw, December 10, 2004. 
7. The development of local democracy and trans-border co-operation – is of very 
special importance for Poland. We should be all aware that effective trans-
border cooperation and developed local democracy are the main factors 
strengthening European unity based on democracy, human rights and the rule 
of law at the lowest – local level. Poland has gathered a rich experience in this 
field that can be shared with other partners, especially with these with the 
ongoing process of political transformation. 
Adam D. Rotfeld, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Poland, 
address delivered during the Parliamentary Assembly Session in 
Strasbourg, April 28, 2005. 
8. As it was mentioned in many speeches during this Summit, we are especially 
concerned about the situation in Belarus. Notorious violations of all the basic 
democratic principles and human rights in Belarus are unacceptable. The 
Belarusian people have for centuries been part of European civilization, 
making an important contribution to it in cultural terms, and they fully deserve 
to live in freedom, democracy and justice. We are looking forward to the 
moment when Belarus will join the family of Council of Europe Member 
States, so that we may work together to translate the European values into 
practice. 
Aleksander Kwasniewski, President of the Republic of Poland, address 
delivered at the concluding session of the Third Summit of the Council of 
Europe, Warsaw, May 17, 2005. 
9. The freedom awaited for so long has come at last. We have been enjoying it in 
Poland and passing the test for 16 years now. Here in Ukraine the voice calling 
for freedom of the nation and dignity of people, for truth and democracy came 
from the Maydan last November and December. And Poland heard the call 
from Ukraine. At the request of both sides of the conflict, we initiated, together 
with European mediators, a ‘roundtable’ meeting during which the crisis was 
settled by political means. Ukraine has made its own sovereign decisions. We 
welcome your success and we are very proud of it. The road you have chosen 
is not an easy one. But we want to assure you that you are not alone. Poland 
wants to be with you and will be with you and your strivings. And we believe 
there will come a moment when we welcome you in the family of European 
Union nations! 
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Aleksander Kwasniewski, President of the Republic of Poland, statement 
delivered during a gala opening of the Polish pre-war military cemetery in 
Lvov, June 24, 2005. 
10. We give much attention to the developments to the east of our borders. We are 
in solidarity with the efforts the Ukrainian civic society that awoke during the 
days of the ‘Orange Revolution’ and wants to see Ukraine in the family of 
democratic states that share European standards and values. 
Marek Belka, Prime Minister of the Republic of Poland, address broadcast 
on television, October 18, 2005. 
11. On the way to the implementation of the foreign policy agenda 2006-2010 and 
beyond we should not forget about our most like-minded international 
partners. Cooperation in the area of democracy promotion should remain one 
of the most vital pillars of the transatlantic dialogue. US and Europe should 
continue spreading their common values, like: democracy, human rights, 
market economy. 
Anna Fotyga, Foreign Minister of the Republic of Poland, address 
delivered at the session “EU Foreign Policy Agenda 2006–2010,” Warsaw, 
May 19, 2006. 
12. The Polish Nation view the achievements of the American People with 
profound respect. We appreciate and share their love of peace, freedom and 
democracy. Our participation in stability operations world-wide serves as a 
means to defend those very values and ideals, and in this regard we continue to 
be an active ally of the United States of America. 
Lech Kaczynski, President of the Republic of Poland, message of 




EXPLANATIONS OF SLOVAK DEMOCRACY PROMOTION BY SLOVAK 
POLITICAL ELITES IN OFFICIAL FOREIGN POLICY DOCUMENTS AND 
SPEECHES 
Strategic References: 
1. Slovakia will continue to develop good and fair neighborly relations with 
Ukraine, which is an important element of the European security architecture. 
Slovakia will support Ukraine’s efforts to gradually integrate into the group of 
democratic and market-oriented European states, including regional and sub-
regional organizations, in particular CEFTA 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Slovak Republic, Orientation of the 
Slovak Republic’s Foreign Policy for 2000 (Bratislava, 1999). 
2. Bitter lessons of conflicts in the Balkans, Caucasus and in Central Asia have 
more than ever manifested that security is closely connected with regional 
stability and trust. [ . . . ] Democracy, fair treatment of minorities and good 
neighborly relations are important prerequisites for the stability of any region. 
When one element of this triangle is missing, the security of a region is 
vulnerable. Isolated, authoritarian, and xenophobic regimes have a large 
potential of projecting instability to the whole region. [ . . . ] Continuation of the 
Alliance’s enlargement policy has to be regarded also as a process of widening 
of the zone of stability and establishing reinforced relations between new 
democracies. 
Eduard Kukan, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Slovak Republic, 
intervention at NATO HQ Meeting of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership 
Council, December 15, 2000. 
3. Our relations to our neighbors are of tremendous importance of our foreign 
policy. [ . . . ] the value of our house would increase with the value of the house 
of our neighbors. This – and also for pragmatic reasons – is why we are 
extremely interested in outstanding and even better and better neighborhood 
relations. From the European participation viewpoint there are two dominating 
vectors present where Slovakia wants to contribute and will contribute – first of 
all it is the Western Balkans and Ukraine. [ . . . ]Russia is a vital and key element 
of stability in Europe, but also in a wider, more global scale. This is why we will 
contribute to democratic development of Russia, with plurality and still 
strengthening civic society. 
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Mikulas Dzurinda, “Presentation of the Prime Minister of the Slovak 
Republic,” in Slovak Institute for International Studies, Yearbook of 
Foreign Policy of the Slovak Republic 2003 (Bratislava, 2004, n.p.). 
4. Ukraine is not only a neighbor of the Slovak Republic, but it also became a 
neighbor of the European Union. [ . . . ] We do care very much about democratic 
and perspective development of Ukraine, about its direction to a community on a 
similar journey as did we in Slovakia. Russia is a vital and one of the key 
elements of stability in Europe, but also in a wider, more global scale. This is 
why we will contribute to democratic development of Russia, with plurality and 
still strengthening civic society. 
Mikulas Dzurinda, “Presentation of the Prime Minister of the Slovak 
Republic,” in Slovak Institute for International Studies, Yearbook of 
Foreign Policy of the Slovak Republic 2003 (Bratislava, 2004, n.p.). 
5. Slovak Republic will continue to develop good neighborly and fair relations 
with Ukraine. In this context, the Slovak Republic will actively promote concrete 
steps aimed at Ukraine’s gradual integration into the community of democratic 
and market-oriented European countries, including regional and subregional 
organizations. 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Slovak Republic, Focus of the Foreign 
Policy of the Slovak Republic for 2003 (Bratislava, 2002). 
6. The Slovak Republic has a particular experience that traditional donors don’t 
have. This experience is rooted in the transformation process after 1989. 
Slovakia underwent changes in all sectors of society (politics, economy, social 
sphere, etc.) The transfer of this experience to countries currently undergoing 
their own transformations will consolidate the political and economic ties of 
Slovakia with these countries. 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Slovak Republic, Medium-Term Strategy 
for Official Development Assistance: 2003–2008 (Bratislava, 2003). 
7. Due to its enlargement, the EU became a neighbor of regions that are potentially 
unstable. We do not wish for their isolation. On the contrary, we chose the 
Balkans and Ukraine as the priority regions of Slovak foreign policy. Our 
contribution was and remains the sharing of our experience on the way to 
stability and democracy and through the help of our non-governmental 
organizations. 
Eduard Kukan, “Presentation of the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the 
Slovak Republic,” in Slovak Institute for International Studies, Yearbook of 
Foreign Policy of the Slovak Republic 2004 (Bratislava, 2005), 87–93. 
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8. Slovakia has a long-standing interest in a stable and balanced democratic 
development in Ukraine, which belongs to the permanent priorities of Slovak 
foreign policy. Through the development of intensive cooperation in various 
areas, Slovakia has supported the efforts of Ukraine to gradually move towards 
Euro-Atlantic structures. 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Slovak Republic, Report on the 
Performance of the Foreign Policy of the Slovak Republic in 2004 
(Bratislava, 2005). 
9. Unresolved conflicts beyond the boundaries of the enlarged European Union 
continue to be accompanied by organized crime, illegal migration, terrorism, and 
the ever-present risk of proliferation of the weapons of mass destruction. These 
phenomena represent long-term threats to the stability and prosperity of 
Slovakia. These threats result from social and economic underdevelopment of 
certain states, from the deficits of human rights and democratic principles, and 
from persistent ethnic and religious intolerance. Comprehensive resolutions must 
therefore be focused also on preventive elimination of their causes, not only 
towards fighting individual negative phenomena. [ . . . ] The strategic objective 
of foreign policy of the Slovak Republic is the development of the country 
within a stable and predictable international environment. The Slovak Republic 
will promote the expansion of the area of freedom, stability, peace and prosperity 
in Europe and elsewhere in the world. 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Slovak Republic, Medium-Term Foreign 
Policy Strategy of the Slovak Republic until 2015 (Bratislava, 2004). 
10. The Commonwealth of Independent States is, due to specific historical and social 
reasons, in the natural sphere of interest of Slovakia’s foreign policy. Slovakia’s 
relations with the Commonwealth also affect Slovakia’s strategic interest in 
stability in that space, which has a direct impact on the safety of the Slovak 
Republic. Finally, the Commonwealth area is strategically important one for 
Slovakia, given the link between the energy needs of Slovakia and the energy 
supply by the Commonwealth countries. [ . . . ] Slovakia will pay particular 
attention to the development of democracy, human rights, rule of law, and the 
building of civil society [in the Commonwealth]. [ . . . ] Slovakia has the 
ambition to be an active participant in promoting democratic reforms and 
economic transformation in Russia. Support for strengthening the security and 
stability in Central and Eastern Europe remains one of the primary objectives of 
the Slovak security and defense policy and the political developments in Russia 
is a key factor in this regard. 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Slovak Republic, Focus of the Foreign 
Policy of the Slovak Republic for 2005 (Bratislava, 2004). 
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12. Ukraine is also high on the list of the Slovak foreign policy priorities. We are 
convinced that this country deserves a clear Euro-Atlantic perspective. 
Democracy and stability in the immediate neighborhood of the EU is in the best 
interest of all of us. 
Magdalena Vasaryova, “Lessons Learned from Building a Civil Society in 
Slovakia – Spreading Democracy and Stability in Central and Eastern 
Europe,” Round Table at the School of Slavonic and East European 
Studies, London, November 9, 2005. 
13. Vital Interests of the Slovak Republic: [ . . . ] preservation of peace and stability 
in Central Europe, linked with the expansion of the zone of democracy, security 
and prosperity, including full membership of the Slovak Republic in the North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization and in the European Union. 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Slovak Republic, Security Strategy of the 
Slovak Republic (Bratislava, 2005). 
14. Slovakia will continue to develop good neighborly and fair relations with 
Ukraine, which it considers an integral part of the security architecture of 
Europe. In this context, Slovakia will actively promote concrete steps aimed at 
Ukraine’s gradual integration into the community of democratic and market-
oriented European countries, including regional, subregional and global 
organizations (WTO) and Ukraine closer to NATO and the EU. 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Slovak Republic, Focus of the Foreign 
Policy of the Slovak Republic for 2006 (Bratislava, 2005). 
15. Slovak Republic will act as a trusted partner who delivers on its commitments in 
relation to its allies, partners, and international organizations and will contribute 
the consolidation of world peace, developing democracy and protecting human 
rights. 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Slovak Republic, Focus of the Foreign 
Policy of the Slovak Republic for 2006 (Bratislava, 2005). 
16. In the past year, the Western Balkans and Eastern Europe remained foreign 
policy priorities of the Slovak Republic for bilateral and multilateral diplamacy. 
Historical ties those regions of Europe, the existence of Slovakian diasporas in 
these countries, and the strong effects of developments in these regions on the 
stability and security in the whole continent compel us to assist the 
transformation processes in the relevant countries and the development of 
democracy, rule of law, market economy and civil society, which are 
prerequisites for the Euro-Atlantic intergration prospects of these countries. 
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Slovakia’s transition experience is our value added to the international efforts to 
achieve the above objectives. 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Slovak Republic, Report on the Foreign 
Policy Activities of the Slovak Republic in 2006 (Bratislava, 2007). 
17. The stability and prosperity of the European continent depend significantly on 
the situation in Eastern Europe. Slovakia is a direct neighbor of this region and 
therefore Bratislava will continue to actively participate in the shaping of the 
“Eastern” policy of the European Union and the North Atlantic Alliance. [ . . . ] 
Slovakia will continue to support further enlargement of the EU because it 
significantly contributes to the extension of the zone of democracy, stability and 
prosperity in Europe. Slovakia is interested in developing a stable and prospering 
neighborhood, and therefore Slovakia will support the EU steps aimed at 
fostering relations with the countries of the European Neighborhood Policy and 
Russia as a strategic partner of the European Union. [ . . . ] Slovakia is ready to 
share its experience gained from the reform and transformation processes with 
the countries in the ENP framework. With respect to Ukraine as a neighboring 
country, the main objective of Slovakia will be supporting the development of 
the country, its democratic institutions, and the development of a good 
neighborhood. The European and Euroatlantic orientation of Ukraine and the 
pro-integration direction of Ukrainian foreign policy are in the strategic interest 
of Slovakia. [ . . . ] Slovakia will continue to support the democratic forces in 
Belarus in their struggle for human and political rights. [ . . . ] The significant 
impact of the situation in the Western Balkans on the stability and development 
in Central Europe and the historic links make this region a priority of Slovakia’s 
foreign policy. [ . . . ] Slovakia is ready to continue its contribution to the 
recovery of stability and regional security in the Western Balkans and the future 
prosperity of this region within European and Euroatlantic structures. In order to 
achieve these goals, Slovakia will further promote continuing the integration 
process of the countries of the region into the EU [ . . . and] will also support 
Euroatlantic ambitions of the Western Balkans and maintaining the principle of 
NATO open door policy. 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Slovak Republic, The Background and 
Main Goals of Slovak Republic’s Foreign Policy in 2007: Slovakia’s 
Foreign Policy Orientation for 2007 (Bratislava, 2006). 
18. The South Caucasus are an exceptionally politically unstable region where 
territorial disputes affect the political and social life of each country. [ . . . ] It is 
necessary to develop the EU’s efforts to improve the security situation, human 
rights and democracy [in the South Caucasus]. 
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Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Slovak Republic, The Background and 
Main Goals of Slovak Republic’s Foreign Policy in 2007: Slovakia’s 
Foreign Policy Orientation for 2007 (Bratislava, 2006). 
19. In the long run, it is in the interest of the Slovak Republic to support democratic 
forces and associations in the Republic of Belarus, which seek to change 
conditions in the country; to contribute to the efforts of the international 
community to support democratic development, economic transformation to a 
market economy and stabilization of the Republic of Belarus and its integration 
into European and global cooperation; to support the efforts and steps that lead 
to the democratization of the Belarusian society in all spheres of social life. 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Slovak Republic, Annual Report: 
Foreign Policy in 2007 (Bratislava, 2008). 
20. The Slovak Republic and its citizens are an integral part of the democratic world 
by their own decision. It is in their vital interest that this world will not only be 
secure, but that the zone of democracy and security will continue to spread with 
a perspective of sustainable development. 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Slovak Republic, Annual Report: 
Foreign Policy in 2007 (Bratislava, 2008). 
21. In their dialogue with various Council of Europe representatives, Slovak 
diplomats strive to support activities, aimed at supporting the expansion of the 
area of the secure and democratic world, especially in the regions of 
geographical and political priority to us. 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Slovak Republic, Focus of the Foreign 
Policy of the Slovak Republic for 2008 (Bratislava, 2007). 
22. These [“fundamental and long-term threats to the stability and prosperity of 
Slovakia”] threats result from the social and economic underdevelopment of 
certain states, deficits of human rights and democratic principles, as well as from 
persistent ethnic and religious intolerance. 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Slovak Republic, Medium-Term Foreign 
Policy Strategy of the Slovak Republic until 2015 (Bratislava, 2008). 
23. One of the Slovak official development assistance goals is: Ensuring global 
peace and security, in particular by enhancing democracy, the rules of law, 
human rights and good governance in developing countries. 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Slovak Republic, Medium-Term Strategy 
for Official Development Assistance: 2009–2013 (Bratislava, 2008). 
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Combined Strategic and Normative References: 
1. [ . . . ] the geopolitical position of Ukraine, situated along the North-South and 
East-West axes, its geographical size and the number of inhabitants, its key 
importance for the region, as well as shared values and common interests that are 
important for enhancing peace, stability and prosperity in Europe. Ukraine has 
special significance for the Slovak Republic. It is its largest neighbor that has 
traditional social, economic and cultural ties with Slovakia, including similarities 
of languages and religions, and reciprocal presence of minorities. [ . . . ] Slovakia 
supports the efforts at building a democratic, economically strong and stable 
Ukraine and its integration into the European structures. Independence and 
sovereignty of Ukraine is an important security factor for the Slovak Republic as 
well. 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Slovak Republic, Slovakia’s Key Goals 
and Interests as Regards to Ukraine (Bratislava, 2001). 
2. Europe that was for centuries tossed around by wars and social unrest is now a 
place of peace, stability and prosperity. The Western Balkans is our common 
task in the nearest future. [ . . . ] We are a part of today’s world, so to hide in 
isolation and false neutrality under a mask of stability, security and prosperity of 
current Europe would be irresponsible and shortsighted. Responsible foreign 
policy always looks to future, anticipates possible development and tries to find 
answers. Integration is such an answer. [ . . . ] Integration brings enlargement of 
the zone of freedom and self-realization for states as well as for individuals. 
Eduard Kukan, “Presentation of the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the 
Slovak Republic,” in Slovak Institute for International Studies, Yearbook of 
Foreign Policy of the Slovak Republic 2003 (Bratislava, 2004, n.p.). 
3. Interest in freedom and rights of others is not useless idealism. I believe that 
interest in these problems is a part of every sound foreign policy and it is also a 
visiting card of maturity of a nation. [ . . . ] An issue of spreading of democracy 
in the world is an issue directly connected to the issue of peace and worldwide 
security. Not to talk about the moral aspects of both issues mentioned. 
Pavol Hrusovsky, “Presentation of the Chairman of the National Council of 
the Slovak Republic,” in Slovak Institute for International Studies, 
Yearbook of Foreign Policy of the Slovak Republic 2003 (Bratislava, 2004, 
n.p.). 
4. Slovakia will devote special attention to such key issues as the fight against 
terrorism, arms control, respect for human rights and freedoms, development co-
operation, effective state administration and sustainable development. The 
Slovak Republic considers active approach to these issues in both close and 
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remote parts of the world not only as a moral imperative, but also as an 
investment into the future growth and prosperity of the world community. 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Slovak Republic, Medium-Term Foreign 
Policy Strategy of the Slovak Republic until 2015 (Bratislava, 2004). 
5. In 2004, Slovakia will join the EU and NATO. Slovakia is committed to the 
spreading of the principles and values of the Euro-Atlantic community to the 
outside world. After 2004, democracy and stability, market economy, human 
rights standards will become vectors determining our foreign policy towards 
other countries – especially in the broader Euro-Atlantic area. [ . . . Slovakia will 
take steps to] continue the dialogue on spreading stability and supporting the 
Euro-Atlantic integration of countries into the so-called “Wider Europe,” i.e. the 
Western Balkans, the South Caucasus and the future neighbors on the eastern 
borders of the EU. Slovakia will share its best reform practices and thus the path 
to stability and development of a democratic and prosperous society. 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Slovak Republic, Report on the 
Performance of the Foreign Policy of the Slovak Republic in 2004 
(Bratislava, 2005). 
6. These are the consequences of our undertaking a wider responsibility for 
development in important regions neighboring Europe. It is also an expansion of 
a willingness to look beyond short-term and local issues. This is because our 
problems are linked with the problems of other countries. It also relates to 
national security, not only because today we are members of the EU and NATO, 
not only because our moral sense prevents us from gazing passively at the 
suffering of others, but also because of a principle dictated by political 
responsibility and providence. We must be interested in spreading liberty around 
the world. In places where open relations exist among nations, where 
governments are under control of the opposition, the chances for war are 
diminished and the chances for peace and prosperity are higher. [ . . . ] our 
interest in human rights and spreading democracy in not an expression of 
idealistic dreams. it is a realistic part of a sound policy. 
Pavol Hrusovsky, “Presentation of the Chairman of the National Council of 
the Slovak Republic,” in Slovak Institute for International Studies, 
Yearbook of Foreign Policy of the Slovak Republic 2003 (Bratislava, 2004, 
n.p.). 
7. Respect for universal human rights norms and the fundamental attributes of a 
functioning democratic society are also one of the essential conditions for 
peaceful coexistence among nations. [ . . . ]Slovakia continues to fulfill its 
obligations in the protection of human rights and promote the universal 
ratification of international human rights conventions. 
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Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Slovak Republic, Focus of the Foreign 
Policy of the Slovak Republic for 2006 (Bratislava, 2005). 
Normative References: 
1. Someone might find our foreign policy not “realistic” enough; because it does 
not directly concern felt national interests. Nevertheless is has a specific 
urgency. It concerns our relation to people in parts of the world where 
democracy has not started the writing of its history; yet, there live people striving 
for it. If we dedicate our attention to their situation even for only a moment, we 
may comprehend the trifling nature of many problems we see at home as so 
immense. . . . But situation of dissidents in restricting countries in many points 
even into details resembles our own recent history. 
Pavol Hrusovsky, “Presentation of the Chairman of the National Council of 
the Slovak Republic,” in Slovak Institute for International Studies, 
Yearbook of Foreign Policy of the Slovakia Republic 2003 (Bratislava, 
2004, n.p.). 
2. Our decision making was much more sensitive and emotional because there are 
many Slovaks living in Serbia, and the Balkans are traditionally and historically 
a very close region for us. [We had to decide] whether we will behave on 
principle, with perspective and correctly, with values or not [ . . . ]. 
Mikulas Dzurinda, “Presentation of the Prime Minister of the Slovak 
Republic,” in Slovak Institute for International Studies, Yearbook of 
Foreign Policy of the Slovak Republic 2003 (Bratislava: 2004, n.p.). 
3. Interests and values should not be in contradiction. [ . . . ] I am convinced that 
the solidarity is of Slovakia’s interest. Human rights must be the part of our 
foreign policy. 
Jan Figel, “Presentation of the Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee 
of the National Council of the Slovak Republic,” in Slovak Institute for 
International Studies, Yearbook of Foreign Policy of the Slovak Republic 
2003(Bratislava, 2004, n.p.). 
4. In 2003, Slovakia was actively involved in a number of international activities to 
promote human rights and the rights of persons belonging to national minorities. 
Particularly in the area of multilateral relations, we were among the countries 
whose aim is to strive for democratization and human rights in all countries of 
the international community. Moreover, we have adopted a number of 
international treaties on human rights, which are now a part of our domestic 
law. In this context, we support the efforts of the international community to 
strengthen and reform the human-rights mechanisms, including effective 
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functioning of treaty monitoring bodies and bodies to report to the consistent 
implementation of the idea human rights documents at the national level. 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Slovak Republic, Report on the 
Performance of the Foreign Policy of the Slovak Republic in 2003 
(Bratislava, 2004). 
5. The Slovak Republic recognizes, asserts and protects democracy, the principle of 
the rule of law, and the observance of basic human rights and freedoms in 
accordance with the principles of the Charter of the Organization of the United 
Nations and other international documents. 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Slovak Republic, Focus of the Foreign 
Policy of the Slovak Republic for 2008 (Bratislava, 2007). 
6. Human rights are not for sale. Slovakia is convinced that developing economic 
relations and supporting human rights in Belarus are compatible, and therefore, 
supports the participation of Belarus in both the Eastern Partnership project and 
in the activities of the Council of Europe, providing that Belarus adopts certain 
specific [liberalization] measures. 
Martina Hvorlova, “Slovakia’s Chairmanship of the Committee of 
Ministers of the Council of Europe,” in Slovak Institute for International 
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